Union Of India (Uoi) vs Mohindra Supply Company

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 5 September 1961

Coram: J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo, Raghubar Dayal

In this case, the Court recorded that a dispute had arisen under a contract for the supply of solidified fuel between Messrs Mohindra Supply Company, hereinafter called the respondents, and the Governor‑General of India in Council. The parties agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration and appointed two arbitrators. On 19 March 1946 the arbitrators issued a published award directing the Governor‑General to pay the respondents the sum of Rs 47,250 with interest at three per cent per annum from 17 July 1944 until the amount was paid. The award was subsequently filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi. The Governor‑General then applied to that court for an order setting aside the award on certain grounds, which the Court noted were not material to the present appeal. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application and refused to set aside the award. Dissatisfied with that decision, the Governor‑General appealed to the Lahore High Court. After the establishment of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, the appeal was transferred to the Circuit Bench of the East Punjab High Court at Delhi. Justice Falshaw, hearing the appeal, set aside the Subordinate Judge’s order, reasoning that the dispute could not lawfully be referred to arbitration under the contract that gave rise to it and that this deficiency was sufficient to invalidate the award.

Subsequently, an appeal was taken against Justice Falshaw’s order under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Lahore. By virtue of the High Court (Punjab) Order of 1947, this clause was applied to the East Punjab High Court. Before the appellate bench, the Governor‑General contended that the appeal under the Letters Patent was barred by section 39(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act. The question of the appeal’s maintainability was referred to a Full Bench of the High Court. That Full Bench held that an appeal from a judgment of a single judge exercising appellate powers did lie under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, and that the restriction in section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act did not preclude such an appeal. After the Full Bench gave its opinion, a Division Bench considered the appeal on its merits and set aside Justice Falshaw’s order. The Union of India then appealed against the decision of the High Court.

The Court clarified that the present appeal was limited to the issue of whether an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court against Justice Falshaw’s order was maintainable. It observed that, since the enactment of the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940, all arbitration proceedings were governed by that Act, which was a consolidating and amending statute. The Act had repealed the Arbitration Act of 1899, Schedule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and clauses (a) to (f) of section 104(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court therefore framed its analysis of the maintainability of the appeal within the framework established by the 1940 Arbitration Act.

In this case the Court explained that the Civil Procedure Code previously contained provisions for appeals from orders in arbitration proceedings. The Arbitration Act of 1940 replaced those provisions and created a new system for all contractual arbitrations. Its provisions, except for certain exceptions, also applied to any arbitration that was conducted under any other law then in force, treating that other law as if it were an arbitration agreement, unless the Arbitration Act conflicted with that other law or with rules made under it. Section 39 of the Act dealt with appeals. Sub‑section (1) stated that an appeal could be taken only from the orders listed in that clause and from no other orders, and that the appeal had to be made to the court authorised to hear appeals from the original decree of the court that made the order. The listed orders included an order superseding an arbitration; an order on an award stated in the form of a special case; an order modifying or correcting an award; an order filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement; an order staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where an arbitration agreement existed; and an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award. The provision also said that it did not apply to orders of a Small Cause Court. Sub‑section (2) provided that no second appeal could be taken from an order passed in appeal under sub‑section (1), but it clarified that nothing in the section removed the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court noted that the two sub‑sections formed a single legislative scheme: the first gave a right of appeal against only the specified orders, and the second barred any further appeal from an appellate order made under the first sub‑section, except an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Court then examined whether the bar in sub‑section (2) applied to an appeal made under the Letters Patent of the High Court. It observed that the High Courts of India had expressed different views on this point. The Bombay High Court, in Madhavdas v. Vithaldas (I. L. R. (1952) Bom. 570), held that once a single judge of the High Court disposed of an appeal under section 39(1), there was no further right of appeal under the Letters Patent. The Madras High Court reached the same conclusion in Radha Krishan Murthy v. Ethirajulu (I. L. R. (1945) Mad. 564). Conversely, the Delhi High Court in Hanuman Chamber of Commerce Ltd., Delhi v. Jassa Ram Hira Nand (A. I. R. (1948) Lah. 64) and the East Punjab High Court in Banwari Lal Ram Dev v. The Board of Trustees, Hindu College (I. L. R. (1948) E. P. 159) decided that an appeal under the Letters Patent against an order made in appeal under section 39(1) was not barred by section 39(2). These courts treated the prohibition in sub‑section (2) as applying only to a second appeal in the sense of a further appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, not to an intra‑court appeal under the Letters Patent.

In this matter the Court observed that the transfer of an appeal from a Single Judge to a Bench of the same High Court was not prohibited by any statutory provision. The Madras High Court, in its later decision in Mulchand Kewal Chand Daga v. Kissan Das Gridhardass (1961) 74 L. W. 408 F. B, expressly overruled the earlier view expressed in Radha Krishna Murthy’s case. The later judgment held that section 39 of the Arbitration Act governs only appeals from orders made by a court to a superior court and does not extend to “intra‑court” appeals. Accordingly, section 39(2) cannot be invoked to bar an appeal under the Letters Patent against an order issued by a Single Judge who is exercising appellate jurisdiction in an arbitration proceeding. Section 39(2) expressly forbids a “second appeal” from an order that has already been appealed under section 39(1), except where the appeal is directed to this Court. The language of sub‑section (2) indicates that the term “second appeal” does not refer to an appeal filed under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The statute even provides a specific exception for an appeal to this Court, which shows that such an appeal is not considered a “second appeal”. If Parliament had intended to prohibit appeals under section 100, it would have been unnecessary to carve out an explicit saving provision for appeals to this Court.

The Court further noted that an appeal under section 39(1) is confined to orders that supersede, modify, or correct an award; orders concerning the filing or refusal to file an arbitration agreement; orders staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where an arbitration agreement exists; and orders setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, including awards framed as special cases. These orders are not “decrees” within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore do not acquire the effect of decrees under the Arbitration Act. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals exclusively with appeals from appellate decrees, not from appellate orders. If section 39(2) had been intended to bar appeals from appellate decrees, the provision would be redundant, and the Court would be unjustified in ascribing to Parliament a purpose to create a sterile clause. Consequently, the expression “second appeal” in section 39(2) must be understood as a further appeal from an order passed in an appeal under section 39(1), and not as an appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. This interpretation was previously expressed by Justice Savdekar in Madhavdass v. Vithaldas (1952) I. L. R. Bom. 570 and by Chief Justice Rajamannar in Mulchand Kewal Chand Daga v. Kissan Das Gridhardass (1961) 74 L. W. 408 F. B, and the Court agreed that the adjective “second” imports the meaning of a numerically second, further appeal. The remaining question, therefore, was whether the right to appeal under the Letters Patent is at all limited by the provisions of section 39.

Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, insofar as it was relevant, provided that an appeal was permitted to the High Court from a judgment of a single High Court judge, except where the judgment was rendered in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a decree or order made by a court under the superintendence of that High Court, or where the order was made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. In effect, this clause expressly granted a right of appeal, subject to the limited exceptions, from a judge of the High Court to a Division Bench of the same High Court. However, clause 37 of the Letters Patent made clear that the Letters Patent were subject to the legislative authority of the Governor‑General in Council and also to the Governor‑in‑Council under the Government of India Act, 1915, and that they could be amended or altered by that legislative power. Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act then stipulated that an appeal could lie only from the orders specified in that subsection and from no other orders. The legislature therefore plainly expressed that appeals against orders made under the Arbitration Act were permissible only with respect to certain enumerated orders, and that the right to appeal against all other orders was expressly removed. Consequently, if the explicit provision of section 39(1) removed the right to appeal from a judgment that might otherwise have been available under the Letters Patent, there was no basis for holding that section 39(2) did not impose a similar restriction on the appellate authority granted by the Letters Patent. Moreover, if the term “second appeal” was understood to include an appeal under the Letters Patent, it would be untenable to conclude that, despite the clear prohibition, an appeal under the Letters Patent from an order rendered on appeal under subsection (1) remained permissible.

The Punjab High Court, in Banwari Lal Ram Dev v. The Board of Trustees, Hindu College, and the Lahore High Court, in Hanuman Chamber of Commerce Ltd., Delhi v. Jassa Ram Hira Nand, had held that the appeals contemplated by section 39 were appeals to superior courts rather than “intra‑court” appeals, and hence that the right of appeal under the Letters Patent was not limited by subsections (1) and (2). A careful analysis of that position revealed startling consequences. If the appeal contemplated by section 39(1) was confined to an appeal to a superior court, then orders issued by a subordinate court that were otherwise appealable to the same court would become entirely non‑appealable under the Arbitration Act. For example, under the Bombay Civil Courts Act, certain decisions of Assistant Judges were made appealable to the District Courts. An Assistant Judge was, in fact, a Judge of the District Court, and under the same Act, appeals against his orders were ordinarily directed to that District Court. Accepting the view that section 39(1) allowed only appeals to a higher court would therefore eliminate the possibility of appellate review of such Assistant Judge orders, illustrating the impracticality of interpreting the provision in that restrictive manner.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that certain decrees are appealed to the District Court. The Court considered the proposition that an appeal under clause (1) of section 39 should be understood as an appeal only to a superior court. Accepting that proposition would mean that an order made by an Assistant Judge, which is made appealable under section 39(1), could not be appealed at all. The Court noted that statutes in other States contain comparable provisions in their Civil Courts Acts. The Court further examined the expression “to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order” found in section 39(1). It held that this wording does not introduce the idea that the appellate court must be a different and separate institution from the court that issued the original order or decree. The legislature, the Court observed, did not intend such a requirement and the surrounding context does not support that construction. Consequently, the provision was understood merely to specify the appropriate forum for filing an appeal.

The Court explained that if an appeal from the decision of a court hearing a suit or proceeding is directed to a Judge or a panel of Judges of the same court, then, by virtue of section 39(1), an appeal from an order passed under the Arbitration Act—provided that the order is appealable—will lie to those same Judge(s) of that court. The suggestion that the right to bring an appeal to the Supreme Court from orders arising out of arbitration proceedings would be severely limited was found by the Court to lack merit. The Court held that where an order issued in the original jurisdiction of a High Court is appealable under section 39(1), the appeal will be taken to a Division Bench of that High Court. From a decision of the Division Bench, an appeal, as expressly provided in sub‑section (2), may be made to the Supreme Court, subject to the constitutional restrictions applicable to such appeals. If an order does not fall within the ambit of section 39(1), no appeal will lie. The Court further observed that when a Division Bench of a High Court hears an appeal against an order passed in arbitration, a further appeal to this Court as a matter of right is permissible if the conditions of Article 133 are satisfied; however, when a Single Judge decides the same case, no such appeal exists. The Court emphasized that the right to appeal originates in statute; litigants possess no inherent right to appeal a court’s decision. The perceived inconsistency raised by the appellant relates to second appeals and revision applications. When such matters are disposed of by Single Judges, there is no right to appeal to this Court, whereas decisions of Division Benches may be appealed. Finally, the Court noted the argument that the interpretation of section 39 should not be isolated from legislative history, and that reference to the legislative background and the Privy Council’s dictum in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia ((1882) L. R. 10 I. A. 4, 17), which has been widely followed, is relevant when assessing the extent of the right.

In examining whether the right of appeal that had previously been available to litigants against decisions of single Judges of High Courts in arbitration matters could be withdrawn by section 39(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, the Court observed that it could not justify limiting a right of appeal that, under the Letters Patent, remained exercisable up to 1940. The Court therefore had to interpret the statutory language of section 39 without allowing any preconceived notion about the state of the law that existed before the Arbitration Act was enacted to influence the meaning. The 1940 Act was characterized as a consolidating and amending statute and, for all practical purposes, a code governing arbitration. In addressing the proper method of construction, the Court referred to the Privy Council decision in Narendra Nath Sircar v. Kamlabasini Dasi (1896 L.R. 23 I.A. 18), which held that a code must be understood according to the natural meaning of its language rather than on the assumption that it was intended to leave the pre‑existing law untouched. The Court also cited the Judicial Committee’s endorsement of Lord Herschell’s remarks in Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers ([1891] A.C. 107, 144‑145), which stressed that the first step in statutory interpretation is to examine the language and ask what its natural meaning is, uninfluenced by any consideration of the law’s former position. The passage required that a court should not begin by asking how the law previously stood, presume that the legislature intended no change, and then test whether the words can be read to support that presumption. The Committee warned that treating a codifying statute in such a way would defeat its purpose, rendering its utility almost entirely destroyed, because the very object of enacting a code is that any point expressly covered by it should be determined by interpreting the language used, not by wandering through a multitude of earlier authorities to discover the prior rule and then extracting it by minute and critical examination of former decisions.

The Court further declared that when a statute codifies a particular branch of law, interpretation must proceed without inserting words that are not found in the enactment, and it is impermissible to start with the assumption that the legislature did not intend to alter the existing law. The Court emphasized that no additional words may be introduced unless they are expressly supported by authority within the statute itself. However, the Court also noted that it would not resolve the argument solely on these general principles. While acknowledging the relevance of the broader interpretative considerations, the Court indicated that a detailed analysis of the specific provisions and their plain and apparent intendment would be required before reaching a final conclusion on the effect of section 39(2) on the previously available right of appeal.

In this case, the Court observed that the legislative history, when examined together with the ruling of the Privy Council in Hurrish Chunder’s case, offered no satisfactory reason to deviate from the clear and ordinary meaning of the statute. Under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877, the statute created a specific right of appeal for parties against certain orders, and that right was confined to orders that fell within section 588; no appeal could be taken from any other type of order. The provisions identified as clauses (s) and (t) dealt respectively with a right to appeal an order made under section 514, which superseded an arbitration, and with a right to appeal an order made under section 518 that modified an award. The last paragraph of the code expressly declared that any order passed in the course of such an appeal would be final and could not be further questioned. Section 589, paragraph two, stipulated that when an appeal from any order was permitted by the chapter, the appeal would lie to the same court that would entertain an appeal from the decree in the original suit to which the order related. Section 591 further provided that, “Except as provided in this Chapter, no appeal shall lie from an order passed by any Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.” The Code of 1877 was later repealed and replaced by the Code of 1882, but the sections dealing with appeals from orders were re‑enacted in the new code using exactly the same language.

Before the Privy Council’s decision in Hurrish Chunder’s case, the prevailing opinion, especially among the High Courts of Bombay and Madras, held that under clause (15) of the Letters Patent governing the High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, an appeal from an order issued by a single judge of a High Court could be taken only under section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not under any other provision. This view was articulated by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sonba’i v. Ahmed Bha’i Habibha’i ((1872) 9 Bom. H. C. Reports 398). In that decision, the Bench interpreted the Letters Patent in light of section 363 of the Civil Procedure Code and concluded that an appeal to the High Court from an interlocutory order made by one judge was permissible only when the Code itself allowed an appeal, together with any amendments to the Code. The Madras High Court expressed a similar position in the case of Achaya v. Ratrandu, (I. L. R. 9 Mad. 447). However, the Privy Council, in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia ((1882) L. R. 10 I. A. 4, 17), adopted a contrary stance. The Council considered a factual scenario in which a Kassiswari had executed a will that divided a taluk equally between her daughter Chundermoni and her daughter‑in‑law Kali Sundari. After the Kassiswari’s death, the two devisees sued Hurrish Chunder to obtain a decree for possession of the taluk. The Subordinate Judge granted a decree in favor of the plaintiffs, and that decree was later affirmed by the Privy Council on appeal. The Court noted these facts as the background to its differing interpretation of the right of appeal.

In the case, the daughters of Chundermoni were involved, and the order issued by the Queen‑in‑Council was sent to the High Court for execution. While that order was pending, Hurrish Chunder purchased Chundermoni’s half‑share (moiety) in the taluk. After the purchase, Kali Sundari filed an application in the original jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court seeking execution of the Queen‑in‑Council’s order. Pontifex, J., refused to carry out the order because he believed that execution could not be made by only one of the two original plaintiffs. Against Pontifex, J.’s refusal, an appeal was lodged under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court. The Full Bench of the High Court considered the matter and, in a unanimous decision, held that the discretion exercised by Pontifex, J. was erroneous. However, Garth C. J. expressed a different view, arguing that the order passed by Pontifex, J. was merely a ministerial act that he lacked authority to make, and therefore the appeal was incompetent. In contrast, White and Romeshchunder Mitter, JJ., pronounced that the order constituted a ‘judgment’ and was therefore appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The defendant, Hurrish Chunder, then appealed the High Court’s order to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee affirmed the majority view of the High Court. In rejecting Garth C. J.’s argument, the Committee observed that there was no evidence that Pontifex, J. had usurped jurisdiction that was not his. Even assuming such usurpation, the Committee held that it would still provide a valid ground for appeal, and that when a High Court judge makes an order based on a mistaken understanding of his jurisdiction, the High Court possesses the power to entertain an appeal to correct the miscarriage of justice. The Committee further remarked that section 588 of Act X of 1877, which limits certain appeals, did not apply to a situation where the appeal was from one judge of the Court to the full Court.

This judgment in the case of Hurrish Chunder Chowdry generated a serious conflict of opinion among the High Courts in India. The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, following the Privy Council’s dictum, held that an order that was not appealable under section 588 of the Civil Procedure Code could nevertheless be appealed if it amounted to a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the respective Letters Patent. Authorities cited in support of this view included Chappan v. Moidin Kutti (I. L. R. (1899) 22 Mad. 68), Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanaswami Chetti (I. L. R. (1902) 25 Mad. 555), Toolsee Money Dassee v. Sudevi Dassee (I. L. R. (1899) 26 Cal. 363) and Secretary of State v. Jehangir ([1902] 4 Bom. 342). By contrast, the Allahabad High Court, in Banno Bibi v. Mehdi Husain (I. L. R. (1889) 11 All. 375), expressed a contrary opinion. Sir John Edge, C. J., observed that if the

It was held that when an order was not appealable under section 588 and section 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that order could not be appealed against under the Letters Patent of the High Court. This principle was subsequently affirmed by a Full Bench of the same court in the case of Muhammad Naim‑Ul‑Lah Khan v. Ihsan‑Ul‑Lah Khan (I. L. R. (1892) 14 All. 226). In response to this state of affairs, the legislature intervened and, in the Code of 1908, introduced section 4. The first sub‑section of section 4 provided that “in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.” The same Code also enacted section 104(1), which declared that an appeal shall lie only from the orders expressly listed therein and, except as expressly provided elsewhere in the Code or by any other law then in force, no appeal shall lie from any other order. Additionally, the legislature expressly stated that “no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.” Section 105 of the 1908 Code was drafted substantially in the same terms as section 591 of the earlier Code. The purpose of enacting sub‑section (1) of section 104 was clear: it sought to preserve the right to appeal that was conferred by any other law then in force. This legislative intent was reinforced by section 4, which emphasized that, unless a specific provision to the contrary existed, the Code was not intended to limit or affect any special jurisdiction or power granted by any other law. Consequently, the right to appeal judgments that did not amount to decrees under the Letters Patent was not displaced by section 104(1) of the 1908 Code of Civil Procedure. Under the amended Code, the prevailing view has consistently been that interlocutory judgments—decisions that, although not decrees, affect the merits of the dispute by determining a right or liability—issued by single judges of Chartered High Courts were appealable under the Letters Patent. This principle is reflected in cases such as Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh (1922) 3 Lah. 188, Paramasivan v. Ramasami (I. L. R. (1933) 56 Mad. 915), Vaman Ravji Kulkarni v. Nagesh Vishnu Joshi’s (I. L. R. (1940) Bom. 426), and Ram Sarup v. Kaniz Ummebani (I. L. R. (1937) All. 386). Prior to 1940, the law governing contractual arbitration—except where covered by the Arbitration Act of 1899—was contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, and certain orders issued by courts during arbitration were made appealable under section 588 of the 1877 Code and under section 104 of the 1908 Code. In 1940, the legislature enacted Act X, which altered this framework.

In 1940 the legislature repealed Schedule 2 and the clauses (a) to (f) of section 104(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, together with the Arbitration Act of 1899. By virtue of section 39 of the new Arbitration Act, a right of appeal was granted to parties in arbitration proceedings solely from certain specified orders, while the right to appeal from appellate orders was expressly removed by subsection 2 of that provision. The clause in section 104 of the 1908 Code that had preserved a special jurisdiction under any other law was incorporated into section 39, and the provision was drafted in an absolute manner without any carve‑outs. Under the 1908 Code, an appeal to the High Court under the Letters Patent could be made from an order of a single Judge of a Chartered High Court even when that order was issued in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, because the statute expressly preserved the Court’s power to entertain appeals under any special law then in force. The 1940 Arbitration Act, however, contains no provision analogous to section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure that saves powers reserved to courts under special statutes, and the wording “authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court” in section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act does not, by implication, retain the Letters Patent jurisdiction to hear appeals against orders made in arbitration proceedings. Consequently, the Letters Patent provision for appeals must be read subject to sections 39(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act. Under the 1908 Code, the right to appeal under the Letters Patent was protected both by section 4 and the reservation clause in section 104(1); the 1940 Arbitration Act, by contrast, does not preserve the jurisdiction of the Court under any other law then in force. Hence, the right of appeal in arbitration matters is now confined to the scope of section 39, and no appeal—other than an appeal to this Court—lies from an appellate order. The argument advanced by counsel for the respondents that the reservation clause in section 104 of the 1908 Code was merely “superfluous” and that its omission from section 39(1) makes no substantial difference lacks merit. The clause was enacted to eliminate the unsettled state of the law and the divergent opinions expressed by the Allahabad High Court on one side and the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts on the other regarding the effect of section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the powers conferred by the Letters Patent. The legislature, being aware of this difference of opinion before the amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure and the unanimity of opinion that followed, deliberately omitted the reservation clause from the Arbitration Act of 1940 in order to restrict the right of appeal strictly within the limits defined by section 39 and to withdraw the right previously created by other statutes.

The Court observed that after the amendment Parliament deliberately omitted the reservation clause from the sections that dealt with appeals in the Arbitration Act of 1940. Consequently the Court found that this omission could only be understood as an intention to limit the right of appeal to the narrow parameters specified in section thirty‑nine and to remove any appeal rights that might have been available under other statutes. The Court further noted that the Arbitration Act is a consolidating and amending enactment which, in substance, functions as a code governing arbitration. Because of this character the Act must be interpreted without presuming that Parliament did not intend to change the law relating to appeals. The language of the statute, according to the Court, is clear, plain and explicit; therefore it must be given its full effect and read in its natural meaning. The Court stressed that such interpretation must not be coloured by any assumptions based on the earlier state of the law, nor by any notion that the legislature intended to leave the pre‑existing law unchanged. In the Court’s view the legislature deliberately departed from the law that existed before the enactment of Act X of 1940 by codifying the law of appeals in section thirty‑nine. On that basis the Court held that the appeal was proper and should be allowed. The Court ordered that no costs be awarded in this proceeding. It set aside the order of the Division Bench of the High Court and restored the order made by the learned Single Judge. The Court added that, with respect to its view on the competence of the appeal under clause ten of the Letters Patent, it had not heard counsel on the merits of the appeal. Accordingly the appeal was allowed.