Anant Prasad Lakshminivas Generiwal vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No.140162

Decision Date: 02/11/1962

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

The Supreme Court of India, delivering its judgment on 2 November 1962, heard the petition of Anant Prasad Lakshminivas Generiwal against the State of Andhra Pradesh and other respondents. The bench comprised Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K.C. Das‑Gupta, and Justice J.C. Shah, and the case was reported as 1963 AIR 853 and 1963 S.C.R. Suppl. (1) 844. The core issue concerned the registration and control of a public religious trust under the Hyderabad Endowments Regulations, 1940, and its compatibility with the constitution. The appellant asserted that he alone was the hereditary trustee and mutwalli of the ancient Shri Sitaram Maharaj temple located in Hyderabad. The temple’s maintenance had historically depended on several villages in Berar that had been granted by the Nizam. In June 1955, the appellant’s father had registered the temple as a public trust under section 7(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951.

On 31 December 1957, the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad, served a notice directing the appellant to register the temple anew under the Hyderabad Endowments Regulations, 1940. The appellant contended that because the temple was already registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act, it was not required to register again, and he further argued that the State of Andhra Pradesh lacked jurisdiction over the endowment and its property. He consequently filed a writ petition before the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the notice on several grounds. The High Court rejected his petition, upheld the validity of the notice, and his appeal against this order was dismissed.

Subsequent to the High Court’s dismissal, the Director of Endowments issued two orders: the first placed the supervision of the temple under rule 179 of the Endowment Rules, and the second vested the management of the temple in the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad. The appellant then approached this Court, filing a writ petition challenging the two orders on the ground that the Hyderabad Endowments Regulations and the rules framed thereunder were repugnant to articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. He further maintained that the orders could not be made even under the Regulations themselves.

The Court held that because the trust was situated in Hyderabad, the Hyderabad Endowments Regulations applied not only to the temple premises within Hyderabad but also to its property located outside the State of Andhra Pradesh. The prior registration under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act did not alter this applicability, as sections 2(4) and 3 of that Act expressly limited a public trust contemplated by it to being situated within Madhya Pradesh. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Hyderabad Endowment Regulations remained operative over the trust and its extraterritorial property.

The Court referred to the reported decisions in [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 601 and applied the principles therein. It also mentioned the case of State of Bihar v. Bhabapritananda Ojha, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 624, as a relevant authority. The Court held that it was incorrect to argue that the application of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 and the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 to Hyderabad – then a Part B State – automatically caused the Hyderabad Endowment Regulations, 1940 to be repealed by virtue of section 6 of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951. The earlier statutes expressly excluded public religious trusts such as the one concerned, and section 3 of the Part B States (Laws) Act was limited to a very narrow purpose. Consequently, the mere difference between the two bodies of law governing public religious and charitable trusts in the two parts of Andhra State – one formerly belonging to the former Madras State and the other to the former Hyderabad State – could not be described as discriminatory. The Court explained that such a difference arose from historical circumstances and therefore did not constitute a ground for invalidating the statutes under Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision in Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 297, was applied, whereas the earlier case of State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji, [1954] S.C.R. 996, was held not applicable to the present facts.

The Court examined the provisions contained in sections 3 to 11 of the Hyderabad Regulations, except for the portion of section 4(b) which had no practical operation. Those provisions dealt with the registration of endowments, were framed in the public interest, and were therefore reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Constitution. Accordingly, they did not offend Article 19(1)(f). The Court concluded that the validity of those provisions and the rules made under them, apart from rule 25 which was irrelevant to the appeal and any consequential rules, must be upheld. However, the Court found that the two orders issued against the appellant, which resulted in his removal from trusteeship, were beyond the authority of the regulator. Neither the Regulations nor the Rules authorised removal of a trustee for failure to respond to a notice for registration of an endowment, and the orders could not be justified under rules 67 and 68 because no inquiry had been held, the orders were not issued by the Government, and the reason for removal was not permissible under those rules. Consequently, the Court held that both orders were ultra vires and should be set aside.

The judgment recorded that the appeal was a civil appeal under special leave, bearing the number 140 of 1962, arising from the order dated 18 March 1960 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 358 of 1958, together with Petition No. 86 of 1960 filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondents were listed. The judgment was delivered on 2 November 1962 by Justice Wanchoo, and the Court indicated that the appeal was to be considered.

By special leave, the appellant sought relief from an order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The appellant had also filed a writ petition, and because the two matters were closely connected, the Court chose to consider them together. The appellant, Anant Prasad Lakshminivas Generiwal, was the same person who appeared as petitioner in the writ petition; hence, he would be referred to as the appellant throughout this narration. The principal respondents, who were also the opposite parties in the writ petition, consisted of the State of Andhra Pradesh and the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad; these parties would be identified as the respondents. The appellant asserted that he was the sole hereditary trustee and Mutwalli of the temple known as Shri Sitaram Maharaj Sansthan together with its subsidiary deity Shri Varadarajaswami, located at Sitaram Bagh in Hyderabad.

The historical background began in the early nineteenth century when an ancestor of the appellant migrated to Hyderabad and established a commercial enterprise there. That ancestor prospered and, in or about 1833, constructed a temple at an expense of two lakhs of rupees. He installed the idols of Shri Rama and various ancillary deities, and he consecrated the temple for the benefit of the public and for worship. In 1841, Maharaja Chandulal, who served as a minister to the then Nizam, granted a jagir comprising the villages of Akolee and Bordee in Berar for the upkeep and maintenance of the temple. Subsequently, the Nizam resumed those villages and, in their place, bestowed two different villages on the temple. Those two replacement villages were later also resumed, after which the village of Bulgaon was granted to the temple in 1850. Although the village of Akolee was formally resumed, the resumption order was never executed, and the temple continued to possess that village. Consequently, from 1850 onward, the temple held two villages—Akolee and Bulgaon—to support its upkeep and maintenance.

In 1853 the territory of Berar was transferred by the Nizam to the British Government of India, causing the two villages to fall under the administration of the Government of India. By 1859 doubts arose concerning the temple’s title to the villages, prompting inquiries under the Berar Inam Rules. The inquiries eventually concluded that the temple’s title was valid and that the villages, having been assigned along with the remainder of Berar to the Government of India for administration, were granted in jagir for a religious purpose. Their devolution was therefore governed by Rule IV of the Berar Inam Rules. Following this determination, inam certificates were issued in the name of Ramlal, son of Hargopal, who was described as the manager of the jagirdar, Shri Sitaramji Maharaj of Akolee and Bulgaon. The purpose of the jagir was expressly stated as “for charitable expenses of the temple of Shri Sitaram Maharaj situated in the Sitaram Bagh, at Hyderabad.” In the twentieth century, significant litigation arose among members of the founder’s family regarding the right to manage the temple. Ultimately, the dispute was resolved in 1932, naming Lakshminivas Generiwal, the father of the appellant, as the manager of the jagirdar, a decision that was confirmed by the Governor of the Central Provinces in 1933.

In 1932 the authorities decided that Lakshminivas Generiwal, who was the father of the appellant, should be appointed as the manager of the jagirdar. This appointment received final confirmation the following year, when the Governor of the Central Provinces issued an order in 1933 confirming Lakshminivas Generiwal’s position. Throughout the period that followed, the Government of Hyderabad made repeated attempts to ascertain how the income generated from the jagir was being utilized. However, it was determined that only the Government of the Central Provinces possessed the jurisdiction to demand accounts from the villages and to ensure that the conditions attached to the grant were being observed. The Central Provinces therefore bore the responsibility for supervising the proper administration of the jagir’s revenues. In 1941 the Government of Hyderabad appeared to accept this allocation of authority, and it did not challenge the exclusive right of the Central Provinces to call for accounts. After the Constitution of India came into force on 26 January 1950, the former Central Provinces and Berar were reorganised, and the State of Madhya Pradesh succeeded them. The new State enacted the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, No. 1 of 1951. Pursuant to that legislation, the two villages that formed part of the jagir were taken over by the State, and statutory compensation was paid for the acquisition. Additionally, the State sanctioned an annual cash grant of Rs 8,470 to be applied towards the maintenance of the temple. Apart from this grant, a substantial tract of home‑farm land in the two villages remained under the possession of the trustee for the benefit of the trust, and the trustee reportedly derived an annual income of Rs 1,30,000 from that land.

It also emerged that the temple had hereditary pujaris and mahants who began to allege that Lakshminivas Generiwal was misappropriating temple funds on a large scale, neglecting his duties as a trustee, and committing various breaches of trust. In 1951 three of the hereditary pujaris lodged a formal complaint with the Government of Hyderabad, accusing the trustee of mismanagement. The Home Minister of Hyderabad investigated the allegation and issued a directive that the temple should be managed by a committee of five persons, a step that was reported to have been taken with the consent of Lakshminivas Generiwal. Subsequently, Lakshminivas Generiwal repudiated that claim, asserting that he had never agreed to the formation of the committee because it would diminish his hereditary trustee rights. In response, the Home Minister ordered the Director of Endowments to conduct a thorough inquiry into the matter. While this investigation was pending, one of the hereditary pujaris filed a petition under section 3 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, No. 14 of 1920, seeking a court order for the rendition of accounts before the City Civil Court in Hyderabad. In March 1956 the court directed that the accounts be rendered and appointed an auditor to examine them. The auditor’s review uncovered several gross irregularities in the accounts. Concurrently, Lakshminivas Generiwal applied for registration of the temple under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, No. 30 of 1951, and in June 1955 the Registrar of Public Trusts directed that Shri Sitaram Maharaj Sansthan, Sitaram Bagh, Hyderabad, be registered as a public trust pursuant to section 7(1) of that Act.

In June 1955, under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act (No 30 of 1951), the Registrar of Public Trusts ordered the registration of Shri Sitaram Maharaj Sansthan, Sitaram Bagh, Hyderabad, as a public trust pursuant to section 7(1) of that Act. At the same time, the State of Hyderabad was governed by the Hyderabad Endowments Regulations, a statute enacted in 1940 to ensure proper administration of religious and charitable charities and the proper application of their income. Section 2 of those Regulations defined an “endowment” as any transfer of property made for religious, charitable, or public‑utility purposes, and required that every such property be recorded in a “Book of Endowment.” The same section also defined a “trustee” as a person appointed by the endower to manage the property and to fulfil the objects of the endowment. Subsequent sections 3 to 11 prescribed the compilation of the Book of Endowment; section 12 dealt with management of the endowed property; section 13 enumerated the duties of trustees; section 14 addressed possession of the endowed property; section 15 regulated expenditure of income; section 16 allowed framing of rules; section 17 provided for appeals; and section 18 dealt with revision. Under the rule‑making authority granted by the Regulations, a total of 478 rules had been framed, and the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad, was empowered to enforce both the Regulations and the Rules.

Exercising that power, the Director of Endowments issued a notice to Lakshminivas Generiwal on 12 September 1957, directing him to show cause within fourteen days why he should not be removed from the trusteeship of the temple and why the alleged unauthorised trusteeship of his son, the appellant, should not be terminated. The notice listed six specific charges. Lakshminivas Generiwal replied on 17 September 1957, stating that he was no longer a trustee because his son had been appointed trustee under the Madhya Pradesh Act, No 30 of 1951, by order of the Deputy Commissioner of Amravati in November 1956, and he denied each of the charges. Following this reply, a further notice was served on 31 December 1957 to the appellant, informing him that the temple must be registered under the Hyderabad Regulations and warning that failure to do so would result in the property being taken over by the Government, with no further objection entertained. The appellant lodged an objection to that notice on 1 February 1958, asserting that the trust’s registration under the Madhya Pradesh Act rendered the Hyderabad Regulations inapplicable and that the State of Andhra Pradesh lacked jurisdiction over the endowment and its assets.

In the proceedings, the appellant argued that because the trust, including the temple, had been registered under section 7(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 30 of 1951, the endowment could not be subject to registration under the Regulations and the Rules made thereunder, and consequently the State of Andhra Pradesh lacked any jurisdiction over the endowment and its property. Acting on this position, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 3 February 1958, challenging the notice dated 31 December 1957. The petition raised four principal contentions on his behalf. First, it maintained that the registration of the trust under the Madhya Pradesh Act, as provided in section 7(1), rendered the operation of the Regulations inapplicable, since that registration had become final and conclusive. Second, it submitted that even if the Regulations were to be applied, the courts should observe the principle of comity of nations and refrain from interfering with jurisdiction lawfully exercised by another State, namely the State of Madhya Pradesh, which after the States Reorganisation Act 1956 had become part of Bombay. Third, it contended that the Hyderabad Government had acquiesced to the control exercised by the authorities in Berar and therefore could not now repudiate that jurisdiction and claim powers under the Regulations. Fourth, it argued that the Regulations were invalid because they infringed the appellant’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected all these contentions and, by an order dated 18 March 1960, dismissed the writ petition, thereby upholding the validity of the notice issued on 31 December 1957. The appellant appealed this order by special leave. Subsequent to the High Court’s dismissal, the Director of Endowments issued two orders. The first order, dated 13 June 1960, observed that the trustee had failed to appear before him despite the High Court’s judgment being three months old, and consequently, in the interests of the institution, the Director considered it appropriate to assume supervision of the trust under rule 179 of the Endowment Rules. The second order, dated 14 June 1960, declared that the temple, together with its buildings and related property situated in Hyderabad, had been taken under the supervision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and that management of the temple would vest in the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad, effective from the date of that order. The appellant’s writ petition before this Court sought to set aside these two orders, challenging the validity of the Regulations and the Rules made thereunder on the ground that they conflicted with Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, and additionally contended that the orders were not justified even under the Regulations. The State of Andhra Pradesh opposed the petition, maintaining that the Director of Endowments possessed the requisite authority.

In this case the Court noted that the Director of Endowments waited until 13 June 1960, after the High Court had dismissed the writ petition, for the appellant to appear and comply with the notice dated 31 December 1957 so that the endowment could be brought under the registration provisions of the Regulations. The appellant, however, failed to appear in answer to that notice. In view of the earlier conduct of the temple trustees, the several complaints that had been lodged against them, and the trustees’ refusal even to disclose the nature and extent of the temple’s properties, the Director considered that immediate action under the Regulations and the Rules framed thereunder was indispensable. Consequently, to secure and preserve the trust property and to prevent any possibility of the property being concealed, the Director took prompt steps to take the property under control.

The State also argued that the Regulations and the Rules gave it the power to take possession of the endowment and that the two orders dated 13 June 1960 and 14 June 1960 were issued pursuant to the powers conferred by section 4(b) and section 12 of the Regulations. It was further submitted that the Regulations and the Rules were not ultra vires, because they did not offend Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Counsel for the appellant then set out five specific points for the Court’s consideration. First, the appellant contended that because the trust, including the temple, had been registered under section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 30 of 1951, the operation of the Regulations was thereby excluded. Second, the appellant claimed that the Regulations and the Rules were no longer in force, having been deemed repealed by the Part B States (Laws) Act No. III of 1951. Third and fourth, the appellant argued respectively that the Regulations and the Rules were repugnant to Article 14 and to Article 19 of the Constitution. Fifth, the appellant asserted that the orders passed on 13 June and 14 June 1960 could not be supported under the Regulations.

The Court observed that the appeal principally concerned the notice of 31 December 1957, whereas the writ petition also attacked the two orders of June 1960. Although the challenges to the notice and to the orders overlapped to a large extent, the Court decided to first deal with the objections to the notice, which comprised the first four points raised by the appellant. The fifth point, which related solely to the two June 1960 orders, was to be addressed later. Regarding the first point, the Court found no merit in the contention that registration under the Madhya Pradesh Act barred the application of the Regulations, or that the Regulations could not affect property of the temple situated outside the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Court acknowledged that two villages, namely Bulgaon and Akolee, lay outside Andhra Pradesh, but emphasized that the temple itself was situated within the State, and that its property – including the temple building, adjoining shops and the income from pilgrim offerings received in Hyderabad – fell within the territorial ambit of the Regulations. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Regulations and the Rules could validly be applied to the temple and its assets.

It was not disputed that the temple in question was located within the State of Andhra Pradesh and that certain temple assets, including shops and the temple building itself, were also situated in that State. It was equally accepted that the offerings made by pilgrims formed part of the temple’s income and that such income was received in Hyderabad. Consequently, the Court could not understand how the Regulations and the Rules made thereunder could be held inapplicable to a temple that was plainly situated in an area covered by those Regulations. A comparable issue had earlier been examined by the Court in The State of Bihar v. Smt. Charusila Dasi (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 60. In that precedent, the temple was located in Deoghar, Bihar, while the majority of the income‑generating property endowed to the temple lay in Calcutta. The question before the Court was whether the Bihar statute would extend to the temple and its properties. Section 3 of the Bihar Act declared the Act applicable to all public religious and charitable institutions as defined in section 2(1) of that Act, and the definition clause stipulated that the Act applied to any religious trust, irrespective of the date of its creation, if any portion of its property was situated in Bihar. The Court held that “where the trust is situated in Bihar the State has legislative power over it and also over its trustees or their servants and agents who must be in Bihar to administer the trust, and as the object of the Act is to provide for the better administration of Hindu Religious Trusts in the State of Bihar and for the protection of properties appertaining thereto, in respect of the property belonging to the trust outside the State the aim is sought to be achieved by exercising control over the trustees in‑personam, and there is really no question of the Act having extra‑territorial operation.” The Court further observed that “the circumstance that the temples where the deities were installed are situated in Bihar and that the hospital and charitable dispensary are to be established in Bihar for the benefit of the Hindu public in Bihar, gives enough territorial connection to enable the legislature of Bihar to make a law with respect to such trust.” In the Court’s opinion this decision made it abundantly clear that when a trust is situated in a particular State, the law of that State applies to the trust even if portions of the trust’s property, whether large or small, are located outside the State of the trust’s situs. The Court also referred to State of Bihar v. Bhabapritananda Ojha (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 624, where a similar question arose regarding the application of the Bihar Act to a trust situated in Bihar.

In the earlier authority, the Court examined a dispute concerning the applicability of the Bihar Act to a temple located in Bihar, where the scheme for the trust had been prepared by the District Judge of Burdwan and subsequently confirmed by the Calcutta High Court at a time when Bihar formed part of Bengal prior to the 1911 partition. It was argued that the Bihar Act should not govern the temple because the scheme and the approving courts were situated outside the territorial limits of Bihar, and that the Act would otherwise intrude upon the jurisdiction of those external courts, thereby giving the statute an extra‑territorial character. The Court rejected that contention and held that the Bihar legislature possessed the competence to enact legislation affecting religious trusts situated within Bihar even though some of the trust’s property might lie beyond Bihar’s borders. Moreover, the Court observed that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure ceased to operate in view of section 4(5) of the Bihar Act, and consequently the Bihar Act did not operate extra‑territorially.

Applying that precedent to the present matter, the Court noted that the temple in question is physically located in Hyderabad, which lies within the State of Andhra Pradesh. Although the temple holds some property in that state, the principal income‑generating endowed property is situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Following the reasoning articulated in Smt. Charusila Dasi’s case, the regulations applicable to public trusts will likewise apply to this trust because the trust is situated in Andhra Pradesh, and the existence of endowed assets outside Andhra Pradesh does not defeat that application. The fact that the trust has been registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act of 1951 cannot bar the operation of the regulations, for the trust is undeniably situated in the area where those regulations are in force. The Court further referred to the definition of “public trust” contained in section 2(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, which describes a public trust as an express or constructive trust created for a public, religious or charitable purpose and expressly includes temples, mathas, mosques, churches, wakfs or any other religious or charitable endowments, as well as societies formed for religious or charitable purposes. Section 3 of the same Act provides that the Deputy Commissioner shall act as the Registrar of public trusts with respect to every public trust whose principal office or principal place of business, as declared in the application under sub‑section (3) of section 4, is situated in his district, and that the Registrar must maintain a register of public trusts. Section 4 prescribes the procedure for the registration of public trusts. It is evident from these provisions that the concept of a public trust under section 2(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Act is intended to refer only to trusts situated within Madhya Pradesh, because the legislature could not, and did not intend to, legislate with respect to trusts located outside the State. Consequently, as supported by section 3, the Registrar’s jurisdiction extends only to trusts within his district, and, applying the principle from Smt. Charusila Dasi’s case, the trust at issue must be regarded as situated in Andhra Pradesh, not in Madhya Pradesh, despite the location of some endowed property. Accordingly, the registration of the trust under the Madhya Pradesh Act does not constitute an impediment to the enforcement of the applicable regulations.

In this matter, the provision of the 1951 Act was held to apply only to public trusts that are situated within the State of Madhya Pradesh. Although the wording of section 2(4) does not expressly limit its definition to trusts located in Madhya Pradesh, the Court inferred that the legislature could not have intended to regulate trusts that lie outside the territorial jurisdiction of the State. Consequently, the definition in section 2(4) must be read as pertaining solely to public trusts that are situated in Madhya Pradesh. This interpretation is reinforced by section 3, which makes clear that the Registrar’s authority is confined to a public trust located in his own district. The question of where a public trust is situated must be decided in accordance with the precedent set in Smt. Charusila Dasi’s case, and applying that principle the Court concluded that the trust in the present dispute is situated in Andhra Pradesh, even though some of its endowed properties are located in Madhya Pradesh. Accordingly, the registration of the trust under the Madhya Pradesh Act cannot be used as a barrier to the application of the Hyderabad Regulations. While it may be necessary for the management of the property situated in Madhya Pradesh to register the trust in that State, such registration does not deprive the State of Andhra Pradesh of its legislative competence over a trust that is undeniably situated in Andhra Pradesh despite the presence of some assets in Madhya Pradesh. Accordingly, the Court concurred with the High Court’s finding that the trust is situated in Andhra Pradesh and that the Hyderabad Regulations therefore apply to it. Regarding the second contention, it was argued that the Part B (States) Act 1951 had extended certain Central Acts to the former Part B State of Hyderabad from 1 April 1951, and that section 6 of that Act provides that any pre‑existing law in a Part B State corresponding to a newly extended Act is repealed unless the Act expressly provides otherwise. The appellant relied on two such Central Acts – the Charitable Endowments Act No. VI of 1890 and the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act No. XIV of 1920 – contending that their extension to Hyderabad had automatically repealed the Regulations under section 6. The Court found this argument untenable. It observed that the Charitable Endowments Act No. VI of 1890 expressly excludes religious public trusts from its scope, and therefore cannot be regarded as a corresponding law that would trigger the repeal provision of section 6. Accordingly, the contention that the Regulations were repealed by the application of these two Central Acts was rejected.

The Regulations distinguish between two categories of trusts: public religious trusts and trusts created for charitable or public‑utility purposes. The present dispute concerns a public religious trust, which the Charitable Endowments Act, No VI of 1890 expressly excludes from its scope. Consequently, whatever effect the 1890 Act may have on the portion of the Regulations that governs public trusts other than religious trusts, the Court does not need to consider that portion because the present case involves only religious trusts. It follows that the Regulations, insofar as they apply to religious trusts, cannot be deemed repealed by the operation of Act VI of 1890 in the former Part B State of Hyderabad. The Regulations dealing with religious trusts do not correspond to the 1890 Act, and therefore the 1890 Act does not displace them.

Turning to the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, No XIV of 1920, this statute does apply to both religious trusts and other charitable trusts that serve public purposes. However, a reading of section 3 of that Act shows that its purpose is narrowly limited. Section 3 empowers any person with an interest in an express or constructive trust of a charitable or religious nature to approach the Court having jurisdiction over the location of the trust’s substantial assets. The Court may then order the trustee to provide, through the court, detailed information about the trust’s nature, objects, value, condition, management, use of its assets, and income, and may also direct that the trust’s accounts be examined and audited. This is the sole substantive provision of the 1920 Act; the remaining sections are merely ancillary to the core requirement of section 3.

By contrast, the Regulations constitute a much broader legislative scheme. They provide for the preparation of a book of endowments, the management of endowed property, the duties and powers of trustees, possession and control of endowed property, and the regulation of expenses drawn from the income of such property. None of these matters are covered by the narrow powers granted under section 3 of the 1920 Act. Accordingly, the application of the 1920 Act to the former Part B State of Hyderabad does not repeal the Regulations under section 6 of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951.

The petitioners further contend that two different statutes now operate in the two regions of Andhra Pradesh with respect to religious endowments, and that the substantive differences between those statutes amount to discrimination prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution. The State of Andhra Pradesh, as it exists following the re‑organisation of States, comprises the former Part A area transferred from Madras and the former Part B area transferred from Hyderabad, each historically operating under distinct legal regimes.

After the implementation of the States Re‑organisation Act, 1956, the present State comprised two distinct territories: one territory had been transferred to the State in 1953 from the former Part A State of Madras, and the other territory had been added in 1956 from the former Part B State of Hyderabad. Inevitably, these two territories were governed by different statutory regimes. The Court was informed that the State Government was undertaking measures to bring the laws of the two territories into a single, uniform framework, but that such a process required time and that total assimilation of all statutes had not yet been achieved. Further, the Court noted that the State Government was actively considering the formulation of a single law to govern public trusts of a religious or charitable character. In view of these circumstances, the Court held that it would be inappropriate to invalidate all the statutes currently operating in the two territorial parts of the State merely because of certain differences that stemmed from historical origins, namely the fact that the two areas had previously belonged to separate States – the former Part A State of Madras and the former Part B State of Hyderabad. The Court’s attention was then drawn to the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji (1). In that case a statute concerning the management of jagir estates applied only to a portion of Rajasthan and was struck down on the ground that no corresponding law existed in the remaining parts of the State; the judgment emphasized that “there was no real and substantial distinction why the jagirdars of a particular area should continue to be treated with inequality as compared with the jagirdars in another area of Rajasthan.” By contrast, the respondents relied upon Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2). In the latter case the sales‑tax statutes applicable to different regions of the newly created State of Madhya Pradesh, which had been formed after the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, differed in certain respects because they had been enacted by different legislatures. Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act provides that all laws in force at the time of reorganisation shall remain operative until they are repealed or amended by the appropriate legislature. Accordingly, the Court held that parallel statutes in the various parts of Madhya Pradesh could be sustained on the basis that the differentiation arose from historical reasons, and that a geographical classification grounded in historical circumstances did not offend the equal‑protection guarantee contained in Article 14. The Court expressed the view that the ratio decidendi of Bhaiyalal Shukla’s case (1) was applicable to the present dispute, whereas the ratio from Rao Manohar Singhji’s case (2) was not. In Rao Manohar Singhji’s case, the jagirdars of a specific area were singled out after the creation of the State of Rajasthan and were divested of the management of their estates, while the jagirdars in the remainder of Rajasthan retained such management rights. It was under those circumstances, when a pre‑existing law existed in one part of Rajasthan to which

In the present matter the Court observed that the situation closely resembled the precedent set in Bhaiyalal Shukla’s case (1), where both parts of a State possessed similar statutes governing sales tax albeit with certain variations in their provisions; consequently the Court there had upheld parallel, though not identical, laws on the basis of a “geographical classification based on historical reasons.” The Court explained that the same principle applied to the two regions of Andhra Pradesh, because each region enacted legislation relating to public trusts of a religious character, and although the detailed provisions differed, the overall scheme was comparable. Accordingly, the Court rejected the challenge that the differing provisions violated Article 14 of the Constitution, relying on the authority of Bhaiyalal Shukla’s case (1) to repulse the claim of unlawful discrimination. Turning to the question of whether the Regulations contravened Article 19(1)(f), the Court clarified that it would not address the multitude of Rules made under the Regulations; instead it confined its review to the portion of the Regulations that dealt with the registration of endowments, since the appeal concerned only that aspect. The Court noted that certain rules had previously been attacked before the former High Court of Hyderabad, and some of those rules had been struck down in Narayan Pershad v. State of Hyderabad (1). The sections relevant to registration were identified as Sections 3 through 7. Section 3 required the preparation of a book of endowments listing all endowments in force at the time the Regulations became effective, as well as any future endowments. Section 4(a) imposed a duty on every trustee or endowed person to provide the Director of Endowments, in writing, details of both movable and immovable property belonging to the endowment and to submit the deed of endowment or a certified copy thereof. Section 4(b) stipulated that a trustee who failed to comply with the duties under Section 4(a) could be deprived, wholly or partially, of the benefit or consideration he possessed under the endowment. Section 5 allowed any person to inform the Director of Endowments about an endowment that had not yet been entered in the book of endowments. Section 6 empowered the Director to issue a notice for the registration of endowed property whenever he became aware of such property. Finally, Section 7 provided that if no objection was raised within the time specified in the notice, the endowed property would be registered, provided the endowment was found to be legal.

Sections 8 and 9 of the Act prescribe the procedure to be followed when objections to a notice are filed, requiring that such objections be considered and decided upon. Section 10 provides that any person whose objection is rejected may institute a suit for declaration in a civil court within one year of the dismissal of the objection, thereby allowing the civil court to determine the person’s rights and to order that entries in the book of endowments be made in accordance with the court’s decision. The same section further stipulates that a person who has not lodged any objection is barred from filing a civil suit. Section 11 creates a presumption that entries recorded in the book of endowments are correct unless a civil court declares otherwise. Taken together, the provisions contained in sections 3 to 11, with the exception of section 4(b), establish a system for registering endowed property and for effecting the purposes of the Act, namely to ensure that the endower’s intentions are carried out and that trustees discharge their duties efficiently for the benefit of humanity. These regulations constitute reasonable restrictions in the public interest within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Constitution, being designed to secure accurate information about endowments existing in the State so that their management can be performed efficiently and for the benefit of humanity in accordance with the terms of each endowment. Consequently, the provisions relating to registration of endowments, except for section 4(b), do not offend the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f). Regarding section 4(b), no opinion was expressed in this case because the provision merely imposes a penalty on a trustee who fails to comply with section 4(a), allowing deprivation of any benefit that may arise from the endowment. In the present matter, the appellant did not claim any benefit accruing to him under the endowment; therefore, section 4(b) was held inapplicable. In this connection, reference was made to rule 25, which provides that if a trustee derives no benefit or return from the endowment in accordance with rule 24, then, upon failure to perform duties, the trustee may be suspended from the trusteeship for a suitable period, with the Government assuming management during that interval. Although this rule has been challenged as exceeding the Government’s rule‑making authority, it was deemed unnecessary to adjudicate on the validity of that rule because the impugned action did not arise under it. Nevertheless, the decision to uphold the validity of the registration provisions in the Regulations and Rules should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the legality of rule 25 or any consequential rules.

The Court upheld the validity of the provisions relating to the registration of endowments, except for section 4(b) on which it expressed no opinion, and it also upheld the Rules framed under those provisions, except for rule 25 and the rules consequential thereon, on which it likewise expressed no opinion. The notice referred to in the proceedings had been issued to the appellant on 31 December 1957. Based on the Court’s conclusions on the four points previously discussed, the appeal was dismissed as lacking merit.

The Court then turned to the question of the authority of the orders dated 13 June 1960 and 14 June 1960. The challenge to those orders was presented in two parts. First, it was contended that if the orders fell within the powers granted by the Regulations and the Rules framed thereunder, they should be struck down because the Regulations and Rules that deprive a trustee of his right of management are ultra vires article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Second, it was argued that the orders, purportedly issued under rule 179, are invalid because rule 179 exceeds the powers conferred on the rule‑making authority by the Regulations and, in any event, conflicts with the Rules. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Regulations and the Rules concerning the removal of a trustee are unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court confined its analysis to the second portion of the argument, namely whether the Regulations authorize the removal of a trustee under any circumstances and whether the removal in the present case was effected in accordance with those Regulations and the Rules made thereunder. The Court could not doubt that, taken together, the two orders effectively removed the appellant from his trusteeship. The sole provision governing the management of endowed property is section 12, which provides that the trustee is generally competent to exercise powers conferred by the endower; however, if a trustee is found incompetent, the Minister for Endowments may frame rules and regulations to realise the objects of the endowment and to improve its management, or may appoint a Superintendent under those rules. The Court analysed this section as comprising three parts: the first part recognises the trustee’s competence to manage the trust property according to the endowment; the second part empowers the Minister to issue appropriate rules if the trustee is deemed incompetent; and the third part authorises the Minister, as an alternative, to appoint a Superintendent for management purposes. The appointment of a Superintendent under section 12 therefore deprives the trustee of management authority and, in effect, constitutes removal from trusteeship.

The Court observed that the third segment of section 12 empowers the Minister for Endowments, in cases where a trustee is deemed incompetent, to appoint a Superintendent under the applicable Rules. Section 2 defines a Superintendent as a person appointed by the Government for the purpose of management, indicating that such appointment removes the trustee’s authority to manage the endowed property and effectively terminates the trustee’s role. This view is reinforced by the provisions contained in Chapters XLIII, XLIV and XLV of the Rules. Chapter XLIII concerns “Superintendence by Government”, Chapter XLIV deals with “direct superintendence of Government”, and Chapter XLV addresses supervision “with munthazim (manager)”. The term “munthazim” has been translated as “Superintendent” in the definition of section 2 and as “manager” in Chapter XLV, making it clear that the Superintendent and the manager are the same office. Rule 177 stipulates that when the Government assumes control of endowed buildings under its superintendence, it may either arrange for direct superintendence, appoint any munthazim (Superintendent), or manage the property through a committee. Chapter XLIV provides for direct government superintendence, and Rule 182 within that chapter specifies that, under direct superintendence, the power to spend recurring amounts according to the budget remains vested in the trustee in accordance with the powers conferred on him by the Rules; consequently, the trustee is not removed from his position. By contrast, when a Superintendent is appointed under Chapter XLV, that officer acquires all the powers of a trustee enumerated in Chapter XXXI, as reflected in Rule 187. The orders dated 13 June 1960 and 14 June 1960, although framed under Rule 179, which pertains to “direct superintendence by Government”, demonstrate that the Government exceeded the scope of that rule by taking over the temple’s management and vesting it in the Director of Endowments from 14 June 1960. This action deprived the appellant of management rights and, in effect, removed him from trusteeship, a step that presumptively would be followed by the appointment of a Superintendent. Accordingly, the final clause of section 12, which provides for the appointment of a Superintendent pursuant to the Rules, also entails the deprivation of the trustee’s management rights and thus his removal. Rule 67, which deals with the removal of trustees, enumerates six conditions that justify such removal; its last condition permits removal for any other reason, provided that a competent officer conducts an inquiry. This requirement ensures that a trustee is afforded an opportunity to show cause before being removed, aligning with the language of section 12, where the phrase “if a trustee is not found to be competent” indicates that action under the second and third parts of the section may be taken only after such a finding.

The regulations concerning trusteeship enumerate six specific conditions under which a trustee may be removed. The sixth condition provides that a trustee who is unfit for trusteeship for any reason not covered by the first five conditions may be removed, but only after the matter has been examined by a competent officer. Rule 67 therefore expressly requires that no trustee be dismissed without an inquiry conducted by a competent officer. This requirement implies that the trustee must be given an opportunity to show cause why removal should not occur, and that removal can follow only after a proper inquiry. The language of Section 12, which states “if a trustee is not found to be competent,” aligns with this procedural safeguard; the use of the word “found” indicates that legislative intent was to permit action under the second and third parts of the section only after a proper determination through inquiry. In addition, Rule 68 vests the authority to remove a trustee in the Minister for Endowments. Accordingly, after a competent officer has completed an inquiry, the removal power rests with the Minister for Endowments, which in the present administrative structure corresponds to the Government. The Court has already observed that it is unnecessary to decide whether these removal provisions, as applied by the Government, are constitutionally valid. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the provisions are constitutionally sound, the issue is whether the two orders dated June 13 and June 14, 1960—orders that, when read together, effectively remove the appellant from trusteeship—can be justified under the Regulations and Rules. Those two orders were issued by the Member of the Board of Revenue, whereas Rule 68 contemplates that only the Minister for Endowments (i.e., the Government) may effect removal. Moreover, Rule 67 mandates that a trustee cannot be removed unless a competent officer has held an inquiry, which requires that notice be served on the trustee to permit him to show cause. Only after such an inquiry and the establishment of one of the six conditions listed in Rule 67 may removal be effected. In the present case, no notice was ever served on the appellant to enable him to show cause against removal from trusteeship. While it is true that a notice dated December 31, 1957, warned that failure to respond concerning registration of the endowed property would lead to completion of the case, this notice pertained solely to registration matters and did not invoke the procedural requirements of Rule 67 for removal of a trustee.

In the present case the notice issued to the appellant stated that the property would be placed under Government supervision and that no further objections would be entertained after that notice. The legal effect of failing to respond to such a notice was laid down in section 7, which provided that if no objection was filed the endowment would be registered, and in section 10(b), which barred a person who did not appear to object from exercising any right to institute a suit as contemplated in section 10(a). However, rule 67 did not empower the Government to remove a trustee solely because the trustee failed to answer a notice calling for registration of the endowed property. Rule 67 enumerated six specific grounds on which a trustee could be removed: (i) insanity; (ii) contraction of a specified contagious disease; (iii) conviction by a criminal court; (iv) leaving Hyderabad State without informing the authorities for a period exceeding one month; (v) renunciation of the religion to which the endowment related; and (vi) unfitness for trusteeship for any other reason. Since none of these conditions applied, there was no statutory basis for removal merely on the ground of non‑appearance in reply to the notice issued under section 6 of the Regulations. Consequently, the orders dated 13 June and 14 June 1960, which must be read together, could not be justified under rules 67 and 68 for three reasons: first, no inquiry under rule 67 had been conducted; second, the orders were not issued by the Minister of Endowments, i.e., the Government; and third, the ground for removal was not among those permitted by the rules. The Director of Endowments was only authorised, on the basis of the 31 December 1957 notice, to proceed with registration of the endowment even if the appellant failed to respond, after making any inquiries he deemed appropriate and taking further action permissible under other provisions of the Regulations. He was not authorized to issue the June 1960 orders that removed the appellant from trusteeship and transferred management of the trust to the Government. Accordingly, those orders were declared ultra‑violet of the Regulations and Rules, assuming the constitutionality of the provisions governing trustee removal. The appeal was dismissed with costs, the writ petition was allowed with costs, and the orders dated 13 June and 14 June 1960 were set aside.