The Chief Inspector Of Mines And Another vs Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: 1961 AIR 838

Decision Date: 10 February 1961

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

The case titled The Chief Inspector of Mines and Another versus Lala Karam Chand Thapar etc. was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 10 February 1961. The judgment was authored by Justice K. C. Das Gupta and the bench comprised Justices K. C. Das Gupta, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S. K. Das, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar. The parties were recorded as the Chief Inspector of Mines and another as petitioners and Lala Karam Chand Thapar and others as respondents. The decision is reported in 1961 AIR 838 and 1962 SCR (1) 9, with citator references including 1961 SC 849, 1961 SC 1543, 1972 SC 2066, 1976 SC 1031, 1980 SC 1858, 1982 SC 1413 and 1989 SC 1612. The factual backdrop involved a colliery owned by a company whose directors, the directors of its managing agents, as well as the colliery’s manager and its agent, were prosecuted for contraventions of sections 73 and 74 of the Mines Act, 1932, arising from violations of several provisions of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926.

The accused parties challenged the prosecution on several grounds. Firstly, they argued that the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926 had been framed under the Mines Act, 1923 and, by virtue of section 31(4) of that Act, possessed the force of law as if incorporated into the Act. Since the Mines Act, 1923 was repealed and replaced by the Mines Act, 1952, the appellants contended that the 1926 Regulations had ceased to exist legally before the alleged infractions occurred. Secondly, they maintained that the 1926 Regulations were merely deemed regulations under the Mines Act, 1952 and therefore did not qualify as “laws in force” at the relevant time, rendering the prosecution violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. Additionally, two directors objected on the basis that section 76 of the Mines Act, 1952 allowed prosecution of only one director, not all, and the directors of the managing agents asserted that, being non‑owners of the colliery, they could not be liable to prosecution. The Court held, in the first part of its reasoning, that section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 required that when an Act is repealed and reenacted, the rules and regulations made under the repealed Act continue in force and are deemed to have been made under the provisions of the reenacted Act.

The Court explained that any rule or regulation that was framed under an Act that has since been repealed continues to remain in force and is to be treated as if it had been made under the provisions that have been reenacted. Accordingly, section 31(4) of the Mines Act 1923, although itself repealed, must be interpreted so that, for the purpose of ensuring continuity, the regulations made under that Act are not considered to be part of the repealed Act. As a result, the Indian Coal Mines Regulations of 1926 continued to be operative on the date relevant to the present case and they must be regarded as regulations made under the Mines Act 1952. The Court distinguished the earlier authorities Institute of Patent Agents and others v. Joseph Lockwood [1894] A.C. 347 and State v. K. B. Chandra (1914) I.L.R. 33 Pat. 507 on this point. It further held that although the 1926 regulations became deemed regulations under the Mines Act 1952 by operation of a deeming provision, they nonetheless qualified as “laws in force” within the meaning of article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, thereby distinguishing the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh [1953] S.C.R. 1188. The Court also interpreted the expression “any one of the directors” in section 76 of the Mines Act 1952 to mean “every one of the directors,” relying on the authority Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin (1883) 25 Ch. D. 320. Moreover, the Court observed that the managing agents and the colliery company were neither the owners of the mine nor the occupiers as defined in section 2(1) of the Mines Act 1952; consequently, the prosecution of the directors of the managing agents could not be sustained. The judgment then proceeded to note the criminal appellate jurisdiction, listing Criminal Appeals Nos. 98 to 106 of 1959, which were appeals by special leave from the Patna High Court judgment and order dated 3 March 1958 in multiple M.J.C. cases. The parties’ counsel were identified for each set of appeals. The Court’s judgment dated 10 February 1961, delivered by Justice D.A.S. Gupta, recounted the tragic accident that occurred on 5 February 1955 at the Amlabad Colliery in Manbhum District, Bihar, in which fifty‑two persons lost their lives and one person escaped with injuries. The court of enquiry appointed to investigate the accident submitted its report on 26 September 1955, concluding that the accident resulted from negligence and the failure to observe certain provisions of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations 1926. This report had been duly published under section 27 of the Mines Act 1952.

In 1952 the statutory framework was in force, and thereafter, on 3 March 1956, the Government of India sent a notice to the manager and the agent of the Amlabad Colliery informing them that a court of enquiry was being constituted under clause (a) of Regulation 48 to examine their conduct. At the same time criminal proceedings were instituted against fourteen individuals, namely the manager, the agent, all the directors of the company that owned the colliery, and the directors of the managing agents of that company. The complaints alleged that the fourteen accused had violated several provisions of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926. Two separate complaints were filed, each alleging breach of different regulations. The first complaint asserted that, by contravening the specified regulations, the accused had committed offences punishable under section 73 of the Mines Act, 1952. The second complaint alleged that the same violations gave rise to offences under both sections 73 and 74 of the Mines Act, 1952. The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate took cognizance of these alleged offences and on 23 May 1956 issued process against all fourteen persons.

Six of the accused – Lala Karam Chand Thapar, H. P. Poddar, Jagat Ram Sharma, Kumud Ranjan Dutt, H. V. Varma and U. Mehta – subsequently filed applications before the High Court of Patna seeking writs or orders that would quash the criminal proceedings. Their principal argument was that the regulations they were alleged to have violated no longer possessed any legal force because the Mines Act, 1923, which had originally created those regulations, had been repealed long before the alleged violations occurred. All the applicants also contended that the prosecutions infringed article 20(1) of the Constitution. In addition, the two directors of the owning company, Lala Karam Chand Thapar and H. P. Poddar, raised the point that the Mines Act, 1952, did not permit the prosecution of all the directors. The directors of the managing agents argued that, since the managing agents were not owners of the colliery, their own directors should not be subject to prosecution.

The High Court rejected the contention that the regulations framed under section 29 of the Mines Act, 1923, had ceased to exist after the repeal of that Act. However, the Court accepted the argument of the managing agents’ directors that they were not liable to prosecution. Moreover, after examining section 76 of the 1952 Act, the Court held that not all directors of the owning company could be prosecuted; instead, only a single director, to be selected by the complainant from among the directors, could be proceeded against. On the basis of these findings the High Court dismissed the applications of the manager and the agent, while allowing the applications of the managing agents’ directors.

The High Court had allowed the applications filed by the directors of the managing agents. In the two applications filed by the directors of the colliery company, namely Lala Karam Chand Thaper and H. P. Poddar, the Court directed the respondents identified as the Chief Inspector of Mines and the Regional Inspector of Mines, Dhanbad, to select one of the company’s directors for prosecution and to remove the names of the other directors from the list of accused persons. Both directors of the company obtained special leave to appeal against this direction and consequently filed two criminal appeals, which are now recorded as Criminal Appeals Nos. 103 and 104 of 1959. The manager and the agent of the colliery also appealed the order that had rejected their own applications; these appeals are listed as Criminal Appeals Nos. 105 and 106 of 1959. In addition, the Chief Inspector of Mines and other respondents in the original application under Article 226 filed their own appeals on special leave. Their appeals challenged the High Court’s decisions that had allowed the applications of the managing agents’ directors, as well as the directions ordering the Chief Inspector and the Regional Inspector to choose only one director of the company for prosecution. The appeals concerning the managing agents’ directors were numbered Criminal Appeals Nos. 100 and 101, while the appeals relating to the colliery company’s directors were numbered Criminal Appeals Nos. 98 and 99 of 1957. For convenience, the Court referred to these four appeals collectively as the “government‑appellants.” Around the same time these various applications were before the High Court, the agent and the manager of the colliery also sought writs from the Patna High Court to restrain the Commissioner of Chotanagpur, who had been appointed to conduct an inquiry under Regulation 48, from proceeding with that inquiry. The Patna High Court held that no inquiry could be ordered against the agents, but it rejected the manager’s application. The manager, Shri Kumud Ranjan Dutt, obtained special leave to appeal that decision and filed Appeal No. 102 of 1959, which is now before the Court.

The Court noted that the matters raised in Appeals Nos. 100 and 101 did not require extensive discussion. Regardless of any remaining controversy concerning the continued operation of the 1926 Regulations after the repeal of the 1923 Mines Act, and irrespective of the alleged breach of Article 20(1) of the Constitution, the Court was unequivocal that the High Court had correctly concluded that the managing agents of the colliery company were neither the owners of the coal mines nor the “manager” or “agent” within the meaning of the statutory provisions. The Court observed that no argument had been advanced before it suggesting that the managing agents could be classified as owners, managers, or agents under the Act. Consequently, the High Court’s finding on this point stood affirmed.

In this case the Court observed that the managing agents of the colliery company could not be considered the owners of the coal mines, nor could they be regarded as the “manager” or the “agent” of those mines. The Court noted that no suggestion had been made to the Court that the managing agents were either managers or agents within the meanings given by the legislation. The Act defines “agent” as the representative of the owner for the purpose of managing, controlling and directing the mine, and a managing agent of a company does not fall within that definition. The term “manager” is not defined in the Act, but section 17 provides that each mine must be placed under one manager who possesses the prescribed qualifications and who shall be responsible for the control, management, supervision and directions of the mine. The owner and the agent of each mine must appoint either themselves or another suitably qualified person to act as that manager. In the Amlabad Colliery the Court accepted that Mr Kumud Ranjan Dutt had been duly appointed as the manager, and it was on that basis that proceedings were instituted against him. The managing agent of the company, however, could not be the manager of the Amlabad Colliery. It was argued, nevertheless, that the managing agents of the colliery company were in occupation of the mines and therefore fell within the definition of “owner” in section 2(1) of the Act. Section 2(1) defines “owner” in relation to a mine as any person who is the immediate proprietor, lessee or occupier of the mine or any part thereof. The argument submitted was that, by virtue of being managing agents of the colliery company, they exercised possession of the mine and thus “occupied” it. The Court pointed out that the word “occupier” is not defined in the Act, but it would be manifestly absurd to assume that every person who holds possession of the mine is automatically an “occupier” and therefore an “owner” for the purposes of the Mines Act. The expression “immediate proprietor, or lessee or occupier of the mine” was held to indicate that only a person whose occupation is of the same character—namely, an occupation by a proprietor or a lessee, that is, possession on his own behalf and not on behalf of another—falls within the meaning of “occupier” in the definition. Consequently, a trespasser who wrongfully possesses the mine to the exclusion of the rightful owner would be an occupier and thus an “owner” under the Act. However, when a servant or an agent of the proprietor or lessee is in possession of the mine, that possession is on behalf of his master or principal and not on his own behalf. It would therefore be unreasonable to suppose that the legislature intended to treat such servants or agents as “owners” of the mine. While possession on behalf of another would satisfy the description of “occupier” in section 2(1), the Court concluded that this would make every manager an occupier and therefore vest in each manager all the responsibilities of an “owner”.

The Court observed that the term “owner” in the legislation could not be automatically extended to every “agent” of the proprietor or lessee of a mine. If the legislature had intended agents and managers to be treated as owners, it would have been unnecessary to list “agent” and “manager” separately in section 18, which designates the persons responsible for the proper conduct of mining operations under the Act, the Regulations, the bye‑laws and any orders made thereunder. Likewise, the inclusion of “agent” and “manager” alongside the word “Inspector” in the provision granting special directions for the removal of defects, and their separate mention in section 61 concerning the framing of bye‑laws, would be redundant if agents or managers were already covered by the definition of “owner” in section 2(1). The Court therefore inferred that the legislature deliberately kept “agent” and “manager” distinct from “owner”. This distinction arose because possession held on behalf of another was not regarded by the legislature as an “occupation” that would make the possessor an “occupier” within the meaning of section 2(1). Consequently, any managing agents of a colliery company who exercised possession of a mine did so on behalf of the colliery company and not in a personal capacity, and therefore they could not be classified as “occupiers” under section 2(k). Since the managing‑agent company was not an “agent”, a “manager”, or an “owner” of the mine, the Court held that no question of contravention of the Coal Mines Regulations by that company or by its directors could arise.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the High Court had correctly quashed the criminal proceedings against the directors of the managing‑agent company, and it dismissed Appeals Nos 100 and 101. The Court then turned to the principal issue common to the remaining seven appeals, namely whether the Mines Regulations 1926, which were framed under clause 29 of the Mines Act 1923, remained effective after the Mines Act 1923 was repealed by the Mines Act 1952. To address this question, the Court stressed that it was necessary to examine both section 31 of the Mines Act 1923 and article 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897. The first subsection of article 31 stipulated that the power to make regulations and rules under sections 29, 30 and 30A could be exercised only after the regulations and rules had been previously published. The fourth subsection further required that such regulations and rules be published in the Official Gazette, upon which publication they would have effect “as if enacted in this Act”. The Court noted that the regulations alleged to have been violated were all made under section 29 of the 1923 Act and, as a matter of record, had been duly published in the Official Gazette.

Because the regulations had been published in the official gazette, they acquired effect from the date of publication as if they had been enacted in the Mines Act of 1923. The issue that required resolution was whether those regulations were automatically repealed when the Mines Act of 1923 itself was repealed. Before attempting to answer that issue, the Court examined section twenty‑four of the General Clauses Act. That provision states: “When any Central Act is after the commencement of this Act repealed and reenacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any rule made or issued under the repealed Act shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions reenacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so reenacted unless and until it is superseded by any rule made or issued under the provisions so reenacted.” The Court observed that a regulation clearly qualifies as a rule within the meaning of that clause. In the present case the Mines Act of 1923 had been repealed and replaced, with modifications, by the Mines Act of 1952. The power to make regulations under section twenty‑nine of the 1923 Act was reenacted in the 1952 legislation as section fifty‑seven. The regulations in question had been issued in 1926 under section twenty‑nine of the 1923 Act, and by the relevant year of 1955 no regulations had yet been issued under section fifty‑seven of the 1952 Act. Consequently, the 1926 regulations had not been superseded by any later regulations made under the reenacted provision. Applying section twenty‑four of the General Clauses Act, the Court concluded that the Mines Regulations of 1926 were still in force in 1955 and, in the absence of any express contrary provision and because they were not inconsistent with the reenacted provisions, they were to be regarded as having been made under section fifty‑seven of the 1952 Act.

The appellant, Mr Pathak, contended that section twenty‑four of the General Clauses Act could not operate upon the 1926 regulations because they had been repealed together with the Mines Act of 1923. His argument relied on section thirty‑one, sub‑section four, of the 1923 Act, which provides that the regulations “shall have effect as if enacted in that Act.” The appellant argued that this wording meant the regulations became part of the Act itself, and that the entire Act was repealed by section eighty‑eight of the 1952 Act. Accordingly, the 1926 regulations, being part of the repealed Act, ceased to exist on the day the 1952 Act came into force. On that basis, the appellant maintained that there was nothing for section twenty‑four of the General Clauses Act to operate upon. The core of his reasoning was the assumption that the effect of section thirty‑one, sub‑section four, was to incorporate the regulations into the Act, causing their automatic repeal when the Act was repealed.

The provision in the 1923 Act states that, once published, the regulations shall have effect as if they were enacted by the Act, leading to the conclusion that those regulations became an integral part of the Act. The Court first examined whether this inference was properly justified. In doing so, it considered that the General Clauses Act was enacted to consolidate, within a single statute, various interpretative rules and legal principles that would otherwise have to be inserted separately in many different Acts and regulations. Consequently, every rule or principle laid down in the General Clauses Act must be read into each piece of legislation to which the General Clauses Act is applicable. Because the Mines Act of 1923 is a Central Act, Section 24 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 applies to it, and therefore the Mines Act must be read as containing an additional provision that embodies the words of Section 24. As a result, the Mines Act of 1923 contains, on one hand, a provision that regulations made under Section 29 of that Act shall have effect as if they were enacted by the Act, and, on the other hand, a further provision that such regulations shall continue to remain in force when the Act is repealed and reenacted, being deemed to have been made under the reenacted provisions unless and until they are superseded by regulations made under the reenacted provisions. The Court then considered the effect of interpreting Section 31(4) to mean that the regulations became part of the Act to the extent that, upon repeal of the Act, the regulations would also be repealed. Such an interpretation creates an immediate conflict between Section 31(4) and the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. In other words, while Section 31(4) of the Mines Act appears to provide that the repeal of the Act will automatically repeal the regulations, the incorporation of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act into the Mines Act would mean that, upon repeal and reenactment of the Act, the regulations would not be repealed but would continue in force until they are replaced by new regulations under the reenacted Act. To resolve this inconsistency, the Court held that the rule of harmonious construction must be applied. Counsel for the appellant suggested that harmony could be achieved by interpreting Section 24 of the General Clauses Act to operate only where the regulations survive the repeal of the parent Act, while simultaneously construing Section 31(4) as meaning that the regulations became, for all purposes, part and parcel of the Act. The Court observed, however, that achieving such harmony would effectively render Section 24 of the General Clauses Act nugatory with respect to the Mines Act, thereby destroying the effect of that provision rather than reconciling the two statutes.

In interpreting the two conflicting provisions, the Court determined that a different method of achieving harmony was required. The Court concluded that the most reasonable approach was to read section 31(4) of the Mines Act, 1923, as granting the published regulations the same legal effect as if they were part of the Act for certain specific purposes, for example, for determining whether the regulations themselves are valid. At the same time, the Court held that for the purpose of ensuring the continuity of the regulations’ existence, those regulations would not be treated as part of the Act. Consequently, even if the Mines Act were to be repealed, the regulations would remain in force under the authority of section 24 of the General Clauses Act. This interpretation gives effect to section 31(4) while preserving the beneficial purpose of section 24, thereby avoiding any conflict between the two statutes.

The Court noted that regulations made under any Act are of paramount importance because they enable the effective operation of the primary legislation. Without appropriate regulations, a statute may become ineffective or even useless. The Court observed that when an Act is repealed and later reenacted, a gap is almost inevitable between the commencement of the reenacted Act and the issuance of new regulations under it. Even a highly efficient rule‑making authority cannot eliminate the inevitable hiatus that occurs between the repeal of the old Act, the commencement of the new Act, and the formulation of fresh regulations. In many instances, this lag can be considerable.

The Court considered whether the legislature, by stipulating that regulations “shall have effect as if enacted in the Act,” might have intended that any repeal and reenactment of the Act would cause those regulations to cease to exist for the purposes of the reenacted statute, thereby rendering the new statute a “dead letter” for a period of time. The Court rejected this possibility, stating that such an outcome would be contrary to the legislative purpose. It would be unreasonable for the draftsmen to intend that the very language granting regulations the status of being “as if enacted in the Act” would lead to their repeal whenever the Act itself is repealed. The Court affirmed that the legislature could not have intended such a result, and that the wording of the provision does not produce that effect.

Finally, the Court applied the rule of harmonious construction, as previously discussed, and concluded that section 31(4) does not obstruct the operation of section 24 of the General Clauses Act. The appropriate construction of a legislative provision dealing with rules or regulations that are to have the effect “as if enacted in the Act” must therefore be understood in a manner consistent with the principles set out in several earlier decisions.

In reviewing the authorities, the Court referred to early English and Indian decisions that addressed the same issue, noting particularly the case of Institute of Patent Agents and others v. Joseph Lockwood. In that case, the petitioners sought a declaration that Lockwood was not a registered patent agent under the Patents, Design and Trade Marks Act of 1888 and therefore had no right to describe himself as such, and they also asked for consequential relief. The Act’s first section mandated registration, but it did not specify the procedure for forming the register, the identity of the registrar, the formalities required for registration, or any other particulars. Consequently, the Act authorized the Board of Trade to devise general rules necessary to give effect to the registration requirement. Among those rules the Board required the payment of a fee at the time of first registration and an annual fee thereafter, providing that failure to pay the annual fee would constitute a ground for cancelling the registration. The validity of those fee‑related rules was questioned as to whether they were within the statutory power (intra vires) or beyond it (ultra vires). The House of Lords held that the rules were intra vires, but it also considered an argument raised by the appellants. The appellants contended that, because the Act declared that the rules “shall be of the same effect as if they were contained in this Act,” the courts could not examine the question of the rules’ validity at all. Lord Herschell, then the Lord Chancellor, explained the meaning of that provision, stating that he found it difficult to interpret it in any way other than to treat the rules, for all purposes of construction, obligation, or otherwise, as if they were actually part of the Act. Counsel for the petitioner emphasized the phrase “for all purposes of construction, or obligation or otherwise” and argued that it was a strong authority for the view that, when deciding whether the rules formed part of the Act and therefore would be affected by the repeal of the Act, the rules should be treated as if they were within the Act itself, citing the 1894 decision reported in A‑C 347, which had subsequently been repealed. However, the Court observed that the specific question of whether the rules would be treated as part of the Act for the purpose of determining the effect of the Act’s repeal was never before the House of Lords. The only issue before that court was the extent to which, if at all, the courts could examine the validity of the rules in light of the statutory provision that they “shall have the same effect as if they were contained in the Act.”

The Court observed that the Lord Chancellor’s comments did not address the broader effect of the provision that treats rules “as if they were in the Act.” After the quoted passage, the Lord Chancellor explained that a conflict might arise between a rule and a provision of the Act, just as a conflict can arise between two sections of the same Act. He advised that the parties should try to reconcile the conflict and, if reconciliation fails, must decide which provision is the leading one and which is subordinate, allowing the dominant provision to prevail. He further stated that the same approach applies to enactments and to rules treated as if they were part of the enactment, so that the enactment would be the governing consideration and the rule would be subordinate to it.

The Court then held that the matter presently before it was not the issue decided in Lockwood’s Case (1). It was clear that the Lord Chancellor did not intend to answer the type of question raised by counsel relying on his remarks. Consequently, the Court concluded that Lockwood’s Case (1) could not be used to support the construction advanced by the learned counsel. The Court also considered the later House of Lords decision in Ministry of Health v. The King (on the prosecution of Yaffe) (2), which examined the scope of the principle articulated in Lockwood’s Case. That decision concerned the validity of a scheme that, once confirmed, would have the same effect as if contained in the Act, and it did not address the precise question now before the Court.

Further, the Court noted that the question decided by the Patna High Court in State v. K.B. Chandra (1) was entirely different. In that case, the contention was that the Mines Creche Rules and Coal Mines Pithead Bath Rules, 1946, should be deemed part of the Mines Act, 1923, and that any challenge to their validity could not be brought before the courts. The High Court rejected that contention and held that the consistency of the rules with the Act could indeed be examined judicially. Importantly, the violations in that case occurred before the Mines Act 1952 came into force, so the court was not called upon to consider the fate of the rules after the repeal of the 1923 Act. The Court therefore found that none of the authorities cited by counsel assisted in deciding the present issue. It concluded that the rules and regulations retain their character as rules and regulations even though, for certain purposes such as construction, they may be treated as if they were contained in the Act.

In this case the Court explained that the rules that were being considered possessed the same legal effect as if they had been written directly in the Act, yet they continued to be subordinate rules to the Act. The Court noted that for certain purposes, including the purpose of statutory construction, those rules were to be treated as if they were contained in the Act, but their true character as subordinate rules was not lost. Accordingly, even after the repeal of the earlier Act, the rules remained subject to the operation of section 24 of the General Clauses Act. The Court then stated that, for the reasons already set out, it had no hesitation in holding that the provisions of section 31, sub‑section 4, of the Mines Act 1923 did not impede the full operation of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. As a result of those provisions, the Coal Mines Regulations of 1926 continued to be in force on the relevant date and were to be deemed to be regulations made under the Mines Act 1952.

The Court then turned to an argument that had been raised, faintly, by counsel for the accused. The argument, cited in (1) (1954) I.L.R. 33 Patna ‘507, asserted that even if the 1926 regulations were deemed to be regulations made under the Mines Act 1952, sections 73 or 74 of that Act could not apply. Counsel pointed out that those sections made punishable a contravention of a provision of the Act or of any regulation, rule, bye‑law or other order made under the Act. He contended that the sections did not make punishable a contravention of regulations only deemed to have been made under the 1952 Act, and therefore, assuming his clients had contravened the 1926 regulations as alleged, no offence under sections 73 or 74 had been committed.

The Court observed that counsel had drawn its attention to the definition of “regulations” in section 2(o) of the 1952 Act, which stated that regulations mean “regulations made under this Act”. Counsel argued that if the legislature had intended a contravention of deemed regulations to be punishable, it would have expressly defined regulations to include both those actually made under the Act and those deemed to have been made under the Act. The Court found that argument implausible. It explained that the effect of a deeming provision is to attach to the deemed thing all the legal consequences of the thing itself; that is, when A is deemed to be B, compliance with A is compliance with B, and contravention of A is contravention of B. Consequently, once it was concluded that, by virtue of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, the Coal Mines Regulations of 1926 were deemed on the date of alleged contravention to be regulations made under the Mines Act 1952, it inevitably followed that a contravention of the 1926 regulations amounted to a contravention of regulations made under the 1952 Act, rendering the contravener guilty of an offence under sections 73 or 74.

In this matter, the Court considered the submission made by counsel that the alleged violation of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926—regulations which, at the date of the alleged breach, were “deemed” to be regulations under the Mines Act, 1952—did not constitute a breach of a law that was in force on that date, and therefore that article 20(1) of the Constitution barred any conviction of the accused. The relevant portion of article 20(1) provides that no person shall be convicted of an offence unless the offence consists of a violation of a law that was in force at the time the act was committed. The effect of this provision is that if the act was not prohibited by any law then existing, no later legislation, even if applied retrospectively, can supply the basis for a conviction. In other words, an act that was not an offence when it was performed cannot be rendered punishable by a subsequent law. The Court found it difficult to accept that the accused could rely on this principle in the present case, because the charges were framed under sections 73 and 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, for contravening certain regulations. The Court thus asked whether those regulations were in force on the date of the alleged contravention. The answer was affirmative, since the regulations were brought within the operation of section 24 of the General Clauses Act. Consequently, the fact that the regulations were “deemed” to be made under the 1952 Act did not remove them from the category of laws that were in force on the relevant date. The Court held that the contention that a deeming provision transformed the regulations into non‑existent law at the time of the alleged breach was wholly mistaken.

The Court further rejected the argument that the decision in Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case supported the accused’s position. In that earlier case, the question was whether a provision of the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance 48 of 1949, which was enacted after the alleged offences, could be deemed to have been in force from an earlier date and thereby qualify as “law in force” for the purpose of article 20. The Court in Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case observed that the expression “law in force” must be given its natural meaning, referring to the law that actually existed and operated at the time of the act, not to a law that was merely “deemed” to be in force through a retrospective provision. The Court emphasized that the phrase “law in force” in article 20 must be understood as the law that was factually in existence at the relevant moment, and that a mere deeming provision cannot create a law retroactively for the purpose of invoking article 20(1). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the regulations complained of were indeed the law in force on the date of the alleged violation, and the argument that they were not because they were “deemed” regulations was without merit.

In the earlier discussion the Court explained that the phrase “law in force” refers to the law that was actually operating at the time the offence was committed, and not to a law that is merely “deemed” to have become operative because the legislature has exercised its power to enact retrospective legislation. The Court emphasized that it was addressing only the question of whether a statute enacted after the alleged act, by providing for its retrospective effect, could be treated as the “law in force” for the purposes of Article 20. The Court held that such treatment was not permissible. The statement that “law in force referred to therein must be taken to relate not to a law ‘deemed to be in force’” must therefore be read in its full context. Immediately after that passage the Court clarified that “law in force relates to a law factually in operation at the time, or what may be called the then‑existing law.” The proper enquiry, then, is whether the law alleged to have been violated was indeed in operation on the date of the alleged violation. In the matters presently before the Court the answer was that the law was in operation on that date. Consequently, Article 20(1) does not apply to the present appeals. No additional issue was raised by the Manager or the Agent, and the appeals identified as Appeals Nos. 102, 105 and 106 are consequently dismissed. The remaining four appeals present a more complex problem concerning the interpretation of the expression “any one of the directors” in Section 76 of the Mines Act. Section 76 reads as follows: “Determination of owner in certain cases:‑ Where the owner of a mine is a firm or other association of individuals, any one of the partners or members thereof, or where the owner of a mine is a public company, any one of the directors thereof, or where the owner of a mine is a private company, any one of the shareholders thereof, may be prosecuted and punished under this Act for any offence for which the owner of a mine is punishable:‑ Provided that where a firm, association or company has given notice in writing to the Chief Inspector that it has nominated, (a) in the case of a firm, any of its partners, (b) in the case of an association, any of its members, (c) in the case of a public company, any of its directors, or (d) in the case of a private company, any of its shareholders, who is resident in each case in any place to which this Act extends to assume the responsibilities of the owner of the mine for the purposes of this Act, such partner, member, director or shareholder, as the case may be, shall, so long as he continues to be the owner of the mine for the purpose of this Act, remain liable unless the Chief Inspector receives a written notice cancelling his nomination or stating that he has ceased to be a partner, member, director or shareholder, as the case may be.” It is on the basis of this provision that prosecutions have been instituted against all the directors. The Court must now consider whether the phrase “any one of the directors” should be understood to mean “each one” or merely “one only,” a question that will determine the validity of the prosecutions.

In this matter the Court considered the meaning of the phrase “any one of the directors” that appears in the statutory provision. The Government, appearing as the appellant in the High Court, had argued that the word “one” should be read to mean “every one,” a construction that would support prosecution of all the directors. The appellants, in Appeals Nos. 103 and 104, counter‑argued that the phrase ought to be understood as “one only of the directors, it does not matter which one,” a view that the High Court had accepted. If the latter interpretation were adopted, the appellants further maintained that the provision would violate Article 14 of the Constitution, rendering it void, and consequently the High Court order directing the Inspector of Mines to select a particular director for prosecution could not be sustained. The Court noted that under the interpretation that “any one of the directors” means “only one of the directors,” the authorities would be entitled to proceed against any single director among the several, and that such discretion might be described as unfettered and unguided. The Court observed that the High Court could not, in law, compel the authorities to exercise this provision in a discriminatory manner. Consequently, the central issue for resolution was the proper construction of the words “any one of the directors.” The Court acknowledged that it is well settled that in certain contexts the expression “any one” can signify “one only, it matters not which,” and therefore the phrase “any of the directors” is capable of meaning “one only of the directors, it does not matter which.” The Court posed the question whether the phrase is capable of any other meaning. If it were not, the judiciary would be bound to adopt that meaning regardless of any perceived legislative intent. However, if the phrase could also be understood to mean “every one of the directors,” the Court would have to determine which of the two senses the legislature intended. Turning to ordinary language use, the Court observed that “any one” is frequently employed to denote “every one” rather than a single individual. Illustrations such as “any one can see that this is wrong” or “any one may enter” are commonly understood to mean “everyone can see that this is wrong” and “all may enter,” respectively. The Court consulted the Oxford English Dictionary, page 378, where “any” is defined in affirmative sentences as asserting, concerning a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation as to which, and thus collectively of every one of them. An example from the dictionary, “I challenge anyone to contradict my assertions,” is interpreted as a challenge to all, not to a single person. From these observations the Court concluded that the expression “any one” is not infrequently used to signify “every one.”

Mr. Pathak accepted the premise and then held that when the expression “any one” is followed by the preposition “of” and then a term indicating a number of persons, it never conveys the meaning “every one”. The Oxford Dictionary excerpt, which the Court found interesting, defines an assertion as “concerning a being or thing of the sort named”, suggesting that the word “of” followed by a numeral phrase functions as a naming of a sort. For illustration, the Court considered changing the sentence “I challenge any one to contradict my assertions” to “I challenge any one of my opponents to contradict my assertion”. In that revised wording, “any one of my opponents” would be interpreted as referring to all of the opponents rather than a single opponent.

The phrase “any one of them” or similar constructions have not been directly examined by our courts or by English courts, although a related phrase “any of the present directors” was decided in the old English case Isle of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin. In that case, a number of shareholders demanded that the directors call a meeting to consider two separate objects, one of which was worded “To remove, if deemed necessary or expedient any of the present directors, and to elect directors, to fill any vacancy on the Board”. The directors issued a notice for a meeting on the other object and proceeded to hold that meeting, after which the shareholders, invoking the Companies Clauses Act 1845, issued their own notice to convene a meeting covering both objects. The directors then sought an injunction to restrain the shareholders from holding their meeting, and the Court of Appeal held that a resolution to remove “any of the present directors” would, in law, justify removal of all directors who were then in office. Cotton, L. J., observed that the word “any” in that context was intended to encompass “all”. Although the language in the case was “any of the present directors” and not “any one of the present directors”, counsel argued that the insertion of the word “one” would alter the meaning, but the Court considered that placing undue emphasis on the word “one” would be mistaken. The Court also noted that the permanent edition of the Words and Phrases cited an American decision, Front & Hintingdon Building & Loan Association v. Berzinski, where “any of them” was held to be equivalent to “any one of them”. After full and careful consideration, the Court concluded that the expression “any one of the directors” is ambiguous; in some situations it conveys the meaning “only one director, whichever one”, while in other situations it can be read to mean “every director”.

In interpreting the expression “any one of the directors,” the Court explained that the phrase was capable of two different meanings. In some contexts it could signify “each director individually,” while in other contexts it could signify “only a single director, whichever one is chosen.” The Court held that the appropriate meaning had to be decided by looking at the surrounding circumstances, particularly the overall scheme and purpose of the legislation in which the words were placed. The Court then turned to section 76 of the Mines Act and described its plain object. The provision aimed to prevent any gap in the application of the Act when a mine was owned not by a single person but by a partnership, an association of individuals, a private company or a public company. The section provided that when the owner was a firm or other association, any one of the partners or members could be punished; when the owner was a private company, any one of the shareholders could be prosecuted; and when the owner was a public company, any one of the directors, rather than any one of the shareholders, could be prosecuted and punished. A proviso further provided that, upon notice of nomination of any of the partners, members, directors or shareholders, ownership of the mine would be determined solely according to that nomination. The Court observed that where a mine was owned by a single individual, that individual alone bore all liabilities that arose from ownership. Consequently, when the legislature thought it desirable to make special rules for mines owned by groups, it could not reasonably be expected to allow all but one partner, member, shareholder or director to escape liability. The purpose of the Act was to secure safety and proper working conditions for labour. To give effect to that purpose, section 18 made the manager, the agent and the owner responsible for complying with the Act and its rules, regulations and bye‑laws, and made contravention punishable by fine or imprisonment. In this scheme, the Court found it reasonable to expect the legislature to treat every person performing the function of an individual owner in the same manner as an individual owner. Thus, the role of owner was filled by all partners in a firm, by all members of an association, by all shareholders of a private company and by all directors of a public company, and each of those persons could be prosecuted and punished in the same way as a sole owner.

In the statutory scheme, the shareholders of a private company and the directors of a public company are regarded as occupying the position that an individual owner would hold with respect to a mine. Consequently, it follows that all the partners in a firm, all the shareholders in a private company and all the directors in a public company should face prosecution and punishment in the same manner as a sole owner of a mine. When the legislature, within this background, employed the expression “any one of the directors, any one of the partners, any one of the members, any one of the shareholders … may be prosecuted and punished,” the wording was capable of being understood in two ways. It could mean that every director, every partner, every member and every shareholder may be prosecuted, or it could be read to mean that only a single director, a single partner, a single member or a single shareholder may be prosecuted. The Court was of the view that the legislature intended the former meaning, that is, the words were meant to refer to all persons occupying those positions. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged reliance upon the special rule of construction that applies to penal statutes: if the language is ambiguous, the interpretation favoring the accused should ordinarily be adopted. He argued that if “any one” were read in the narrow sense, the legislation would be rendered void and the accused would escape liability, and therefore the construction that benefits the accused should be preferred. The Court found no merit in that contention. It held that the rule requiring strict construction of penal statutes in favor of the accused is not of universal application and must be balanced against other well‑established principles of interpretation. Having examined the purpose and design of the Act, the Court concluded that it was reasonable to infer that the legislature intended to hold all directors of a company that owned coal mines liable, not merely a single director. While the High Court had been persuaded by the observation that other statutes use explicit language when the legislature wishes to impose liability on every member of a class, and that the phrase “any one” has not been employed elsewhere in the country to convey the meaning “every one,” the Court deemed it unreasonable to attach excessive weight to that observation. It noted that the phrase “any one of the directors” is capable of meaning “every director,” and the fact that other statutes employed different wording to express a similar notion does not affect this interpretation. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the expression “any one of the directors” must be read as encompassing every director.

In this matter, the Court held that the wording of section 76, namely the phrase “any one of the directors,” must be understood to refer to each individual director, that is, to mean “every one of the directors.” The Court explained that the interpretation advanced by the High Court, which treated the expression as applying to only a single director, was therefore incorrect. By construing the phrase in the broader sense that includes every director, the Court found that there is no breach of Article 14 of the Constitution, because the statutory provision does not create an arbitrary or discriminatory classification.

Consequently, the Court permitted Appeals numbered 98 and 99. In doing so, it set aside the orders that had been issued by the High Court in the two writ petitions numbered 475 and 476 of 1956. The Court further directed that those writ petitions be dismissed, meaning that the relief sought in them could not be granted. The Court also dealt with other pending appeals. It dismissed Appeals numbered 103 and 104, indicating that the arguments presented in those appeals were not successful. The Court reiterated that Appeals 98 and 99 were allowed, confirming the earlier decision to permit those appeals. Finally, the Court dismissed all of the remaining appeals numbered from 100 through 106, thereby concluding the disposition of the entire batch of appeals before it.