Uppalapati Veera... vs Josyula Hanumayamma And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 459 of 1958

Decision Date: 29 September 1961

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter the petition was filed by Uppalapati Veera Venkatasatyam Narayanaraju and another against Josyula Hanumayamma and another. The judgment was delivered on 29 September 1961 by a bench consisting of Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice K.C. Das Gupta, Justice J.C. Shah, and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The case was reported in 1967 AIR 174 and 1962 SCR (3) 910. The central issue concerned the doctrine of attornment by tenants in favour of persons who claimed title to a property but who did not themselves possess a legal title. The trial court examined the facts and found that none of the parties before it held a legal title to the disputed premises. It observed that, after the death of the original owner’s daughter, the individuals who called themselves the “reversioners” obtained a document known as a Kodaha (Kabuliyat) in their favour from two tenants who were the last possessors of the property. The reversioners also executed a cowle in their own favour, but the two tenants never paid rent to the reversioners. The trial court concluded that although the Kadapa (the attornment document) might suggest that the earlier tenants had attorned to the reversioners, the arrangement was merely a paper transaction because no rent had been paid. Consequently, the trial court held that the reversioners did not acquire possession through attornment.

On first appeal, the appellate court focused on the Kadapa and the cowle and held that the reversioners had obtained peaceful possession of the property. However, that court did not consider whether any rent had actually been paid to the reversioners. The High Court, on second appeal, identified the real question as whether the tenants had truly attorned to the reversioners, noting that the first appellate court had omitted an enquiry into the payment of rent. The High Court therefore remitted the case to the trial court for a fresh determination on that specific point. Upon reconsideration, the trial court returned a finding in favour of the respondent regarding possession. The petitioner, seeking special leave, argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to overturn a factual finding made by the first appellate court and that, by calling for a new finding on possession, the High Court had indirectly reversed that factual finding, warranting the High Court’s judgment to be set aside. The Supreme Court held that if the reversioners possessed a true title as the next reversioners, the Kadapa would have sufficed for attornment. However, where the person in whose favour attornment was made lacked a title, a mere document of attornment was insufficient unless accompanied by a genuine attornment demonstrated by the actual payment of rent. The Court affirmed that the High Court was justified in seeking a finding on the rent‑payment issue, which the first appellate court had not examined.

In this case the Court explained that the person who attorned must also have paid rent, either voluntarily or under a decree, to the person in whose favour the attornment was executed. The first appellate court had examined only the written attornment and had failed to consider the evidence concerning rent payments that the trial court had already addressed. Consequently the High Court was justified in requiring a fresh finding on that issue, because the lower appellate court had not dealt with it. According to Justice Raghubar Dayal, once a tenant consented to accept the individual claiming title from the previous landlord, such consent amounted to an attornment in favour of the new landlord and did not depend on the tenant’s subsequent conduct, such as the payment of rent. In support of this proposition the Court referred to Krishna Prasad Lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern (1937) L.R. 64 I.A. 31. The Court further observed that there was no reason to exclude the possession of tenants who had attorned to a person lacking title from being treated as the possession of that person when determining which claimant had a preferential possessory right over another claimant also lacking title. The mere fact that certain evidence had not been scrutinised as closely as the second appellate court might have desired could not serve as a ground for overturning a factual finding on a second appeal. In the present matter the Kadapa deed, whose terms differed from the earlier deed, was not merely a deed of attornment that substituted a new landlord for the old one; rather, it was a document creating a fresh tenancy. However, because the new lessors possessed no title to the property, the lease they executed conferred no enforceable right. The judgment was rendered under civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 459 of 1958, filed by special leave against the judgment and decree dated 29 June 1955 of the former Andhra High Court in Second Appeal No. 730 of 1949. Counsel for the appellants comprised A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and P.V., R. Tatachari, while counsel for the respondents were K. Bhimasankaram and G. Gopalakrishnan. The decision was delivered on 29 September 1961, with Justices Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shah authoring the majority opinion, and Justices Wanchoo and Dayal delivering separate opinions. The Court noted that this proceeding was an appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree of the Madras High Court, wherein the appellants had been defendants in a suit filed by the respondents seeking possession of certain properties that originally belonged to Subbarayudu.

In the factual background, after executing his testament, Nagaraju devised a life interest in the property to his wife, who had originally been the first plaintiff and was before the Court the first respondent, and stipulated that upon her death the estate would pass absolutely to his daughters. The second respondent was a tenant who occupied the premises of the first respondent. Nagaraju died soon after making his will, and the first respondent claimed that she succeeded to possession of the estate on his death and continued to enjoy it peacefully until the appellants forcibly ejected her in 1943. The appellants asserted that they were the purchasers of the property from Seetaramayya and Ramakotayya, who in turn professed to be the reversioners of the estate of Subbarayudu. Accordingly, the suit from which the present appeal arose was instituted in June 1944 for possession of the land and for mesne profits. The appellants opposed the suit and pleaded that they had acquired the property from the reversioners of Subbarayudu in 1942. They further contended that, on the death of Krishnavenamma, the reversioners had taken possession of the estate through the tenants who had been occupying it under a lease granted by Krishnavenamma, and that those tenants remained in possession until the deed of sale in favour of the appellants was executed, after which the tenants were bound to the appellants. Subsequently the two tenants surrendered possession to the appellants, who thereby came into actual possession of the subject land. The appellants also argued that the purported will of Subbarayudu was a forgery and consequently that the first respondent possessed no valid title. On these pleadings, the principal issue for determination was whether the first respondent held a legal title and remained in possession of the property until her dispossession in 1943, and, alternatively, whether the title claimed by the appellants was sufficient to support their possession claim. The trial court found that the alleged will of Subbarayudu had not been proved, and therefore concluded that the first respondent’s title, which depended upon that will, was not a legal title. The court also found that it had not been established that Seetaramayya and Ramakotayya were the rightful reversioners of Subbarayudu’s estate. As a result, the trial court held that neither party possessed a valid title to the suit property. Those findings were affirmed by the Subordinate Judge and subsequently by the High Court on second appeal, leading to the conclusion that both parties lacked title. Consequently, the dispute centred on possessory rights, which each party had asserted in the trial court. The trial court observed that, after Krishnavenamma’s death, the first respondent’s name was entered in the revenue records in her place, but the property was in fact occupied by the two tenants pursuant to a lease executed by Krishnavenamma in 1929 for a period of six years.

In the case before the trial court, a dispute arose between the first respondent and two individuals, Seetaramayya and Ramakotayya, who presented themselves as reversioners in order to win the favour of two tenants. These alleged reversioners succeeded in obtaining, in June 1933, a document known as a kadapa from the tenants, granting them a lease for a period of five years that would end in May 1938. In addition, they executed a cowle in favour of the tenants, and both of these instruments were formally registered in July 1933. The trial court, after examining the factual record, concluded that no rent had been paid by the tenants for the years 1933 and 1934, and that the substantive contest over the land only began towards the end of 1935 or the beginning of 1936. Although the reversioners had secured the kadapa and cowle from the tenants, the court found that no actual rent was ever received by them. Consequently, the court observed that the tenants themselves were the ultimate beneficiaries, as they continued to occupy the land without paying rent to either the first respondent or the so‑called reversioners. Further, the court held that in 1936 the first respondent, through an agent named Moka Subbarao—described as a person of considerable influence in the village—forcefully dispossessed the tenants. From that point onward the first respondent remained in possession of the land via her tenant until November 1943, when the present appellants forcibly removed her after having purchased the land from the alleged reversioners. In effect, the trial court found that neither party possessed the land before 1936; only in that year did the first respondent acquire possession by displacing the tenants, who had held the property since the death of Krishnavenamma and had paid no rent thereafter. Because the first respondent’s possession began earlier, the court held that she was entitled to succeed on the basis of a possessory title, even though the court also concluded that her title was defective. The defect stemmed from the fact that Krishnavenamma did not possess an absolute right in the property; nevertheless, the court characterized the title as voidable rather than void, stating that it could be set aside only by the nearest reversioner or by anyone else holding a superior title—neither of which applied to the appellants or their predecessors. Accordingly, the suit was decreed with an award of mesne profits. The appellants subsequently appealed to the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge affirmed the trial court’s findings regarding the parties’ titles, determining that neither party had proved a valid title, and he rejected the trial court’s suggestion that the first respondent possessed even a defective title. He then turned to the question of possessory title, examining whether the trial court’s conclusion that the first respondent’s earlier possession entitled her to recover possession was correct.

The Subordinate Judge held that possession founded on the first respondent’s claimed possessory title was correct. He concluded that the individuals described as “reversioners” had acquired peaceful possession of the land immediately after the reversion opened in 1933. Consequently, the appellants, whose title derived from those reversioners, were deemed entitled to maintain possession because the reversioners’ possession pre‑dated that of the first respondent. In reaching this conclusion, the Subordinate Judge relied upon a document known as the Kadapa, executed by the tenants in favour of the reversioners in June 1933, and a cowle executed by the reversioners in favour of the tenants. However, the Subordinate Judge did not address a further issue that the trial court had examined, namely whether, after the Kadapa and the cowle were executed, the reversioners ever collected rent from the tenants who had been occupying the land since the time of Krishnavenamma, between 1933 and 1936. The trial court had specifically considered this question and had concluded that although the Kadapa and the cowle were executed, they were merely paper transactions; the reversioners never collected rent during that period, and the tenants did not pay rent to anyone. Despite this, the Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit, reasoning that the reversioners only came into possession after Krishnavenamma’s death and were forcibly evicted in 1936 by Moka Subbarao, who acted as tenant of the first respondent.

A second appeal was filed by the respondents. The High Court held that the Subordinate Judge’s finding that the reversioners were in possession from 1933 to 1936 could not be accepted. The High Court identified the central issue as whether the tenants who were already in possession had truly attorned to the reversioners. After reviewing portions of the evidence, the High Court observed that several material aspects which should have been considered by the Subordinate Judge in forming a factual finding were omitted. Accordingly, the High Court declined to accept the Subordinate Judge’s finding on the second appeal and directed the Subordinate Judge to render a fresh determination on the question of possession.

Upon remand, the Subordinate Judge re‑examined the entire evidence. He concluded that the reversioners, in an effort to fabricate evidence of possession, had taken the Kadapa from the tenants after persuading them—perhaps by promising not to collect rent—that they would no longer be required to pay rent. He further found that the reversioners were not in actual possession of the property after Krishnavenamma’s death, covering the period from 1933 to 1936. The judge observed that during that interval neither the reversioners nor the first respondent possessed the land; instead, the tenants who had been present since Krishnavenamma’s time continued to occupy the property, albeit without paying rent to any party.

The Court observed that, given the circumstances, the tenants’ occupation could only be regarded as the possession of the rightful owner, a status that did not apply to either party in this dispute. Consequently, the Court concluded that the first instance of possession by Moka Subbarao occurred in 1936 when he entered the land as a tenant of the first respondent, while the appellants first obtained possession in 1943. Because the first respondent’s possession preceded that of the appellants, the Court held that the earlier possession should be reinstated. The High Court accepted this finding, allowed the second appeal, and restored the order of the trial court. The appellants then approached this Court by way of special leave. Their principal argument before the Court was that the High Court lacked jurisdiction in a second appeal to overturn the factual finding of the first appellate court concerning possession. They contended that, by ordering a fresh determination of possession, the High Court had effectively reversed the earlier finding and therefore its judgment ought to be set aside for being beyond its jurisdiction.

In response, counsel for the respondents argued that, although the High Court’s order appeared to interfere with a factual finding on possession, a careful review of the trial court’s and first appellate court’s conclusions would reveal that no decisive finding had been made on the pivotal issue central to the suit, which rested on a possessory title. Accordingly, they maintained that the High Court was justified in directing a new finding. The respondents further explained that, when a case relies solely on a possessory title, a party must demonstrate effective possession before succeeding. The trial court had determined that, although a kadapa existed and the earlier tenants had attorned to the so‑called reversioners, this attornment was merely a documentary formality; the tenants never paid rent to the reversioners, and therefore the reversioners never exercised effective possession between 1933 and 1936. The respondents asserted that the Subordinate Judge ought to have given specific weight to this trial‑court finding, but instead the Subordinate Judge relied solely on the kadapa and concluded that the reversioners had peacefully taken possession. They further noted that the legal effect of attornment differs when it is made in favour of the true owner as opposed to a non‑owner; in the latter situation, the claimant must also demonstrate that rent was actually received from the tenants to establish effective possession.

The counsel argued that the tenants had attorned to the reversioner and, because the Subordinate Judge had not rendered a finding on this pivotal issue, the High Court was properly empowered to remit the case to the Subordinate Judge for such a determination. It was further submitted that the High Court was not reversing a factual finding of the first appellate court, a power it admittedly does not possess; rather, the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction to obtain a finding on a question of fact that the Subordinate Judge had left undecided. The learned counsel maintained that, although a superficial reading of the High Court’s order might suggest a reversal of a finding on possession, a closer analysis reveals that the High Court merely observed the absence of any finding by the Subordinate Judge on the crucial question and therefore appropriately directed that the question be answered. Both parties rely on a possessory title, and consequently each must establish effective possession of the property in order to succeed. Effective possession, as defined by the Court, includes either actual physical possession or possession exercised through a tenant who has paid rent either voluntarily or pursuant to a decree to the claimant of the possessory title. The Kadapa documents executed by the earlier tenants in favor of the so‑called reversioners have been treated as an attornment by all three courts, and this Court accepts that characterization. If the so‑called reversioners were true reversioners—meaning the next rightful reversioners—the Kadapa attornment would have suffice to demonstrate their possession. However, where the person in whose favor the attornment was made lacks title, a mere documentary attornment is insufficient to confer possession against third parties; it must be shown that the attornment was effective in the sense that the attorner also paid rent, either voluntarily or by decree, to the person for whom the attornment was made. The fact that the tenants who executed the Kadapa might be estopped from challenging the reversioners’ title in a suit does not alter this position. The Munsif had found that the tenants had paid no rent to anyone and that no suit had been filed by the reversioners to recover rent before the first respondent assumed possession.

The Court observed that the kadaps were only a documentary instrument and that an attornment effected through such a document did not place the so‑called reversioners in real possession nor grant them a possessory title that the appellants could rely on to assert an earlier possessory right against the undisputed possessory title of the first respondent dating from 1936. The Court explained that the High Court’s remark that the pivotal issue was “whether the tenants really attorned to the reversioners” highlighted the necessity of a genuine, not merely formal, attornment. The emphasis on the word “really” indicated that the High Court was not satisfied with a paper attornment, which was the only finding of the Subordinate Judge, and correctly required a substantive attornment in a case premised on possessory title. A substantive attornment, the Court noted, demands that the person who attorns also pays rent either voluntarily or under a decree to the person to whose favor the attornment is made. The Subordinate Judge, however, had only examined the paper attornment and had not evaluated the evidence concerning rent payment, which the trial court had considered. After reviewing the rent‑payment evidence, the trial court concluded that despite the attornment through the kadapa, no rent had actually been paid; consequently, from 1933 to 1936 the tenants alone occupied the land, but they paid no rent to anyone, leaving neither party in possession through them. This finding of the trial court was entirely ignored by the Subordinate Judge, who decided the possession issue solely on the basis of the paper attornment. The High Court therefore held that the Subordinate Judge had not properly addressed the real question, having been content with a mere documentary attornment in a matter that required proof of actual possession, which under the law is insufficient without evidence of rent payment that would confer effective possession on the reversioners. Although the High Court’s phrasing in calling for a finding was not ideal, it effectively determined that the Subordinate Judge had failed to make a finding on the effective possession of the so‑called reversioners after considering the rent‑payment evidence. Accordingly, the High Court was justified in directing a fresh finding on effective possession based on the complete evidence, a stance supported by the trial court’s conclusion that the reversioners possessed no effective possession and that the attornment through the kadaps remained a mere paper transaction.

In the circumstances, it could not be said that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to require a finding. The parties did not dispute that, assuming jurisdiction existed, the High Court’s final order permitting the appeal on the basis of the submitted finding was not open to challenge. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal but, given the circumstances, did not order any costs against the parties.

Justice Raghu Bar Dayal agreed that the appeal should be dismissed, though for different reasons. He observed that if Narasimhulu and Ramudu alias Mark, who occupied the land in suit under the lease shown in Exhibit P‑6 dated 6 May 1929 for a period of six years from Josyula Krishnavenamma, had attorned to Ramakotiah and Seetharamiah by executing the Kadapa (Kabuliat) in Exhibit D‑4 on 16 March 1933, then no further rent payment was necessary to render the attornment effective. In his view, the Subordinate Judge’s conclusion that the predecessors‑in‑interest of the defendants‑appellants were in possession through their tenants over the suit land was therefore correct.

The High Court, however, did not decide, by its first order remitting point 2, whether the plaintiffs had taken possession of the suit properties before the defendants and their predecessors‑in‑title, nor whether they were entitled to recover possession on the basis of their possessory title. Instead, it called for a fresh finding on whether the attornment created by the Kadapa deed was invalid because the executants had not paid rent to Ramakotiah and Seetharamiah. The learned Judge simply remarked: “Apart from the question whether the principle of law adopted by the learned Judge is well‑founded or not, on which I express no opinion at present, it seems to me that the finding of the learned Judge that the first defendant had prior possession from 193 to 1936 cannot be accepted in the second appeal.”

The High Court rejected the Subordinate Judge’s finding on prior possession because it believed the Judge had not closely examined the evidence on the crucial issue that lay between the parties. That issue was framed as whether the tenants truly attorned to the reversioners and whether the reversioners recognized the tenants’ possession as theirs. The precise question the High Court sought to resolve was not clear. Justice Dayal noted that if the execution of Exhibit D‑4 amounted to attornment by the tenants in favour of Seetharamiah and Ramakotiah—who claimed to be heirs of Krishnavenamma—and if the execution of the covenant in Exhibit D‑5 by those two persons in favour of the tenants served to acknowledge the tenants as their tenants, then no further scrutiny of any other evidence on record would have been necessary. The other evidence on record, on which the High Court expressed an opinion, was not presented as a final finding.

In the present appeal, the Court observed that the High Court’s opinion was expressed in a form that amounted to a fresh finding based largely on evidence that favored the defendant. The Court noted that the High Court had not taken into account that evidence, which could have constituted a grievance for the defendants but not for the plaintiff‑appellants before the High Court. The Court explained that an expression of opinion on such evidence, which was detrimental to the defendant’s interest, could not be regarded as a fresh consideration of that evidence by the Subordinate Judge, who, in his own finding, had adopted a substantially similar line of criticism against the same evidence. The Court further held that the mere fact that certain evidence had not been examined closely, or had not been examined in the manner that the second appellate court now desires, could not by itself warrant interference with the factual finding in the second appeal.

The Court then turned to the argument raised on behalf of the respondent that, without proof that the tenants had actually paid rent to Seetharamiah and Ramakotiah—who claimed to be heirs but had been shown not to be heirs of the original landlord—there could be no valid attornment. The Court acknowledged that a fresh finding on the question of attornment might be justified if the Subordinate Judge had failed to refer to the evidence concerning the payment of rent by the tenants and its receipt by the new landlords. However, the Court found it difficult to construe the High Court’s order in that way, particularly because the High Court had not decided on the principle of law that was adopted by the first appellate court.

In explaining the legal concept, the Court quoted the definition of attornment from the authoritative text on landlord‑tenant law, noting that attornment, in its strict sense, is an agreement by a tenant to recognise a new landlord when the original landlord’s reversion is granted to another person. The Court clarified that attornment creates continuity of the tenancy that was originally established by the first landlord, and that the tenant’s agreement to acknowledge the new landlord completes the attornment at the moment of such acknowledgement. The Court emphasized that subsequent payment or non‑payment of rent does not affect the relationship created by attornment; any remedy for arrears belongs to the new landlord. The Court also cited the commentary that recognition of a person as landlord may arise by various modes, including attornment, payment of rent, or other formal acknowledgment, and that once a tenant has recognised a landlord, the tenant cannot later impeach the landlord’s title without showing a superior claim.

The Court observed that a tenant may acknowledge a person as his landlord in a variety of ways, including an express agreement, an act of attornment, or any formal acknowledgment such as the payment of a nominal sum, the regular payment of rent, or even submission to a distress. It explained that attornment is merely one mode of recognizing a landlord, just as the payment of rent constitutes another mode for that purpose. The Court further referred to similar language found in the preceding paragraphs, noting that the tenant is prohibited from challenging the title of a person to whom he has paid rent or otherwise recognised, unless the tenant can demonstrate a superior title held by some other individual. Accordingly, the tenant cannot, after having attorned to a person who claims title under a will, simply argue that a proper construction of the will would deprive that person of title; nor can the tenant, after having paid rent, dispute the landlord’s title on the ground that the devise was void because the testator lacked capacity.

In citing the Privy Council decision in Krishna Proshad Lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern, the Court noted that the Council, while discussing the scope of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, held that questions concerning whether a tenant, by attornment to a person claiming the reversion, or a landlord, by accepting rent from a claimant to the term, is estopped from disputing a claim admitted earlier are important but lie outside the ambit of Section 116. The Council further clarified that, in the ordinary case of a lease intended as a present demise – the situation presently before the Board – the statutory provision applies to the lessee, any assignee of the term, and any sub‑lessee or licencee. All such persons are precluded from denying that the lessor possessed a title at the date of the lease, and there is no exception even where the lease itself reveals a defect in title. The principle, however, does not strip a tenant of the ability to contest the derivative title of a successor who later claims entitlement to the reversion, although other grounds of estoppel, such as attornment or acceptance of rent, may arise in those circumstances. In this sense, the principle applies solely to the title of the landlord who originally let the tenant, and not to any other claimant to the reversion.

From these observations, the Court concluded that merely by attorning, a tenant becomes estopped from questioning the derivative title of the claimant’s successor, just as the acceptance of rent creates an estoppel against the landlord from denying that the rent‑paying party is his tenant. The Court stressed that these precedents do not require an actual payment of rent by a tenant who has attorned in order to render the attornment effective.

The Court examined the point at which an attornment becomes effective. It held that if attornment were not effective, the new landlord to whom the tenant had attorned would be unable to bring any successful action against the tenant until the tenant made the first payment of rent. Consequently, the Court expressed the view that once the tenant agrees to accept the person who claims title from the previous landlord, that agreement itself constitutes an effective attornment in favour of the new landlord, and the effectiveness of the attornment does not hinge on any future conduct of the tenant, such as payment of rent or any other act.

A person may establish a possessory title by showing that he has been in actual possession of the land in dispute, or that he has been in possession through his tenants. So long as those who are in actual possession are deemed to be the tenant’s because of their conduct in recognising the claimant as their landlord and are therefore estopped from questioning his title, the Court saw no reason to refuse to treat their possession as possession on behalf of the claimant, irrespective of whether the claimant possesses legal title. If the claimant possessed a legal title, there would be no question of relying on a possessory claim. Only when the claimant fails to establish a legal title does he have to fall back upon a possessory basis.

The Court also found no justification for refusing to regard the possession of tenants who had attorned to a person lacking legal title as that person’s possession when assessing whether that person enjoyed a preferential possessory title over another claimant who likewise lacked legal title and who obtained possession after the attornment. In this respect, the Court held that the High Court was in error in ordering a fresh finding on the question of possession, because the High Court had not decided that the tenants had, in law, failed to attorn to Seetharamiah and Ramakotiah on the basis of the two documents identified as Kadapa Ex. D‑4 and Cowle Ex. D‑5, and because the first appellate court had concluded that the effect of those documents was that the tenants had indeed attorned to them.

However, the Court expressed an additional view, although the issue was not expressly raised, that the document Kadapa Ex. D‑4 cannot be characterised merely as an agreement by the tenants to accept the claimants as new landlords. By that document the tenants did not simply substitute the new landlords in place of the old; rather, they actually entered into a fresh lease with the two persons. The terms of this new lease differed from those of the earlier lease granted to Krishnavena. The unexpired period of the earlier tenancy was two years, whereas under the Kadapa document the new tenancy was to continue for five years beginning in June 1933. Moreover, the new lease covered not only the land held under the previous tenancy but also additional land, and the rent stipulated in the new lease was considerably reduced. Accordingly, such a document constitutes a fresh tenancy agreement rather than a deed of attornment.

In this case the Court observed that the document in question was merely a deed effecting a fresh tenancy and not an instrument of attornment. The Court held that Seetharamiah and Ramakotiah could not lawfully grant a lease of the land that is the subject of the suit because they themselves did not possess any title to the land; they were not heirs of Krishnavenamma and therefore had no legal right to alienate the property. Consequently, any lease purportedly executed by them could not create any enforceable right. The Court further noted that these two individuals never actually occupied the land at any time, and because they were never in possession they could not have transferred possession to the tenants they purportedly leased to. Since the new lessees derived no title from the alleged lease, their continued occupancy of the suit land could not be regarded as possession under a valid lease from the alleged lessors. Moreover, the Court explained that the tenants’ possession could be traced back to a valid tenancy created by deed Ex. P‑6 in favour of Krishnavenamma, and that such possession was deemed to be on behalf of the legal heir. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Seetharamiah and Ramakotiah could not be said to have been in possession of the suit land through their tenants during the period from June 1933 until, in 1936, those tenants were dispossessed by Moka Subba Rao acting for Plaintiff No. 1. The Court therefore affirmed that the predecessors‑in‑interest of the defendants were correctly held not to have been in possession of the land before Plaintiff No. 1, who likewise lacked title yet obtained possession. The order appealed against was thus upheld and the appeal was dismissed.