Baljeet Singh and Others vs Risal Singh and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 67 to 75 of 1959

Decision Date: 15 February 1962

Coram: Raghubar Dayal

In this case, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 15 February 1962 in the matter of Baljeet Singh and others versus Risal Singh and others. The petitioners, Baljeet Singh and others, had instituted twelve suits against various defendants concerning different plots of land, each suit being filed under section 175 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939. Because the suits involved similar questions of law, the court tried all twelve suits together and finally entered a common judgment that actually comprised twelve separate decrees, one for each suit. Following that judgment, the defendants filed twelve appeals before the Additional Commissioner; three of those appeals, filed by one set of defendants, were dismissed for default, while the remaining nine appeals were dismissed on their merits. The three defendants whose appeals had been dismissed on merit then filed nine second appeals before the Uttar Pradesh Board of Revenue, and on 7 May 1954 the Board dismissed those second appeals on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata applied. In November 1954 the appellants applied for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and on 18 April 1955 that special leave was granted. During July 1954 the villages where the disputed lands lay were placed under consolidation operations pursuant to the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, and the consolidation was completed by a notification issued under section 52 of that Act on 17 October 1953. The appellants made no objections to the consolidation authorities. The respondents argued that, because of the consolidation operations, the appeals before the Supreme Court had become infructuous. The Court held that the appeals had not become infructuous, observing that nothing in the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, as it stood during the period of consolidation, could affect the pending appeals either during or after the consolidation process. The Court further noted that subsequent amending statutes did not alter the situation because they operated prospectively and applied only to cases where consolidation commenced after those amendments had come into force. Regarding the Board of Revenue appeals, the Court found that they were not barred by res judicata, emphasizing that for the doctrine to apply the prior adjudication must have been between the same parties. The three suits whose judgments had become final were against a single defendant identified as B and did not involve any of the present appellants, and each of those suits concerned a different plot of land. Consequently, the common judgment was in reality twelve distinct judgments for the twelve suits. The Court relied upon Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh (1962) 3 SCR in reaching its conclusions.

The Court recorded that the matter concerned Civil Appeals numbered sixty‑seven to seventy‑five of 1959, which had been taken on special leave from the judgment and order dated 7 May 1954 of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Revenue in Second Appeals numbered fifty‑three to sixty‑one of 1945‑46. Counsel for the appellants comprised S P Sinha, J P Goyal and Sadhu Singh, while Bishan Narain and E L Mehta appeared for the respondents. The judgment was delivered on 15 February 1960 by Justice Raghu‑bar Dayal.

These nine appeals, permitted by special leave, challenged the orders of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Revenue that had dismissed nine second appeals filed by the appellants. The Board had dismissed those second appeals on the ground that the decisions of the First Appellate Court in three other related first appeals had become final and consequently operated as res judicata. The factual backdrop involved Khub Chand, who had three sons—Karan Singh, Hoshiar Singh and Mukhtiar Singh. Each son had commenced four separate suits. Hoshiar Singh had instituted suit No. 48 of 1944 under section 175 of the Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939, against a plaintiff identified as Bhartu; suit No. 49 against Har Gyan, Mukhtiar Singh and Data Ram, who were the sons of Sis Ram, the brother of Bhartu; suit No. 50 against Har Gyan and Mukhtiar Singh, again sons of Sis Ram; and suit No. 51 against a plaintiff named Banwari. In a similar pattern, Karan Singh instituted suits Nos. 63, 61, 60 and 62 against comparable defendants, and Mukhtiar Singh filed suits Nos. 67, 65, 64 and 66 against the same set of defendants. Although each suit concerned a different parcel of land, the plaintiffs’ allegations and the defendants’ contentions were substantially identical, resulting in similar issues being framed in every case. Consequently, all twelve suits were tried together and were decided by a single common judgment, after which twelve separate decrees were prepared.

The defendants‑judgment debtors, dissatisfied with the decrees, each lodged a first appeal before the Court of the Additional Commissioner, Meerut Division, making a total of twelve first appeals. The Additional Commissioner dismissed three of these appeals for default; those three were the appeals filed by Banwari against Hoshiar Singh, Karan Singh and Mukhtiar Singh. The remaining nine appeals were heard on their merits, and the Additional Commissioner dismissed them as well. Thereafter, the defendants‑judgment debtors pursued nine second appeals before the Board of Revenue, which on 7 May 1954 rejected the appeals on the basis of res judicata. The appellants applied for special leave before this Court in November 1954, and special leave was granted on 18 April 1955.

While the appeals were pending, further developments occurred. In November 1959 the respondents filed an application under Order XLV, rules 1 to 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, seeking to adduce additional evidence. Their statement of case also incorporated a narration of the intervening events and their impact. The respondents contended that the villages in which the disputed lands were situated had come under the Consolidation Operations prescribed by the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P. V of 1954), hereinafter referred to as “the Act,” sometime in July 1954 when a declaration was issued.

In this matter, the Court observed that the State Government had issued a declaration under section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, stating that a scheme of consolidation for the area in question was to be prepared. Subsequently, in December 1954 a statement listing the plots and the corresponding tenure‑holders was drawn up, and in May 1955 a statement of proposals prepared under section 19 of the Act was filed. In August 1955 the final statements in the form known as “chak form 25” were issued. On 17 October 1955 the State Government published a notification under section 52 of the Act. Section 52 read as follows: “As soon as may be after the tenure‑holders have entered into possession of their new holding in pursuance of Section 26, the State Government shall issue a notification in the Official Gazette that the consolidation operations have been closed in the village and the village shall then cease to be under consolidation operation.” From these events the Court inferred that the village remained under consolidation operations from sometime in July 1954 until the issuance of the notification on 17 October 1955. The appellants, however, did not lodge any objections before the consolidation authorities under section 12 of the Act, neither challenging the correctness nor the nature of the entries made in the statement prepared under section 11 nor the entries made under section 20 against the statement of proposals prepared under section 19.

The Court then listed the operative provisions of the Act. Section 21 authorised the fixing of a date for the enforcement of the consolidation scheme. Section 25 empowered the issuance of an allotment order showing the new fields allotted to each tenure‑holder in accordance with the scheme. Section 26 provided that tenure‑holders could take possession of the allotted fields on or after a specified date. Section 27 mandated the preparation of new village maps, khasras and a record of rights in conformity with the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901; sub‑section (2) of that provision declared that all entries in the record of rights prepared under sub‑section (1) were to be final and conclusive. Section 30 stipulated that the rights, title, interest and liabilities of a tenure‑holder in his original holding would be extinguished, and that the same rights, title, interest and liabilities would thereafter attach to the plots allotted to him under section 25, effective from the date he entered possession of those plots.

Respondents contended that, in view of the consolidation operations and the effect of section 5 of the Act as amended to date, the appeals had become infructuous because the Court could no longer pass any order on the merits of the dispute. The Court noted that the Act had been amended several times since its original enactment. The amendments were: Act XXVI of 1954, which came into force on 13 December 1954; Act XIII of 1955, which came into force on 10 June 1955; Act XX of 1955, which came into force on 21 October 1955; Act XXIV of 1956, which came into force on 3 July 1956; Act XVI of 1957, which came into force on 25 May 1957; and Act XXXVIII of 1958, which came into force on 19 November 1958.

The amendment that came into force on 19 November 1958 was the last of the series of amendments mentioned earlier. While the village that is the subject of the suit was still undergoing consolidation operations, the legislation governing the proceedings was the original Act as it stood after being amended by Acts XXVI of 1954 and XIII of 1955. The subsequent Acts listed earlier were enacted only after the notification under section 52 of the Act had been issued; consequently they were not applicable to the matters that were then before the court. The Court therefore emphasized that this temporal sequence must be kept in mind when considering the arguments raised by the parties. Section 5 of Act V of 1954 contained two sub‑sections. Sub‑section (1) provided that, once a declaration under section 4 was published, the relevant district or local area would be considered to be under consolidation operations from the date of that publication until a further notification under section 52 appeared in the official Gazette stating that the consolidation operations had been closed. Sub‑section (2) stipulated that, while a district or local area was under consolidation operations, the responsibility for preparing and maintaining the maps, the khasra and the annual register prescribed in Chapter I.T.I. of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901, would be transferred to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). It further provided that all the powers that were originally vested in the Collector, the Assistant Collector and the Tahsildar under that chapter would, for the duration of the consolidation operations, be exercised respectively by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Consolidation Officer. Act XXVI of 1954 removed the final portion of sub‑section (2) beginning with the words “and thereupon”. The Amending Act XIII of 1955 made no alteration to this section. Accordingly, the Court observed that nothing in this provision could have interfered with the hearing of the present appeals, either during the period of consolidation or after its conclusion. Section 12 of Act V of 1954 dealt with the publication of the statement of plots and tenure holders prepared under section II and with the procedure for filing objections to the correctness or nature of entries in that statement. Sub‑sections (4), (5) and (6) read as follows: (4) when an objection under sub‑section (1) raises a question of title that has not already been decided by a competent court, the Consolidation Officer shall refer the question to an Arbitrator for determination; (5) all suits or proceedings in the court of first instance or on appeal in which a question of title concerning the same land has been raised shall be stayed; and (6) the decision of the Arbitrator under sub‑section (4) shall be final. The Court noted that these sub‑sections did not specify how a suit or proceeding stayed under sub‑section (5) should be finally decided, nor did they address matters for which no objection under section 12 had been lodged. Because no objection had been filed under section 12 in the present case, these provisions did not affect the pending appeals. Finally, Act XXVI of 1954 amended sub‑section (4) so that an objection referred under that sub‑section would first be sent to the Civil Judge, who would then refer it to

The amendment introduced a new sub‑section in place of the original sub‑section 5. The substituted sub‑section 5 read: “Upon the making of reference under sub‑section 4 all suits or proceedings in the Court of first instance, appeal, reference or revision in which the question of title in relation to the same land has been raised shall be stayed.” This amendment stayed the suits and proceedings not only in the courts of first instance and appeal but also in the courts of reference and revision; however, the amendment did not affect the specific appeals that were before the Court. Sub‑section 2 of section 27 as originally enacted remained unchanged up to 17 October 1955. Its provision made the entries in the record of rights prepared under sub‑section 1 final and conclusive. The Court stated that it was not concerned with the effect of that provision on the present appeals. Section 49 of the Act barred the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Before its amendment by Act XTTT 1955, which came into force on 10 June 1955, the section did not bar the institution of a suit or proceeding in the revenue court; after the amendment it did. The appeals in question had been filed long before that amendment. No objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that those appeals could not have been instituted, but the Court discussed the matter because the appeals were filed after the State Government had made a declaration under section 4 of the Act. The Court noted that it had not been referred to any provision in Acts V 1954, xxvr 1954 and XIII 1955 that would lead to the conclusion that the appeals had become infructuous. Act XX 1955 amended section 27 of the Act, but that amendment did not affect the question before the Court. Act XXIV 1956, which came into force on 3 July 1956, substituted a new section 5 for the old one. The substituted section 5 provided that when a declaration under section 4 had been published in the Gazette, the consequences set forth thereafter would apply from the specified date until a notification under section 52 in the Official Gazette announced the closure of consolidation operations. The consequences included: (a) the district or local area would be deemed to be under consolidation operations from the specified date, and the duty of preparing and maintaining the khasra and the annual Register under Chapter III of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 would be transferred to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation); and (b) all proceedings for the correction of any such records pending before any court or authority would be stayed, without prejudice to the right of the persons affected to agitate the question before the Assistant Consolidation Officer under sub‑section 3 of section 8, or in proceedings commenced.

In the present case, the Court observed that clause (b) of the relevant provision did not pertain to the appeals before it because those appeals did not arise from proceedings seeking correction of village records. The Court noted that Act XXIV of 1956 introduced certain amendments to section 11, but the Court declared that it would not consider those amendments in this matter. Likewise, the Court stated that it would not be concerned with the amendments made by the same Act to subsection (1) of section 12. The Act of 1956, however, substituted a new subsection (5) and inserted a new subsection (7). The Court reproduced the text of those two subsections. Subsection (5) provides that, upon the publication of the statement under section 11, every suit or proceeding in a court of first instance, appeal, reference or revision, in which a question of title relating to any plot mentioned in the statement and referred to in clause (c) of subsection (1) of section II has been raised, shall be stayed to the extent that it concerns such plot, and thereafter shall be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law. Subsection (7) declares that a question of title concerning any plot mentioned in the statement in clause (c) of subsection 1 of section 11, which could and should have been raised under subsection (1) but was not, shall not be raised in any objection filed under subsection (2) of section 20 or under subsection (1) of section 34. The Court explained that, for the first time, suits and proceedings in various courts were required to be stayed when a question of title concerning a plot identified in the statement under clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 11 had been raised, and that those stayed suits or proceedings were to be decided subsequently in the manner prescribed, that is, according to the rules framed under the Act. The Court further held that the provisions of subsection (5) did not affect the present appeals because those provisions operated prospectively and could apply only to cases in which statements under section 11 were filed after the amendment had taken effect. The Court also observed that the amendments introduced by other sections of the same Act and by Act XVI of 1957 did not influence the hearing of the appeals in any manner. Subsequently, the Court referred to Act XXXVIII of 1958, which again substituted a new section 5. The relevant portion of the substituted section states that, upon the publication of the notification under section 4 in the Official Gazette, the consequences set forth therein shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, apply from the date specified therein until the publication of a notification under section 52 or subsection (1) of section 6, as the case may be, in the area to which the declaration relates. Specifically, clause (b)(1) provides that all proceedings for correction of records and all suits for declaration of rights and interest over land, or for possession of land or for partition, pending before any authority or court—whether of first instance, appeal, reference or revision—shall stand stayed.

The Court held that the right of persons affected to assert the disputed right or interest in the proceedings before the consolidation authorities remained intact. This right could be exercised only under the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder in the relevant cases. The Court stated that the findings of authorities in proceedings under this Act concerning right or interest in the land shall be acceptable to authority or court before which the proceeding or suit was pending. The Court noted that these provisions were intended to operate only on future cases and would not apply retrospectively to earlier proceedings. The Court explained that the consequences described in section five arise when the notification under section four is published in the Gazette and remain in effect until the notification under section fifty‑two is published. The Court added that the effect of these provisions ceased after the publication of the notification under section fifty‑two. Consequently, the Court held that the provisions could not apply to cases where the notification under section fifty‑two had been issued on 17 October 1955. The Court therefore concluded that the hearing of the appeals was not barred by those provisions and could therefore proceed. The Court observed that, as a result, the appeals had therefore not become infructuous and remained viable for determination. The Court listed that sections seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, eleven‑A, eleven‑B, twelve, twelve‑A, twelve‑B, twelve‑C and twelve‑D had been replaced by a new section. The new section applied to proceedings taken in consolidation operations after the coming into force of the Amending Act XXXVIII of 1858. The Court noted that subsection (1) of section twelve made clear that the matters mentioned in that subsection could not be raised after the date of the notification under section fifty‑two. The Court stated that there had been no material change in the provisions of sections twenty‑seven and thirty. The Court observed that section forty‑nine now read: "49. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, for the time being in force the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a declaration has been issued under section 4, or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." The Court explained that this provision mandates that the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area under consolidation operations shall be carried out in accordance with the Act and that no civil or revenue court may entertain any suit concerning those rights. The Court observed that this result is practically the same as that obtained under clause (ii) of sub‑section (b) of section five. The Court added that the provisions of this section are not expressly limited to the period between the declaration under section four and the notification under section fifty‑two. The Court further stated that they can be interpreted as relating back to subsection (b)(ii) of the Act because the declaration and adjudication are covered by that subsection.

The Court observed that the adjudication of rights must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It further noted that the amended provision would apply to proceedings concerning rights in land in the area for which a declaration under section 4 had been issued after the amendment. Accordingly, the Court held that the appeals had not become infructuous. On the merits, the Court found that the Board of Revenue was in error in holding that the appeals before it were barred by res judicata. The Court explained that for any prior adjudication of a point to preclude its consideration a second time, the earlier adjudication must have been between the same parties and must have concerned the same matter. The three suits whose judgments had become final were against a person named Banwari and were not against any of the present appellants. Moreover, the matters decided in those three suits were different from the matters raised in the suits that gave rise to the present appeals. Each of the twelve suits related to a different plot of land. The Court clarified that a common judgment arising from similar questions raised in different suits does not automatically collapse those judgments into a single judgment; rather, such a judgment is ordinarily deemed to constitute as many separate judgments as there are suits disposed of by it. The Court referred to the decision in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh for the same principle. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the order of the lower court, and remanded the appeals to that court for fresh hearing and decision according to law. The Court also made clear that it could consider the effect of the Consolidation Act and the proceedings thereunder, provided the parties were given an opportunity to make submissions on any costs they might have to bear to abide by the result. The appeals were therefore allowed. (1) [1962] 3 S. C. R. 759.