Achyut Adhicary vs State of West Bengal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1960

Decision Date: 12 April 1962

Coram: J.L. Kapur, K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter titled Achyut Adhicary versus State of West Bengal, the judgment was delivered on 12 April 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice J L Kapur, with Justices K C Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal forming the bench. The citation for the decision appears as 1963 AIR 1039 and 1963 SCR Supl. (2) 47. The case concerned an appeal to the Supreme Court that was sought on the basis of a certificate issued under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The certificate had been granted by the High Court despite allegations of an unusual delay in the delivery of the High Court’s judgment and claims that the judgment failed to address several factual questions raised during the hearing of the appeal. The appellant, having originally been tried by a Sessions Judge and acquitted of murder, was subsequently convicted by the High Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. The headnote of the decision notes that the Supreme Court held the certificate to be improper because mere delay does not satisfy the requirement of a “fit case for appeal” under Article 134(1)(c). Moreover, the factual questions raised before the High Court could not be transferred to the Supreme Court, as this would convert the Supreme Court into a fact‑appellate body, contrary to precedent set in Haripada Dev v. State of West Bengal and Sidheswar Ganguly v. State of West Bengal. The Court also referred to authorities such as Banashmi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (1900) LR 231 AI, and Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Swaminathna Ayyar (1920) LR 48 IA 31.

The criminal appeal, numbered 115 of 1960, arose from the judgment and order dated 18 September 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Government Appeal No. 14 of 1956. Counsel for the appellant included B L Anand, Ganganarayan Chandra, D N Mukherjee, and P K Bose, while counsel for the respondent comprised K B Bagchi, S N Mukherjee, and P K Bose. The judgment, delivered by Justice Kapur, began by stating that the appeal challenged a preliminary objection concerning the validity of the certificate issued under Article 134(1)(c). The objection asserted that the certificate was not proper and therefore should be set aside. The Court also noted that, should the preliminary objection be upheld, a further question would arise regarding the grant of special leave to appeal under Article 136. The factual background indicated that the appellant had been tried for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code before the Additional Sessions Judge at Alipore, sitting with a jury. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, leading to the appellant’s acquittal. The State appealed this acquittal to the High Court, where a Division Bench found misdirection in the charge to the jury, set aside the jury’s verdict after evaluating the evidence, and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate under Article 134(1)(c). That certificate was granted by a different Division Bench that had not heard the appeal. The appellant raised three specific points before the bench hearing the certificate application: first, that there was an unusual delay in delivering the High Court’s judgment and that many factual questions raised during the appeal had not been considered; second, that the High Court lacked authority to substitute its own assessment of the evidence in an appeal against a jury acquittal; and third, (the text truncates before the third point could be fully stated).

In the trial before the Additional Sessions Judge at Alipore, a jury rendered a verdict of not guilty and the appellant was consequently acquitted. The State appealed that acquittal to the Calcutta High Court. A Division Bench of that Court found that the charge to the jury had been mis‑directed; after reviewing the evidence, the Bench set aside the jury’s verdict, allowed the appeal and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. The appellant thereafter applied to the High Court for a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. That certificate was granted by a different Division Bench which had not itself heard the appeal. Before the Bench hearing the application, three points were raised. The first point contended that there was an unusual delay in delivering the judgment and that the Division Bench hearing the appeal had failed to consider many factual questions that had been raised and argued before it. The second point argued that the High Court possessed no authority to substitute its own assessment of the evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal rendered by a jury. The third point asserted that, in fact, there was no mis‑direction that caused a failure of justice or a mistrial, and therefore the High Court was not entitled to examine the evidence. The learned judges held that points two and three lacked substance, but they regarded the first point as raising a question of importance. The learned Chief Justice observed that the delay in delivering the judgment was indeed a very unusual circumstance and could result in certain arguments presented on behalf of the petitioner being overlooked by the learned judges while delivering their opinion. He noted that those arguments had been summarized by the petitioner in paragraph 18 of the petition; whether those arguments were ultimately persuasive was irrelevant, because the Division Bench judges were bound to consider and decide them. It was not denied that the defence counsel had canvassed the points summarized in paragraph 18 during the hearing of the appeal, and having regard to that fact, the Chief Justice was inclined to conclude that the petitioner was entitled to a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution on that ground. This reasoning formed the basis on which the certificate was granted. The Court has previously examined the circumstances under which a certificate may be issued under Article 134(1)(c). In Haripada Dey v. The State of West Bengal, it was held that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) on a mere question of fact, and that it is not appropriate to refer such a factual question to the Supreme Court, as that would effectively convert the Supreme Court into a court of appeal on facts.

The Court observed that it was not proper for a High Court to refer a question of fact to the Supreme Court for further consideration, because doing so would turn the Supreme Court into an appellate body for factual determinations. Justice Bbagwati had remarked that whatever misgiving the learned Chief Justice might have had regarding the conduct of a full and fair trial, the Chief Justice lacked authority to issue a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) when, in his own view, the matter involved a factual question. The Court noted that even though the appellant had not been afforded a full and fair trial, the issue raised was merely the need for a further factual assessment of the appellant’s case, which did not justify a certificate.

Later, in Sidheswar Granguly v. The State of West Bengal, the Calcutta High Court had granted a certificate on the basis that the appellant’s appeal had been summarily dismissed and that the appellant had not been fully heard. The Supreme Court held that this ground did not warrant a certificate, reiterating that a certificate could not be issued on a pure question of fact. Justice Sinha, speaking as the senior judge then, explained that Article 134(1)(c) did not involve “granting leave” but rather “certifying” that a case was suitable for appeal to the Supreme Court. He described the term “certifying” as a strong word and warned that High Courts erred when they granted certificates solely on factual questions, because the Supreme Court should only entertain cases involving legal complexities that required its authoritative interpretation.

In the present matter, the High Court had issued leave merely because of a delay in delivering its judgment, contending that the delay might have caused certain points raised by counsel to be omitted from the judgment. The Court pointed out that those omitted points were all questions of fact. The High Court had observed that the raised questions might or might not be strong arguments, but if they were raised, the judges “owed it to themselves to come to a decision on those points.” After the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the two cited decisions, the Court found it surprising that the High Court would grant a certificate on the slender basis of a delay in pronouncing a judgment and the alleged omission of factual questions. The Court stated that if the appellant truly had a grievance, the proper recourse was to apply to the Supreme Court under Article 136, not to rely on a mere delay as a basis for certification.

The Court observed that a mere delay in delivering a judgment did not constitute a proper basis for a High Court to certify a case as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court referred to the decisions in Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain [1900] L.R. 28 1 A. 11 and Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyer (1920) L.R. 48 I. A. 31, where the Privy Council, interpreting section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, explained that a certificate under that provision could be granted only when the case involved great or wide public importance. In the present matter, the Court held that a simple delay in rendering a judgment did not satisfy the expression “fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court,” even if the High Court believed that the delay might have caused it to overlook certain factual or legal arguments. The Court further noted that a High Court could not issue a certificate of fitness merely because it thought another bench’s judgment contained factual errors, as illustrated by the cited authorities. Consequently, the Court concluded that the certificate issued by the Calcutta High Court was improper and ordered its cancellation. The appellant then requested special leave to appeal under article 136, arguing that the record had been printed and that, if leave were granted, the appeal could be properly argued. After hearing counsel for the appellant, the Court found no justification to grant special leave. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the order of dismissal was affirmed.