Amarsarjit Singh vs State of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: 1962 AIR 1305

Decision Date: 20 February, 1962

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar, Venkatarama Aiyar

In this matter the petitioner Amarsarjit Singh challenged the State of Punjab under the provisions of the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. The judgment was delivered on 20 February 1962 by a bench comprising Chief Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice J. R. Mudholkar, Justice T. L. Venkatarama, and Justice Aiyar. The case is reported in the 1962 All India Reporter at page 1305 and the 1962 Supreme Court Reporter Supplement (third series) at page 346. The statutory provisions under consideration included sections two paragraph one and two paragraph five of the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957, and entries eighteen and forty‑five of List Two in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners, who held certain land tenures known as the Cis‑Sutlej jagirs, contended that the Act could not be applied to their holdings because the definition of “jagir” in section two paragraph one required a grant of revenue made by the State Government, which they claimed never existed. They argued that there was no historical grant of the Cis‑Sutlej jagirs to them, nor any assignment of land revenue, and that even if a grant had been made it was not by or on behalf of the State Government as required by the statute. Historically, the jagirdars had been rulers who obtained possession of their territories by conquest in 1763. After the advent of British authority, their sovereign powers were gradually removed, and in 1852 the British government assumed collection of revenue from the jagir lands, paying the jagirdars a share of the collections. Subsequent legislation addressed the status of such jagirs. The central question before the Court was whether the payment of revenue to the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars was based on an implied grant. The petitioners maintained that because the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs had never been conquered, any revenue payment must stem from their status as sovereigns and therefore be the result of an implied arrangement rather than a statutory grant. The Court held that the jagirdars were merely subjects of the British Government, and the revenue paid to them was indeed founded on an implied grant. Although the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs were not conquered, the British exercised sovereign powers over the area, implying that sovereignty had transferred to the British by means other than conquest. The Court further relied on the decision in Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax, 1959 S. C. R. 729, to support its conclusion.

In the matters before the Court, the earlier decisions in Thakur Amar Singji v. State of Rajasthan, reported in the 1953 volume of the Supreme Court Reports, and Vajesingji Jorawar Singji v. Secretary of State, reported in the 1924 Law Reports, were cited as authorities. The Court held that the grant made by the British Government was to be regarded as a grant from the “State Government” as defined in section 2(5) of the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. The Court further held that the jagirs concerned fell within the meaning of “jagir” provided in section 2(1) of the same Act. In addition, the Court concluded that the Act was enacted within the legislative competence of the State of Punjab because it fell under entries 18 and 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

The proceedings originated in original jurisdiction under petitions numbered 82 of 1960 and 148, 168 to 174 and 357 to 361 of 1961, each filed under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. These petitions were accompanied by civil appeals numbered 453 to 474 of 1961, which were appeals from the Punjab High Court’s judgment and order dated 25 May 1959 in civil writs numbered 428, 303, 398, 402, 459 to 462, 421, 472, 473, 475, 490, 503, 509, 519, 520, 555, 590, 710 and 712 of 1958. An additional civil appeal, No. 50 of 1962, was filed by special leave against the High Court’s judgment and order dated 25 May 1959 in civil writ No. 347 of 1958. Counsel for the petitioner in petition No. 82 of 1960 and for the appellant in civil appeal No. 50 of 1962 appeared, as did counsel for the petitioners in petition No. 148 of 1961 and for the appellants in appeals numbered 457 to 474 of 1961. Further counsel represented the petitioners in petitions numbered 168 to 174 and 357 to 361 of 1961. The Solicitor‑General of India, together with counsel for the appellants in appeals numbered 453 and 456 of 1961, also appeared, as did counsel for the appellants in appeal No. 454 of 1961 and in appeal No. 455 of 1961. The Advocate‑General of Punjab acted for the State of Punjab, and counsel for the respondents appeared in all petitions and civil appeals. The Attorney‑General of India, together with counsel for Intervener 1, and counsel for Intervener 2 also participated. The judgment was delivered on 20 February 1962 by Justice Venkatarama Aiyar. The central issue for determination was whether the “Cis‑Sutlej” jagirs situated in the State of Punjab were subject to resumption under the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957 (Punjab Act No. 39 of 1957), hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The Act had become operative on 14 November 1957.

The respondent State thereafter initiated proceedings under the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957 for the purpose of resuming the jagirs in question. In reaction to these proceedings, several petitions were filed in the High Court of Punjab invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitions challenged both the validity of the Act itself and the lawfulness of the State’s actions taken under the Act. The challengers advanced two principal grounds: first, that the Act exceeded the legislative competence of the State and therefore was unconstitutional and void; and second, that even assuming the Act was within the State’s jurisdiction, the estates held by the petitioners did not constitute “jagirs” as defined by the Act and consequently could not be resumed under its provisions. By a judgment dated 25 May 1959, the learned Judges held that the legislation fell within the State’s competence and did not offend any constitutional provision. They further concluded that the petitioners’ estates satisfied the statutory definition of “jagir” and were therefore subject to resumption, and that no writ could be issued to restrain the State from acting under the Act. On 27 January 1960 the learned Judges granted leave to appeal to this Court under Article 133(1)(a). Pursuant to that order, Civil Appeals numbered 453 to 474 of 1961 were filed before this Court, and a special leave appeal numbered 50 of 1962 was also directed against the Punjab High Court judgment in a writ petition under Article 226. Additionally, some of the jagirdars lodged petitions in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the Act and the State’s actions on the same grounds raised in the appeals. Accordingly, arguments were heard from counsel in both the writ petitions and the appeals, and the present judgment will govern all of them. Although the pleadings raised several arguments attacking the Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional, the sole contention articulated before this Court was that the Cis‑Sutlej jagirs do not fall within the statutory definition of “jagir,” and therefore the State lacked authority to resume them under the Act. This contention was pursued on two bases: (i) that at no time were the Cis‑Sutlej jagirs granted to their holders, nor was any assignment of land revenue made to them; and (ii) that even if such a grant existed, it was not made by or on behalf of the State Government as required by Section 2(1) of the Act. It was argued that if either basis succeeded, the jagirs would lie outside the scope of the Act and the State would possess no power to resume them. For convenience, the relevant provisions of the Act are set out at this stage, beginning with Section 2(1) which defines “jagir.”

The Act defines the term “jagir” to mean any of the following: (a) an assignment of land revenue made by or on behalf of the State Government; (b) an estate in land that is created or affirmed by or on behalf of the State Government and that carries with it the right to collect land revenue or to receive any portion of that revenue; (c) any grant of money made or continued by or on behalf of the State Government that purports to be or is expressed to be payable out of the land revenue; and (d) any grant of money, including any amount payable by the State Government in respect of any right, privilege, perquisite or office. The definition expressly includes any such grant or assignment that exists in favour of Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars. The Act further defines “Jagirdar” in section 2(2) as the holder of a jagir. Section 2(5) provides the meaning of “State Government”. For any period before 1 November 1956, “State Government” means: (i) the Government of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union or any of the Indian States that merged into that Union on 20 August 1948; and (ii) the Government of the State of Punjab and all its predecessor governments, whatever name they were called, including the Governor‑General or Governor‑General in Council as applicable, and the Sikh Rulers, but it expressly excludes the Central Government as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, after the period commencing on 15 August 1947. For any period after 1 November 1956, “State Government” means the Government of the State of Punjab. Section 3 of the Act provides that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, usage, grant settlement, sanad, other instrument, decree, order of any court or authority, all jagirs shall, from the commencement of the Act, be extinguished and shall stand resumed in the name of the State Government. It is a matter of common ground that the jagirs at issue in the present writ petitions and appeals consist of a right to revenue payable on land and do not constitute an estate that would fall within the definition of section 2(1)(b) of the Act; consequently, if they fall within the Act at all, they must do so under section 2(1)(a). Accordingly, the discussion is confined to the question of whether, as required by section 2(1)(a), there was any assignment of the revenue of these jagirs and whether such an assignment was made by the State Government. On the first question—whether there was an assignment of land revenue—the petitioners and the appellants, hereafter collectively referred to as the jagirdars, contend that the so‑called jagirs are not jagirs in the ordinary sense. They argue that these lands were never the subject of any grant by any State, that they were originally independent states held by rulers with sovereign rights, and that, over time, the British Government imposed its sovereignty and later assumed administration, paying the revenue collected there to the rulers not as an assignee of the revenue but as sovereigns of the states.

The British authorities ultimately assumed sovereignty over the lands in question and subsequently took over the administration of the State. They then paid the revenue that was collected from those lands to the former rulers, not as a person to whom the land‑revenue had been assigned, because no such assignment ever existed, but rather as the sovereigns of the States themselves. On that basis, the petitioners contend that the so‑called jagirs cannot be placed within the definition of section 2(1) of the Act. Consequently, the matter turns to the question of the true status of the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars.

The origin of the Cis‑Sutlej jagirs traces back to the year 1763, when the collapse of the Mughal Empire created a power vacuum in the political stage of the country. Various powers moved in with the ambition of establishing their own sovereignty. The British had by then established their rule and had extended their dominion up to the Yamuna River, while the Sikhs, during the same period, transformed from a purely religious sect into a military organisation that went on to establish several states beyond the Sutlej River. At that time, the tract of territory lying between the Yamuna and the Sutlej was administered by a weak Afghan governor named Zain Khan. The British policy of the era was to regard the Yamuna as the frontier, and therefore they remained indifferent to the fate of this Cis‑Sutlej area. However, the Sikh chiefs beyond the Sutlej could not resist the temptation to overthrow the Afghan governor, seize his territory and install themselves as its rulers. In 1763 a sudden surge occurred when a number of Sikh chiefs crossed the Sutlej, overwhelmed Governor Zain Khan and occupied the whole country up to the Yamuna. “Tradition still describes”, says Cunningham in his History of the Sikhs, p. I 10, I, “how the Sikhs dispersed as soon as the battle was won and how riding day and night each horseman would throw his be‑It and scabbard, his articles of dress and acooutrement, until he was almost naked into successive villages to mark them as his.” When the conquest was over, each chief declared himself the ruler of the territory he was able to occupy and constituted himself its sovereign. This state of affairs continued until 1806. By that time Maharaja Ranjit Singh, known as the “Lion of the Punjab”, had built up a powerful state across the Sutlej. He had already subdued the petty rulers within that area and was turning his attention to the territories south of the Sutlej, occupying several of them. Alarmed by these developments, the Cis‑Sutlej rulers appealed to the British for protection, and by then the British had changed their earlier policy of non‑intervention. The appeal was welcomed and met with a prompt response. As a result, in 1809 the British entered into a treaty with Ranjit Singh whereby he surrendered his acquisitions south of the Sutlej and agreed not to interfere with the Cis‑Sutlej states. This treaty was followed by a proclamation issued by Colonel Ochterlony in May 1809, which assured the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs of their rights as sole owners of their possessions and exempted them from the payment of tribute, but

The Cis‑Sutlej chiefs were obligated to provide supplies to the British Government and to render assistance in the Government’s conflicts with its enemies. In addition, the British authorities issued a rule stating that if any of those rulers died without a legitimate heir, his territory would automatically revert to the British Government. This arrangement remained in effect until the year 1846, when a fundamental shift occurred. In 1845 the British forces engaged in war with the Sikh forces, and during that conflict the Cis‑Sutlej rulers did not support the British against the Sikh forces situated north of the Sutlej River; instead, they either remained indifferent in a manner hostile to British interests or they openly opposed the British. Their lack of cooperation prompted the British Government to reassess and modify its policy toward the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs. As recorded by Kensington in the Ambala Gazetteer (page 26), the chiefs had already lost the confidence of the Government, and the Sikh chiefs, having forfeited any claim to consideration during the Sutlej campaign, faced the introduction of sweeping reforms. The Government decisively resolved to curtail their privileges. Consequently, several significant measures were implemented at once: the police jurisdiction previously exercised by most of the chiefs was abolished because the existing system was deemed highly unsuitable for detecting and punishing crime; all transit and customs duties imposed by the chiefs were eliminated; and a commutation was accepted in place of the personal service that the chief and his contingent had previously rendered. The Governor‑General’s dispatch embodying this resolution was dated 7 November 1846. While these extensive changes were being introduced, the Second Sikh War broke out, culminating in the annexation of the Punjab. With the annexation, the formal arrangement that preserved the appearance of the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs as rulers came to an end. In June 1849 the British Government made a clear declaration that the chiefs should cease to hold sovereign powers, should lose all criminal, civil and fiscal jurisdiction, and should be regarded merely as ordinary subjects of the British Government possessing certain exceptional privileges. Pursuant to that declaration, the chiefs were stripped of all governmental functions, and the final settlement occurred in 1852 when the British assumed responsibility for the collection of revenue from the jagir lands. The British formulated the rules for revenue settlement, carried out the actual settlement and collection, and from the proceeds paid the jagirdars their respective shares. On the basis of these facts the Court must consider whether an assignment of land revenue to the jagirdars can be said to have occurred. No express grants were made to them; the issue before the Court is whether the grants of land revenue can be inferred from the foregoing facts. A comparable question arose in Thakar Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (2), concerning a class of jagirdars in Rajasthan known as Bhomicharas, who had formerly been rulers of territories that later came under the suzerainty of the State of Jodhpur and were required to pay an annual “Foujbal.” The Bhomicharas argued that they possessed the territories as rulers, not as jagirdars under any grant. In rejecting that contention, this Court held that a grant may be implied as well as express, and that, based on the proven facts, the Bhomicharas, although originally rulers, had been reduced to the status of subjects and thus became jagirdars under an implied grant. The situation of the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars closely parallels that of the Bhomicharas in the Thakar Amar Singhji case (2). They became rulers of the territories when they seized them by conquest in 1763, and the first intrusion upon their sovereignty occurred in 1809 when the British established suzerainty over them.

In the earlier case, the Court examined the situation of certain territories that were claimed to be jagirs, after which the State of Jodhpur asserted suzerainty and demanded an annual payment known as “Foujbal”. The Bhomioharas argued that they had originally acquired the territories as sovereign rulers and that they held them in that capacity, not as jagirdars under any grant from a ruler. The Court rejected this argument, holding that a grant of jagir may be either express or implied. On the basis of the evidence, the Court concluded that although the Bhomioharas initially possessed the lands as rulers, they had subsequently been reduced to the status of subjects, and consequently their relationship amounted to that of jagirdars under an implied grant. The Court observed that the circumstances of the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars are closely analogous to those of the Bhomioharas in the earlier decision, Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955) 2 S.C.R. 303. The judgment emphasized that the transformation of a ruler into a subject, even without an explicit document, could create a legal basis for a jagir based on the changed relationship between the former sovereign and the prevailing authority. Hence, the Court treated the Bhomioharas as having a de facto grant derived from the circumstances of their subordination.

According to the record, the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs became rulers of their territories by taking them by conquest in 1763. Their first encounter with external sovereignty occurred in 1809 when the British established suzerainty over them and declared that lands belonging to rulers who died without heirs would revert to the British Crown. Subsequent British actions in 1846 removed their police jurisdiction and the authority to levy customs, and in 1849 all remaining sovereign functions were taken away. These measures, expressly stated in the British declaration of June 1849, clearly reduced the chiefs to ordinary subjects. The Court therefore needed to determine the nature of the revenue settlement made in 1852. If the chiefs had already been subjects by that date, any payment of revenue by the British could only be based on an implied grant. Counsel for the jagirdars opposed this view. They argued that the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs differed fundamentally from the Bhomioharas because the latter had been conquered by the rulers of Jodhpur and compelled to pay the “Foujbal” tribute, whereas the Cis‑Sutlej chiefs had never been conquered by the British, had never paid tribute, and had continued to receive revenue as rulers both before and after the British establishment of authority. They contended that there was no act by the British that would indicate a resumption of authority or a re‑grant, and therefore the payment of land revenue to them should be attributed to their sovereign status. The counsel further asserted that if the British assumed the functions of settlement and collection of land revenue, they did so on behalf of the chiefs and under their authority.

The Court noted that the argument relied on an implied arrangement with the Cis‑Sutlej Chiefs and was based on the assumption that, because those Chiefs had not been conquered by the British, they must necessarily be sovereigns and therefore the land revenue paid to them could not be held as a jagir granted under an implied lease from the Government. The Court rejected that assumption and declared it to be incorrect. It explained that settled law holds that conquest is not the sole means by which a State can acquire sovereignty over the territory of another State; sovereignty may also be acquired by any other mode that effectively establishes it. In discussing the concept of an “act of State,” the Judicial Committee, in Cook v. Sir James Gordon Sprigg, observed that “the taking possession by Her Majesty, whether by cession or by any other means by which sovereignty can be acquired, was an act of State.” Similar observations were made by Lord Danedin in Vajesing Jaravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India in Council, where it was held that when a territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time, it constitutes an act of State irrespective of the manner of acquisition, be it conquest, cession following a treaty, or occupation of territory previously unoccupied by a recognised ruler. The Court further quoted its own earlier decision in M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income‑Tax, stating that the expression “act of State” is not confined to hostile actions between rulers resulting in occupation of territories; it includes all acquisitions of territory by a sovereign State for the first time, whether by conquest or cession, and cited Vajesingji Joravar Singji v. Secretary of State and Thakur Amar Singji v. State of Rajasthan in support. More recently, the Court considered the question in Promod Chandra Deb v. The State of Orissa, where it defined an “act of State” as the taking over of sovereign powers by a State over territory that was not previously part of it, whether by conquest, treaty, cession, or otherwise. Accordingly, the Court held that the mere fact that the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars were not conquered by the British does not settle the issue of whether they should be regarded as sovereigns. The determination depends on who actually exercised sovereign powers over the territories—whether it was the Chiefs or the British. If the British exercised such powers, then sovereignty over the area must be said to have passed to the British, even though not by conquest, and the true status of the Chiefs would be that of subjects. Viewed in this perspective, the Court concluded that the case does not present any substantial difficulty.

It was noted that beginning in 1809 the Chiefs were steadily deprived of the powers that had previously characterised them as sovereigns, and that this gradual erosion of authority reached its conclusion in the year 1849. The jagirdars, through their representatives, expressly acknowledged that after that date the British Government exercised sovereign powers over the territories in question and that the Chiefs had been reduced to the status of subjects of the Crown.

Nevertheless, a submission was advanced contending that, notwithstanding the loss of all other sovereign attributes, the jagirdars retained one remaining element of sovereignty: the right to receive land‑revenue. The argument asserted that, if that were correct, the jagirdars would be subjects of the British in every respect except for the revenue‑receiving right, for which they would continue to be sovereigns. The Court held that such a position was untenable because a person cannot simultaneously be a sovereign and a subject. In dealing with the same issue, this Court previously observed in Thakur Amar Singhji’s case (1) that “the status of a person must be either that of a sovereign or a subject. There is no tertium quid. The law does not recognise an intermediate status of a person being partly a sovereign and partly a subject, and when once it is admitted that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sovereignty of Jodhpur their status can only be that of a subject. A subject might occupy an exalted position and enjoy special privileges, but he is nonetheless a subject; and even if the status of Bhomicharas might be considered superior to that of ordinary jagirdars, they were also subjects.” (pp. 336‑337) Accordingly, if the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars were subjects in all other respects, the right to collect revenue must also be regarded as a function of their subject status, which could arise only by way of an implied grant.

The opposing view argued that an implied grant could not be inferred because, unlike the Bhomicharas, a specific proposal for the resumption and re‑grant of the Cis‑Sutlej Chiefs’ territories had been presented in 1846 and subsequently rejected. The Court referred to the historical account recorded in J. M. Douie’s “Punjab Land Administration Manual,” 1931, p. 45, para 102, which states: “It was indeed proposed in 1846 after the first Sikh War to declare all the estates forfeit on account of the laches of their holders, and to re‑grant them under sanads from the British Government. But Lord Hardinge deemed it impolitic to proclaim to all India the misconduct of the Cis‑Sutlej Chiefs and negatived the proposal. In a sense then the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars, great and …” (1) Writ Petitions Nos. 79 of 1957, 167 and 168 of 1958 and 4 of 1959 decided on November 16, 1961.

The Court observed that the small and large Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars were mediatized rulers, and while they collectively deserved certain consideration, that fact should not be overlooked in dealings with them. It was argued that an implied grant could be recognized in situations where no express grant was made, but that such implication could not arise when a proposal for a grant had been actively considered and rejected. Although this contention appeared plausible, it collapsed upon examination of the reason for the rejection. The despatch of Lord Hardinge dated 17 November 1846 explained that a general measure of resumption would create alarm and would have to be preceded by a public declaration of the disloyalty of the majority of the Sikh protected States, setting out the grounds for forfeiture; this was deemed inexpedient. In light of this explanation, the Court held that it was impossible to conclude that the British Government, by declining to effect a resumption and re‑grant, intended to maintain the Chiefs as sovereigns. Rather, the proper inference was that the British sought to confer upon the chieftains only the status of jagirdars, but for policy reasons wished to avoid publicity; consequently, the proposal for resumption and re‑grant was not adopted. In the same despatch of 17 November 1846, it was further stated that the same objectives could be achieved by measures such as taking over police administration, customs, and similar functions, rendering a formal resumption and express grant unnecessary. Hence, the reason for not making a resumption and an express grant supported an inference of an implied grant. Another argument was based on the description of the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars as “mediatized rulers” in J. M. Douie’s Punjab Land Administration Manual, suggesting that their status was that of sovereigns. The term “mediatized” originally referred to German princes in the Holy Roman Empire who, after being vassals of the Emperor, were later subordinated to other princes also vassals of the Emperor. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “mediatise” in modern usage as the annexation of a principality to another state, leaving the former sovereign with his title and usually some governmental rights. It might be correct to describe the Chiefs as mediatized rulers in 1846, when, although deprived of police and customs powers, they continued to exercise civil and fiscal powers. However, when they were stripped in 1849 of all governmental powers, they ceased to be rulers, mediatized or otherwise, and when the revenue settlements were made in 1852, they possessed no vestige of sovereignty, having become ordinary subjects of the British with certain limited privileges.

The Court observed that the true nature of the revenue settlements made with the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars was accurately described in historical sources. In Baden Powell’s work “Land Systems of British India”, volume 11, page 701, it is noted that under the settlement arrangements the jagirdar receives the revenue while the original land‑holding communities or individuals are settled with, and retain, full proprietary rights. The passage further explains that the jagirdar is, in fact, a mere assignee of the revenue, receiving a portion that otherwise would have gone to the State. A similar explanation appears in the Ambala Gazetteer, pages 27‑28, where Kensington records that the final step in the process was taken in 1852 when the revenue settlement, which had begun for British villages in 1847, was extended to the villages of the chiefs. After this extension the chiefs ceased to retain any relics of their former power, except that they were still permitted to collect revenue directly from their villages in the form of a cash assignment. The Gazetteer states that the chiefs therefore “sunk to the position of jagirdar” but continued to retain a right to the assigned revenue in perpetuity. The respondent’s counsel, the learned Advocate‑General, argued that after 1852 a series of statutes relating to the jagirs had been enacted on the basis that their holders were subjects of the Crown. The Court cited the preamble of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1871 (Act 33 of 1871), which declares that the Government of India is by law entitled to a proportion of the produce of the land of the Punjab to be fixed from time to time, and that it is expedient to consolidate and define the law relating to the settlement and collection of revenue and the duties of revenue officers in the Punjab. The Court noted that the revenue settlements for jagir lands were made under this Act, indicating that, in exercising fiscal jurisdiction, the British administration acted in its sovereign capacity.

The Court further examined the statutory framework that followed. The Punjab Descent of Jagirs Act, 1900 (Punjab Act IV of 1900), was introduced into the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, inserting sections 8 to 8C which enacted rules of descent “in respect of succession to any assignment of land revenue” and provided for the recognition of successors to deceased jagirdars by the Provincial Government on specified conditions. Subsequently, the Punjab Jagir Act V of 1911 dealt with the same subject matter. Its preamble declared it expedient to consolidate the law governing assignments of land revenue and other grants formerly known as jagirs, and to make more precise provisions regarding the manner in which such assignments were to be made or continued in the future. Section 2 of the 1911 Act defined “jagir” in terms substantially identical to the definition in the earlier legislation. The 1911 Act also repealed sections 8 to 80 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, which had been inserted by the Punjab Descent of Jagirs Act, 1900. By setting out this legislative history, the Court highlighted that the right of the jagirdars to receive land revenue rested upon grants, explicit or implied, made by the British Government, and that the statutes reflected the evolution of the jagirdars’ status from sovereign‑like chiefs to subjects holding revenue assignments under the authority of the Crown.

Section 7 of the Act, which reproduces provisions originally contained in the 1900 legislation as sections 7 to 10, contains clause 7(1)(b). That clause requires a jagirdar to accept the rules of descent prepared by the Government by signing a written instrument. The Court noted that the record shows the jagirdars have indeed accepted those rules in the manner prescribed by the statute. As illustrative evidence, the acceptance signed by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 82 of 1960 was marked and entered into the record. From these materials the Court found it unavoidable to conclude that the right of the jagirdars to receive land revenue is founded upon grants that were impliedly made by the British Government.

The Court also referred to the earlier decision of Abdul Ghafoor Khan v. Amar Arji Singh, Regular Second Appeal No. 561 of 1946, decided by the Punjab High Court. In that decision Judges Mahajan and Teja Singh observed that the British Government had neither gifted the jagir lands nor assigned the land revenue to the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars, and those observations have been cited by some as authority for the proposition that no express or implied grant existed in favour of the jagirdars. However, the Court emphasized that the essential question in that appeal was whether the jagirdars could alienate their interests after their death. The High Court held that they could not, providing the reasoning that after the annexation of the Punjab the Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars were stripped of whatever sovereignty they still possessed, were re‑designated as jagirdars, but their possessions, holdings and dominions—including forts and buildings—were left undisturbed and remained with them as before. The dispute in that appeal therefore concerned the nature of such physical properties and not the right to land revenue. Consequently, the Court could not accept the observations from that case as precedent supporting the view that no grant, express or implied, could be inferred concerning the assignment of land revenue to the jagirdars.

Accordingly, the Court held that the jagirs which are the subject of the present proceedings fall within the scope of section 2(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent’s next argument was that even if an assignment of land revenue could be implied in favour of the jagirdars, such an assignment could only be attributed to the British Government and not to the State Government as required by section 2(1)(a). The respondent therefore contended that the State had no authority to resume the jagirs under the Act. The Court observed that, even assuming some force to that contention, the question must be answered by reference to the definition of “State Government” contained in section 2(5). That definition expressly states that “State Government” includes “the Government of the State of Punjab, and all predecessor governments thereof, by whatever name called, the Governor‑General or the Governor‑General in‑Council as the case may be.” This definition is decisive for determining whether the British Government, as a predecessor, can be treated as the “State Government” within the meaning of the statute.

In this case, the Court observed that the expression “Governor‑General‑in‑Council as the case may be” was intended to be broad enough to encompass the British Government that had made the original grant. However, it was argued that this definition did not exist in the original Act and had been inserted only by the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs (Amendment) Act, 1959, and that the parties’ rights should be measured by the law that prevailed before that amendment. The Court found that argument to be without merit, because Section 1(2) of the Amendment Act expressly provides that the amendment operates retrospectively from 14 November 1957. Subsequently, the petitioners contended that the amendment exceeded the legislative competence of the Punjab Legislature and therefore was void. In Petition No. 82 of 1960, they claimed that the amendment was a colourable piece of legislation, asserting that the State Legislature lacked authority to transform the Central Government into a State Government or to legislate on a subject that belongs to the Centre. They further maintained that, since the jagir was not a grant by the State Government, the amended definition of “State Government” was a fraud on the Constitution. The Court rejected this contention, observing that no substantial basis was advanced to support the claim that the amendment was colourable or beyond the Legislature’s competence. The subject matter of the amendment, namely the resumption of jagirs, falls within the domain of land and land‑revenue law, which are enumerated in Entries 18 and 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 18 deals with rights in land, land tenure, landlord‑tenant relations, rent collection, transfer and alienation of agricultural lands, land improvement, agricultural loans and colonisation. Entry 45 covers land revenue, including assessment, collection, maintenance of land records, surveys for revenue purposes, and alienation of revenue. Because the principal legislation is intra vires, an amendment that deals with matters properly falling within those entries cannot be ultra vires. The Court further held that for the purpose of resumption it does not matter whether the lands were granted by the present State of Punjab or by a predecessor government; as long as the land lies within the territory of Punjab, the Legislature has full competence to enact a law permitting their resumption under the cited entries. The Court noted that if the words “made by or on behalf of the State Government” in Section 2(1)(a) had been omitted and the term “jagir” had been defined simply as “any assignment of land revenue,” the legislation would still have been intra vires.

The Court observed that, had the legislation remained unchanged, it would have been within the legislative competence and the State would have been authorised to resume the jagirs regardless of the identity of the grantor. However, the Legislature deliberately inserted the phrase “made by or on behalf of the State Government”. That insertion gave rise to the argument that the law did not extend to jagirs originally granted by the British Government. To eliminate the uncertainty created by that argument, the Legislature subsequently passed the Amendment Act of 1959, which incorporated the contested definition of “State Government”. The Court found no basis on which to hold that this amendment exceeded the legislature’s power, and therefore rejected the contention that the amendment was ultra vires. By rejecting that contention, the Court concluded that all of the substantive issues raised in the writ petitions and the civil appeals had been fully resolved.

In Civil Appeal No. 453 of 1961, which was filed by one of the jagirdars, Umrao Singh, his son Satinder Singh entered as an intervener. The intervener prayed that the Court issue appropriate directions to safeguard his interest in the compensation amount payable to the appellant under the Act. He asserted that, under the applicable law, a Cis‑Sutlej jagirdar does not hold absolute ownership of the jagir; rather, the jagirdar merely possesses a right to enjoy the land without any authority to alienate it. Moreover, after the jagirdar’s death, the next lineal descendant is entitled to the jagir free from any encumbrances imposed by the former holder. Consequently, the intervener contended that the jagirdar’s right to the compensation arising from resumption should be identical to his right to the jagir itself, and that if the compensation were paid to him alone, his reversionary rights would be jeopardised. He therefore requested that the Court provide adequate protection for those rights.

The Court noted that it had been drawn to the decision in Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh (AIR 961 SC 908), where compensation for the acquisition of jagir lands under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was divided equally between the jagirdar and his son in accordance with the provisions of that Act governing entitlement to compensation. However, the present appeal concerned a dismissal of a writ petition under Article 226 that challenged the constitutional validity and the applicability of the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957. As such, determining the allocation of compensation between rival claimants lay outside the scope of the present proceedings.

The intervener further pointed out that the Court, on his earlier application, had stayed the payment of a portion of the compensation to the appellant pending the disposal of the appeal, and he urged that a comparable direction be incorporated into the final judgment to stay part of the payment for a specified period so that he could protect his rights. The Court clarified that the stay order was an interim measure granted solely for the pendency of the appeal, and that a similar order could not be issued in the final judgment unless it was based on a determination of the substantive rights of the parties, which fell beyond the jurisdiction of the present appeal.

The Court observed that the question of the parties’ rights had already been placed outside the jurisdiction of the present proceedings, as earlier decided in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta. Consequently, the Court declined to express any view on the intervener’s entitlement or to issue any order concerning the payment of the compensation amount. The Court merely advised that the intervener remains free to institute any other appropriate legal action to protect his interests. Before closing, the Court noted that Writ Petition No. 148 of 1961 listed a total of seventy‑two petitioners. It was pointed out that several of those petitioners did not fall within the class of Cis‑Sutlej jagirdars, rendering their inclusion in the suit improper. The Court further observed that petitioners numbered sixty‑six, sixty‑eight and sixty‑nine had earlier filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court, raising exactly the same arguments presented in the present matter. Those earlier petitions had been dismissed on their merits and no appeal had been lodged against the dismissal orders, so, according to the Court’s earlier decisions, the same petitioners could not maintain the current writ. However, because the present petitions were being dismissed on their merits, the Court held that no additional consideration of the earlier points was required. Accordingly, the Court ordered that all the writ petitions be dismissed with costs and a single hearing fee, and that the corresponding appeals be dismissed with one set of costs. The judgment concluded with the formal statement that the petitions and the appeals were dismissed, citing the 1952 Supreme Court Reports at page 28.