The Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Limited vs The State Of U. P. And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 327 of 1958

Decision Date: 17 March 1961

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this case, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 17 March 1961 concerning The Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Limited versus the State of Uttar Pradesh and others, together with connected appeals. The judgment was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo and delivered by a bench comprising Justices K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The official citation for the decision was reported as 1961 AIR 1381 and also appeared in the Supreme Court Reporter, volume 1 of 1962 at page 422. The case involved the application of clauses (c), (d) and (g) of section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which authorized the State Government to issue general or special orders for the appointment of industrial courts, the referral of industrial disputes for conciliation or adjudication, and to address any incidental matters deemed necessary or expedient for public safety, order, essential services, or employment. On 15 March 1951, the State Government issued General Order No. 615 under these statutory provisions, yet the order did not expressly state the Government’s opinion that the conditions prescribed in section 3 were satisfied. Subsequently, an industrial dispute was referred under that order and an award was rendered against the appellant, The Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Limited.

The appellant challenged the validity of General Order No. 615 on two principal grounds. First, it argued that section 3 of the Act was unconstitutional because it allegedly transferred essential legislative functions to the executive in respect of clauses (c), (d) and (g). Second, it contended that the order was defective because it failed to recite the condition precedent required by the statute before the order could be made. The State responded by filing an affidavit asserting that the Government had indeed formed the requisite opinion regarding the satisfaction of the conditions prior to issuing the order. The Court examined whether section 3 represented an impermissible delegation of essential legislative power and found that it did not, because the legislature had merely set out a policy and a binding rule of conduct, leaving to the Government only the duty to act when the statutory conditions were met. Regarding the omission of the condition precedent in the order, the Court held that the statute did not compel a literal recital of the satisfied condition, and that the filing of the affidavit sufficed to cure any procedural defect. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of General Order No. 615 and affirmed the award rendered against the appellant.

Section 3 of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act specifies that the Government may issue a general or special order when the prescribed conditions are satisfied, and it also delineates the matters that such orders must contain. After the conditions are met, the Government’s remaining task is to frame subordinate rules that will give effect to the purpose of the legislation. The Court applied the authorities in re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951] S.C.R. 747 and Queen v. Burah, (1878) L.R. 5 I.A. 178, in reaching its decision. The Court further held that the general order in question was valid even though it did not expressly state the condition precedent, because an affidavit subsequently filed cured that omission. When a condition precedent must be fulfilled before a subordinate authority can issue an executive order, the statute does not require the order to recite that satisfaction, unless the statute expressly mandates it. Nevertheless, the Court considered it desirable for the order to mention the satisfied condition, because such mention creates a presumption that the condition was met and puts the burden on challengers to rebut it. The Court explained that even if the order omits the recital, it does not become void ab initio; the authority must instead satisfy the court by other means, such as filing an affidavit, to show the condition precedent was met. The Court relied on the decisions in The State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, [1952] S.C.R. 674; Biswabhusan Naik v. The State of Orissa, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 92; and The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, [1955] S.C.R. 777. The Court also referred to King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, [1944] F.C.R. 42 and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, [1945] F.C.R. 216. Additionally, the Court distinguished the United States cases Wichita Railroad & Light Company v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Kansas, (1922) 67 L. Ed. 124; Herbert Mahler v. Howard Eby, (1924) 68 L. Ed. 549; and Panama Refining Company v. A.D. Ryan, (1935) 79 L. Ed. 446.

The judgment was delivered in the civil appellate jurisdiction concerning Civil Appeal No. 327 of 1958, which arose from the decree of the Allahabad High Court dated March 6, 1956, in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 967 of 1953. The same judgment also addressed Civil Appeals Nos. 363 to 369 of 1958, which were appeals from the decrees of the Allahabad High Court dated February 1, 1957. These appeals concerned Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petitions numbered 51 (Lucknow Bench), 523, 524, 607, 632, 633 and 634 of 1955. Counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 327 of 1958 comprised G.S. Pathak and S.P. Varma. Counsel for respondents numbered three and four in the same appeal were C.B. Agarwala, G.C. Mathur and C.P. Lal. The Additional Solicitor‑General for India, H.N. Sanyal, appeared for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 363 to 369 of 1958, along with H.S. Brar, S.N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra. Counsel for respondent number one in Civil Appeals Nos. 363 to 369 of 1958 were C.B. Agarwala and C.P. Lal. Additional counsel for respondent number four were Bhawani Lal and Dharam, who appeared on behalf of that respondent in the relevant appeals.

Counsel for respondent No. 4 appeared in each of the appeals numbered C A No. 369 of 1958, C As Nos. 366 and 368 of 1958, and C A No. 367 of 1958. The judgment was delivered on March 17 1961 by Justice Wanchoo. The Court explained that this group of appeals raised the constitutional issue of Section 3 of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U P XXVIII of 1947), hereinafter called “the Act”, and also questioned the validity of two general orders issued under the Act on March 15 1951. The appellants were certain industrial enterprises that had been in dispute with their work‑men. Those disputes had been referred for adjudication to industrial tribunals that were said to have been established pursuant to the general orders of March 15 1951. Awards were made by those tribunals, and the appellants challenged the awards before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, where they were again unsuccessful. Subsequently the appellants filed petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Allahabad High Court, seeking to set aside Section 3 of the Act and to invalidate the two general orders of 15 March 1951 that had created the industrial tribunals. The High Court held that Section 3 of the Act was constitutionally valid, but it declared that the two general orders dated 15 March 1951 were invalid. Nevertheless, the High Court concluded that the specific orders of reference issued in the present cases were “special orders” within the meaning of Section 3 and therefore were not invalid; consequently the High Court dismissed the petitions. The appellants then applied for and obtained certificates of leave to appeal, which brought the matter before this Court. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to restate the full factual background of the appeals because the only issues raised before it concerned the constitutionality of Section 3, the validity of the two 1951 general orders, and the legality of the references made in the cases. The Court observed that it was not in dispute that if the appellants could not succeed on those points, their appeals in this Court would also fail. Accordingly, the Court first addressed the question of whether Section 3 of the Act was constitutional. The provision of Section 3, as it stood in 1951, read as follows: “If, in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient to do so for securing public safety or convenience, or for maintaining public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general or special order, make provision—(c) for appointing industrial courts; (d) for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order; (g) for any incidental or supplementary matters which appear to the State Government to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of the order.” The principal contention advanced by the appellants was that Section 3 was unconstitutional because it purported to delegate essential legislative functions to the Government, particularly with respect to clauses (c), (d) and (g).

The appellants argued that section 3 of the Act transfers an essential legislative function to the Government, specifically with respect to clauses (c), (d) and (g). In support of this contention, they relied on the observations of Chief Justice Kania in the decision In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1), where he examined the meaning of the term “delegation.” He stated that when a legislative body passes an Act, it has exercised its legislative function and that the essentials of that function consist of determining the legislative policy and formulating it as a rule of conduct. The quotation continues: “When a legislative body passes an Act it has exercised its legislative function. The essentials of such function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. (1) [1951] S.C.R. 747,767‑54 These essentials are the characteristics of a legislature by itself… Those essentials are preserved, when the legislature specifies the basic conclusions of fact, upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data, by a designated administrative agency, it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective. The legislature having thus made its laws, it is clear that every detail for working it out and for carrying the enactments into operation and effect may be done by the legislature or may be left to another subordinate agency or to some executive officer. While this also is sometimes described as a delegation of legislative powers, in essence it is different from delegation of legislative power which means a determination of the legislative policy and formulation of the same as a rule of conduct.” The same principle was echoed by Justice Mukherjea at page 982 of the same case, who observed: “The essential legislative function consists in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. It is open to the legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as little or as much details as it thinks proper and it may delegate the rest of the legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work out the details within the framework of that policy. ‘So long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by statute no constitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the legislation is to apply.’”

Consequently, the Court needed to determine whether, in the present case, the legislature performed its essential legislative function by determining and choosing the legislative policy and by formally enacting that policy as a binding rule of conduct. The law allows the legislature to frame its policy as broadly or as narrowly as it deems appropriate. Once the policy is laid down and a statutory standard is established, there is no constitutional prohibition against the legislature delegating the remaining details to a subordinate authority, provided the delegation is limited to making subordinate rules within prescribed limits. Accordingly, if the legislature, in enacting section 3, chose the legislative policy and formally enacted that policy into a binding rule of conduct, it could constitutionally permit the Government to prescribe the remaining details by means of general or special orders without violating the principle against excessive delegation of legislative power.

Section 3 first specifies the circumstances in which the Government may exercise the authority conferred by that provision. It then states that, once those circumstances have been satisfied, the Government may issue either a general order or a special order. The provision further details the matters that must be included in any such order issued by the Government. Among the powers granted to the Government are, inter alia, the authority to appoint industrial courts, the power to refer any industrial dispute to conciliation or adjudication in the manner prescribed by the order, and the ability to make any incidental or supplementary provision that may be necessary or expedient for the purposes of that order. In this way the legislature has expressed its policy and has turned that policy into a binding rule of conduct. The legislature has also prescribed the moments at which the Government may act under Section 3, the manner in which the Government must act, and the specific actions that the Government is required to take once it acts under the section. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that the delegation of power contained in Section 3 is not excessive and does not exceed the limits of permissible delegation. Any order issued by the Government pursuant to Section 3 must, inter alia, provide for the appointment of industrial courts, for the referral of industrial disputes to conciliation or adjudication, and for any incidental or supplementary matters that may be necessary or expedient. The Government is bound to act within the prescribed limits when it issues an order under Section 3, and such an order will possess the force of subordinate rules.

The appellants have contended that Section 3 fails to specify certain essential details, such as the powers of the industrial courts, the qualifications required of the persons who will constitute those courts, and the locations where the courts will sit, arguing that these matters are essential and should have been provided for by the legislature itself. In support of this argument, reference was made to the observations of the Privy Council in Queen v. Burah, a case concerning conditional legislation. The Privy Council held that when a proper legislature has exercised its judgment with respect to “place, person, laws and powers,” and the result is conditional legislation concerning those aspects, the legislation becomes absolute once the stipulated conditions are fulfilled. The Court holds that those observations do not address the detailed questions raised by the appellants concerning the venue of a court or tribunal or the qualifications of its members; rather, the Privy Council’s remarks pertained to more fundamental issues inherent in the terms “place” and “person.” In the present context, “place” refers to the geographical area to which the legislation applies, and the legislature has clearly defined that area as the whole of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Likewise, “person” denotes the class of individuals to whom the legislation applies, and the legislature has likewise identified that class as employers and employees of industrial concerns within the State.

The Court observed that the statutory language of section 3 expressly covered employers and employees of industrial concerns. It further noted that the conditions prescribed for the issuance of an order were already detailed in the introductory portion of section 3, and that the manner in which the Government was to act was likewise specified, namely by referring any industrial dispute that might arise to a process of conciliation or adjudication. Regarding the authority of the industrial court, the Court held that this authority was also embodied in section 3, which provides that an industrial court shall adjudicate the industrial dispute that is referred to it. Consequently, the Court reasoned that the only task remaining for the Government was to establish the necessary machinery through a general order possessing the force of subordinate rules, thereby giving effect to the legislative policy that had been set out in broad terms in section 3 and subsequently formalised into a binding rule of con. duct. The Court concluded that section 3 was not unconstitutional in any respect because it did not delegate any essential legislative function; rather, it left to the Government merely the power to issue subordinate rules for the purpose of carrying out the legislation’s objectives. Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument, cited as (1) (1878) L.R. 5 I.A. 178, that section 3 was unconstitutional on the ground of excessive delegation. The discussion then turned to the validity of General Order No. 615 dated 15 March 1951, which had been issued under the authority of section 3. The preamble to that order was quoted in full: “In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (b), (c), (d) and (g) of section 3 and section 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947) and in supersession of Government Order No. 781(L)/XVIII dated 10 March 1948, the Governor is pleased to make the following order, and to direct, with reference to section 19 of the said Act, that notice of this Order be given by publication in the Official Gazette.” Following this preamble, the order proceeded to establish conciliation boards for the purpose of conciliation and industrial tribunals for the purpose of adjudication. The primary contention raised by the appellants was that section 3 stipulated certain conditions precedent that had to be satisfied before an order could be issued, and that those conditions precedent needed to be explicitly recited in the order for the exercise of power under section 3 to be valid. The Court affirmed that there was no doubt that section 3 conferred on the State Government the authority to make provisions by general or special order, provided that, in its opinion, such action was necessary or expedient for securing public safety or convenience, maintaining public order, ensuring the supply of services essential to community life, or preserving employment. The formation of that opinion itself constituted a condition precedent to the issuance of the order. However, the Court noted that the preamble to the second order did not contain any recital indicating that the State Government had formed the requisite opinion, thereby raising the question of compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by section 3.

The appellants argued that the orders were invalid because they failed to record the required opinion that the State Government had formed before issuing the orders. They maintained that the condition precedent prescribed by section 3 had not been set out in the wording of the orders themselves, and therefore the orders could not be said to be lawfully made. Subsequently, the appellants also contended that, as a matter of fact, the orders had been issued without any satisfaction on the part of the State Government that section 3 demanded, even though the appellants did not support this claim with an affidavit. It was noted with regret that the State Government likewise had not filed any affidavit to demonstrate that the conditions precedent in section 3 had been complied with, despite the absence of any such recital on the face of the orders. The Court observed that, although the appellants had not filed an affidavit on this point, it would have been reasonable for the State, as a precaution, to file an affidavit indicating whether the conditions precedent of section 3 had been fulfilled, especially because the orders in question were general orders that affected a large number of adjudications. The High Court had previously remarked that the State Government had not filed any affidavit to show that it was, in fact, satisfied as required by section 3, even though the order itself did not contain a statement of such satisfaction. Considering the significance of the issue—given its potential impact on many employers and workmen—the Court asked the State Government whether it wished to file an affidavit at that stage. The State then filed an affidavit sworn by the Secretary to the Government, Labour Department. The affidavit stated that the drafts of Government Order No. 615 and the consequential order Government Order No. 671, both dated 15 March 1951, had been placed before the Labour Minister of that time. It further affirmed that those notifications were issued only after the State Government had fully considered all aspects of the matter and had satisfied itself that it was necessary and expedient to issue them in order to secure public convenience, maintain public order, ensure the supply of essential services to the community, and preserve employment. The Court accepted this affidavit and consequently found that the satisfaction required as a condition precedent under section 3 did exist before the issuance of Order 615 on 15 March 1951 and the related Order 671 of the same date. In light of this finding, the sole remaining question for the Court was whether the satisfaction must be expressly recited in the order itself, and whether the absence of such a recital would render an order of this nature invalid.

The first contention raised by counsel for one of the appellants was that when a statute imposes a condition precedent for the exercise of a statutory power, that condition must be satisfied before a subordinate authority may exercise the delegated power. The Court found that this proposition was not open to dispute. Counsel further submitted that the order exercising the delegated power must contain a recital stating that the condition precedent has been fulfilled before the subordinate authority acts. According to this submission, if the order lacks such a recital, the defect could not be cured by an affidavit filed in the proceedings, and consequently the order would be invalid from the outset. It was also argued that where subordinate rules of this type are to be made and they affect the general public or a segment of the public, the condition precedent to the exercise of power must be expressly recited at the time the power is exercised. The purpose of this requirement, counsel contended, is to enable the public to see that the rules are lawful and have been framed after the necessary conditions have been satisfied. In addition, counsel pointed out that some subordinate rules may have to be enforced by courts and tribunals, and it is therefore essential that those courts and tribunals be able to ascertain from the presence of the recital in the order that the rules are legal, binding, and have been framed after the condition precedent was satisfied. In particular, counsel emphasized that where the rules are of a general nature and constitute subordinate legislation, the satisfaction of the condition precedent becomes part of the legislative process for the subordinate authority, and a defect in that legislative process cannot be remedied later by an affidavit. On the other side, counsel for the respondent argued that when a statute authorises the making of an order subject to certain conditions, the statute does not require those conditions to be set out in the order itself unless the statute expressly mandates such a recital. Accordingly, it was submitted that the order should be presumed valid, with the condition satisfied, unless evidence to the contrary is produced. Counsel distinguished two situations: one in which the condition precedent consists of the subjective opinion of the subordinate authority, and another in which the statute requires a hearing and a finding. In the former situation, the presumption should favour the view that the opinion was formed before the order was issued, whereas in the latter situation the order should disclose that a hearing and a finding had occurred. Counsel further observed that the power to pass an order under section 3 arises as soon as the necessary opinion required by that provision is formed, and that such opinion is naturally formed before the order is made. Consequently, if the opinion was formed and an order was thereafter passed, the order would constitute a valid exercise of the power conferred by the section, regardless of whether the subsequent notification publishing the order recited the formation of the opinion.

The Court observed that the absence of a statement in the order indicating that the requisite opinion had been formed does not remove the authority to issue the order once that authority has already arisen and resulted in the order’s issuance. Accordingly, the order’s validity is not contingent upon the opinion’s formation being recorded within the order; rather, it depends on the fact that the opinion was indeed formed and that the order was subsequently issued on that basis. Consequently, the Court held that where, by mistake or any other reason, the preamble of an order fails to mention that the opinion had been formed, the defect can be cured by producing other evidence in proceedings that challenge the order’s validity, so that it can be shown that the order was actually made after the opinion had been formed and therefore constitutes a proper exercise of the statutory power. The Court qualified this principle by stating that an exception arises only when the statute expressly requires that the order itself must contain a recital of the opinion before the order can be considered valid. The Court acknowledged that when a statute mandates that a delegated power may be exercised only upon satisfaction of a condition precedent, it is highly desirable for the order to begin with a recital confirming that the condition has been satisfied. Nevertheless, the Court noted that several decisions on executive orders have held that even if such a recital is missing, the order is not void from the outset and the defect can be remedied by filing an affidavit or other proof later demonstrating that the condition precedent was fulfilled. In The State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, a preventive‑detention case, this Court ruled that even when an order is defective in form, the State Government may establish its validity by alternative means. In Biswabhusan Naik v. The State of Orissa, a case concerning sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, No. II of 1947, the Court observed that while it is preferable to set out the factual basis on the face of the sanction, an omission of those facts does not render the sanction fatal provided the facts can be proved in some other manner. Later, in The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, a case involving requisition under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, the Court held that it is not necessary to state the purpose of the requisition in the order; although stating the purpose is desirable, the purpose may be established by other evidence when it is not recorded in the order. The Court therefore concluded that an omission of a recital of the opinion or purpose does not, by itself, invalidate an order if the required condition precedent can be satisfactorily demonstrated through other evidence.

In this passage the Court observed that the absence of a factual recital in an order is not fatal provided that the facts can be proven to the court’s satisfaction by other means. The same principle, the Court said, applies to orders that are characterised as subordinate legislation. The Court explained that whether an order is an executive action or an act of subordinate legislation, its validity depends on the satisfaction of certain prescribed conditions precedent. If those conditions are not expressly mentioned in the face of the order, but the authority can demonstrate that they were fulfilled to the court’s satisfaction, the order remains valid. The Court noted that this view is consistent with earlier decisions, citing the cases reported at [1952] S.C.R. 674, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 92 and [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777. The Court rejected the argument advanced by counsel Aggarwala that the mere fact of an order’s issuance creates a presumption that all conditions precedent have been satisfied, when no such recital appears in the order. The Court held that such a presumption arises only when the order itself contains an explicit statement to that effect. Consequently, when an order is challenged on the ground that the required conditions were not met, the authority that issued the order must prove, by evidence other than the order’s text, that the conditions were indeed satisfied prior to issuance. Similarly, the Court was not persuaded by counsel Pathak’s contention that, without a recital, the public, courts or tribunals would be unaware of the order’s validity and that a recital on the face of the order is therefore indispensable. The Court recognised that a general presumption of regularity attaches to public acts, but it clarified that once an order is contested on the basis that the conditions precedent were not fulfilled, the burden shifts to the issuing authority to demonstrate compliance by means other than a recital. The distinction, the Court explained, is that when an order contains an explicit recital, the court may presume that the conditions precedent have been satisfied, and the challenger must then prove that the recital is inaccurate and that the conditions were not actually met. In contrast, where no recital is present, the onus is on the authority to establish, through alternative evidence, that the prescribed conditions were satisfied before the order was made.

The Court observed that the argument presented by the counsel for the respondent, which relied on the decisions in Sibnath Banerjee (1) and the subsequent Privy Council approval in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee (2), was unpersuasive. The counsel contended that once conditions are attached to the legislative process, non‑compliance would render the subordinate legislation illegal and that any defect could not be remedied later by an affidavit. While the Court recognised that a power may be exercised subject to certain conditions precedent, it stressed that this does not transform the action of a subordinate executive authority into a legislative procedure that must be completed before a law is enacted. Consequently, the Court concluded that when specific conditions precedent must be fulfilled before a subordinate authority—whether executive in nature or akin to subordinate legislation—issues an order, the order does not have to expressly recite the satisfaction of those conditions unless the governing statute mandates such a recital. Nonetheless, the Court noted that it is highly desirable for the order to contain such a recital because it creates a presumption that the conditions were satisfied, thereby placing the burden on any challenger to prove that the recital is inaccurate. Even in the absence of an explicit recital, the Court held that the order does not become invalid from the outset; instead, the authority that issued the order bears an additional burden to demonstrate to the Court, by other means, that the required conditions were indeed met. In the present matter, the Court found that this burden had been discharged through the filing of an affidavit before it. Accordingly, the Court was of the opinion that the defect in the two orders dated 15 March 1951 had been cured and that those orders were issued after the State Government had satisfied the requirements of section 3 of the Act. Therefore, Government Orders Nos. 615 and 671 of 15 March 1951, which are the subject of these appeals, were held to be valid under section 3 of the Act. The Court then turned to the authorities cited by the counsel for the respondent. The first authority referred to was Wichita Railroad & Light Company v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Kansas (1). In that case, the Commission was required to hold a hearing, make a factual finding, and determine that the contract rates were unreasonable before they could be altered. Relying on section 13 of the statute under review, the United States Supreme Court held that a valid order of the Commission must contain a factual finding based on hearing and investigation, and that the absence of such a finding rendered the order void. The Court rejected the notion that an express finding could be supplied by implication. The Court noted, however, that the Kansas decision was grounded in a statutory provision that expressly required a finding to be stated in the order, and therefore it does not establish a general principle that every delegated authority must include an express recital of conditions precedent in its order.

By referring to the statements made in the petition that invoked the Commission’s action, the Court rested its decision on the principle that an express finding of unreasonableness by the Commission was indispensable under the statutes of the State. The Court observed that the cited case was decided on the basis of a statutory provision that required such a finding to be stated in the order, and therefore it could not be treated as authority for the proposition that an express recital is required in every order before a delegate may exercise delegated power. The next authority considered was Herbert Mahler v. Howard Eby. That case concerned the deportation of aliens, where the statute authorised deportation if, after a hearing, the Secretary (Labour) found that the aliens were undesirable residents of the United States. In the case before the lower court the Secretary had not made an express finding in the warrant for deportation, and the defect in the warrant was not corrected before the court’s hearing. The Court held that the finding was a condition precedent to deportation and that, when an executive exercises delegated legislative authority, it must substantially comply with all statutory requirements. Accordingly, if making a finding is a condition precedent, that fulfilment must appear in the record of the act. The Court also relied on the earlier decision of Wichita Railroad & Light Company v. Public Utilities Commission (2). The Court noted that this precedent similarly involved a hearing and a statutory requirement that the finding be stated in the order, and therefore it had to be distinguished from the present matter. It was added, however, that the Court in Herbert Mahler did not discharge the deportees; rather, it gave a reasonable time to the Secretary (Labour) to correct and perfect his finding on the evidence produced at the original hearing or to commence another proceeding against them (1) (1924) 68 L. Ed. 549‑ (2) (1922) 67 L. Ed. 124‑. The last case examined was Panama Refining Company v. A. D. Ryan (1). In that case section 9(e) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 was struck down on the ground of excessive delegation, and it was further held that the executive order contained no finding and no statement of the grounds for the President’s action in enacting the prohibition. The Court held that this precedent was not applicable to the matter before it, because the statutory provision itself had been invalidated, causing any executive order issued under it to fail. Consequently, the Court concluded that section 3 of the Act is constitutional insofar as clauses (c), (d) and (g) are concerned, and that Government Orders Nos. 615 and 671 dated 15 March 1951 are legal and valid. In these circumstances the Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the High Court was correct in holding that the referenced orders were special orders under section 3.

The Court observed that the references made under the orders in question satisfied the legal requirements and were therefore valid. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeals challenging those orders could not be sustained and consequently dismissed the appeals. The judgment further recorded that, given the circumstances, the Court expressly stated, “we pass no order as to costs.” By making that statement, the Court indicated that it would not award any costs to either party and that no order concerning costs would be issued. In effect, the dismissal of the appeals was effected without any cost consequences for the parties involved. The final operative part of the judgment reiterated that the appeals were dismissed, thereby bringing the dispute to an end. The Court also cited the earlier authority for reference, noting the citation as (1) (1935) 79 L. Ed- 446.