A. L. V. R. S. T. Veerappa Chettiar vs S. Michael Etc

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 131 and 132 of 1960

Decision Date: 19 November 1962

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Subba Rao

The case titled A. L. V. R. S. T. Veerappa Chettiar versus S. Michael et al. was decided on 19 November 1962 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by a bench that included Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner in the appeal was identified as A. L. V. R. S. T. Veerappa Chettiar, while the respondents were S. Michael and others. The formal citation for the decision appears as 1963 AIR 933 and also as 1963 SCR Supplement (2) 244. The reference to the applicable statutory framework was recorded as Hindu Law concerning Asura marriage, specifically addressing the test for distinguishing Asura and Brahma forms of marriage, the presumption that every Hindu marriage is in Brahma form, the requirement that the objector must prove otherwise, the effect of the bridegroom bearing marriage expenses, and the relevance of the Kanyādana rite.

The principal issue presented in both appeals concerned whether the marriage of Bangaru Ammal was performed in the Asura form or in the Brahma form. The appellant contended that the marriage was not of the Asura type. Apart from a mere allegation in the plaint that the marriage had been conducted in the Asura manner, the petitioners failed to provide any specific details or to establish a customary practice within the community to which the parties belonged. The petitioners introduced evidence that a sum of Rs. 1,000 had been paid as ‘Parisam’ to the bride’s father; however, both the trial court and the appellate court rejected this evidence as insufficient. The respondents, on the other hand, highlighted that the bridegroom’s party presented Kambu to the bride’s party at the time of betrothal and incurred an expense of Rs. 300 in connection with Bangaru Ammal’s marriage, arguing that these facts indicated an Asura marriage. The Court held that Bangaru Ammal’s marriage was not in the Asura form but was a Brahma marriage. No proof was found of any family custom of giving Kambu as Parisam to the bride, nor was there any evidence that Kambu was paid as Parisam at the betrothal ceremony. It was established that the bride’s father had spent a substantial amount, whereas the groom’s side had spent only about Rs. 300 on the marriage. The Court observed that the modest expenditure by the groom’s party could not be regarded as consideration for the father’s act of giving his daughter in marriage. Under Hindu law there is a presumption that every Hindu marriage follows the Brahma form, and this presumption was not overcome in the present case. Consequently, the Court was justified in presuming that the essential Kanyādana ceremony had been performed. Because no consideration passed from the groom to the bride’s father, the father’s act was treated as a gratuitous gift of his daughter to the groom. At page 245 the Court explained that the essence of an Asura marriage is the sale of a bride for a price, a form of marriage prohibited by Manu for all four castes of Hindu society. The vice of such a marriage lies in the receipt of the price by the bride’s father or other persons authorized to give her away.

The Court explained that if money or ornaments are given to the bride or to her father merely as a sign of affection, respect, or to fulfil a customary or ritual requirement, such payment does not constitute the consideration required to characterize the marriage as an Asura marriage. The Court observed that the legal texts do not prescribe that the expenditure incurred wholly or partially by the bridegroom or his parents be a condition or a defining feature of an Asura marriage; in those circumstances the bride’s father or any other person authorized to give her in marriage receives no consideration and derives no benefit from the marriage. The Court noted that the fact that the bridegroom’s party may bear the expenses of the marriage can arise from a variety of reasons, including the desire for prestige or vanity, prevailing social customs, the poverty of the bride’s father, or his unwillingness to spend on the ceremony. In each of these situations, the money spent by the bridegroom’s side is not a price or consideration for the bride. Even where the bride’s father is wealthy but chooses not to incur large expenses for the marriage and allows the bridegroom to bear the whole or part of the cost, the Court held that the father does not receive any consideration or price for his daughter. The Court further stated that if, in such a case, the bridegroom’s father had not incurred the expenditure, the bride’s father might have been compelled to spend some money; however, that indirect consequence cannot be described as a price or consideration for giving the bride. According to the Court, an Asura marriage is one in which the father of the bride, or any other person entitled to give her away, receives a sulka or price for the bride’s marriage. The Court explained that the test for an Asura marriage is two‑fold: there must be a benefit to the father, and that benefit must constitute the consideration for the sale of the bride. When the element of consideration is absent, the marriage cannot be characterized as an Asura marriage. The Court cited several authorities to support this view, including Jaikisondas Gopaldas v. Harikisandas Hulleshandas (1876) I.L.R. 2 Born 9; Vijarangam v. Lakshman (1871) 8 Born. H.C. Report 244; Muthu Aiyar v. Chidambara Aiyar (1893) 3 M.L.J. 261; Chunilal v. Surajram (1909) I.L.R. 33 Born 433; S. Authikesayulu Chetty v. S. Ramanvjan Chetty (1909) 1 L.R. 32 Mad. 512; Gabrielnathaswami v. Valliammai Ammal A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 884; Ratnathanni v. Somasundara Mudaliar (1921) 41 M.L.J. 76; Samu Asari v. Anachi Ammal (1925) 49 M.L.J. 554; Kailasanath Mudaliar v. Parasakthti Vadivanni (1934) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 488; Sivangalingam Pillai v. K. V. Ambalayana Pillai A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 479; V. S. Velavutha Pandaram v. S. Suryamurthi Pillai (1941) 2 M.L.J. 770; and Vedakummapprath Pillai v. Kulathinkai Kuppan (1949) 2 M.L.J. 804.

Civil appellate jurisdiction covered Civil Appeals Numbers 131 and 132 of 1960, which were filed on the basis of a certificate issued by the Madras High Court. The appeals challenged the judgment and decree dated 4 April 1952 rendered by the Madras High Court in Appeal Number 816 of 1947 and Appeal Number 83 of 1948. Counsel representing the appellants comprised A V Yiswanatha Sastri, R Ganapathy Iyer, K Parasaran and G Gopalakrishnan, while the respondents numbered two to four were represented by K Bhimassankaran, Durgabai Deshmukh, A Narayana Swami and R Thiagarajan. In Civil Appeal Number 132 of 1960, respondent Number 2 was advised by R Gopalakrishnan. The judgment was delivered on 19 November 1962 by Justice Subba Rao. These appeals raised a point of Hindu law concerning the validity of a marriage performed in the so‑called Asura form. To understand the factual matrix and the parties’ contentions, the Court set out the family genealogy. Muthusami Naicker had two wives, a senior wife and a junior wife. From the senior wife were born Konda Bommu Naicker (who died on 23 October 1873) and Kandaswami Naicker (who died on 31 July 1881). From the junior wife were born Kamayasami Naicker (who died on 31 July 1901) and Ponnuthayee Naicker (who died on 13 March 1938). The lineage also included Banmuga Valla, Konda Bommu Naicker (who died on 21 January 1901), Dorairaja Muthusami, Kama‑Parama alias the second plaintiff, and Thanipuli alias the third and fourth plaintiffs, as well as Errammal (who died on 2 February 1933) and Bangaru Ammual (who died on 14 December 1930). Bangaru Ammual had also married eight other women; the last of those to die were Meenakshi Ammual (5 June 1938), Krishna Ammual (10 November 1938) and Vellayammal alias Chinathayammal (2 May 1940). Thevaram, located in Madurai District, was an ancient indivisible zamindari. Shanumugavalla Konda Bommu Naicker held the zamindari from 23 August 1876 until his death on 20 January 1901. Upon his death on 21 January 1901, his daughter Bangaru Ammal succeeded to the entire estate by virtue of a will executed by the deceased.

To discharge debts incurred by her father, Bangaru Ammal executed a mortgage on 13 March 1913 over her properties in favour of Chidambram Chettiar for the sum of Rs 2,15,000. After the death of Chidambram Chettiar, his son Veerappa Chettiar instituted suit C S 31 of 1925 on 16 April 1921 in the Subordinate Court at Dindigul, seeking recovery of Rs 5,49,633‑8‑7 as the balance due under the mortgage. The parties reached a compromise, and a compromise decree was entered on 28 July 1928. Under that decree the mortgaged lands were divided into three schedules—A, B and C. The decree stipulated that if the amount of Rs 3,75,000 was paid by 31 July 1931, the mortgage would be deemed fully discharged; failure to pay would cause the properties listed in Schedule A to become the absolute property of the plaintiff. Properties in Schedule B, comprising certain pannai lands, and those in Schedule C, which had already been alienated by Bangaru Ammal, were released from the mortgage. Following the decree, K V Ramasami Iyer was appointed as the manager of the estate and as the receiver of the Schedule A properties, with a direction that any surplus income should be deposited with the court to apply toward the amount due under the compromise decree.

The Receiver of the properties listed in Schedule A was ordered to place any surplus income into the court account to be applied toward the balance due under the compromise decree. Before the deadline prescribed in that decree, Bangaru Ammal died on 14 December 1930. Her mother, Errammal, asserted that she was the rightful heir on the ground that Bangaru Ammal’s marriage had been performed in the so‑called “Asura form.” Errammal consequently filed Interlocutory Application No. 190 of 1931 in the Subordinate Judge’s Court at Dindigul, seeking an order directing the Receiver to surrender the estate to her. In response, Veerappa Chettiar filed Interlocutory Application No. 170 of 1932, requesting that the Receiver be directed to deliver possession of the Schedule A properties to him, contending that the period fixed by the compromise decree had elapsed and that the balance remaining under the decree had not been paid. In her petition, Errammal challenged the validity and the binding effect of the compromise decree as it applied to her interests.

After a detailed inquiry, the learned Subordinate Judge delivered his judgment on 1 February 1933. Though he held that Bangaru Ammal’s marriage had indeed been in “Asura form,” he dismissed Errammal’s petition on the basis that the original mortgage was valid and remained binding on her. He therefore allowed Veerappa Chettiar’s application and ordered that possession of the Schedule A properties be delivered to him. Accordingly, on 2 February 1933 Veerappa Chettiar took possession of the Schedule A properties, and on 19 July 1933 the Collector of Madura entered his name as proprietor of the Thevaram estate.

On the same day, 2 February 1933, Errammal died, having executed a will dated 30 January 1933 in favour of her nephew, Thangachami Naicker. It is also relevant that three co‑widows of Shanmugavalla survived Errammal; they died successively, the last of them, Vellayammal, passing away on 2 May 1940. Thangachami Naicker, together with one of the widows, lodged appeals before the High Court contesting the earlier judgments. The High Court dismissed those appeals, holding that they were not maintainable.

Subsequently, Thangachami Naicker interfered with Veerappa Chettiar’s rights concerning certain tanks and watercourses within the Zamindari. In response, he filed Original Suit No. 2 of 1934 in the Subordinate Judge’s Court at Dindigul against Thanchami Naicker and obtained a decree affirming his entitlement to the specified tanks. Thanchami Naicker appealed against that decree, but his appeal was dismissed with costs on 10 April 1940. In execution of the decree for costs, Veerappa Chettiar secured attachment of the property that Thanchami Naicker was alleged to possess.

S. Michael, the son of Thanchami Naicker, objected to the attachment on the ground that a sale in his favour had been effected by the alleged reversioners of Bangaru Ammal’s estate. The court dismissed his objection on 23 August 1944. The same claimant, S. Michael, thereafter filed Original Suit No. 52 of 1944 in the Subordinate Judge’s Court at Dindigul, seeking to set aside the order that had dismissed his claim. The suit proceeded on that basis.

Veerappa Chettiar and Thangachami Naicker were joined as defendants in the proceedings. On 31 January 1945 the people who asserted that they were the reversioners of the estate of Bangaru Ammal instituted Original Suit 14 of 1945 in the Subordinate Judge’s Court at Dindigul. That suit was brought against Veerappa Chettiar, his younger brother, and two other respondents identified as defendants 3 and 9, who were alleged to be tenants occupying certain items listed in the plaint’s Schedule of properties. The plaintiffs in this action were the grandsons of Kandaswamy Naicker, who, according to a genealogical record, was a paternal uncle of Shanmugavalla Konda Bommu Naicker. They claimed that they were the rightful reversioners of the Bangaru Ammal estate because Bangaru Ammal had been married in so‑called “Asura form.” The plaint alleged that succession in their favour arose when Vellayammal died on 2 May 1940, that a compromise decree issued against Bangaru Ammal did not bind them, and that, in any event, the properties enumerated in Schedule C and Schedule C‑1 attached to the plaint did not pass to Veerappa Chettiar under that decree. The defendants in both Original Suit 14 of 1945 and Original Suit 52 of 1944 contended that Bangaru Ammal’s marriage was not an “Asura” marriage; consequently, they argued that the plaintiffs in the 1944 suit were not the reversioners of the estate, that the compromise decree was binding upon the estate, that the Schedule C and C‑1 properties also devolved to the decree holder, and that, regardless of those points, the suit was barred by limitation. From the foregoing facts it was apparent that identical questions of fact and law arose in the two suits, because the title asserted by the plaintiffs in the 1944 suit derived from a sale deed executed by the plaintiffs in the 1945 suit. Accordingly, the claim in the earlier suit would succeed or fail depending on the validity of the title established in the later suit. For this reason the Subordinate Judge heard both suits together and the resulting common judgment was later appealed to the High Court.

The Subordinate Judge, after examining the evidence, concluded that the marriage of Bangaru Ammal to the Mannarkottai Zamindar was indeed an “Asura” marriage, noting that the Zamindar had expended an amount ranging from Rs 300 to Rs 575 toward Bangaru Ammal’s marriage and that, in light of certain High Court decisions, such expenditure rendered the marriage an Asura one. The Judge further held that the compromise decree was binding on the plaintiffs. Regarding the properties listed in Schedule C and Schedule C‑1, the Judge found that those items had passed to Veerappa Chettiar under the compromise decree as part of the Thevaram Zamindari estate, and observed that the plaintiffs had not been in possession of item 70 of Schedule C within twelve years of the filing of the suit, thereby rendering the suit time‑barred. Based on these findings, the Judge dismissed Original Suit 14 of 1945 and awarded costs against the plaintiffs. In the decision on Original Suit 52 of 1944, the Judge held that the plaintiff therein had acquired a valid title because he had purchased the disputed land from the plaintiffs in

The Court observed that the plaintiff in the other suit, who claimed to be the reversioner of Bangaru Ammal’s estate, could not rely on the decree that had been executed against the property because that decree did not bind the estate of Bangaru Ammal. Consequently, the Court decreed in favour of the plaintiff in that suit. Veerappa Chettiar, dissatisfied with the decree issued in O.S. 52 of 1944, filed an appeal before the Madras High Court identified as A.S. No. 816 of 1947. Similarly, against the decree in O.S. 14 of 1945 that had dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit, Veerappa Chettiar lodged an appeal designated A.S. 83 of 1948 and also filed cross‑objections in that proceeding. Both appeals were heard together by the High Court because they raised common points of law. The High Court held that, in Bangaru Ammal’s marriage, the community custom of giving Kambu (a millet‑flour box) before betrothal had been observed and that the entire marriage expense had been borne by the Mannarcottai Zamindar, apparently in accordance with that custom or a private arrangement between the parties. On that basis, the High Court concluded that the marriage was of the Asura type. The Court further held that, under the compromise decree, only the Melwaram right in the Schedule C and C properties passed to Veerappa Chettiar. Since there was no clear evidence as to who actually possessed those lands, and because those in actual occupation were not joined as parties to the suit, the Court deemed it appropriate to reserve the plaintiffs’ right to recover possession of the Schedule C lands in a suitable proceeding. Regarding item No. 70 of the Schedule C land, the High Court concurred with the Subordinate Judge’s finding. The Court also rejected the plea of limitation. As a result, appeal A.S. 816 of 1947 was dismissed with costs, and appeal A.S. 83 of 1948 was dismissed with costs, subject to the modification just described.

The counsel for the appellant summarized his arguments as follows: He contended that Bangaru Ammal’s marriage to the Mannarcottai Zamindar was not of the Asura form and therefore the plaintiffs in O.S. 52 of 1944, who were the grandchildren of her father’s uncle, could not be deemed reversioners to her estate. He explained that, according to Hindu dharmashastras, the essential distinction between a Brahma marriage and an Asura marriage lies in the nature of the transaction – a Brahma marriage involves the gift of the bride, whereas an Asura marriage involves the sale of the bride. Apart from a bare allegation in the plaint that the marriage was Asura, the plaintiffs offered no further particulars nor did they identify any specific custom of the community to which the parties belonged. The appellant pointed out that the plaintiffs had produced evidence suggesting that the Mannarcottai Zamindar had paid a sum of Rs 1,000 as parisam to the bride’s father for taking the bride, but that both the Subordinate Judge and the High Court had correctly found that such payment was not established by the evidence. Accordingly, the appellant maintained that the lower courts erred in characterising the marriage as Asura and in consequently treating the plaintiffs as reversioners to Bangaru Ammal’s estate.

In this case the Court noted that both the trial court and the High Court had correctly concluded that the alleged payment was not established by the evidence, but each court subsequently erred by constructing a different justification for characterising the marriage. The trial court mistakenly held that the fact the Mannarcottai Zamindar had spent an amount ranging from three hundred rupees to five hundred seventy‑five rupees on the wedding expenses automatically rendered the marriage an Asura type. The High Court went further and erroneously concluded that a general custom existed in the community whereby a bride‑price was paid by providing Kambu grain and Kambu flour at the time of the settlement of the marriage, and that the bridegroom’s side was required to bear the costs of celebrating the marriage. The High Court also held, concerning the marriage of Bangaru Ammal, that Kambu had been given and that the Mannarcottai Zamindar had incurred the marriage expenses, apparently in accordance with the alleged community practice or an arrangement between the parties.

The Court emphasized that no such custom had been pleaded by the parties and that there was no evidence to sustain the existence of a customary bride‑price involving Kambu. Moreover, the Court explained that the mere ceremonial giving of Kambu as a relic of an earlier tradition, or the bearing of some or all of the marriage expenses by the bridegroom’s party, could not be treated as a bride‑price as defined in the Sastras, because under those circumstances the bride’s father—or, in his absence, the bride’s relatives entitled to give her away—did not receive any consideration for the bride.

The learned counsel therefore attacked both the legal and factual findings reached by the High Court. The counsel for Mr Bheemasankaran summarised his argument as follows: according to the Dharam‑Shastras there were originally eight forms of marriage in Hindu law, four approved and four disapproved. Over the centuries most of those forms became obsolete, leaving at present only two recognised forms, namely Brahma and Asura. While the comparative merits of the various forms may have mattered in antiquity, today they are regarded as two valid forms of marriage that can be adopted by any caste without any perception of inferiority.

The counsel further submitted that although in remote antiquity the Asura form of marriage often involved a literal sale transaction, in the present day it is sufficient for a marriage to be classified as Asura if a ritualistic indication demonstrates that the parties or the community were conscious that the marriage was of that type. Such an indication may be manifested by the ceremonial presentation of Kambu at the time of betrothal or by the bridegroom’s party assuming liability for the marriage expenses, either wholly or substantially.

Finally, the counsel argued that, in the present case, clear evidence existed that the community to which Bangaru Ammal and her husband belonged practised the custom of the bridegroom’s party presenting Kambu to the bride’s party at betrothal and of the bridegroom’s party bearing the marriage expenses. The Court observed that these practices, if proven, would demonstrate that the bride’s father—or, in his absence, the bride’s relatives entitled to give her away—received a clear benefit, thereby supporting the conclusion that the marriage was of the Asura form rather than the Brahma form, which requires a formal Kanyadhan.

It was observed that the custom in the community was to give a clear benefit to the bride’s family at the time of marriage, and the evidence showed that this custom had been observed in the marriage of Bangaru Ammal. The Court noted that for a marriage to be classified as a Brahma form a ritual known as “Kanyadhan” must be performed; however, the records demonstrated that no Kanyadhan had taken place. Consequently, the Court concluded that Bangaru Ammal’s marriage could not be described as a Brahma marriage and could only fall under the alternative category, namely the Asura form. Before addressing the specific arguments raised, the Court made several general observations. It stated that it was not concerned with the present‑day relative importance of the two forms of marriage, but solely with the conditions prescribed by the Shastras for each form and with determining which form applied to Bangaru Ammal’s marriage. The Court also clarified that it was not examining whether the institution of Brahma marriage continues to be observed in its original purity. Moreover, the appeals did not involve any customary form of marriage; the dispute concerned a marriage sanctioned by Hindu law, and no custom was invoked to derogate from that law. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that a community custom may exist that does not conflict with Hindu law but merely prescribes the manner of satisfying a legal condition. For example, if the criterion for an Asura marriage is the sale of the bride, a community might have a customary way of paying the consideration for that sale. The Court pointed out that, in the present case, the counsel for the respondents did not rely on any such custom in the extended sense; instead, they relied only on the prevailing practice in the community to support the evidence that the same practice had been followed in Bangaru Ammal’s marriage. The principal issue, therefore, was to determine the essential ingredients of an Asura marriage. The Court turned to the Manu Smriti, which has been regarded by sages and commentators from the earliest times as a paramount authority, for guidance. The relevant verses, as translated by Manmatha Nath Dutt Shastri, were quoted. Chapter III, Verse 21 enumerates the various types of marriage as Brahma, Daiva, Prajapatya, Asura, Gandharva, Rakshasa and Paisacha, the latter being the eighth form. Verse 24 states that the four forms of marriage are ordained as proper for Brahmanas, the Rakshasa form is proper for Kshatriyas, and the Asura form is proper for Vaishyas and Shudras. Verse 25 declares that out of five recognized forms, three are lawful and two are sinful, expressly prohibiting a man from marrying a wife in the Pisacha or Asura form. Verse 27 describes the form of marriage in which a well‑attired bride, adorned with ornaments, is given in …

The Court explained that a marriage in which an erudite and good‑charactered bridegroom is specially invited by the bride’s father to receive his daughter is described in the ancient text as a Brahma marriage. It then quoted Verse 31, which defines the A’sura form of marriage as the situation where the bridegroom, of his own desire, pays money both to the bride’s father and to the bride herself and thereby receives the bride in marriage. The Court further cited Verse 51, observing that an educated father of a girl must not accept any amount referred to as “Sulka” from the bridegroom; the verse warns that a father who takes a dowry out of greed becomes the seller of his offspring. Verse 53 was then mentioned, explaining that even the acceptance of an “abovine pair” by the bride’s father from the bridegroom is regarded by certain authorities as a dowry, and that any dowry, whether of great value or of insignificant worth, amounts to the sale of the girl. In contrast, Verse 54 states that when the relatives of the bride accept a dowry voluntarily presented by the bridegroom’s father, such a transfer does not constitute a sale of the bride, because the gift is deemed an expression of love or affection rather than a purchase. The Court also referred to Verse 98 of Chapter IX, which admonishes that even a Śūdra must not receive any price, duty, or monetary consideration for his daughter’s hand when she is given away in marriage, as such receipt amounts to a concealed sale of the girl. The Court summarized that, prior to the composition of the Manu Smriti, the A’sura type of marriage was considered appropriate for Vaishyas and Śūdras but was prohibited for Brahmins and Kshatriyas. However, the Manu Smriti emphatically declares that the A’sura form is sinful for all castes, including Śūdras, leaving no ambiguity about the universal prohibition. Verse 98 reinforces this point by specifically stating that a Śūdra may not accept any price for his daughter’s hand. The Court then turned to the criteria that define an A’sura marriage according to Manu, noting that a comparison between the terminology used for Brahma marriage and that for A’sura marriage reveals the author’s intention. The key terms identified in the definitions are “dāna” (gift), “kānyapradānam” (the giving of the bride), “draviṇa” (wealth), “dattavā” (after having given), “saktitah” (as much as he can), and “svacchaṇḍya” (as according to his will). The Court highlighted that the word “apradāna” appears in the definition of A’sura marriage, contrasting with “dāna” in the Brahma form; in a Brahma marriage the father bestows the bride as a gift, whereas in an A’sura marriage the bridegroom acquires the bride not through a gift but by providing wealth to both the bride’s father and the bride. In the former case the father voluntarily offers the bride adorned with ornaments, while in the latter case the bridegroom, acting of his own volition, pays as much money as he is able to the father and then takes the bride as his wife.

The Court observed that the terms “Saktitah” and “Svacchandya” convey that the payment is made to the extent that the bridegroom is able, and that the bride is taken because the bridegroom voluntarily wishes to do so. In other words, a bridegroom who desires to marry a girl acquires her only insofar as he can afford to purchase her from her father. The Court said that this arrangement is essentially a sale because every element of a sale is present. Any doubt that might remain about this characterization, the Court explained, is removed by reference to Verse 51 and Verse 54 of the Manu‑Smriti.

According to Verse 51, Manu clarifies that when a father accepts a dowry motivated by greed, he becomes the seller of his own offspring. The term “Sulka” is defined as the receipt of a gratuity or price. The expression “dravina” occurring in Verse 31 is explicated by the use of “Sulka” in Verse 51. The Court emphasized that the prohibited act is the demand of Sulka, that is, the price for the bride. Verse 54 distinguishes between Sulka or dravina, which is the price paid by the bridegroom as a purchase price for the bride, and a dowry that is given as a gift out of love, affection, or admiration for the bride. Verse 98 further reiterates that what Manu forbids is the sale of a bride for a price.

Consequently, the Court held that, as per Manu, an “A’sura” marriage is a transaction of sale in which the girl is sold for a price. The Court noted that the same meaning, though expressed in different wording, is found in the writings of other Hindu law‑givers. The Court then quoted several ancient sources that describe the A’sura rite as a marriage in which money is given to the parents and the bride is purchased. For example, the Baudhayana text 1, II, 20(7) states that when a bridegroom receives a maiden after pleasing the parents with money, this constitutes the rite of the Asuras. Another passage declares that a woman purchased for money is not considered a wife and cannot serve as a participant in sacrificial rites, being likened to a slave. Further citations from Baudhayana Prasad, Kasyapa, Vasishtha, Narada, Gautama, Vishnu, and Yajnavalkya all describe the A’sura marriage as one in which a bride is obtained for money, distinguishing it from other forms of marriage such as Gandharva, Rakshasa, and Paishacha, which are based on mutual consent, force, or deception respectively.

In the 1918 edition of Srisachandra Vidyāmavā, page 126, the term “girl” is examined in the context of the Mitakshara commentary. The commentary explains that an Asura marriage is one in which a large amount of money is given to the father and other relatives in exchange for the girl. The ancient text Apastamba states that when a suitor pays money for his bride and subsequently marries her, the marriage is called the Asura rite. The Arthashastra of Kautilya uses the term “Sulkadanat Asura,” employing the word “Sulka.” In his commentary on verse 54 of the Manu Samhita, Medhatithi observes that the receipt of money or its equivalent for the benefit of the girl (kanyārthe) does not constitute a sale of the girl; rather, it enhances her self‑esteem and raises her standing in society. Medhatithi further concludes that receiving a dowry for the girl (kanyārtham dānagrahaṇam) is prescribed and that such a practice produces beneficial results (arthavādena). Apte’s Dictionary (page 239, column III) explains Asura as one of the eight recognized forms of marriage in which the bridegroom purchases the bride from her father or other paternal kinsmen, citing Manu 331 and Yājñavalkya 1.61. The sages and commentators, following Manu, describe the Asura marriage as a transaction whereby the bridegroom pays a price to the girl’s father or to kin entitled to give her in marriage. They also acknowledge a distinction between the bride‑price paid to the father and the presents presented to the bride herself.

The learned judges of the High Court, relying on the text of Apastamba, observed that the payment made to the bride’s father is intended to comply with Dharma rather than to serve as consideration for a commercial transaction. While the Dharmic interpretation may mitigate the perceived moral stigma of the practice, the judges held that it does not alter the essential nature of the incident. Consequently, they concluded that an Asura marriage is essentially a marriage transaction in which the bridegroom acquires the bride by paying a price to the bride’s father or other persons authorized to give her in marriage, and that, in substance, this amounts to a sale of the bride. The judges also noted that the expenditure incurred by the bridegroom for the marriage is considered a consideration for giving the bride. In support of this view, they referred to Arthur Steel’s 1868 work “Law and Custom of Hindu Castes,” which compiled the customs prevailing in the Presidency of Bombay for reference. On page 24, Steel states that the Sastras recognize eight kinds of marriage, including the Brahma type, where the bride’s father alone bears the expenses, and the Asura type, where the bride is taken in exchange for wealth and married—a form described as peculiar among the Vaisya and Shudra castes.

The Court observed that the passage in question, cited as 3.20,34, describes a transaction that is regarded as Uscorwiwuha and stree‑soolk, and notes that any money which remains unpaid constitutes an unlawful debt, as referenced in B‑2 at page 199. The author’s definition of Asura marriage, the Court explained, does not advance the discussion beyond what is already contained in the Hindu law texts; the author’s reliance is instead on his description of Brahmu marriage, which he characterises as a marriage in which the expenses are borne exclusively by the bride’s father. From this description, a contrary inference was attempted, namely that a marriage would qualify as Asura if the majority of the expenses were shouldered by the bridegroom’s father. The Court rejected this inference on two grounds. First, it held that the author’s definition of Brahmu marriage does not align with the definition provided by the traditional law‑givers. Second, the passage does not logically support the proposition that the bridegroom’s father incurring the costs renders the marriage an Asura one; had that been the case, the author would have explicitly stated in his definition of Asura marriage that such expenditure by the bridegroom’s family would classify the marriage as Asura. Consequently, the Court concluded that this valuable compilation of contemporary laws and customs fails to illuminate the issue presently before it.

Having dismissed the argument based on the author’s work, the Court turned to the broader question of whether the notion of a sale for a price has, over time, lost its substantive meaning, so that a mere form of sale—regardless of any real benefit to the bride’s father—might now satisfy the criteria of an Asura marriage. The Court found that no statutory text or scholarly commentary supporting this modern interpretation had been cited. Moreover, the existing case law did not endorse any such evolution of the doctrine. The earliest authority cited was the decision of the Divisional Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaikisondas Gopaldas v. Harkisondas Hulleshandas, reported in 1876 at I.L.R. 2 Bom. 9, where the Court defined the essential characteristic of Asura marriage as the giving of money or presents by the bridegroom or his family to the bride’s father or paternal kin, effectively amounting to a sale of the bride by her father or another relative who possessed the right to dispose of her in marriage. The Court further referred to Vijarangam and Damodhar v. Lakshuman and Lakshmi, reported in the West Bengal Reports, which provided historical background on the origin of Asura marriage and observed that all the Shastras cited by the parties concurred that the receipt of money for the bride is the distinctive feature of the Asura form of marriage. Additionally, the Court noted the decision in Muthu Aiyar v. Chidambara Aiyar, where money was paid by the bridegroom’s party to the bride’s father to cover marriage expenses; the subordinate judge, based on the evidence, found that the father retained the money for his own purposes rather than for the bride’s benefit, and consequently held that the marriage was an Asura marriage.

In the earlier case the trial judge classified the marriage as an Asura marriage because the bride‑groom’s party had paid money directly to the bride’s father. The High Court, in a brief judgment, affirmed that finding and stated, “it being found that a money payment was made to Thailu’s father we are not prepared to differ from the courts below in their opinion as to the nature of the marriage.” That pronouncement has been cited to support the argument that a marriage in which the bride‑groom bears the expenses is automatically an Asura marriage. However, the High Court’s view was rendered without a detailed analysis. The matter before the High Court was a second appeal, and the judges therefore accepted the factual finding of the Subordinate Judge – namely that a monetary payment had been made to the bride’s father – and expressed no willingness to depart from that finding. Their reluctance to revisit a factual issue on second appeal does not illuminate the specific question now before us. In the earlier decision of Chandavarkar J. in Chunilal v. Surajram (3) the same definition was endorsed when he observed: “Where the person who gives a girl in marriage received (1) (1871) 8 Born. F..C. Reports 244. (2) (1893) M.L.J. 261. (3) (1909) I.L.R. 33 Bom. 433. money consideration for it, the substance of the transaction makes it, according to Hindu Law, not a gift but a sale of the girl. The money received is what is called bride‑price; and that is the essential element of the Asura form. The fact that the rites prescribed for the Brahma form are gone through cannot take it out of that category, if there was pecuniary benefit to the giver of the girl. The Hindu law‑givers one and all condemn such benefit and the Shastras, regarding it as an ineradicable sin, prescribe no penance for the sale of a bride.” The learned judge also recognised the presumption that every Hindu marriage is of the Brahma type unless evidence disproves that presumption. In S. Authikesavulu Chetty v. S. Ramanujan Chetty (1) the record showed that at the betrothal ceremony a married woman belonging to the same caste as the parties travelled from the bride‑groom’s house to the bride’s house carrying a tray of presents that included coconuts, betel‑nut, garlands, black beads, saffron‑red powder and other items. The tray also contained a pagoda and a fanam. At that time there existed an arrangement wherein the bride‑groom’s father was required to pay a certain sum to the bride, while the bride’s father was expected to give some jewels to the bride‑groom. The parties claimed that the marriage was of the Asura type. The judges, however, held that the hallmark of an Asura marriage is the payment of money as consideration for the bride, and that the payment of a single pagoda and two‑and‑a‑half annas could not be interpreted as such consideration, especially because the bride’s father had spent thousands of rupees of his own money and had presented gifts of substantial value to both the bride and the bride‑groom. Accordingly, the decision underscored that a nominal or token payment does not by itself convert a marriage into the Asura form.

The Court noted that a token or gift presented as a compliment to one of the parents could not be treated as consideration for the sale of the bride, and it further held that all the surrounding circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether any amount was paid as a price for the bride. The Court referred to the earlier decision reported in (1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 512, where a Divisional Bench of the Madras High Court in Gabrielnathaswmi v. Valliammai Ammal rejected the argument that the mere receipt by a bride’s parents of what is called “parisam” automatically meant that the marriage was of the Asura form rather than the Brahma form. The learned judges observed that “it may be that parisam is a relic of what in old days was regarded as the price for the bride… the real test is whether in the community or among the parties the payment of ‘parisam’ was tacitly understood as being substantially a payment for taking the girl in marriage. That will depend generally upon the evidence in the case.” They also reaffirmed the Hindu law presumption that, “ordinarily the presumption is that whatever may be the caste to which the parties belong, a marriage should be regarded as being in the Brahma form unless it can be shown that it was in the Asura form.” The present decision, which also deals with the issue of parisam, follows that authority and establishes that the use of the word “parisam” alone is not decisive of whether a bride price was paid; each case must be examined to see whether the payment, whether small or large, in cash or kind, was intended as a bride’s price, i.e., as consideration for the bride. The Court then considered the case of Ratnathanni v. Somasundara Mudaliar, where a sum of Rs. 200 was paid to the bride’s mother for the expenses of the marriage as a term of the marriage contract. On that finding, Ramesam J. concluded that the payment was made for the benefit of the bride’s mother because, without it, she would have had to obtain the amount by borrowing, pledging her jewels or other property, and therefore the marriage was of the Asura form. The learned judge relied on Steel’s observation that the parents should incur the expenditure of the marriage in the Brahma form and, citing A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 884 and (1921) 41 M.L.J. 76, drew the contrary inference that if the bridegroom’s party met the expenditure, the marriage would be Asura. The same decision was also relied upon in Muthu Aiyar v. Chidambara Aiyar, and Spencer J., in a separate judgment, agreed with that view. The Court further observed that there is no justification in the Hindu law texts for the proposition that the bearing of the marriage expenditure by the bridegroom alone constitutes a test of an Asura marriage.

In this case the Court considered whether a marriage could be classified as Asura when the expenses of the ceremony were borne by the bridegroom’s side. The Court held that merely having the bridegroom’s party pay for the marriage could not be treated as consideration given to the bride’s father for the purpose of obtaining the bride. The Court referred to the judgment of Ramesam J., who had sat alone in Samu Asari v. Anachi Ammal, and noted that he had reiterated his view in even stronger terms. He had observed that it was irrelevant whether the bridegroom’s family paid the entire cost of the marriage or only a substantial part of it. He explained that when the bride’s father received such a contribution from the bridegroom’s father, he certainly benefited, even though he did not keep the money as profit but used it to meet the costs of the marriage.

Ramesam J. also stated that, in certain situations, payments made to the bride’s parents that were either small or comparatively modest in relation to the overall scale of the marriage expenses did not convert the marriage into an Asura marriage. Accordingly, the decision distinguished between “courtesy presents” given to the bride’s parents and the payment of the whole or a substantial portion of the marriage expenses by the bridegroom’s father. While the Court agreed that such courtesy presents could not, by themselves, make a marriage Asura, it expressed difficulty in accepting the view that the mere incurring of expenses by the bridegroom satisfied the test of consideration for the bride.

The Court then referred to the earlier authority of Kailasanatha Mudaliar v. Parasakthi Vadivanni, in which Varadachar J., speaking for the Court, defined the distinctive feature of an Asura marriage as “the giving of money or money’s worth to the bride’s father for his benefit or as consideration for his giving the girl in marriage.” The Court distinguished that case from Samu Asari v. Anachi Ammal on the ground that, in the latter, the money was held to have been paid for the father’s own benefit, even though he used it to meet the marriage expenses out of his own funds. The Court also pointed out the difference between payments made to the father for his own benefit and payments that reached the bride through relatives who did not intend to use the money for themselves. In Samu Asari, a jewel was presented by the bride’s father and placed on the bride’s neck during the betrothal ceremony as “parisam”; the value of that jewel was not the subject of any bargain but was left to the discretion of the bridegroom’s father. The learned judge observed that such a gift could not be described as a bride’s price.

Finally, the Court cited the case of Sivangalingam Pillai v. K. V. Ambalavana Pillai, where the bride’s father gave a large sum of money and jewels to the bride, and the plaintiff’s brother‑in‑law, on behalf of the bridegroom, presented the bride’s father with a gift of Rs 1,000 and a cloth worth Rs 65. It was also agreed that all the expenses of the marriage would be borne by the bridegroom. The Court considered these facts in determining whether such gifts and expenses amounted to consideration that would render the marriage Asura.

The court noted that the parties had agreed that all expenses of the marriage should be borne by the bridegroom. It was argued before the bench that the gifts presented and the money spent on the marriage constituted consideration for the bride, and that therefore the marriage should be characterized as an Asura marriage. The Divisional Bench rejected this argument. Pandrang Row J., speaking at page 481, observed that it is a well‑known fact that, irrespective of local customs, the bridegroom and his relatives also spend a considerable amount of money on the wedding whenever they are able to do so. He explained that such expenditure does not transform a marriage that is otherwise in the Brahma form into one that is in the Asura form, citing the authorities (1) (1925) 49 M.L.J. 554 and (2) A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 479. The judge further stated at page 480 that, in this Presidency, all Hindu marriages are presumed to be of the Brahma type unless the opposite is proved. Consequently, the onus lies on the party alleging that a particular marriage was Asura to demonstrate that a bride‑price was actually paid by the bridegroom or his representatives to the bride’s father. Regarding the customary present made to the bride’s father, the learned judge remarked that such a present does not automatically amount to a bride‑price.

Abdur Rahman J. added that any party claiming that a marriage was Asuric must establish that some price was paid for the bride either through an express agreement or an implied contract with the bride’s father or on the father’s account. The judgment, in the view of the court, correctly placed the principle on a sound legal foundation and clearly distinguished between a true bride‑price on the one hand and the gifts or expenditures made by either party in connection with the marriage on the other. Patanjali Sastri J., in the case of V.S. Velavutha Pandaram v. S. Suryamurthi Pillai (1), examined a similar situation where the bridegroom paid Rs 500 to the bride’s father specifically to have jewellery made for the bride, the payment being conditioned on the gift of the jewellery as a term of the marriage. The learned judge held that this payment did not constitute a bride‑price and therefore did not render the marriage an Asura marriage. In passing, the judge referred to the decision in Samu Asari v. Anachi Ammal (2) and quoted that “the father was benefitted by such contribution in that he was relieved to that extent from defraying such expenses himself, the marriage was one in the Asura form.” The court noted, however, that this view has been criticised in the latest edition of Mayne’s Hindu Law as not being truly supported by Hindu Law texts, and suggested that the point may require reconsideration.

In the earlier discussion the Court observed that the issue should be reconsidered if it later arose. The matter was taken up again by Patanjali Sastri, J. in Second Appeal No. 2272 of 1945. On the occasion of the marriage in that appeal a single sovereign, together with other presents, was given to the bride’s father as a customary token called Memmekkanoni. The central question was whether the mere observance of this customary form, without any further consideration, automatically classified the marriage as an Asura or otherwise unapproved marriage. The learned judge held that the payment of memekanoni was no longer, in substance, a consideration for the transfer of the bride; rather, it had survived merely as a token ceremonial payment that formed part of the marriage ritual.

This view was subsequently affirmed by a Divisional Bench of the same High Court in the case of Vedakummpprath Pillai Muthu appellant v. Kulathinkai Kuppan. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., speaking for the Bench, succinctly summarized the law on page 804 of the reported judgment, stating: “One essential feature of an Asura marriage, the feature which makes the form objectionable, is that the father of the bride receives a gratuity or fee for giving the girl in marriage. Ordinarily, it would be expected of every decent and respectable father when he selects a husband for his daughter to make his selection uninfluenced by any considerations other than the welfare of the girl. But when he receives a payment for his personal benefit, a very objectionable factor would influence his selection and it is clearly this which the ancient lawgivers took objection to and therefore relegated the form to the category we call ‘disapproved’. When the father accepts money and allows his greed or avarice to sway his judgment, he thereby converts what is intended to be a sacrament into a commercial transaction.” The present Court expressed full agreement with these observations.

Commenting on the argument concerning the payment of one sovereign to the bride’s father, the learned judge observed that, in most cases, such a payment had lost its original significance and now survived only as a ritualistic form, a ceremonial symbol devoid of any substantive content, meaning, or purpose. He further noted that when a father gives a substantial amount as stridhanam and receives a single sovereign in accordance with traditional practice, it would be incorrect to describe the father as having sold or mortgaged his daughter, or to claim that the sovereign was received out of greed or a desire for gain.

The discussion thus leads to the following conclusions. Under Hindu law marriage is a sacrament, and it is the religious duty of the father to give his daughter in marriage to a suitable person. However, if the father receives a payment, whether in cash or kind, as a consideration for giving his daughter in marriage, the sacrament is transformed into a commercial transaction. The Brahma form of marriage satisfies the test laid down by Hindu law, whereas, from Vedic times, seven other forms of marriage were also recognized.

According to customary practice and practical convenience, the Asura form was recognised as one of the eight classical types of marriage. The essential characteristic of an Asura marriage was the sale of a bride for a stipulated price, and this form had been expressly prohibited by Manu for members of all four Hindu varnas. The defect of the Asura marriage lay in the receipt of money or valuable ornaments by the bride’s father, or by any other person who possessed the right to give away the bride, as consideration for the bride herself. However, the Court observed that when the sum paid, or the ornaments presented, were not intended as consideration for the bride but were instead given to the bride, to her father, or to the family out of affection, as a token of respect, or merely to fulfil a traditional or ritualistic custom, such a payment did not convert the marriage into an Asura marriage. The legal texts did not prescribe that the bridegroom or his parents must bear the expenses of the marriage as a condition of an Asura union. In circumstances where the bride’s father or other authorized person received no consideration or material benefit from the marriage, the fact that the bridegroom’s party incurred the expenses was irrelevant to the classification of the marriage. The Court noted that the bridegroom’s family might assume the financial burden for a variety of reasons, including social prestige, vanity, customary expectations, the poverty of the bride’s family, or the bride‑father’s reluctance to spend. In each of these situations, the money spent by the groom’s side was not the price or consideration for the bride. Even in a scenario where the bride’s father was affluent but chose not to finance the marriage functions, allowing the groom’s family to bear the cost did not constitute receipt of a price for the bride. If the groom’s family had not incurred the expenditure, the bride’s father might have been compelled to spend some amount; such an indirect consequence also could not be described as a price or consideration for the marriage.

In concise terms, the Court defined an Asura marriage as one in which the bride’s father, or any other person entitled to give away the bride, receives a sulka or price as consideration for the bride’s marriage. The test for such a classification was two‑fold: first, there must be a benefit to the father or the person giving away the bride; second, that benefit must constitute consideration for the sale of the bride. When the element of consideration was absent, the marriage could not be said to be an Asura marriage. Because an Asura marriage did not satisfy the strict standards laid down by Hindu law, it was consistently regarded as an unapproved form of marriage. Moreover, the Court reiterated that whenever a dispute arose as to whether a marriage was Brahma or Asura, the prevailing presumption was that the marriage was of the Brahma type, and the onus of proving the contrary rested on the party asserting that the marriage was Asura.

In order to demonstrate that the marriage in question was an Asura marriage or any other recognized form, the parties relied on the statements made in the two plaints, both of which asserted that Bangaru Ammal had been married in the Asura manner but provided no further particulars. The plaintiff’s witnesses, speaking in unison, testified that within the Rakambala caste to which Bangaru Ammal and her husband belonged there existed a custom of delivering a sum of money known as “parisam” to the bride’s father at the time of betrothal. These witnesses further declared that, at Bangaru Ammal’s betrothal, a payment of one thousand rupees had been made as “parisam.” Both the trial court and the appellate court rejected this testimony, holding that the evidence failed to establish that a sum of one thousand rupees had indeed been paid as “parisam” at the time of Bangaru Ammal’s betrothal. That finding was not contested before the present Court. The plaintiff argued that the evidence disclosed a practice in the caste of giving Kambu as “parisam” to the bride’s father as a bride‑price, and that this practice supported the view that a similar “parisam” had been paid in Bangaru Ammal’s marriage. On the question of the alleged practice, the record does not support it. Plaintiff’s witnesses numbered one through ten testified that “parisam” is paid in cash for marriages in their community, with amounts ranging from one hundred fifty rupees to one thousand rupees. Both courts correctly disbelieved this testimony, finding that the evidence did not demonstrate any payment of “parisam” in Kambu. Although some witnesses also asserted that a payment of one thousand rupees had been made as “parisam” at Bangaru Ammal’s marriage, those statements were likewise rejected. The cumulative evidence therefore defeats the claim that “parisam” was paid in Kambu as consideration for the marriage. No witness examined in either of the two earlier cases testified that Kambu is paid at the marriages of members of the community or at the time of Bangaru Ammal’s marriage as a consideration; the only references to such a practice came from witnesses whose testimony in the earlier suit was later admitted by consent in the present proceedings. Errammal, the mother of Bangaru Ammal, whose evidence is recorded on page eleven of the record, stated that when Thevaram Zamindar married her, the “parisam” amounted to only one thousand rupees, and that the same amount was given when her daughter was married. In cross‑examination she clarified that, according to community custom, the practice is to present a mapelli at the nischithartham (betrothal) ceremony, and that it is also customary to bring cumbu and flour at the marriage ceremony and to sprinkle them in the marriage hall. This testimony indicates that “parisam” is given solely in cash, while Kambu is brought to the marriage venue and used in a ritual sprinkling, not as a monetary bride‑price.

In the material presented, the marriage hall was described as being used, presumably, for the purpose of purification, but the record does not demonstrate that Kambu was given as “parisam” in order to secure the bride. The testimony of Sermalai Naicker, who belonged to the Rajakambala caste and whose evidence appears as document P. 11 (a) in the earlier suit, clarifies the financial and ritual aspects of marriage in his community. During his principal examination he stated that he paid a cash sum of two hundred rupees as “parisam” at the time of his own marriage, that he paid three hundred rupees as “parisam” for his son’s marriage, and that he received two hundred rupees as “parisam” when his daughter was married. When cross‑examined, he explained that on the day of betrothal only one kalam of cumbu together with cash is presented to the bride’s party, and that the Kambu grain is utilized by the bride’s relatives. He further described that at the actual wedding ceremony three or four marakkals of cumbu are again brought and are thrown over the bride and groom as a form of blessing. He added that the act of throwing Kambu is a ritual element of the marriage ceremony and that both Kambu and cash are collectively referred to as “parisam.” This testimony therefore distinguishes the cash component that is paid as “parisam” from the Kambu grain that is introduced solely to fulfil a traditional ritual requirement.

The evidence of other witnesses likewise undermines any proposition that Kambu was customarily paid as “parisam.” The record identified as R.W. 3, a guru of the Rajakambala caste who performed the marriage of Moolipatti Zamindar, testified that Kambu is taken by the groom’s party to the bride’s house at the time of betrothal, accompanied by seven pieces of jaggery, a cloth and other items, and that no monetary “parisam” is exchanged within the caste. His account therefore indicates that Kambu functions only as a ritual token and that no “parisam” is paid. Similarly, the testimony of Ramasami Naicker, Zamindar of Ammaianaickoor, recorded as document D‑416, is unequivocal in the principal examination that his community does not pay any “parisam.” He characterized the receipt of “parisam” as undignified and affirmed that he has never observed any such payment in his caste. Whether his statements are factual or not, they do not lend support to the plaintiff’s case. Consequently, from the totality of the evidence it is impossible to conclude that the Rajakambala community has a practice of giving Kambu as “parisam” for the bride, nor that Kambu was paid as “parisam” during the betrothal ceremony connected with Bangaru Ammal’s marriage. The plaintiff’s reliance on secondary sources, such as the passage on page 82 of Part II of Nelson’s Manual of the Madhura Country (published in 1865), which describes a bride price of seven kalams of Kambu being solemnly carried under a white canopy to the bride’s father’s house, is therefore irrelevant. That description reflects a ceremonial relic rather than a substantive financial obligation, and it does not substantiate the plaintiff’s claim.

The Court noted that a passage quoted from Nelson’s Manual of the Madhura Country, published in 1865, and a passage from Thurston’s Castes and Tribes of Southern India, published in 1902, were both cited by the plaintiffs to support their claim. The Nelson passage described a bridal procession in which the price of the bride, usually seven kalams of kambu grain, was carried under a white canopy to the bride’s father’s house. The Thurston passage, appearing in volume VII under the heading “Thotti Naickers,” stated that the bride price consisted of seven kalams of kambu and that the couple might consume only that grain and horsegram until the wedding was concluded. The Court held that the evidence adduced in the present case did not substantiate these statements. Even assuming that such formalities were observed, the Court considered them to be mere relics of an earlier era, serving only a symbolic ritual function without any practical effect on the circumstances before the court. The Court further observed that the witnesses, aware of the ritualistic nature of these observances, had attempted to ground the plaintiffs’ case on a more substantial basis, but their efforts had failed. Consequently, the passages from the two historical works did not assist the plaintiffs in establishing their claim.

The Court then turned to the question of whether the expenses of the marriage had been incurred by the bridegroom’s party, namely the Mannarcottai Zamindar. The learned Subordinate Judge, relying on the evidence, had found that while the Thevaram Zamindar had spent a large sum on the marriage, the Mannarcottai Zamindar had also contributed either Rs 300 or Rs 575 toward the marriage expenses. The Subordinate Judge expressed that, had the matter been decided on a clean record, he would have concluded that such expenditure by the bridegroom’s side did not render the marriage an ‘Asura’ marriage. However, he felt bound by certain decisions of the Madras High Court and therefore reached the opposite conclusion. The High Court judges, on review, held that the entire cost of the marriage had been borne by the Mannarcottai Zamindar, suggesting that this expenditure must have been made either in accordance with custom or by arrangement within the community. The Court found the evidence regarding a customary practice of the bridegroom’s party bearing the wedding costs to be unconvincing. Moreover, the respondent’s counsel did not rely on any custom but instead based the argument on the High Court’s finding that the Mannarcottai Zamindar had covered the whole expense.

The Court examined the evidence in detail. Plaintiff’s witness 1 testified that Bangaru Ammal was the sole child of the Thevaram Zamindar, that the Zamindar was deeply affectionate toward her, and that he had spent heavily on the marriage, though he could not specify the exact amount. Plaintiff’s witness 4 added that the Thevaram Zamindar had given Bangaru Ammal a large quantity of jewellery and ultimately transferred his entire estate to her. The Court held that the evidence showing that the Thevaram Zamindar had expended a substantial sum and bestowed significant jewellery on Bangaru Ammal was reliable. It was inconceivable, the Court observed, that a marriage that took place in 1895 could have been celebrated with only a few hundred rupees contributed by the Mannarcottai Zamindar. Rather, the Court concluded that the Thevaram Zamindar must have spent an amount far larger than that modest figure, consistent with his social status and position, especially in view of the celebration of his only daughter’s marriage.

In examining the documentary evidence that the respondents presented to support the claim that the Mannarcottai Zamindar had met the entire expense of the marriage, the Court considered exhibits P. 22, P. 23, P. 25, P. 26 and P. 28. Exhibit P. 22 consisted of a letter dated 8 August 1885, which had been sent by persons acting on behalf of the Mannarcottai Zamindar to the office of the Thevaram Zamindar. In that letter the writer stated, “You should soon get ready there all the materials and samans for the shed and ‘Panthal’ in connection with muhurtham. We will start and come without fail.” The Court observed that the letter merely conveyed an intention that the necessary items for the marriage ceremony should be prepared because the people of Mannarcottai would attend, and it did not demonstrate that the Mannarcottai Zamindar actually provided money for the procurement of those materials and samans.

Exhibit P. 23 was an account showing the expenditure incurred on Bangammal’s marriage for the period from 1 September 1895 to 5 September 1895. The respondents claimed that this document reflected the amount spent on behalf of the Mannarcottai Zamindar and the portion that was later recovered from him. The Court found the account to be ambiguous. The entry for the charge of pounding fifty kalams of paddy indicated that the paddy must have been supplied from the stores of Thevaram, and there was no entry showing that the same quantity had been purchased on the Mannarcottai account. Consequently, the account did not appear to represent the total cost of the marriage. Nonetheless, the record showed that the Mannarcottai Zamindar had paid roughly Rs 300, and the respondents, relying on Exhibit P. 27, argued that the balance of Rs 295 and 14 shown in Exhibit P. 23 as an excess amount spent by the Thevaram Estate had been settled by the Mannarcottai Zamindar to the Thevaram Zamindar.

Exhibit P. 27 was a entry dated 30 September 1885 in the account book of the Thevaram Zamindar. It recorded that the Maharaja, meaning the Thevaram Zamindar, gave Rs 290 to the Thevaram office. The Court noted that this entry did not substantiate the respondents’ version. The only point of relevance was that the two figures, Rs 295 and Rs 290, were approximately similar. If the Rs 290 represented the amount paid by the Mannarcottai Zamindar to the Thevaram Zamindar in full settlement of the liability shown in Exhibit P. 23, then the entry should have indicated that the balance due from Mannarcottai had been cleared and consequently would have been credited to the Mannarcottai account. It was also possible that the Rs 290 was simply the balance remaining from the sum that the Thevaram Zamindar had taken with him when he traveled to Mannarcottai for his own expenditure.

The other documents, namely Exhibits P. 25 and P. 26, were found to be incomplete and unclear, and the Court could not draw any definitive conclusion from them. Based on the evidence and the probabilities that emerged, the Court held that the Thevaram Zamindar had indeed spent a large amount in connection with the marriage, whereas the Mannarcottai Zamindar had contributed only about Rs 300 towards the ceremony. This finding did not, in the Court’s view, bring the marriage within the definition of Asura marriage as earlier explained.

In this case the Court observed that the amount spent by the bridegroom’s party, which was approximately three hundred rupees, did not bring the marriage within the meaning of an Asura marriage as had been explained earlier. The expenditure incurred by the groom’s side was not, and could not be, treated as consideration for the Thevaram Zamindar giving his daughter in marriage. It was contended that the High Court had held that no “Kanyadhan” was performed at the time of Bangaru Ammal’s marriage and, because “Kanyadhan” is a necessary element of a Brahmu marriage, Bangaru Ammal could not have been married in that form. The High Court had relied on the testimony of Veluchami Naicker, who was described as the Guru of the caste, and who asserted that “Kanyadhan” had not been observed in Bangaru Ammal’s marriage. The counsel for the appellant challenged the correctness of that finding and referred to certain invitations in support of the contention that “Kanyadhan” had indeed been observed, but the documents were not clear on that point. Moreover, the Guru’s evidence only narrated some of the ceremonies customary in the community and did not expressly state that the ceremony of “Kanyadhan” was omitted in Bangaru Ammal’s marriage. In view of this state of evidence, the presumption under Hindu Law that the marriage was performed in the Brahmu form had to be invoked. As noted in Hindu Law, whether a marriage is of the Brahmu or Asura type, the Court will presume, even where the parties belong to the Shudra caste, that it was a Brahmu marriage. Further, when the fact of a marriage is proved, the Court will also presume that the necessary ceremonies have been performed, as affirmed in Mauji Lal v. Chandrabati Kumari. This presumption had not been rebutted in the present case. The argument of the counsel for the respondents was found to conflate an essential ingredient of a Brahmu marriage—the gift of the bride by the father or an authorized person—with the particular ritual adopted for effecting such a gift. In both Brahmu and Asura marriages a girl is given by her father, or by any other person empowered to do so, to the bridegroom; in a Brahmu marriage the transfer takes the form of a gift, whereas in an Asura marriage it is treated as a sale because a price is paid by the groom. Because no consideration passed from the bridegroom to the bride’s father in Bangaru Ammal’s marriage, the father must be held to have made a gift of the girl to the groom, which in other words means that “Kanyadhan” was performed. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention that the marriage was of the Asura type. Finally, reliance was placed on the appellant’s conduct of not challenging the Subordinate Judge’s finding that the marriage was in the Asura form in his application for delivery. The appellant’s counsel attempted to explain this conduct, but the Court found no material significance in it. No further opinion was given on the other questions raised in the appeals.

The Court examined the submission that the appellant’s behaviour might convert the marriage into the Asura type in law. The Court observed that the marriage had already been held not to be of the Asura form by the trial judge. Consequently, the Court stated that the appellant’s conduct could not alter the character of the marriage and could not render it an Asura marriage. Because this point settled the central issue, the Court found it unnecessary to express an opinion on the remaining questions that had been raised in the appeals. Accordingly, the Court set aside the decrees that had been issued by the High Court and ordered that both suits be dismissed. The vacatur of the High Court decisions removed any benefit that the parties might have derived from those orders. Both of the civil actions that had been pending were terminated with no further rights to claim relief. The dismissal was ordered with costs awarded against the parties throughout the proceedings from the commencement of the case to its final disposal. In addition, the Court directed that only one hearing fee be payable, thereby limiting the financial burden on the parties. The directive reflected the view that a single judicial hearing was sufficient to dispose of the matters in this case. By allowing the appeals, the Court confirmed that the lower Court's judgment was erroneous and that the proper outcome was the dismissal of the suits. The judgment was recorded as appearing in the 1911 Law Reports, volume 38, Indian Appeals, page 122 of the Supreme Court.