Ananga Bijoy Mittra vs Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 286 of 1960

Decision Date: 9 November 1962

Coram: DAS GUPTA

In this case the petitioner, Ananga Bijoy Mittra, appealed against Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. The judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court of India on 9 November 1962. The matter concerned an application for lease of land situated in Jamshedpur and raised questions under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, specifically sections 4(2) and 6. The land, measuring 1,267 square feet in the Sakchi New Planning area, had been let to a predecessor in interest of the appellant on a month‑to‑month basis at a rent of one rupee per month, although no formal lease document had been executed. The application for settlement asserted that the applicant desired the land “for garden purposes,” agreed to hold it on a monthly tenancy, and undertook to comply with the house‑building rules. After a notice to quit was served, the landowners filed a suit seeking the appellant’s eviction and recovery of rent arrears. The defence claimed that the tenancy was not a monthly tenancy but an agricultural one; it argued that the lease was for agricultural and horticultural purposes, making the appellant an agricultural tenant within the meaning of sections 4 and 6 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, thereby granting him fixity of tenure and protecting him from eviction. The trial court accepted the defence, a decision that was affirmed by the Subordinate Judge. On second appeal, the Patna High Court held that the lease was not for agricultural purposes and ordered eviction. The present appeal, taken by special leave, contended that the application plainly indicated a garden purpose, which should render the appellant a raiyat under section 6 of the Act. The Court held that the stated purpose must be read in conjunction with other statements in the application, namely the request for a monthly tenancy and the undertaking to obey house‑building rules. Considering all these factors, the Court concluded that the lease was not for horticultural or agricultural purposes. The appeal is styled as Civil Appeal No. 286 of 1960, arising from the judgment and decree dated 26 March 1958 of the Patna High Court in Second Appeal No. 1330 of 1954. Counsel for the appellant were N.C. Chatterjee and R.C. Prasad, while S.N. Andley and S.P. Varma appeared for the respondent. The judgment was pronounced by Justice Das Gupta.

In the present case the appellant asserted that he held an interest in a plot of land and therefore applied to the Land Officer of the proprietor, Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., for the settlement of that plot. The application was granted and the land was subsequently let to Abdul Gani on a month‑to‑month basis at a rent of one rupee per month. A suit arising from this transaction was instituted in 1949 seeking the ejectment of Abdul Gani after the tenancy had been terminated by a notice to quit the premises; the suit also claimed for arrears of rent computed at one rupee per month. Abdul Gani defended the action by contending that he was an agriculturist tenant as contemplated under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and not a monthly tenant, and that no monthly rent had actually been paid. He further pleaded that the lease was granted for agricultural and horticultural purposes at an annual rent, that under those circumstances he had acquired a valid right of occupancy, and that, consequently, he could not be lawfully ejected. The present appellant was subsequently added as a defendant by order dated 25 May 1953, and he filed a written statement asserting that, by virtue of the provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, Abdul Gani had obtained an occupancy right; that the purpose for which the settlement was made could not give rise to a monthly tenancy; and that the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to specific possession of the land. The trial court, identified as the Additional Munsif, Jamshedpur, accepted Abdul Gani’s defence, holding that the tenancy created in his favour was agricultural, that he had acquired an occupancy raiyat’s right, and that because the tenancy fell under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act the suit could not be tried by a civil court. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge of Singhbhum affirmed the trial court’s findings that the holding was agricultural and thus governed by the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, and upheld the lower court’s judgment and decree. Conversely, the Patna High Court, in the second appeal, concluded that the lease was not for agricultural or horticultural purposes and that the defendant had not acquired any right of occupancy in the land. The High Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts, allowed the appeal, and decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The present appeal was filed against that decision under special leave granted by this Court. In support of the appeal, counsel submitted that the High Court erred in determining that the lease was not for agricultural or horticultural purposes. He emphasized that the lease application expressly mentioned “garden purpose” as the purpose of the tenancy and argued that this statement was sufficient to qualify Abdul Gani as a raiyat within the meaning of section 6 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. Section 4 of the Act provides that, for the purposes of this legislation, four classes of tenants are recognised.

The Act provides for four distinct categories of tenants, namely: (1) tenure‑holders, (2) raiyats, (3) under‑raiyats, and (4) Munderi Khunt‑kattidars. It is admitted and evident that Abdul Gani did not fall within the first, third or fourth categories. Consequently, the only possible avenue for him to be covered by the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act is as a “raiyat”, the second class of tenant. Section 6 of the Act defines a “raiyat” as a person who has obtained a right to hold land primarily for the purpose of cultivating it, either personally, through members of his family, by hired servants, with the assistance of partners, and includes the successors‑in‑interest of persons who have acquired such a right. Judicial pronouncements of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts have consistently held that the activity of planting an orchard falls within the meaning of “cultivation”. Accordingly, if it can be shown that Abdul Gani entered into the lease of the disputed land with the intent to cultivate an orchard, he would indisputably qualify as a raiyat under the provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.

In the present matter there is no formal lease document; however, the court possesses Abdul Gani’s written application for lease together with the landlord’s order granting the lease. The application reads in part as follows: “I beg to apply for a plot of land measuring 1267 sq ft in Sakchi New Planning for Garden Purpose and for permission to retain one step in the east side. I agree to hold the land on monthly tenancy and to abide by the terms and conditions of the Company and the house building rules. I also agree to abide by the rules and bye‑laws of the Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee in force from time to time. I agree to pay the security deposit to be fixed by you in respect of my tenancy as soon as the plot is allotted to me and shall submit the plan of my proposed house for approval of the Chief Town Engineer before I start construction. I therefore request that you will kindly allot me a plot of land in the above mentioned Basti on your usual terms.” Counsel for the appellant emphasizes the phrase “for garden purpose” to contend that the lease was intended for orchard cultivation. Nevertheless, it would be improper to focus solely on that expression while disregarding the remainder of the document. It is noteworthy that immediately after stating the intention to use the land “for garden purpose”, Abdul Gani also declares his willingness to hold the land on a monthly tenancy and to comply with the company’s house‑building regulations. It is hard to imagine a lease designed for cultivation being taken on a monthly basis, and even more difficult to understand why a tenant whose sole aim was to grow an orchard would consent to abide by house‑building rules. These

In this case the Court observed that two specific facts must be taken into account. First, the lease document indicated that the land would be held on a monthly tenancy. Second, the same document required the tenant to obey the house‑building rules that governed the premises. These two facts have to be read together with the earlier statement in the application that the land was being taken “for garden purpose.” The Court held that, when read collectively, the terms of the application for lease were sufficient to demonstrate that the lease was not intended for an agricultural or horticultural purpose. Because the written terms already disclosed the true nature of the lease, the Court found it unnecessary to conduct a detailed inquiry into the actual manner in which the land was used after the lease was granted. Nevertheless, the Court noted that if the evidence were examined for the purpose of ascertaining the actual use, the record would show that a portion of the plot had indeed been cultivated with a few guava trees and some flowering plants. At the same time, a permanent (pacca) room had been constructed on another part of the same plot. Considering all of these circumstances together, the Court agreed with the view of the High Court that the purpose of the lease was neither agricultural nor horticultural. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in granting the decree sought by the plaintiff. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs.