Amar Nath Dogra vs Union of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1961

Decision Date: 15 April 1962

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In this matter the petitioner, Amar Nath Dogra, appealed against the Union of India. The judgment was delivered on 15 April 1962 by a Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, and Justice K. N. Wanchoo. The case is reported in 1963 AIR 424 and 1963 SCR (1) 657, with subsequent citations including RF 1966 SC 1068, R 1984 SC 1004, and others. The dispute concerned a suit brought against the Government under the Punjab Excise Act (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), section 40, and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act of 1908), section 80.

The petitioner had obtained a monopoly vend‑licence for the retail sale of country‑liquor. During the period that the licence was in force, he served the Government with a notice issued under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming damages for an alleged breach of certain licence stipulations. After receiving the notice the Excise Authorities suspended the licence, assumed control of the vend shops, and commenced proceedings to recover the monthly instalments that were due from the petitioner. The petitioner initially filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the State from realizing the balance of the licence fees; that suit was later withdrawn. He then instituted the present suit, claiming damages on several grounds, including damages resulting from the suspension of the licence. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the notice under section 80 was not proper and that the suit was barred by section 40 of the Punjab Excise Act, although it recorded findings on the merits. The High Court affirmed the dismissal but altered the finding on one specific claim item. Before the Supreme Court the petitioner contended that the notice issued under section 80 was proper and that the suit was therefore maintainable.

The Court held that when a first suit is filed after a notice under section 80 and that suit is withdrawn, a second suit may be instituted without issuing a fresh notice, provided the original notice satisfies the legal requirements for the second suit. The Court emphasized that the notice should be interpreted not in a pedantic manner but with common‑sense, focusing on its purpose to convey substantial information about the claim so that the Government can consider the claim and possibly avoid litigation. In the instant case the Court found that the notice failed to fulfil that purpose. The Court referred to the authorities State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies (AIR 1960 SC 1309) and Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. Union of India (1958 SCR 781). Additionally, the Court observed that the plaint was inconsistent with the notice and sought reliefs based on a cause of action that arose after the notice was served.

The Court observed that the relief claimed in the suit arose after the notice had been served, and therefore, even if the language of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code were read literally, it could not be said that the statutory requirement of giving a proper notice had been satisfied. In addition, the Court held that the claim for a refund of the advance deposit could not be entertained because the suit was barred by section 40 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914.

The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No 417 of 1961, which was filed by special leave against the order dated 31 December 1958 pronounced by the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh at Simla in Regular Civil First Appeal No 4 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant were A V Viswanatha Sastri and Gopal Singh, while the respondent was represented by V D Mahajan and P D Menon. The appeal was decided on 10 April 1962, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The appeal challenged the decision of the Judicial Commissioner which confirmed a decree of the Senior Sub‑Judge of Mandi that dismissed the appellant’s suit.

For context, the dispute originated from a public auction held on 25 February 1952 at Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, where a monopoly vend‑licence for the retail sale of country‑liquor for the period from 1 April 1952 to 31 March 1953 was put up for bidding. The appellant emerged as the highest bidder with a bid of Rs 1,28,600, and the bid was accepted. The auction terms required the payment of one‑sixth of the bid amount within a month; consequently, the appellant deposited Rs 21,460 as the required advance. After obtaining the licence, the appellant commenced its operation and paid the stipulated monthly instalments of Rs 10,714 for the months of April and May.

Subsequently, the appellant alleged that the Excise authorities had failed to fulfil certain obligations, particularly concerning the supply of liquor, and the parties exchanged correspondence on the matter. Although the authorities made some attempts to resolve the issues, the appellant remained dissatisfied, ceased his liquor sales, and on 2 September 1952 served a notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code on the Government, claiming damages for alleged breaches of the licence stipulations. Following receipt of this notice, the Collector of Excise suspended the appellant’s licence pursuant to section 36 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, and then, invoking section 39 of the same Act, took over the management of the vend‑shops previously run by the appellant. Because the appellant failed to pay the monthly instalments due from June 1952 onward, the Collector also initiated proceedings to recover those outstanding amounts. In response, the appellant instituted Suit No 345 of 1952 before the Sub‑Judge of Mandi on 26 November 1952, together with other plaintiffs who were similarly situated, seeking a permanent injunction restraining the State of Himachal Pradesh from realising the balance of the licence‑fees due from him.

In the earlier proceedings the appellant had sought a permanent injunction to restrain the State of Himachal Pradesh from recovering the balance of licence fees that were alleged to be due from him, alleging that another liquor licence had been taken from persons who were apparently in a similar position. Several technical objections were raised concerning the maintainability of that suit, and subsequently the suit was withdrawn on 12 May 1953. The withdrawal was made after the court granted the appellant liberty, under Order 23 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, to institute a fresh suit. Acting upon that liberty, the appellant filed a new suit in the Court of the District Judge at Mandi on 5 May 1953. The new suit was essentially an action for damages on the ground of breach of contract. The Union of India, which was the respondent in that suit, pleaded a number of defences. These defences were of two kinds: first, the Union contended that the suit was defective because it had not been preceded by a proper notice as required by section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code; second, the Union asserted that the suit was barred by the Punjab Land Revenue Act as applied to Himachal Pradesh, as well as by the Punjab Excise Act of 1914 and the rules made thereunder. The learned District Judge gave effect to the technical objections raised by the Union and dismissed the suit on that basis, although he also recorded findings on the merits. The findings on the merits were largely adverse to the appellant, and consequently the appellant’s claim for damages was rejected. The appellant then appealed to the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh. The Judicial Commissioner largely affirmed the District Judge’s conclusions, accepting both the technical objections and the adverse findings on the merits. However, the Commissioner did reverse one finding in which the trial‑Judge had previously ruled in the appellant’s favour, but notwithstanding that reversal the appeal was dismissed. Following the dismissal, the appellant applied for a certificate of fitness under article 133 (1)(b) of the Constitution in order to seek a further appeal to this Court. That application was refused, and the appellant then obtained special leave to appeal from this Court, which brings the matter before us today. From the preceding narrative it was clear that any consideration of the appellant’s substantive claim for damages could arise only if the underlying suit were found to be maintainable. Because the Court was of the view that the appeal must fail primarily on the ground that the suit was not maintainable due to non‑compliance with the requirements of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court did not hear counsel on the merits of the appellant’s alleged breach of contract or on the relief that might be awarded. Accordingly, the Court limited its discussion to the facts necessary to decide whether the suit was maintainable in view of the alleged failure to comply with the requisites of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the relevant provision of which provides: “No suit shall be instituted against the Government…”

Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that no suit may be instituted against the Government or a public officer for any act allegedly performed by the officer in his official capacity until after a period of two months has elapsed following the delivery, or leaving, of a written notice. The notice must be addressed to, or left at the office of, the appropriate authority: in the case of a suit against the Central Government—except where the suit relates to a railway—the notice must be delivered to a Secretary to that Government; for other categories the statute enumerates additional recipients, indicated in the text as (b) and (c). When the notice is directed to a public officer, it must be delivered to him or left at his office and must state the cause of action, the plaintiff’s name, description and place of residence, and the relief claimed. The plaint itself must contain a declaration that such notice has been delivered or left. It is undisputed that compliance with the requirements of section 80 is mandatory for the suits to which it applies, and that a suit failing to satisfy those requirements is liable to be dismissed.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the requirements of section 80 had been substantially complied with, and the Court addressed that contention. According to the last provision of section 80, the plaint must state that the notice was delivered or left. The appellant’s plaint, in paragraph 20, asserted: “The plaintiff delivered a notice under s. 80, Civil Procedure Code containing the requisite particulars to the defendant through the Collector, Mandi on September 4, 1952 and through the Chief Secretary on September 3, 1952. A previous suit for injunction was withdrawn on May 12, 1953 with permission to bring a fresh suit on payment of costs which was deposited on May 13, 1953 per Challan No. 17 of 1953. Copy of the order is attached herewith.” The Union of India, in its written statement, contested the validity of that notice. It argued that the notice did not satisfy the statutory requirements of section 80 and therefore the suit was untenable. The Union’s objection was phrased as follows: “A fresh notice was necessary for the institution of this suit. The plaintiff has failed to serve such a notice under s. 80, Civil Procedure Code. The notice mentioned in paragraph 20 of the plaint was not valid; it was defective and not according to law. The present suit, moreover, is at variance with the notice. The suit shall therefore be deemed to be without notice and not maintainable.” The Union’s plea raised three specific points for consideration: (1) when a suit is instituted after a notice under section 80 but later withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit, a new notice is required before the second suit can be filed; (2) the allegations and reliefs set out in the plaint differ from the cause of action and reliefs described in the notice issued under section 80; and (3) the notice itself is defective because it does not comply with the requirements of section 80. The Court indicated that it would not accept the first objection as decisive, and indicated a focus on the second objection concerning the substantial disconformity between the plaint and the notice.

It was observed that the first objection raised contained considerable substance. The Court held that if the suit presently before it was preceded by a notice that fully complied with the requirements of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the subsequent filing and later withdrawal of an earlier suit could not, on any legal principle, nullify or extinguish the effect of that notice. Consequently, the existence of a prior suit that had been dismissed did not defeat the validity of the notice issued before the present pleading. The Court then turned its attention primarily to the second objection, which alleged a significant mismatch between the pleading filed by the appellant and the notice referred to in paragraph 20 of the petition. To determine whether the respondent’s claim of inconsistency was justified, the Court decided to examine closely both the allegations and the reliefs pleaded in the petition as well as the contents of the notice. The analysis began with a detailed review of the petition. The petition first recounted an auction that took place on 25 February 1952, through which a vend‑licence was granted to the appellant for the financial year 1952‑53, and it set out the essential terms and conditions of that auction. In paragraph 2, the petition alleged that the defendant had breached the contract, thereby giving the plaintiff the right to sue for damages. The petition then enumerated a series of heads of claim, spanning paragraphs 3 to 20, which together comprised the total sum of damages for which a decree was sought. The initial head of claim, detailed in paragraph 3, concerned loss of profit attributable to an inadequate supply of liquor. The petition asserted that during May and June 1952, the supply fell short by 632 gallons, resulting in a loss of Rs 5,112‑18/‑ that the plaintiff could have earned had the supply been made in full. Paragraph 4 addressed the non‑supply of certain special varieties of liquor during April, May and June. Paragraph 5 complained that the liquor supplied was kerosene‑based and unwholesome, and that the authorities had declared it unfit for human consumption. The petition calculated the damages for this offence in paragraph 18 at Rs 4,222/‑, representing the excise duty paid to the Treasury on the liquor that had been declared unfit; a later paragraph sought a refund of that amount. Paragraph 6 set forth another allegation. The plaintiff claimed that he had offered a bid exceeding one lakh and twenty thousand rupees because the auction terms required that liquor be supplied in pilfer‑proof bottles with metal caps. The plaintiff contended that the failure to meet this condition caused a loss of Rs 8/‑ per bottle, amounting to a total loss of Rs 26,400/‑ on the number of bottles that should have been delivered.

In the plaint, the claimant detailed several separate monetary demands. Paragraph eight sought Rs 1,047/10/ as compensation for the loss arising because the Government charged a price assuming delivery in pilfer‑proof bottles while the actual supplies were placed in ordinary containers. Paragraph seven alleged a loss of Rs 5,008/11, asserting that the price reflected a deficient quantity of liquor supplied due to the use of undersized bottles. Paragraph nine complained that the contract required the Government to purchase back empty bottles, but the Government failed to do so, causing the plaintiff to lose Rs 931/8/-. Paragraph ten asserted that the Government had not taken measures to suppress illicit distillation, which allegedly caused loss; however, the loss was not quantified and no monetary claim was made under that heading. Paragraphs two through thirteen challenged the legality of the Excise authorities’ actions in suspending the licence and assuming control of the vend‑shops under their management.

Paragraph sixteen claimed a refund of Rs 21,460/-, representing the amount that had been deposited in the Treasury when the licence was originally granted to the appellant. Paragraph nineteen contended that the Government’s breach of contract cost the plaintiff a monthly profit of Rs 5,052/, for the unworked period spanning from July 1, 1952 to March 31, 1953, amounting in total to Rs 45,471/6/-. The various amounts enumerated in the plaint summed to Rs 1,09,653/11/. The plaintiff then stated that, based on Schedule B, the total refund and compensation due amounted to Rs 1,09,653/11/ and that the detailed computation supporting this figure was set out in that schedule. The claimant limited the claim for damages and refunds to Rs 74,935/8/3, restricting recovery to the items demonstrably due. Finally, paragraph twenty‑two prayed for a decree granting the asserted sum and for ancillary relief that would permanently restrain the dependent from recovering any licence fee or other dues from the plaintiff. The Court then turned to the notice of suit filed by the appellant, which purported to comply with section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. The notice, prepared by counsel instructed to serve the Collector of Mandi and the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh, recounted that the appellant had been the successful auction bidder and reiterated key contractual terms before stating that, beginning April 1, 1952, the client had continuously complied with the obligations under the agreement.

In the notice sent to the Collector of Mandi and the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh, the drafter asserted that the Government of Himachal Pradesh had failed to honour the obligations imposed by the agreement concerning the auction of the licences. The notice listed three specific breaches. First, it claimed that the contractors responsible for the warehouses had not kept standard‑sized bottles in stock. Second, it alleged that liquor was being supplied in bottles sealed with paper capsules rather than in tamper‑proof bottles fitted with metal lids. Third, it complained that, month after month, the quantity of liquor required to meet urgent demands was either supplied in insufficient amounts or not supplied at all. Following these allegations, the notice urged the Government to recognise its duties and liabilities and then set out the monetary claim. The drafter wrote that he was detailing the items that had generated damages which had accrued up to the present date and that he requested the Himachal Government to arrange for immediate payment. He stated that the loss suffered by L. Amar Nath Dogra arose from quota shortages, from supplies delivered in undersized bottles, from miscellaneous Excise VIII charges on supplies in ordinary bottles, and from the Government’s failure to maintain and enforce a buy‑back system for empty bottles. In addition, he claimed the return of two months’ advance deposits and a deposit relating to Duty and Miscellaneous Excise VIII that had been credited to the treasury at Sunder Nagar. The total amount he demanded was Rs 74,935/8/3, which he said could be paid either directly to his client or to him without delay.

The Court then examined the extent to which the statement of claim in the plaint differed from the contents of the notice. It noted that at an early stage of the proceedings the appellant had withdrawn a request for a permanent injunction, a relief that was not mentioned in the notice, so the Court need not consider that extra claim. The Court observed that the amount claimed in the plaint had been reduced to Rs 74,935/8/3, evidently because that figure corresponded to the amount asserted in the notice of suit. However, the notice did not explain how the sum of Rs 74,935/8/3 was calculated, nor did it show how the various items of loss related to that total. The Court further held that the detailed statements annexed to the plaint could not be used to infer the computation of the figure claimed in the notice. Additionally, the Court identified two items of loss that appeared in the plaint but could not have been included in the notice because they arose only after the Government had suspended the licence, subsequently cancelled it, and taken over the vend‑shops under its own management. These two items were (i) a loss on the yearly quota of liquor calculated at Rs 26,400 and (ii) a loss of profit for the period that remained unworked from July 1, 1952 onward.

In the calculation set out, the loss on the yearly quota of liquor was arrived at as Rs 45,471‑6/‑. If this amount and the loss of profit for the unworked period were subtracted from the total loss figure of Rs 1,09,653‑111/‑, the remainder would be only Rs 37,782‑5/‑. However, the notice of suit claimed a sum of Rs 74,935‑8/‑ in relation to the same items of complaint, which shows a stark difference between the two figures. There is also one item that appears in both the notice and the plaint with a definite amount: the claim for a refund of Rs 21,460/‑, representing the initial deposit of one‑sixth of the bid amount that the appellant had paid into the Treasury in March 1952. When this amount is deducted from the balance of Rs 37,782‑5/‑, the resulting figure is Rs 16,322‑5/‑. The notice, on the other hand, refers to a sum of Rs 53,475‑8/13 as the amount sought for the three specific complaints—failure to supply standard‑sized bottles, failure to observe the buy‑back system, and non‑supply of liquor in pilfer‑proof bottles. These calculations make it clear that there is a complete variance between the claim asserted in the notice and the claim articulated in the plaint. The Court wishes to emphasize that this is not a situation where a claim for a definite sum stated in the notice has been reduced in the plaint; rather, there is no possible way to link any particular amount claimed in the suit with the amount pleaded in the preceding notice. In the notice, the claim under one head could, for all that is known, be for an infinitesimally small sum, while the claim under another head appears to be exaggerated beyond the amounts shown in the plaint, making identification of corresponding sums impossible. Another way of viewing the matter is to note that the appellant’s notice listed several heads of claim, although all of them arose out of a single contract. On a reasonable and proper construction of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the authority to whom the notice is addressed is entitled to be informed of the claim made in each separate head. While it is true that a notice under section 80 is not a pleading and need not duplicate the plaint, and that no specific technical form is prescribed for such a notice, the purpose of the provision requires that the notice contain sufficient detail to inform the recipient of the nature and basis of each claim and of the relief sought. In stating this, the Court is merely restating the terms of the statute and acknowledging that a notice must, therefore, convey enough substantive information.

In this case, the Court considered whether the notice that was before it contained enough information for the recipient to understand the plaintiff’s claim and decide whether to defend the suit. The Court stated that the notice should be interpreted in a common‑sense manner, without being overly critical of the exact wording. After examining the contents of the notice, the Court concluded that the required answer was negative, meaning the notice did not give sufficient information. The Court noted that counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sastri, referred to a decision of this Court in State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies (1). In that decision, Chief Justice Das, speaking for the Court, observed: “The object of s. 80 is manifestly to give the Government or the public officer sufficient notice for the case which is proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he may consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. In order to enable the Government or the public officer to arrive at a decision it is necessary that it or he should be informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise reliefs asked for.” The Court also relied on a later passage in which the same Chief Justice extracted a statement from the judgment reported as Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. Union of India (2), which read: “The Privy Council no doubt laid down in 54 Ind. App. 338: (Air 1927 PC 176) that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not however mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from commonsense.” Applying this reasoning, the Court held that the notice placed before it in the earlier case complied with the requirements of section 80 because it set out the several heads of claim in detail. The Court then turned to the present notice and reproduced its various paragraphs. After a careful reading, the Court observed that the notice disclosed the existence of a contract for payment of godown rent, the quantity of goods, the rate applicable, the period for which the claim was made, and the failure of the first defendant to make payment. These particulars, the Court said, were sufficient to enable the first defendant, who is the appellant, to understand the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim and to decide whether to concede or resist it. The Court emphasized that such specific details were missing from the notice in the present case. While there is a general allegation that the Government did not comply with the contract, the notice does not break down the claim into the individual heads of demand that were listed in the earlier judgment. Consequently, the Court found that the present notice lacked the necessary quantification of each head of claim, and therefore did not satisfy the statutory requirement of section 80.

In this case the Court noted that the contract in dispute was outlined in the notice, and the various heads of claim were itemised in the paragraphs of that notice. The Court observed that, had the notice specified the monetary amount claimed for each individual head of relief, the Government would have been able to evaluate whether it was advantageous to settle the matter by paying the sum demanded. Because of the manner in which the notice was drafted and the way the relief was described, the Government never obtained such an opportunity. The Court identified only one component of the notice that contained a quantified amount, namely the claim for a refund of Rs 21,460, which represented an advance deposit paid before the licence was granted. However, the Court held that this particular claim was barred by section 40 of the Punjab Excise Act, which provides that when a licence, permit or pass is cancelled or suspended under the listed clauses, the holder is not entitled to any compensation for the cancellation or suspension nor to a refund of any fee or deposit paid in respect thereof. Consequently, the Court concluded that, as a result of the combined effect of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 40 of the Punjab Excise Act, the entire suit must fail.

Turning to the argument raised concerning section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court examined a further submission made by counsel for the respondent. Counsel contended that, notwithstanding any other defects in the notice dated 2 September 1952, the notice complied literally with the requirements of section 80 and therefore had to be treated as valid. Counsel argued that the only requisites of section 80 relevant in the present context were that the notice must specify the cause of action and the relief claimed. According to counsel, the notice identified a breach of a single, entire contract and listed the various stipulations alleged to have been violated, thereby satisfying the requirement to state the cause of action. Counsel further asserted that the notice satisfied the requirement to state the relief because it claimed damages in the form of compensation and set out the amount sought. Counsel pointed out that, with respect to the damages claim, the plaint had aggregated the various items to a total of Rs 1,09,653‑11, but had limited the claim to Rs 74,935‑18‑3, which was the figure used for computing damages in the notice. Accordingly, counsel argued that the Court possessed jurisdiction to grant relief at least to the extent that the items of claim common to both the notice and the plaint were concerned.

The Court observed that the validity of the notice could not be sustained on the basis suggested. It noted that when the notice dated 2 September 1952 was issued, the Collector had neither suspended nor cancelled the licence, and the claim set out in the notice sought relief for alleged breaches of stipulations in a contract that was then still subsisting. The Court referred to the extracted paragraphs of the notice, which stated that the client could not be forced to pay fees and other amounts without first being compensated for the damages and losses caused by the Government’s failure to fulfil material conditions. The notice further requested that the Government refrain from taking any untoward action, describing such action as unwarranted, illegal and unjustified, and expressed the client’s willingness to comply with auction conditions if the Government provided immediate redress and supplied pilfer‑proof bottles. The notice warned that, failing such redress, the client would be compelled to approach the courts, at which point the Himachal Government would be liable for damages, costs and expenses incurred.

When the plaint was filed, however, the Court noted a radical change in circumstances. By that date the contract had been terminated, the licence had been suspended, and the Collector had assumed management of the shops under section 39 of the Punjab Excise Act. Consequently, the allegations and the reliefs claimed in the plaint differed fundamentally from those in the notice. In the notice, the cause of action was the breach of specific stipulations in a contract that remained in force, and the sum of Rs. 74,935/8/3 was claimed as damages for those breaches. In the plaint, the cause of action was the alleged repudiation of the entire contract by the Government, which had cancelled the licence and taken over the shops; the heads of claim in the plaint therefore reflected damages computed on the basis of a total contractual breach. The Court concluded that, even if section 80 were interpreted narrowly and strictly, the requirements of that provision had not been met. As a result, the Court held that the entire claim in the suit must fail.

In this case the Court restated the reasons it had already explained earlier in the judgment and, after carefully reviewing the material placed before it, determined that the appellant had not shown any viable basis to overturn the earlier order. Consequently the Court concluded that the appeal could not succeed and therefore it ordered that the appeal fail and be dismissed. With respect to the question of costs, the Court observed that the particular facts and the conduct of the parties did not merit an award of costs against either side. It therefore decided that each party should bear its own legal expenses incurred in pursuing this appeal. Accordingly, the appellant was required to pay its own costs and the respondent was likewise required to pay its own costs. The final order of the Court therefore recorded that the appeal was dismissed and that the parties would each bear the costs of their own representation. This disposition brought the proceedings to a close, leaving the relief sought by the appellant denied and confirming that no party would be required to compensate the other for costs incurred in the appeal.