Abdul Mateen vs Ram Kailash Pandey And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 195 of 1962

Decision Date: 31 July 1962

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.C. Shah

In this case the Supreme Court of India heard a petition filed by Abdul Mateen against Ram Kailash Pandey and other respondents. The judgment was delivered on 31 July 1962 by a bench consisting of Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice J.C. Shah. The citation of the decision is reported in 1963 AIR 64 and 1963 S.C.R. (3) 523, and it has been referenced in several later reports such as RF 1966 SC1780, RF 1968 SC410, RF 1969 SC1130, R 1970 SC1542, R 1970 SC1704, R 1972 SC2110, R 1975 SC386, and R 1978 SC949. The matter arose under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (as amended by Bihar Amendment Act No XXVII of 1950) particularly sections 47, 48, 57, 64 and 64‑A, which dealt with stage‑carriage permits.

The factual background began with the Regional Transport Authority advertising a new route and inviting applications for two permanent stage‑carriage permits. The authority awarded those two permits, one to the appellant Abdul Mateen and the other to a different person. An aggrieved party filed an appeal against the authority’s order, but the appellate authority dismissed the appeal. Subsequently one of the respondents, Sudhakar Sharma, approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the High Court set aside the appellate order. When the matter returned to the appellate authority, the permit that had been granted to the appellant was cancelled and was instead allotted to Sudhakar Sharma.

Following the cancellation, the appellant filed an application with the State Government under section 64‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, seeking an additional permit. The Minister of Transport examined the application, affirmed the appellate authority’s decision to cancel the appellant’s original permit, granted that permit to Sudhakar Sharma, and additionally issued a third permit to the appellant. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Ram Kailash Pandey instituted a writ petition in the High Court challenging the Minister’s order. He argued that the State Government lacked jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 64‑A for the purpose of increasing the number of permits, and that the grant of a third permit to the appellant was ultra vires.

The High Court accepted the petitioner's contention and set aside the portion of the Minister’s order that conferred the third permit on the appellant. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal to this Court. After considering the submissions, the Court held that where the Regional Transport Authority has fixed a quantitative limit under section 47(3), any subsequent consideration of applications for permits under sections 48 read with 57 must be confined to that fixed limit. Accordingly, on an appeal or revision, the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority must also be restricted to issuing permits within the limit prescribed by section 47(3). The Court further observed that the State Government cannot issue any order that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the authority whose orders are being reviewed.

In discussing the exercise of revisional authority, the Court explained that a revisional authority may not issue an order that corrects a decision of a lower authority when that lower authority itself lacked the power to make the original order. The Court observed that it cannot always be inferred that the number of vacancies shown in a public advertisement represents the limit fixed under section 47(3) by the Regional Transport Authority. However, the Court held that in a situation where a new route is being opened for the first time and the advertisement explicitly states the number of vacancies for that route, it is reasonable to conclude that the stated vacancies indicate the limit that the Regional Transport Authority must have established under section 47(3). The Court relied on the earlier decisions in Ban Gopal v. Anant Prasad, [1939] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 692 and Arunachalam Pillai v. Southarn Railways (Private) Ltd., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 764, which were followed. It also approved the view expressed in Mohammad Luqman Sharif v. State Transport Authority, A.I.R. 1961 All. 342, and reversed the earlier finding in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v. Shri Nathu Ram Mirdha, I.L.R. (1959) Raj. 120.

The matter before the Court was a civil appeal, designated as Civil Appeal No. 195 of 1962, filed by special leave from the judgment and order dated 24 August 1961 of the Patna High Court in M. J. C. No. 126 of 1961. The appellant was represented by counsel, while respondents 1, 2, and 3 were each represented by their respective counsel. The appeal was heard on 31 July 1962, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Wanchoo. The Court recounted the essential facts as follows: In July 1957 the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority advertised a new route between Gopalganj and Pahlezghat, inviting applications for permanent stage‑carriage permits and stating that two vacancies existed on that route. Several applicants responded, and in January 1958 the Regional Transport Authority granted permits to the appellant and another individual. The appellant challenged this decision before the Appellate Authority, but the appeal was dismissed. Subsequently, one of the respondents, Sudhakar Sharma, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Patna High Court. In April 1960 the High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Authority, relying on the precedent established in Ram Gopal v. Anant Prasad. The case was then remitted to the Appellate Authority for rehearing. Upon rehearing, the Appellate Authority altered the original order of the Regional Transport Authority by cancelling the permit previously granted to the appellant and granting a permit in place of the appellant to Sudhakar Sharma, while leaving the other permit unchanged. Following this modification, the appellant filed an application with the State Government under section 64‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. 4 of 1939 (as amended by the Bihar Amendment), seeking relief against the cancellation of his permit.

The Court noted that the Bihar Amendment Act, Act No. 27 of 1950, contained a provision stating that the State Government could, upon receiving an application within thirty days of the issuance of an order made in any proceeding under the relevant Chapter by any subordinate authority or officer, call for the records of that proceeding and, after examining those records, pass such orders as it considered appropriate. An application filed under this provision was heard by the Minister for Transport, who affirmed the order of the Appellate Authority that had cancelled the appellant’s permit and granted a permit to the respondent Sudhakar Sharma. The Minister, however, expressed the view that the introduction of bus service in North Bihar had created a growing public preference for bus travel because it offered a cheap and speedy means of transportation, and therefore an additional service on the same route could be permitted without impairing the effectiveness of the existing service. Consequently, while upholding the cancellation of the appellant’s original permit, the Minister concluded that justice would be better served by granting an additional permit to the appellant, who he found to be a suitable operator, and ordered that an extra service be allowed to the appellant on the specified route. Following this order, Ram Kailash Pandey, who had also filed an application under section 64‑A that had been dismissed, filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the Minister’s decision. Pandey’s principal argument was that the grant of an additional permit to the appellant was wholly unjustified, especially in view of the appellant’s inferior claim compared with the other permit holders. The petition named the appellant, the two persons who had received permits, the State of Bihar, the Appellate Authority and the Regional Transport Authority as parties. When the matter was heard before the High Court, it was contended that the State Government, in dealing with an application under section 64‑A, lacked authority to increase the number of permits beyond the two fixed by the Regional Transport Authority and that the order granting a third permit to the appellant was therefore ultra vires. The High Court accepted this contention, set aside the portion of the order that awarded the third permit to the appellant, but left untouched the remainder of the order that confirmed the permits to the other two persons. The appellant then applied for a certificate of appeal to the Supreme Court, which was denied. He subsequently sought special leave to appeal, and that leave was granted, bringing the present appeal before this Court. The principal question for determination in this appeal was whether the State Government, acting under section 64‑A of the Bihar Amendment Act, possessed the power to increase the number of permits for which applications had been invited by the Regional Transport Authority.

The appellant argued that the State Government possessed the same authority under section 64‑A as the Regional Transport Authority, a view that this Court had previously endorsed in Ram Gopal’s Case, and therefore the State Government could lawfully increase the number of permits in the same manner that the Regional Transport Authority could whenever it deemed such an increase necessary. To understand the appellant’s contention, it is essential to examine the structure of the Act as it relates to the issuance of stage‑carriage permits. The provisions governing the regulation of transport vehicles are located in Chapter IV of the Act. Section 42 stipulates that no owner of a transport vehicle may use or allow the vehicle to be used in any public place except in accordance with the conditions of a permit that has been granted or countersigned by either a Regional Transport Authority or a State Transport Authority. Section 43 empowers the State Government to issue directions to the State Transport Authority concerning various matters enumerated within that section. Section 44 deals with the constitution of both Regional Transport Authorities and the State Transport Authority and outlines the powers vested in them. Section 45 requires that an application for a permit be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region where the vehicle is intended to operate, subject to two provisos which are not relevant to the present appeal. Section 46 prescribes the specific form in which an application for a stage‑carriage permit must be presented. Section 47(1) sets out the criteria that a Regional Transport Authority must consider when evaluating an application for such a permit. Importantly, subsection 47(3) confers on the Regional Transport Authority the authority to limit the overall number of stage‑carriage vehicles, or any particular type, that may be permitted within the region, a specified area, or on a particular route, taking into account the matters mentioned in subsection 1. Section 48 authorises the Regional Transport Authority, subject to the provisions of section 47, to either grant a stage‑carriage permit on the terms of the application, to modify the terms as it sees fit, or to refuse the permit altogether, and also provides for the attachment of conditions to any permit in accordance with the applicable rules. Section 57 outlines the procedural steps for applying for and granting permits. Section 64 establishes the right of aggrieved parties to appeal certain orders made by the Regional Transport Authority within a prescribed time and in a prescribed manner to the designated authority. Finally, section 64‑A, which was inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act, provides for a revisionary power vested in the State Government. The scope and effect of this revisionary power become clear when the overall scheme of the Act is considered in light of the foregoing provisions.

In this case the Court noted that the principal provision governing the grant of a stage‑carriage permit is Section 48 of the Act and that, when the Regional Transport Authority issues an order either granting or refusing such a permit, it must do so subject to the provisions of Section 47. Section 57 was described as a procedural provision that sets out the steps to be followed in applying for and granting permits. Accordingly, the power of the Authority to issue stage‑carriage permits lies in Section 48, but that power is expressly subject to the conditions laid down in Section 47. Section 47(1) enumerates the matters that the Authority must consider when evaluating an application for a stage‑carriage permit, and Section 47(3) empowers the Authority, having regard to those matters, to limit the number of stage carriages generally, or of any specified type, for which permits may be granted in a particular region, area, or route. The Court therefore concluded that whenever the Authority proceeds, in accordance with the procedure set out in Section 57, to consider an application for a stage‑carriage permit and ultimately decides either to grant it or to refuse it under Section 48, the resulting order must be consistent with the provisions of Section 47, including the limitation power contained in Section 47(3). Consequently, if the Authority has exercised its power under Section 47(3) to fix a ceiling on the number of stage carriages, any permits it subsequently grants under Section 48 must adhere to that ceiling. The Court could not accept the appellant’s contention that, after following the procedure of Section 57, the Authority could disregard the limit fixed under Section 47(3) when granting or refusing a permit, because the same Authority is the one making the order under Section 48. Section 47(3) pertains to a general order that limits stage carriages generally, based on the considerations specified in Section 47(1). While the Authority may modify that general order if it so decides, such modification is not a matter for consideration at the stage when the Authority is dealing with the actual grant of permits under Section 48 read with Section 57. At that point, the Authority’s task is to select among the various applicants who have filed applications under Section 46 read with Section 57. The Court held that this is not the stage at which the general order made under Section 47(3) can be revisited, because the order under Section 48 is required to be subject to the provisions of Section 47, which includes the general limitation order of Section 47(3). Section 57(2) further indicates that an application for a permit may be made at any time not less than six weeks before the desired effective date, or on dates appointed by the Authority, and that every application, whichever the manner of receipt, must be dealt with according to the procedure of Section 57, culminating in a final order passed under Section 48.

According to the statute, an application for a stage‑carriage permit may be filed at any time provided that it is submitted at least six weeks before the date on which the applicant wishes the permit to become effective, or, if the Regional Transport Authority has prescribed specific dates for the receipt of applications, on those prescribed dates. Every application, irrespective of whether it is submitted before the prescribed deadline or on the appointed date, must be processed in accordance with the procedure laid down in section 57, and the ultimate decision to grant a stage‑carriage permit must be made by way of a final order under section 48. At that decisive stage, as previously observed, the Regional Transport Authority does not re‑examine the general limitation imposed by section 47(3); instead, it merely determines which of the pending applications should be approved. This determination involves selecting among the applicants when the number of applicants exceeds the number of vacancies advertised or exceeds the numerical ceiling established by section 47(3). Consequently, the legislative scheme operates as follows: a quantitative limit is first fixed under section 47(3); thereafter, applications received are processed according to the mechanism of section 57; and permits are finally issued under section 48, but only to the extent that the number of permits issued does not surpass the limit fixed by section 47(3). Section 64 further clarifies that an appeal under that provision may be lodged only by a person who is aggrieved by the specific orders enumerated therein, and it does not envisage an appeal against the general order made under section 47(3) that limits the overall number of stage carriages. Because such a general order is not a personal grievance, it cannot form the basis of an appeal under section 64. Accordingly, when the Appellate Authority entertains an appeal under section 64, it is not reviewing the general limitation order made under section 47(3); rather, it is addressing the same substantive issues that the Regional Transport Authority considered under section 41, namely, the selection among competing applicants for the grant of permits. Moreover, when an application is made under section 64‑A of the Bihar‑Amendment Act, the State Government is empowered to request the record of any proceeding conducted under Chapter IV by any subordinate authority or officer and to issue such order as it deems appropriate in relation to the case. It is noteworthy that the present version of section 64‑A differs substantially from the version introduced by the Bihar Amendment Act, and under the current wording the State Government no longer possesses the authority to act under section 64‑A. A remaining question is whether the provision inserted by Central Act No. 100 of 1956, namely section 64‑A, implicitly repealed the earlier provision inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act. Since the proceedings in the present matter originated in 1957, Central Act 100 of 1956 would govern, and therefore, if the provision introduced by the Bihar Amendment Act were implicitly repealed by the later Central Act provision, the subsequent analysis would be affected.

In this case, the Court observed that if the provision inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act were no longer in force after 1956, the State Government would lack authority to amend the order of the Appellate Authority thereafter. However, the Court decided not to pursue that question because it had never been raised before the High Court, and therefore it proceeded on the assumption that section 64‑A of the Bihar Amendment Act was applicable to the present proceedings. The Court also held that it was unnecessary to determine whether, under the provision inserted by Central Act 100 of 1956, the State Transport Authority could vary a general order made under section 47(3). The matter before the Court concerned a revision sought under section 64‑A, as inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act, by a person who was dissatisfied with an order of the Appellate Authority issued under section 64. The Court expressed the view that the revisional authority’s power was limited strictly to those matters that the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority were authorized to consider under section 48 and section 64 respectively. It reiterated that section 48 empowered the Regional Transport Authority to choose among various applicants when granting or refusing permits, and that section 64 confined the Appellate Authority to the same function when hearing an appeal by an aggrieved person. Consequently, when a revisional authority examined an application filed under section 64‑A by a person aggrieved by an order made under section 64, its jurisdiction was likewise confined within the same boundaries that limited the Appellate Authority under section 64 and the Regional Transport Authority under section 48. The Court cited its earlier decision in Ram Gopal’s case and reaffirmed the principle in A.S.T. Arunachalam Pillai v. Messrs Southern Roadways (Private) Limited, noting that although the words “as it deems fit” in section 64‑A are broad, they do not authorize the State Government to issue any order that the original authority was powerless to pass. The appellant argued that the Regional Transport Authority unquestionably possessed the power to revise a general order made under section 47(3), and therefore a revisional authority acting under section 64‑A could exceed the limits set by section 47(3) and grant a permit beyond the number fixed therein. The Court identified a flaw in that argument. While it accepted that the Regional Transport Authority could indeed revise the limit it had established under section 47(3), the Court clarified that such a power to revise the limit did not arise under section 48 when the authority was dealing with the grant or refusal of individual permits.

Section 48 was held to operate only insofar as it was consistent with the provisions of Section 47, and in particular it could not exceed any ceiling that might be prescribed under clause (3) of Section 47. The Court explained that the authority of the Regional Transport Authority to alter the quantitative limits fixed by it under Section 47(3) was a distinct power that should not be confused with the separate authority it possessed when it dealt with the grant or denial of individual permits under Section 48. Accordingly, the power to revise the limits under Section 47(3) was a general, regulatory power, whereas the power exercised under Section 48 related specifically to decisions concerning particular applicants. Because of this distinction, when an aggrieved person appealed an order made pursuant to Section 48 and then sought a revision of that order under Section 64‑A, the powers of both the Appellate Authority and the revisional authority were likewise constrained by Section 47(3). In other words, the appellate and revisional authorities were required to act in the same way as the Regional Transport Authority, and their orders would be subject to the same limitation that the Regional Transport Authority itself must observe under Section 47. If the Regional Transport Authority had, for example, fixed a numerical limit under Section 47(3), that same limit would bind the Appellate Authority exercising power under Section 64 and the revisional authority operating under Section 64‑A when they considered the same matter on the application of an aggrieved person.

In the case before the Court, the Regional Transport Authority had received a large number of applications in response to its advertisement for two vacancies on a particular route. After evaluating those applications, it selected two candidates and issued an order under Section 48 granting the permits. The matter was subsequently taken to the Appellate Authority, which modified the Regional Transport Authority’s order, but both the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority proceeded on the assumption that only two permits could be issued, that number having been fixed under Section 47(3). One of the aggrieved persons whose permit had been set aside by the Appellate Authority then filed a revision petition under the Bihar Amendment Act. The Court held that the revisional authority, exercising power under Section 64‑A, could only decide which of the applicants should receive the two permits; it could not increase the number of permits beyond the ceiling of two established by the Regional Transport Authority under Section 47(3). The Court further referred to the proviso to Section 57(3), introduced in 1956, which provides that where a limit has been fixed under Section 47(3), the Regional Transport Authority may refuse applications summarily if granting them would cause the number of vehicles on the route to exceed that limit. This provision demonstrates that the power under Section 48, when read together with the procedure in Section 57, must be exercised within the confines of the quantitative limit fixed by Section 47(3). Moreover, the Court noted that the Regional Transport Authority need not even follow the procedural steps laid down in Section 57 when the total number of vehicles already equals the limit set by Section 47(3). Consequently, an order issued under Section 48 in conjunction with Section 57 remains subject to the ceiling prescribed by Section 47(3), and such an order is not open to alteration by the Regional Transport Authority when it is acting under Section 48 together with Section 57.

The Court observed that under section 47(3) the Regional Transport Authority is empowered to reject an application for a permit summarily whenever granting such a permit would cause the number of vehicles on the concerned route to exceed the ceiling that has been fixed by that same provision. This observation demonstrates that the authority conferred by section 48, together with the procedural requirements of section 57, must be exercised strictly within the confines of the ceiling established by section 47(3). Accordingly, the authority need not even follow the procedure laid down in section 57 if the vehicles already operating on the route have reached the number prescribed in section 47(3). The Court further explained that an order issued under section 48 in exercise of the procedure of section 57 remains subject to the substantive limitation imposed by section 47(3). When the authority considers an application under section 48 together with section 57, it must act within the limits prescribed by section 47(3), and the order made under section 47(3) is not open to alteration merely because the authority is acting under section 48 and section 57. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the Regional Transport Authority retains the power to revise its own order at any time if, after proper consideration, it concludes that revision is warranted in accordance with the factors enumerated in section 47(1). In this regard, the Court affirmed the view expressed by the High Court that once the Regional Transport Authority has fixed a limit under section 47(3) and subsequently proceeds to entertain applications for permits under section 48 and section 57, it must keep the total number of permits it issues within that fixed limit. Likewise, on any appeal or revision brought by an aggrieved applicant, the Appellate Authority or the revisional authority must also be confined to issuing permits only up to the ceiling established by section 47(3).

The appellant contended that no limit had been fixed by the Regional Transport Authority and therefore the State Government could increase the number of permits from two to three. The Court explained that the normal method by which the Regional Transport Authority establishes a limit under section 47(3) is through a formal resolution, and that it may vary such a limit by passing another resolution. It was then urged that the record contained no evidence of any such resolution fixing the number of stage‑carriages on the route in question to two. The Court acknowledged that indeed there was no documentary proof of a resolution limiting the number of stage‑carriages to two. However, the High Court had held that the number could be inferred from an advertisement issued by the Regional Transport Authority that invited applications for two vacancies. This inference was vigorously challenged by the appellant, who argued that an advertisement alone should not be treated as conclusive evidence of a limit fixed under section 47(3). The Court therefore examined whether the advertisement could be deemed to represent a bona‑fide determination of the permissible number of permits, or whether a formal resolution was indispensable for establishing a statutory limit.

In the present matter the Court acknowledged that, as a general principle, the number of vacancies shown in an advertisement of this type cannot be taken as proof of the limit fixed by the Regional Transport Authority under section 47(3). Nevertheless, the Court identified a specific exception to this rule. The exception arises when the advertisement concerns a route that is being opened for the first time. It was undisputed that the case before the Court involved a newly inaugurated route and that the advertisement announced two vacancies and invited applications for those two positions. The Court explained that, for a new route, the Authority must first determine how many stage carriages it intends to permit on that route, and only thereafter issue an advertisement inviting applications for precisely that number. Consequently, when an advertisement for a brand‑new route specifies a particular number of vacancies, it is reasonable to infer that the number mentioned reflects the limit that the Regional Transport Authority has decided upon under section 47(3). The Court noted that, otherwise, it would be inexplicable why the advertisement for a new route would call for only two vacancies rather than, for example, four or six. The very inclusion of “two vacancies” in the advertisement therefore demonstrates that the Authority had concluded, before publishing the notice, that the number of stage carriages permissible on that route would be limited to two under section 47(3). The High Court had drawn the same inference, albeit without expressly stating that the route was newly opened. The present Court affirmed that such an inference is warranted in the context of a newly opened route. By contrast, the Court emphasized that for an existing (old) route, the number of vacancies indicated in an advertisement does not necessarily correspond to the statutory limit, because the overall limit may be higher and only a few permits may be vacant due to expirations. Accordingly, given the facts that the route was new and the advertisement specified two vacancies, the Court concluded that the Regional Transport Authority had already fixed the limit at two stage carriages under section 47(3). Once this conclusion is accepted, the subsequent legal consequences follow.

Accordingly, the Court observed that under section 48 the Regional Transport Authority was statutorily barred from issuing more than two permits for the route in question. Because the authority’s power was limited by that provision, the Appellate Authority, which reviews decisions of the Regional Transport Authority under section 64, also lacked any power to grant additional permits beyond the two permitted by section 48. The Court further held that a revisional authority, even when approached by an aggrieved person, could not exceed the same two‑permit limit.

The Court noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether the revisional authority might have jurisdiction under section 64‑A, which was inserted by Central Act 100 of 1956 for the purpose of revising a general order of the Regional Transport Authority made under section 47(3). The matter before the Court concerned only a specific sequence of proceedings: an order issued by the Regional Transport Authority under section 48 was appealed by an aggrieved person to the Appellate Authority under section 64, and subsequently that appellate order was taken in revision by an aggrieved person under section 64‑A, which had been added by the Bihar Amendment Act. In that factual context, the Court explained that the numerical limitation fixed under section 47(3) bound not only the Regional Transport Authority but also the Appellate Authority and the revisional authority. Consequently, none of these authorities could issue permits that exceeded the ceiling prescribed by section 47(3).

Based on this reasoning, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in holding that the State Government possessed no power to increase the number of permits beyond the two that had been fixed by the Regional Transport Authority under section 47(3). Specifically, the State Government could not raise the number of permits to three on the basis of an application made under section 64‑A, which arose from proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority under section 48 and before the Appellate Authority under section 61. The Court observed that different High Courts had expressed divergent views on this point of law.

The Court cited the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v. Shri Nahtu Ram Mirdha (I.L.R. (1959) Raj. 120), where the Rajasthan court examined section 48(a) of the Act as it existed before the 1956 amendment— a provision analogous to section 47(3) after the amendment. The Rajasthan High Court held that, at that time, limiting the number of stage carriages on any particular route under section 48(a) did not render the Regional Transport Authority’s order a final and binding decision upon the Appellate Authority. In contrast, the Allahabad High Court, in Mohammad Luqman Sharif v. State Transport Authority (A.I.R. (1961) All.342), adopted the opposite view. It held that when an order restricting the number of stage carriages was made under section 48(a) before the 1956 amendment, no appeal could be entertained against that order under section 64. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority, hearing an appeal under section 64, could lawfully revise, or “refix,” the number of stage carriages for the route in question.

After considering the authorities and the statutory scheme, the Court expressed its opinion that the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court was the correct approach. This conclusion was reached in light of the observations made earlier in the judgment and the limitations outlined regarding the powers of the Regional Transport Authority, the Appellate Authority, and the revisional authority under the relevant provisions of the Act.

The Court stated that, in view of the earlier discussion and the limitations it had identified, the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court was correct. The appellant then argued that respondent number one, who had filed the writ petition in the High Court, lacked locus stand to do so. The Court held that this contention had no merit, and consequently it could not be accepted as a valid ground. Respondent number one had claimed before the High Court that he should have been granted a permit instead of the appellant. Consequently, the Court found that respondent number one possessed the necessary locus stand to file the writ petition. It was during the consideration of that writ petition that the issue on which the appellant ultimately lost arose. For these reasons, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that costs be awarded to respondent number two, Sudhakar Sharma. The costs were imposed because respondent number two alone had supported the High Court’s construction on the question of jurisdiction. Thus, the appeal was dismissed and the costs were directed against respondent number two as the sole party supporting the High Court’s view. The Court entered a final order stating that, after consideration of all arguments, the appeal was dismissed in its entirety.