The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur vs Dwarka Prasad

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 374 of 1957

Decision Date: 16 January 1961

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, J.L. Kapur, J.C. Shah

The case titled The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur versus Dwarka Prasad was decided on 16 January 1961 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice M. Hidayatullah and was delivered by a bench consisting of Justices M. Hidayatullah, J. L. Kapur and J. C. Shah. The parties to the proceedings were identified as the petitioner, The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur, and the respondent, Dwarka Prasad. The official citation of the judgment appears as 1961 AIR 606 and 1961 SCR (3) 495, with subsequent references recorded as RF 1966 SC1888 (3), D 1969 SC 483 (12) and R 1978 SC 1 (8). The statutory provisions discussed in the case include the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. III of 1947), specifically sections 2(d) and 3, as well as section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898). The headnote of the reported judgment summarises the legal issue as follows: Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 empowered a landlord to institute an eviction suit against a tenant, but only after obtaining permission from the District Magistrate. Section 2(d) defined the term “District Magistrate” to include any officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. By virtue of a notification issued under section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Government of Uttar Pradesh appointed Mr. Seth as an Additional District Magistrate, granting him “all the powers of a District Magistrate under the said Code and under any other law for the time being in force.”

In the factual backdrop, the respondent applied to the District Magistrate for permission to file an ejectment suit against the appellant. The District Magistrate subsequently transferred the application to the Additional District Magistrate, Mr. Seth, who then granted the required permission. The appellant challenged the validity of that permission, contending that the District Magistrate mentioned in section 3 of the Act was a persona designata and that only the District Magistrate himself, or an officer expressly authorised by him to perform his functions, could grant such permission; consequently, the appellant argued that the Additional District Magistrate lacked authority. The Supreme Court held that the permission granted by the Additional District Magistrate was valid. The Court explained that the government notification had vested Mr. Seth with all the powers of a District Magistrate both under the Code of Criminal Procedure and under any other law, including the Eviction Act, thereby making him competent to grant permission under section 3. The Court further clarified that the District Magistrate referred to in section 3 was not a persona designata. It defined a persona designata as an individual appointed in his private capacity, not in the capacity of a specific office, and relied on the decisions in Kedar Nath v. Moot Chand, AIR 1953 All 62, and Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, (1923) ILR 47 Mad 369 (FB) to support this interpretation. The judgment arose from Civil Appeal No. 374 of 1957, which was an appeal against the decree dated 21 September 1955 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 251 of 1954, itself emanating from a decree dated 24 May 1954 of the Civil Judge, Kanpur, in Suit No. 35 of 1949.

No. 35 of 1949 was the cause number. Counsel for the appellant were three advocates who appeared on behalf of Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur. Counsel for the respondent were four advocates who represented Babu Dwarka Prasad. The judgment was delivered on 16 January 1961 by Justice Hidayatullah. The matter before the Court was an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court, issued under a certificate granted pursuant to Article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution. The High Court had reversed the decision of the trial Court, upheld the ejectment suit against the appellants and ordered the plaintiff‑respondent to receive damages at a rate of Rs 593‑12‑0 per month. The suit had been instituted by the respondent, Babu Dwarka Prasad, against the appellants, Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur, and its managing director, Lala Ram Narain Garg. The factual background, in brief, was that Dwarka Prasad owned outright a plot of land numbered 73/22 (old number 73/28) in Collector Gunj, Kanpur. In 1933 a lease agreement was executed by five persons in favour of Lala Rameshwardas, who was the predecessor‑in‑title of Dwarka Prasad. Under that agreement the five lessees were to take a hall and other constructions on lease, and the lessor promised to erect the structures at a cost of Rs 16,000 within four months. The parties further agreed that if the construction cost exceeded Rs 16,000, the lessor would be entitled to interest at a rate of twelve annas per cent per month from the second party until the tenancy ended. The tenancy was initially month‑to‑month, with an overall term fixed at five years. The tenancy continued with varying rent amounts until 1946. On 15 January 1946 Dwarka Prasad sent a letter to the defendants stating that the lease would expire on 28 February 1946 and that Central Talkies Ltd. should vacate the premises by that date. The defendants failed to vacate, and an ejectment suit was filed against Central Talkies Ltd.

While that suit was pending, the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947—referred to in the judgment as the Eviction Act—came into force. Section 3 of the Eviction Act required that any suit for eviction filed in a civil court obtain prior permission from the District Magistrate, except where the ground for eviction fell within specific categories listed in the section. The original suit had been filed on a ground not enumerated in the statute, and consequently the plaintiff‑respondent withdrew it. Thereafter, Dwarka Prasad applied to the District Magistrate for permission to evict Central Talkies Ltd. from the premises. That permission was granted by the Additional District Magistrate (Rural Area) on 7 July 1948. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to set out the specific defenses raised by the defendants in the newly filed suit, because the sole issue presented for determination was whether the suit had been instituted without obtaining the required permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the Eviction Act.

In this matter, the contention before the court was that the suit for eviction was incompetent because the permission of the District Magistrate required by section 3 of the Eviction Act had not been obtained. The Divisional Bench of the High Court, however, held that the suit was competent. The two judges hearing the appeal arrived at the same conclusion, albeit on slightly different grounds. Justice Raghubar Dayal observed that the Additional District Magistrate who granted the permission was empowered by the Provincial Government under section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to exercise all the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code and under any other law then in force, and therefore the requirements of section 3 had been satisfied. Justice Brij Mohan Lal reasoned that the District Magistrate, by transferring the case to the Additional District Magistrate (Rural Area), had authorised that officer to perform the functions required by the Act, and that the Additional District Magistrate fell within the definition of “District Magistrate” under section 2(d). Both judges therefore concurred that the suit had been instituted with the requisite permission and was therefore competent. It was noted that the original application for permission had first been made to the District Magistrate, Mr Hadi Hasan, who also served as an Additional District Magistrate. He returned the file to the District Magistrate asking for a transfer because the defendants had approached him. The District Magistrate subsequently ordered on 11 February 1948 that the matter be “Transferred to Additional District Magistrate (R.A.) for disposal.” The permission was finally granted by Mr Brijpal Singh Seth, Additional District Magistrate (Rural Area), on 7 July 1948. Mr Seth had previously been City Magistrate, Kanpur, and was appointed Additional District Magistrate by Notification No. 3400/11‑276‑48 dated 22 May 1948. The essential part of that notification stated that, with effect from the date he assumed charge, Shri Brijpal Singh Seth, City Magistrate, Kanpur, was appointed as Additional District Magistrate of Kanpur District under subsection (2) of section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with jurisdiction over the whole district and with all the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code and any other law in force.

The appellants argued before this Court that neither of the reasons given by the Divisional Bench was valid and that the suit had not been filed in accordance with the Eviction Act. Initially, they intended to challenge the validity of the notice, but during the arguments they expressly abandoned that ground. Consequently, their case was presented solely on the basis that the permission granted by Mr Brijpal Singh Seth did not comply with section 3 of the Eviction Act. The appellants maintained that the definition of “District Magistrate” in section 2(d) made the office a persona designata, and that only the District Magistrate himself or an officer expressly authorised by him could grant the required permission. They argued that, in view of the quoted provisions and section 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an Additional District Magistrate could not grant permission unless specifically authorised by the District Magistrate. This formed the sole ground on which the appellants contested the competence of the suit.

Section 3 of the Eviction Act, as it read on the date in question, provided that no suit could be instituted in any civil court against a tenant for eviction from any accommodation unless the suit was filed with the permission of the District Magistrate and was based on one or more of the grounds specified in the section. The Act defined “District Magistrate” in section 2(d) to include an officer who had been authorized by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. The appellants argued that the District Magistrate mentioned in section 3 was a persona designata, meaning that only the District Magistrate himself, or an officer expressly authorized by him, could grant such permission. Relying on this definition and on the provisions of section 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellants contended that an Additional District Magistrate could not grant permission unless he had received specific authorisation from the District Magistrate. They maintained that the order by which the case was transferred from the District Magistrate to the Additional District Magistrate (Rural Area) was merely a transfer and did not amount to authorisation. According to the appellants, a transfer could occur only to a person who possessed the requisite jurisdiction, and under the Eviction Act that jurisdiction was limited to the District Magistrate or an officer he had authorized. Consequently, they argued that the transfer did not create the necessary authority for the Additional District Magistrate to grant permission.

The appellants also relied on judicial precedents, specifically a decision of a single judge of the Allahabad High Court reported in Kedar Nath v. Mool Chand (1) and on a decision of the Nagpur High Court referred to therein, P. K. Tare v. Emperor (2). They examined section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it stood at the relevant time, which stipulated in clause (1) that the Provincial Government shall appoint a Magistrate of the first class in every district, who shall be called the District Magistrate. Clause (2) allowed the Provincial Government to appoint any Magistrate of the first class as an Additional District Magistrate, conferring upon the Additional District Magistrate all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code or under any other law, as directed by the Provincial Government. The notification concerning Mr Brijpal Singh Seth, which had previously been quoted, invested him with all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as under any other law in force. Accordingly, the notification rendered him competent to consider an application under the Eviction Act for permission to file a civil suit without requiring a separate authorisation from the District Magistrate. Nonetheless, counsel for the appellants maintained that the definition of “District Magistrate” plainly indicated that, apart from the District Magistrate himself, only an officer specially authorised by him could act under the Eviction Act.

In this case the Court considered the provisions of the Eviction Act together with the language of sub‑section (2) of section 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stated that the Code “extends to the whole of British India; but, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.” The learned counsel argued that the special jurisdiction created by the Eviction Act was therefore not displaced by section 10(2) of the Code because of the protective wording of that sub‑section. The Court observed that the argument failed to give effect to the words “in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary”. Since the Code of Criminal Procedure itself contains a specific provision in section 10(2), the protective sub‑section (2) of section 1 was excluded, and consequently an Additional District Magistrate had to be treated as possessing the powers conferred by any other law, including the Eviction Act.

The Court further rejected the contention that the District Magistrate was a “persona designata”. Under the definition of “District Magistrate”, the special authorisation granted by a District Magistrate created officers who could exercise the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act, and, when authorised, those officers were to be treated as equivalent to the District Magistrate. The Court explained that a persona designata is “a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character” (see Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 253). In the words of Justice Schwabe, C.J., in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, “personae designatae are persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges.” The Court held that the same reasoning applied to a well‑known officer such as the District Magistrate, who, by virtue of his office, could have his powers exercised by an Additional District Magistrate and could also create other officers equal to himself for purposes of the Eviction Act.

The Court criticized the decision of Justice Sapru in the Allahabad case as erroneous. It noted that the United Provinces (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, defined “District Magistrate” to include an “Additional District Magistrate”. That definition was deliberately broadened because, under section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an Additional District Magistrate must be specially empowered. By expressly including the Additional District Magistrate within the definition, the Requisition Act itself conferred power on such an officer, regardless of whether the Provincial Government had separately empowered a particular Additional District Magistrate. By contrast, the Eviction Act defined “District Magistrate” differently, granting the District Magistrate the authority to authorise officers other than the Additional District Magistrates empowered by the Provincial Government.

In view of these considerations, the Court found that it was scarcely necessary to pursue any further argument on the point.

The Court examined the explanations that had been provided by Brij Mohan Lal, J.; it stated that, while respecting the earlier reasoning, those explanations were also regarded as equally sound. The Court then explained that when the case was transferred to the Additional District Magistrate, the action of the District Magistrate was to be understood as having given the Additional District Magistrate authority to act under section 3 of the Eviction Act. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that it was unnecessary to depend on that particular line of reasoning because, in its view, section 10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure already conferred sufficient authority on Mr Brijpal Singh Seth to grant permission for instituting the suit. The Court cited the authority found in I.L.R. 47 Mad. 369, 373 (F.B.) to illustrate the breadth of the powers granted by section 10(2). Accordingly, the order issued by the District Magistrate, even if it were interpreted as a mere transfer, was held to be valid. On the basis of this assessment, the Court concluded that the appeal could not succeed. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to bear costs, with the appellate relief being denied.