The Poohari Fakir Sadavarthy of Bondilipuram vs The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1959

Decision Date: 22 December 1961

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar

The matter concerned a petition filed by the Poohari Fakir Sadavarthy of Bondilipuram against the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, and the judgment was delivered on 22 December 1961 by a three‑judge bench of the Supreme Court of India. The bench comprised Justice Raghubar Dayal, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar. The case is reported in 1963 AIR 510 and also appears in the 1962 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 276, with later citations in 1979 (SC 1147 (2)) and 1992 (SC 1110 (21)). The statutory provision in issue was section 9, clause 12 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927).

The historical background set out that the Emperor Aurangazeb had granted certain lands to Mukuldas Babajee, who founded the institution known as Poohari Fakir Sadavarthy, for the purpose of maintaining the founder and distributing Sadavarthy to fakirs and other religious persons. Several generations later, the sixth head of the institution constructed a shrine intended for private worship. This shrine was physically attached to the main institution, but the public was not permitted to enter it without the explicit permission of the Mahant. The income derived from various properties granted to the founder and his disciples was regularly applied to maintain the head of the institution, to fund charitable distributions to sadhus and pilgrims, and to meet the expenses of worship in the temple.

The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras, had held that the temple in dispute was a public temple. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the institution satisfied the definition of a public temple under the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926. The Court explained that an institution qualifies as a public temple under the Act only if two conditions are met: first, the place must be used for public religious worship; second, it must be dedicated to, or used by right of, the Hindu community or any segment thereof as a place of worship. The Court further observed that even if many persons worship at a temple, that fact alone does not convert a private temple into a public one when there is credible evidence that the temple was intended to be private, and where the owner customarily restricts access to visitors.

In the present case, the description of the shrine’s construction, its equipment, the religious practices observed and the form of worship were not inconsistent with the other evidence indicating that the shrine was not a public temple. Accordingly, the Court held that the shrine did not meet the statutory definition of a public temple and was not used as a place of worship by the Hindu community or any of its sections as a matter of right. The Court also noted that while the Inam Register is of great evidentiary value, its entries cannot be accepted at face value without considering other relevant matters recorded in the same entry.

The Court observed that although a register may be of great evidentiary value, this does not require that any entry or entries in a particular column be accepted at face value without giving appropriate consideration to other matters recorded in the same entry. The appeal concerned Civil Appeal No 87 of 1959, filed under the certificate jurisdiction of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh against the order of that High Court which had reversed the decision of the District Judge of Vizagapatam. The District Judge had held that the place of worship in dispute was not a temple within the meaning of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927). On 28 March 1947 the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Madras, had declared the institution to be a temple as defined in the Act. After that designation, the appellants lodged a petition under section 84(2) of the Act in the Vizagapatam District Court, seeking to set aside the Board’s order. They contended that the institution, known as the Poohari Fakir Sadavarthy at Bondilipuram, Chicacole, was an ancient establishment founded by Malukdas Bavajee during the reign of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. According to historically recognised works such as the Bhakthamala of Maharaja Raghunandha Singh Deo of Rewa, the emperor, impressed by Bavajee’s piety, granted him lands and other privileges so that he could sustain himself, distribute Sadavarthy to Fakirs and Sadhus, and pray for the empire’s prosperity. The institution prospered and continues to exist. The original plaintiff No 2, Rajaram Das Bavajee, who was the ninth successor of the founder, died during the litigation and is now represented by Mahant Gangaram Das Bavajee, appellant No 2. Sithaldas Bavajee, the sixth head of the institution in the early nineteenth century, constructed a shrine and placed certain idols for his private worship. This shrine, an adjunct of the Poohari Fakir Sadavarthy, is alleged to be a private temple called the Jagannadhaswami Temple at Balaga, intended for the Mahant and his disciples, one of whom performs daily worship. The revenues from the various properties granted to Malukdas Bavajee or his successors have been regularly employed for the maintenance of the head of the institution and for distributing charitable aid to sadhus and pilgrims passing through Balaga, although a portion of the income has also been expended on the expenses of worship at the shrine.

The evidence showed that the revenue derived from the various properties allotted to Malukdas Bavajee or his successors had been applied to the upkeep of the shrine and to the incidental expenses that were necessarily connected with its operation. The respondent Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board contested the claim that the Jagannadhaswami temple was a private place of worship. The Board asserted that the public was not required to obtain permission from the Bavajee in order to enter the temple and that the shrine possessed every characteristic of a place of public religious worship. It further alleged that the temple was dedicated to, or was for the benefit of, the Hindu community and that it was used as a matter of right by that community as a place of worship. To support their position, the appellants examined five witnesses, one of whom was plaintiff No. 2, and relied on a series of documentary submissions. The respondent, in turn, examined a single witness and produced a modest collection of documents, among which were the Board’s order dated 28 March 1947 and the accompanying enclosure. After considering all of the evidence, the learned District Judge held that the Jagannadhaswami temple did not satisfy the statutory definition of a temple under the Act because it functioned solely as a private shrine for the benefit of the appellants. Accordingly, the judge set aside the order issued by the Board. On appeal, the High Court reached a contrary view and allowed the Board’s appeal. The High Court based its conclusion principally on entries found in the Inam registers relating to the institution and on a series of factual findings that it regarded as established: (i) the shrine was an extremely old structure, having been built around the year 1750; (ii) its architecture and organisational structure resembled those of a public temple; (iii) the premises contained utsava vigrahams and vahanams; (iv) the complex was enclosed by a substantial compound wall with a gate opening onto Chinna Bazaar Road; (v) daily worship was conducted at a fixed schedule; (vi) an archaka was engaged to perform the rituals; (vii) a considerable number of pilgrims visited each day and partook of the food offered after naivedyam; and (viii) the temple hosted utsavams and, in particular, a large‑scale rathotsavam that attracted members of the general public. The High Court accepted the testimony of the solitary witness called by the Board and gave no weight to the statements of the witnesses produced by the appellants. The sole issue that the Supreme Court was called upon to decide was whether the institution fell within the meaning of “temple” as defined in Section 9(12) of the Act, which provides that a temple means “a place, by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu community, or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship.” Accordingly, for the institution to be classified as a temple, two conditions must be satisfied: first, it must be a place of public religious worship; second, it must be dedicated to or for the benefit of, or be used as of right by, the Hindu community or a segment of that community. After reviewing the oral testimonies and the documentary material, this Court was of the opinion that the evidence fully supported the appellants’ contention that the shrine did not meet the statutory definition of a temple. The documents on

The record shows a series of documents dated from 1698 to 1803 A.D. that refer to grants made for the benefit of the Bavajee, the head of the institution. The earliest document, identified as Exhibit P‑1, belongs to the Hijri year 1117, which corresponds to 1698 A.D., and it claims to have been executed by Ibrahim Khan Bahadur, a humble servant of Badshah Alamgir Ghazi, that is, Emperor Aurangazeb. According to the order, the village of Cheedivalasa in the Boonamali Pargana Haveli, situated towards Kaling of the said Sirkar, had been fixed and continued as a complete inam in favour of Poohari Fakir Sadabarty in accordance with the Sanads of the previous rulers. The order further states that, in view of the claims of the said person, the grant was confirmed as per endorsement in accordance with momooli (usage) and mustamir (continuing, lasting long). The document emphasised that it was necessary for the village to be placed in the enjoyment of the said person so that, by using the incomes thereof for his own maintenance, he could engage himself in praying for the stability of the State till eternity. The purpose of the remaining grants is expressed in practically similar terms, and it is not necessary to quote each of them individually.

None of the grants of land or other property on record bears a date later than the year 1803 A.D. The documents identified as Exhibits P‑47, P‑48 and P‑49 are orders of the Collectors and refer to the villages of Cheedivalasa and Thallavalasa. The latter two orders state that the income of these two villages was given for sadavarty (feeding) for the respective year to Phalari (Phulhari) Bavaji. Neither of these two documents mentions any grant being made for the purposes of a temple or for the purposes of the Bavaji as well as for those of a temple. The only reference to the construction of a temple appears in Exhibit P‑52, an extract from the Register of Inams dated 22 May 1865, concerning village Vanzangi. Although the name of the village does not appear in the document itself, it records that “about a century ago, the trustees built a temple of Jagannadhaswamy.” According to this note, the temple may be said to have been built around 1760 A.D. The documents of the period from 1761 to 1803 A.D., Exhibits P‑31 to P‑49, do not record that the grants under them were for the expenses of a temple. The grants merely state that they were for the expenses of Fakirs, in the name of Poohari Fakir Sadavarthy, and not for a temple. The absence of any reference to the temple in the various documents is consistent with the temple being intended for the private worship of the head of the Sadavarti Institution and being an adjunct to that institution; in such a case no separate grant to the temple would be expected, and the grant would have been made to the Sadavarti Institution or to its head. It is also striking that no independent grant to this temple was made after its alleged construction.

In this matter, the Court observed that no grant had been made after the temple came into existence. It was suggested that a person of religious and charitable inclination might have considered endowing property to the temple, which was constructed by the head of a well‑known institution in that region. Judicial pronouncement in the case established a presumption that such a temple is a public temple. The Court clarified that, for the present discussion, the documents being examined do not include any entries from the Inam registers.

A careful review of the documentary evidence dating from 1608 to 1803 A.D. showed that all the endowments recorded during that period were made in favour of the Fakir or Bavajee who administered the Sadavarti institution. None of those grants was directed to the temple itself, nor even to the Sadavarti institution as a corporate entity; each grant was made in the name of the Bavajee who was then in charge. Before turning to the Inam register entries, which the Court recognised as carrying considerable weight, the Court first referred to the statutory rules that governed the making of entries in those registers after the appropriate investigation had been completed.

The extracts taken from the Inam registers and placed on record indicated that the proposals for grant were sanctioned under rule 3, clause (1), as tax‑free. Consequently, the Court found it necessary to examine that rule. The rule forms part of the regulations for the adjudication and settlement of Inam lands in the Madras Presidency and is reproduced in the judgment of Arunachellam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal at page 219. The rule provides that if an Inam was granted for religious or charitable purposes—such as the support of temples, mosques, colleges, choultries, or other public buildings or institutions, or for services rendered therein, whether the grant is held in the name of the institution or the individual providing the services—it shall continue in favour of the present holder and his successors and shall not be subject to further interference, provided that the buildings or institutions are kept in a proper state and the services are performed in accordance with the conditions of the grant.

The Court also cited a passage from page 217 of the same report, noting that the Inam Register for the year 1864 had been produced and was accorded significance by the Court. While the Register was created primarily to determine whether the lands were tax‑free, the Court emphasized that its preparation represented a substantial act of state. The Register’s contents had been the subject of extensive deliberation, detailed reports and minutes. The Inam Commissioners, through their officials, had conducted on‑site inquiries, heard evidence, examined documents and, for each specific property, had provided the Government not only with a conclusion on the tax status but also with a statement of the property’s history and tenure. The Court affirmed that it did not doubt the reliability of such a report.

The Court observed that the Inam Register does not overrule genuine and authentic evidence that may exist in individual cases; however, when such primary evidence is missing, the Board is obliged to give the greatest weight to the information recorded in the Register as an integral part of the historical record of the property. The Court emphasized that the Register, in the absence of other proof, becomes a crucial source for determining the nature and conditions of the grant.

Exhibit P‑50 is an extract taken from Inam Register No. 48 and relates to the village of Tallavalasa situated in the Taluk of Chicacole, district of Ganjam. The note entered by the Deputy Collector, Inam Commissioner, records a series of particulars concerning the grant. Firstly, the village was originally granted by Nawab Mafuz Khan in Hijri year 1155, which corresponds to A.D. 1739, to an Inamdar identified simply as Bairagi. Because the original sanad is not available, the Court could not detail the exact purpose of the grant or the tenure terms. The mokhasa jahagiri is presently held by the person listed in column II, who is identified as Palahara Mahant Bartudoss Bavaji, a Bairagi. Secondly, Bartudoss Bavaji asserted that this village together with three other villages had been granted by former rulers for Sadavarti and other divine services, and that a portion of the proceeds was to be used for the expenses of the Sri Jagannadhaswami temple, as well as for distributing Sadavarti, providing food, fire‑wood, and cooked meals to Bairagis and other pilgrims traveling between Rameswaram and Benaras. Thirdly, Bartudoss Bavaji produced a sanad issued by Sri Seetaram Ranzi Maharaja, the former zamindar of Vizianagaram in Vizagapatam district, granting the village to Gopaladass Palahari Bavaji. This sanad, dated Subhakrutu year and corresponding to A.D. 1782, shows that Gopaladass was then acting as manager of a charitable branch and that the village was granted free of tax in lieu of income from the villages of Balaza, Petranivalasa and Serumohannadpuram, which had originally been granted for charitable support but were later resumed and merged with circar lands. The sanad explicitly stated that the proceeds of the village were to be appropriated for Sadavarti. Fourthly, the Court concluded that, on the whole, the mokhasa was granted for Sadavarti and for the support of the Sri Jagannadhaswami temple in Balaga, noting the existence of a Bairagi Mattam in Balaga and a temple of the same deity there. Accordingly, the grant was characterised as a charitable grant, and the Court expressed the view that, to preserve the purpose of the grant, the village could be confirmed in its present tenure. Fifthly, column 8 of the register, which records the description of the inam, contains the entry: “Granted for the support for the Sadavarti Bairagi mattam in Balaga and of the temple of Sri Jagannadhaswami in the same village now efficiently kept up.” Sixthly, column 10, under the heading indicating whether the grant is hereditary, unconditional, for life only, or for two or more lives, records the term “hereditary.” Seventhly, column 11, which is intended to note the name of the grantor and the year of the grant, lists Nawab Mafuz Khan, dated Hijri 1155. Eighthly, column 13 records Mandasa Palahari Bairagi as the original grantee. Finally, column 9 was left without any entry, indicating that no additional description was provided for that column.

The entry appearing in column eighteen, which relates to the relationship of the original grantee or subsequent registered holders, records the description “Sadavarti Bairagi mattam and the temple of Sri Jagannadhaswami in Balaga Trustee Palahara Mahant Barta Dasu Bavaji”. From this description and from the fact that the grant was characterised as “a charitable grant”, it follows that the purpose of the grant was understood to be the support of Sadavarti rather than the support of the temple. This interpretation is reinforced by the statement of Bartudoss Bavaji, who explained that only a part of the village proceeds was expended on the temple and that such expenditure was not a major portion of the proceeds; his statement indicates that the proceeds were appropriated for temple expenses “to some extent”. No evidence was offered to show that the temple existed in the year 1739 A.D., the year in which the grant was made. Consequently, it is clear that the grant could not have been made for the purpose of meeting temple expenses at that time, and that any expenditure on the temple would have been a small, subsequent outlay by the Bavaji after the temple’s construction. Any suggestion in the records that the grant was intended both for Sadavarti and for temple expenses appears to stem from a mistaken inference by the person conducting the enquiry. Such an error could arise because a temple existed at the time of the enquiry and because the term “divine service” was used in the records. The phrase “divine service”, as understood from other contemporary documents dating from 1698 to 1802 A.D., actually referred to prayers offered for the stability and continuity of the State, not to temple rituals. Moreover, the description of the grant as “hereditary” supports the conclusion that the benefit was intended for the Bavajee personally and not for the temple, even if the temple had been present at the time of the original grant. The original sanad, issued by Seetaram Ranzi Maharaja and produced before the enquiry officers, explicitly states that the village proceeds were to be appropriated for Sadavarti. This passage therefore bolsters the appellant’s case, despite the mention of the temple’s name alongside Sadavarti Bairagi. The confirmation of the grant as tax‑free was recommended by the Deputy Collector, Inam Commissioner, pursuant to Rule 3, Clause (1). The order of the Officiating Inam Commissioner dated July 1864 states “Confirmed on present tenure”, and column nine records the tenure as “tax free”. Exhibit P‑51 is an extract from the Inam Register of the Zamindari estate of Tekkaly in Chicacole Taluk, Ganjam District, relating to the village Chinna Zavanapalli. The Deputy Collector’s report records that the claim of the then Bavajee was that the village had been granted in the name of Gopaladass, trustee and priest of the mattam, in Hijri 1165 (corresponding to 1752 A.D.). The report further records a statement made on behalf of the Zamindar’s shiristadar that the grant was given for

The Court observed that the grant described in the records was made for the support of the mattam and was expressly not a personal grant to any individual. It was entered in the permanent settlement accounts as an agrahar, that is, a land grant designated for religious and charitable purposes. The purpose of the grant, as stated in the documents, was to provide sustenance to Bairagis and similar ascetics who travelled between Benaras and Rameswaram, and to supply them with food, clothing and other necessities. This particular type of charitable activity was identified in the records as “sadavarti”. The revenue generated from the village in question, together with the revenue from other villages that were also granted for the same charitable purpose, was to be appropriated for sadavarti and for the worship of the idols in the temple of the mattam. Because the grant was made wholly for the benefit of the charitable branch, the Court thought that it ought to be confirmed in its present tenure.

The entries recorded under the various columns of the register closely match those shown in Exhibit P‑50. Those entries likewise support the appellants’ case by indicating that the original grant, dated 1752 A.D., was made to the then‑incumbent Bavajee and was intended exclusively for charitable purposes. Exhibit P‑52, which is an extract from the Register of Inams relating to the village of Vanzangi, contains a clear statement: “The object of this grant is to give ‘sadavarti’ to travellers, that is, distributing alms and supplying victuals to travellers.” The register further notes that the grant was made during the reign of Alangir Padsha and that the inam has continued uninterrupted since that time. About a century ago the trustees constructed a temple of Jagannadhaswamy. In addition to distributing alms and giving sadavarti to Bairagis and others, the temple’s idol is worshipped and annual festivals are conducted. The entry expressly states that the trustee is defraying expenses to meet the object of the grant and is not misappropriating the inam’s proceeds.

The Court pointed out that the inam had been confirmed as a charitable grant to the Mandasu Sadavarty Charity in accordance with the terms of the original grant. This extract was deemed highly significant because it unambiguously recorded that the purpose of the grant was to provide sadavarti to travellers and that it had been confirmed as a charity grant to that institution. It also referred to the erection of the temple and reiterated that the trustee was using temple‑related expenses to fulfil the grant’s purpose. From this, the Court inferred that the costs of maintaining the temple were considered incidental to the overall expenses of the sadavarti institution, and that the temple itself functioned merely as an adjunct to the sadavarti charitable activity.

Further documentary evidence was cited. Exhibit P‑7, a Parwana dated 15 November 1722 (corresponding to the 14th day of Rabiʽ al‑Awwal, 1135 Hijri), referred to the grant of the village to the Poohari Fakir Sadavarti. Exhibit P‑53, an extract from the Register of Inams concerning the village of Ragolu in Chicacole Taluk, recorded that the sanad explicitly mentioned that the inam was given for the support of fakirs to the original grantee about a century ago. The remaining notes in this extract were practically identical to those found in Exhibit P‑52. The final order of the Inam Commissioner, as reflected in the register, was also phrased in similar terms and stated that the grant was “confirmed to the fakirs.”

The Court observed that the sadavarti charity, as stated in the grant, was held free of any assessment because there was no excess revenue. The Court found it noteworthy that column 2 of the record, which indicates the general class to which the inam belongs, was entered as “Dewadayam”, meaning dedicated to God. In column 8, which provides a description of the inam, the entry read “for the support of Pagoda of Sri Jagannadhaswami in Bondilipuram”. Column 11 further recorded that the grant had been made by Anavaruddin Khan Bahadur in Hijri 1171, which corresponds to the years 1754‑55 A.D. The Court held that the annotation describing the land as dedicated to God was erroneous, because the Sanad explicitly stated that the inam had been given for the support of fakirs to the original grantee, identified in column 13 as Mandasa Palahari Bairagi, about a century earlier. Moreover, the Court noted that the trustees of the sadavarti institution had constructed a temple, and therefore the original grant could not have been intended for a temple or for a deity. The entries in the present extract, the Court said, corroborated the construction details that had been placed on similar entries in Exhibit P‑52 and on other extracts that indicated a grant to the temple.

Exhibit P‑54, the Court explained, was an extract from the Inam Register concerning entry No. 85, titled “Tallavalasa” in the Taluk of Chicacole in the District of Ganjam. That extract recorded that Pratapa Rudra Narayana Devu had granted the village to Falar Gosayi for the support of the “Bavajee” or Swami in Hijri 1141, which corresponds to about 1747 A.D. The report accompanying the extract noted that the object of the grant was that the proceeds should be appropriated for a divine purpose, and that the proceeds were indeed appropriated to both the temple and the sadavarti. The Court observed that the note in column 8 stating “for the support of the pagoda of Jagannadhaswami” appeared to be a mistaken entry made under an erroneous impression, because no temple existed at the time the grant was made in about 1747 A.D.

Exhibit P‑55, the Court further detailed, was an extract from the Register of Inams for the village of Balaga in Chicacole taluk, dated 13 August 1881. Under the heading “by whom granted and in what year”, the extract stated that the grant had been made by Rajah Narayana Gazapati Raz Bahadur under the orders of Alamgir Padsha on 14 May Hijri 1171, which corresponds to the English years 1754‑55. The extract also mentioned that the Sanad granting the inam was still in existence. The entry further explained that, as the lands appeared from a former firman to have been granted to Sadavarti Mandass Bavaji for planting trees and raising buildings, they should be restored to him in accordance with a long‑standing right. The Court interpreted this to mean that the firman, which had not been produced during the inam enquiry, dated from a very early period. Finally, the Court reiterated that this extract also described the inam as “Devadayam”, meaning dedicated to God, and again held that this description was incorrect in view of the Sanad that clearly stated the true nature and purpose of the grant.

The Court observed that the lands in question had been granted by a firman to Sadavarti Mandass Bavaji for the purpose of planting trees and erecting buildings, and it further noted that Exhibit P‑12, a parwana dated 1742 A.D. and bearing the seal of Nawab Jafer Ali Khan, recorded that “it had been proved that Mandas, the successor of Poohari (Poojari) Faqir Sadabarti, had, by endorsement, six kattis of land free from assessment in the village of Balaga and in the villages of the said Haveli Sircar, the revenue from which was fixed for the expenses of the coming and going Fakirs in accordance with the sanads of the previous rulers. Therefore, in consideration of the blessings to follow, it was confirmed as of yore.” The Court held that this entry formed the basis of the enquiry officer’s mistaken view, which led the Inam Commissioner to confirm the grant as being free of quit‑rent on the condition that the stipulated service was maintained. The Commissioner apparently interpreted the service as that of the deity, although the distribution of charity could not properly be described as “service.” The Court further pointed out that the Inam Commissioner’s treatment of the grant referred to in Exhibit P‑50 as being for the support of Sadavarti and for the temple of Sri Jagannadhaswami did not convert the grant into a temple grant, because the temple itself did not exist at the time the grant was made and a later sanad explicitly stated that the original villages were granted for charitable purposes. The Court referred to the observations of the Privy Council in Arunachellam’s Case, which held that in the absence of the original grant the Inam Register possessed great evidentiary value, but cautioned that this did not require accepting any particular entry or column at face value without giving due consideration to the other materials recorded in the same entry. The Court reiterated its earlier finding that the phrase “divine service” in the entry did not denote religious worship but rather the prayers offered by the grantee for the preservation of the State. Consequently, the Court found no record to support the High Court’s conclusion that Bavajee, with the consent of the ruler then in power, had constructed a temple and appropriated the grant’s income for temple worship. No document indicated that the temple was built by Bavajee after obtaining such consent. Exhibits P‑52 and P‑55 merely mentioned that “the trustees built a temple of Sri Jagannadhaswami,” and the term “trustees” referred to the trustees of the Sadavarti institution, not to trustees of a temple. Accordingly, there was nothing in the documents to substantiate the view that the temple was erected with the ruler’s consent. The appellants had called five witnesses to support their claim that the Hindu public had no right to worship in the temple because it was a private temple, and the learned Judges described the statement of Janardhana Prasad Bhatt, P.W. 4, as worthless.

In the present proceedings, the Court observed that the remark made by Janardhana Prasad Bhatt was considered worthless and that no specific reliance was placed on his statement by the appellants before this Court. Nevertheless, the appellants argued that the High Court had dismissed the testimonies of other witnesses without adequate reasons. The first witness they referred to was Iswara Satyanarayana Sarma, who was identified as PW 1. At the time of his deposition in 1949, he was sixty‑three years old and served as a Sanskrit and Telugu Pandit at the Municipal High School while also practicing as an Ayurvedic doctor. He had offered reasons supporting the view that the temple in question was not a public temple; however, the Court found it unnecessary to elaborate on those reasons. His testimony was rejected on the ground that he was perceived to be interested in the Mahant, who had been his patient, and because his statement that individuals, including sishyas (disciples), obtained permission from the Mahant for worship was deemed artificial. The rejection was based on an erroneous impression that he had asserted that even disciples required the Mahant’s permission, a point he had not actually made. Moreover, the mere fact that the Mahant consulted him for medical ailments does not constitute a basis for concluding that his statements were false; there was no obligation on his part to the Mahant, although the reverse relationship might have existed. The second witness discussed by the appellants was P. Kameswara Rao, identified as PW 2, who was approximately thirty years of age. He had previously held the position of Additional Public Prosecutor of Vizagapatam, had served as a Municipal Councillor for ten years, and was President of the Co‑operative Central Bank, residing in close proximity to the temple. Given his background, he was well placed to comment on whether the temple was used for public worship as a matter of right. He testified that he had never observed members of the public worshipping at the temple and that he himself had visited the temple roughly one hundred times. When subjected to a direct question during cross‑examination, he gave a clear answer denying, on personal knowledge, that the premises were used for public religious worship and that Hindus in general possessed any right of access for worship purposes. The question also sought to ascertain whether the temple had been constructed as a place of public religious worship, and his denial implicitly covered that aspect as well. The Court noted that the witness could not have possessed knowledge of the temple’s original purpose and seemed to have overlooked the significance of that portion of the inquiry. Nevertheless, the Court did not consider that his denial, based on personal knowledge, impaired his credibility, especially since he further detailed three specific observations forming his personal knowledge: (i) his attendance at the Rathayatra during which he observed that no offerings of harati or dakshina were made; (ii) his failure to see any member of the public entering the temple on any occasion he entered; and (iii) his practice of seeking the Mahant’s permission each time he entered the temple. The learned judges had previously rejected his testimony, a point that will be addressed in the subsequent analysis.

The Court observed that the testimony of the first witness resembled an advocate’s argument in favor of the mahant rather than impartial evidence presented by a factual witness, noting that the witness had boldly asserted conclusions while relying only on a narrow set of personal observations. The Court clarified that the phrase “the aforesaid facts” referred to the three matters on which the witness claimed personal knowledge, and it held that these facts provided a sound basis for his view that the temple was not a public place of worship. He had visited the temple on numerous occasions and never observed any member of the public entering, and each time he entered he first obtained permission from the mahant; the Court considered his own conduct of seeking such permission to be strong corroboration of his statement. Accordingly, the Court found no convincing reason to discredit his testimony. The next witness, identified as G. Venkata Rao, a 48‑year‑old chairman of the Municipal Council of Chicacole and a senior officer of the Co‑operative Central Bank, was characterized by the Court as having given a highly artificial statement. Nevertheless, his admission that he always asked the mahant for permission when visiting the temple supported his claim that the temple functioned as a private, not a public, institution. The Court further rejected the suggestion that the mahant’s additional role as Municipal Commissioner and occasional medical consultant undermined the credibility of Rao’s evidence. The final witness examined was the plaintiff numbered two, described as the predecessor of appellant two, whose personal interest in the outcome was acknowledged but not deemed sufficient to discard his testimony. In fact, the Court held that his declaration should be accepted because it was reinforced by the consistent accounts of the three previously mentioned witnesses. The Court also noted the absence of any testimony from members of the Hindu public in support of the respondent’s contention that the public had a rightful claim to worship at the temple; it observed that if such a right truly existed, a substantial number of lay worshippers would have been available for examination. Conversely, the respondent had relied solely on the evidence of M. Adinarayana Rao, who served as Inspector of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board for the Chicacole division from 1946 to 1948. Rao asserted that the temple in dispute was a public temple open to all for worship as a matter of right, but the Court regarded this statement as moot because it was not grounded in any factual observation of a crowd of worshippers, and such an assertion could not, by itself, overturn the stronger evidence indicating that the temple operated as a private establishment.

It was held that the mere fact that a number of people worshipped in the temple did not establish that the temple was a public temple to which the worshippers went as a matter of right. The Court observed that it is not customary for the owner of a private temple to prohibit visitors, even when the temple is privately owned. The witness for the respondent claimed that the temple observed several festivals, namely Nethroshasevam, the car festival and kalyanam. However, during cross‑examination the witness was compelled to admit that he had never attended the kalyanam festival and was unaware of the date on which it was celebrated. This admission was taken to show that the witness was an eager, perhaps overly zealous, witness. He further asserted that an archak was present in the temple but could not recall the archak’s name. While it might normally be expected that a layperson would not know the name of a priest, the Court noted that the witness had previously served as an Inspector of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board and had visited the temple in an official capacity, preparing a report on his findings. Given this background, the Court found it difficult to accept that the witness could have ignored the name of an archak if such a person truly existed. Consequently, the Court saw no justification for giving preference to the uncertain statements of this witness over the testimonies of the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellants.

The Court further observed that it was unnecessary to evaluate the statements of the respondents’ witnesses concerning features that are associated with a public temple and which were said to be absent in the temple under dispute. One of the respondent’s witnesses admitted the presence of a Tulsi plant before the shrine. The appellants argued that no public temple possesses a Tulsi Kotta, and this contention appeared to be supported by the same witness’s re‑examination, in which he asserted that, in Oriya temples, flag‑staffs are generally not erected and Tulsi plants are cultivated instead. The overall description of the temple—its construction, equipment, customs, observances and forms of worship—did not contradict the inference drawn from the remaining evidence that the temple was not a public temple. The assertion that Oriya temples typically lack flag‑staffs and have Tulsi plants was found to have further significance. In the case of Mundancheri Koman v. Achuthan Nair (1) at page 408, it was held that in the greater part of the Madras Presidency, where private temples were virtually unknown, there exists a presumption that temples and their endowments constitute public charitable trusts. The Court stressed that such a presumption is rebuttable. In the present matter, the evidence was deemed sufficient to rebut the presumption. The temple in question was situated at a location practically on the frontier of the Madras Presidency and close to the common boundary with Orissa. Accordingly, the presumption that a temple within the Madras Presidency is a public trust was considered very weak for a temple located at this border area. On this basis, the Court concluded that the temple under dispute did not qualify as a temple within the meaning of the Act, because it was not used as a matter of right by the Hindu community.

The Court noted that the evidence demonstrated that no part of the temple, nor any section of it, functioned as a place of religious worship for the Hindu community. On the basis of that finding, the Court concluded that the appeal should be allowed. Accordingly, the Court permitted the appeal and ordered that the costs of the proceedings be awarded throughout to the successful party. In addition, the Court set aside the judgment that had been issued by the lower court and reinstated the order that had been passed by the District Judge of Vizagapatam. The Court also nullified the decision of the Board that had been dated 28 March 1947. By taking these steps, the Court effectively reversed the previous decisions and restored the position created by the District Judge’s order. The final outcome recorded by the Court was that the appeal was allowed.