The Board Of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi vs The State Of Delhi And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 96 of 1955

Decision Date: 23 October 1961

Coram: S.K. Das, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

The judgment concerned a petition filed by the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College located in Delhi, which was challenging legislation enacted by the Delhi State Legislature. The decision was rendered on 23 October 1961 by a five‑judge bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising S.K. Das, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J.R. Mudholkar. The official citation of the case is 1962 AIR 458 and 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 156, with additional references including R 1966 SC1307 (8) RF 1970 SC 564 (192) D 1971 SC 966 (10) RF 1976 SC 386 (14) RF 1983 SC 1 (67) R 1985 SC 973 (5). The legislative instrument under scrutiny was the Tibbia College Act, 1952 (Delhi Act 5 of 1952), which dealt with the status of the college’s governing body, while the relevant statutory framework involved the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Sections 5, 6, 7, 13, 14) and the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (Section 20). Constitutional provisions examined included Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 31 of the Constitution of India and the allocation of powers under the Seventh Schedule, specifically List I Entry 44, List II Entry 32, and List III Entries 10 and 28.

The Board of Trustees had originally been registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and was responsible for operating the Tibbia College, an adjoining hostel and the Hindustani Dawakhana. The Delhi State Legislature subsequently enacted the Tibbia College Act, 1952, which dissolved the existing Board, created a new Board incorporated as a corporation, and transferred all property, rights, powers and privileges of the former Board to the newly formed entity. The petitioners contested the validity of this Act on five principal grounds. First, they argued that the original Board, by virtue of its registration, had become a corporation whose objects extended beyond Delhi, thereby bringing it within the jurisdiction of Entry 44 of List I, a matter beyond the competence of the State Legislature. Second, they claimed that the creation of a new corporate Board exceeded the legislative authority of the State. Third, they contended that the Act infringed Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Fourth, they maintained that a State law could not override the Central Societies Registration Act, 1860. Fifth, they alleged that the Legislature had acted mala fide in passing the Act. The Court, through the judgments of Sinha, C.J., Das, Sarkar and Ayyangar, held that the State Legislature possessed the competence to enact the impugned Act. It clarified that registration under the Societies Registration Act did not transform the Board into a corporation within the meaning of Entry 44 of List I; rather, the Board remained an unincorporated society that enjoyed certain corporate‑like privileges. Consequently, the provisions of the Act concerning the dissolution of the old Board fell within the second part of Entry 32 of List II, which encompasses unincorporated societies.

The Court observed that the entry relating to unincorporated societies fell within List II of the Seventh Schedule. Although the impugned Act created a new Board and conferred upon it a corporate status, the Act expressly limited the Board’s powers and duties to institutions situated in Delhi and confined its rights, powers and privileges to the specific purposes for which the Board was established. Consequently, the provisions dealing with the incorporation of the new Board were within the first part of Entry 32 of List II. In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to the decisions in Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1900 A.C. 426) and Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union (L.R. 1956 A.C. 104). It distinguished the cases of Krishnan v. Sundaram (1940 43 Bom. L.R. 562), Boppana Rukminiamma v. Maganti Venkata Ramadas (A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 946), M. A. Nunnier v. Official Assignee, Madras (A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 875) and Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay (1945 48 Bom. L.R. 341). The Court approved the authority in Servants of India Society, Poona v. The Charity Commissioner of Bombay (1960 63 Bom. L.R. 379). Holding further that the impugned Act did not contravene Articles 14, 19 or 31, the Court noted that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate the existence of other similarly situated institutions or to prove that the petitioner was singled out for unequal treatment. Because the transfer of management was effected by a valid law, there was no breach of Article 31(1); moreover, the Act did not provide for compulsory acquisition of property, rendering Article 31(2) inapplicable at the relevant time. Neither the dissolved Board nor its members possessed any right to hold the dissolved Board’s property, so vesting the property in the new Board did not infringe Article 19(1)(f). Under the Societies Registration Act, members of a society acquired no beneficial interest upon dissolution; their sole right was to determine to which other society the property should be transferred for management, a right that does not qualify as “property” within Article 19(1)(f). Accordingly, the removal of such a right by the impugned Act did not violate Article 19(1)(f), a position supported by the decision in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India ([1950] S.C.R. 869). The Court distinguished the cases State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose ([1954] S.C.R. 587) and Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd. ([1954] S.C.R. 674). The Court further held that there was no conflict between a law made by Parliament and a law made by the State Legislature because the Societies Registration Act, 1860, was not a law enacted by Parliament. The State Legislature possessed the authority either to amend the Societies Registration Act with respect to unincorporated societies or to enact a law relating to a corporation, provided its activities were confined to Delhi. The Delhi State Legislature did not exceed its constitutional limits in enacting the impugned Act, and no mala‑fides on the part of the legislature was found. The Court cited K.C. Gajapati Narayn Deo v. The State for support.

Justice Mudholkar observed that although the old Board could not be classified as a corporation because the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not provide for incorporation, the Board nevertheless possessed several characteristics of a corporate body. He therefore described the Board as a “near corporation” or a “quasi corporation” and affirmed that it functioned as a legal entity. He went on to explain that the second part of Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule does not authorize the State Legislature to enact a law that strips an existing legal entity of the powers conferred upon it by the Societies Registration Act, thereby destroying the legal entity. Consequently, the impugned Act could not be justified under the first part of Entry 32 of List II, because the Board’s objects were not confined solely to the territory of Delhi. However, Justice Mudholkar noted that Entries 10 and 28 of List III do empower the State Legislature to pass a law that dissolves a charitable trust and transfers its property, rights and other interests to another institution. Accordingly, the impugned Act could be sustained on the basis of those entries. In support of his reasoning, he referred to the decisions in Servants of India Society, Poona v. The Charity Commissioner of Bombay, (1950) 63 Bom L R 397, The Taff Vale Railway Co. v. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426 and Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union, [1956] A.C. 104.

The matter before the Court was a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights, designated as Petition No. 96 of 1955. The petition sought relief on behalf of two petitioners. The first petitioner was the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi, represented through Hakim Mohammed Jamil Khan, who was described as the duly elected Secretary of the Board. The second petitioner was Hakim Mohammad Jamil Khan himself, who asserted that he continued to be one of the trustees or members of the Board. The petition was originally presented only on behalf of the Board. Subsequently, an amendment petition was moved and permitted by the Court, resulting in the addition of the second petitioner and the inclusion of fresh grounds of attack recorded in paragraph 14 of the amended petition; the Court indicated that it would consider those new grounds later. The short factual matrix set out in the petition explained that Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan, a physician of national reputation in Unani medicine, resided in Delhi and, in 1903, founded a pharmaceutical institute called Hindustani Dawakhana. He also established a medical college known as Tibbia College. He died in 1927, but prior to his death, in 1911, he and several others founded a society named Anjuman‑i‑Tibbia, which they registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The name of the society was later altered in 1915 to the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi, for which the Court used the convenient reference “the Board.” Counsel for the petitioner comprised Purushottam Tricumdas, J. B. Dadachanji, Ravindra Narain and O. C. Mathur, while the respondents were represented by C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor‑General of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and T. M. Sen. The judgment was delivered on 23 October 1961 by a bench comprising Chief Justice Sinha, Justices Das, Sarkar and Ayyangar, with Justice Das delivering the main opinion and Justice Mudholkar delivering a separate judgment.

The society that had been registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 originally bore a different name, but in 1915 its title was altered to “Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi.” For ease of reference the Court referred to this entity simply as the Board. The Board was responsible for operating the Tibbia College together with an adjoining hostel. In addition, the Board managed a pharmaceutical institute, although at one point petitioner number two asserted that the institute was his private property. The Board functioned according to a set of rules and regulations that were periodically amended. The principal objectives articulated in those rules were threefold: first, to establish colleges that would provide higher education in the Unani and Ayurvedic systems of medicine to the people of India; second, to advance the indigenous medical systems by scientific means and to set up one or more pharmaceutical institutes, also known as dawakhana; and third, to compile and translate medical books and to pursue other activities that would increase the popularity of these systems and improve public knowledge on hygiene and related matters. The rules limited the maximum membership of the Board, referred to as trustees, to thirty‑five individuals who were to be elected from all the provinces of India existing at that time. Rule five further required that at least one‑third of the trustees be practitioners known as Hakims and Vaids. The financial year of the Board was prescribed to run from 1 April to 31 March each year, and each trustee was required to pay an annual subscription of twelve rupees in advance, no later than 30 April. Rule six specified the situations in which a trustee’s office would be considered vacant, including the failure to pay the required subscription by the stipulated deadline. Additional rules covered matters such as the power to inspect the college and hostel, the procedure for ordinary meetings of the Board of Trustees, and the categories of issues that could be dealt with by the Board or its sub‑committees; the Court noted that these rules need not be reproduced in full. Rule thirteen established a Managing Committee composed of nine members and six officials for a term of three years, and the functions of this Committee were also defined in the rules. The office‑bearers of both the Board and the Managing Committee were to be the same individuals, occupying the positions of President, Senior Vice‑President, Junior Vice‑President, Secretary, Financial Secretary, and Joint Secretary. Rule twenty‑six mandated that these office‑bearers be elected by the members for a period of three years. The rules further detailed the powers and duties assigned to the President, Secretary, Financial Secretary and Joint Secretary. One provision stipulated that, as far as possible, the office of Secretary of the Board should be held by a lineal descendant of the society’s founder.

The rule required that the office of the Secretary of the Board should, as far as possible, be held by descendants of Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan. Hakim Mohammad Jamil Khan, son of Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan and petitioner number two in this case, served as the first Secretary of the Board. In 1948 the then Collector of Delhi, Shri Rameshwar Dayal, together with Dr Yudhvir Singh, President of the Delhi Municipal Committee, and several other persons, were elected as members of the Board. Dr Yudhvir Singh was chosen as President of the Board, while Shri Mool Chand Gagerna was appointed to the position of Joint Secretary. Shortly after the 1948 elections, competing groups of members began a struggle to gain control of the Board, the college, and possession of the Hindustani Dawakhana, which later led to criminal proceedings. On 18 October 1949 a suit was filed in the court of the senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Secretary and thirty‑one members of the Board. The plaintiff also applied for the appointment of a receiver, and on 19 October 1949 the judge appointed two local advocates as joint receivers endowed with plenary powers. These receivers assumed possession of both the Dawakhana and the college between 19 and 23 October 1949. While the suit remained pending, the Delhi State Legislature enacted the Tibbia College Act, 1952 (Delhi Act No. 5 of 1952), hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, which came into force on 10 October 1952. The principal issue before this Court is the constitutional validity of that Act, and reference will be made to its provisions in due course. Section nine of the impugned Act dissolved the original Board and transferred all movable and immovable property, together with all rights, powers and privileges, to a newly constituted Board known as the Tibia Delhi College Board, hereafter called the new Board. After the passage of the Act, the pending suit before the Subordinate Judge was withdrawn, and an application was filed seeking to hand over possession of the properties to the new Board; the court approved this application despite the objection of petitioner one. Petitioner one unsuccessfully challenged that order in the High Court of Punjab, and subsequently filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ restraining the State of Delhi and the newly constituted Board from enforcing the provisions of the impugned Act or exercising any functions thereunder.

On 13 December 1954 the respondents raised several preliminary objections, after which the writ petition was voluntarily withdrawn by the petitioners. Following the withdrawal, the Board's rules were amended, and the petitioners assert that a fresh election was conducted in compliance with those amended rules on 6 January 1955. On 11 January 1955 the Managing Committee passed a resolution authorising the Secretary to institute proceedings in this Court to enforce the fundamental rights of petitioner one. Pursuant to that resolution, the present petition was filed on 14 March 1955 seeking appropriate relief, and it was later amended in the manner previously indicated. The State of Delhi and the newly constituted Board are named as respondents to the present petition, and the petitioners challenge the validity of the impugned Act on two principal grounds. Their first ground contends that the Delhi State Legislature lacked the legislative competence to enact the impugned Act, rendering it invalid and inoperative. The second ground argues that, assuming the Legislature had authority, several provisions of the Act infringe the petitioners’ fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The petitioners also raised two subsidiary points, one asserting that the Delhi State Legislature could not legislate on matters beyond its constitutional competence, and the other seeking clarification on procedural aspects.

On 11 January 1955 the Managing Committee adopted a resolution that authorised the Secretary to commence proceedings in this Court for the purpose of enforcing the fundamental rights of petitioner number one. In accordance with that resolution the petition was filed on 14 March 1955. The petition was later amended in the manner previously indicated by the Court. The respondents to the petition are the State of Delhi and the newly constituted Board. The counsel for the petitioners contended that the Act was invalid on two principal grounds. The first ground alleged that the Delhi State Legislature lacked any legislative authority to enact the impugned Act and therefore the Act should be declared void and of no effect. The second ground argued that, assuming the Legislature possessed the power to legislate, the Act nevertheless contravened the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. In addition, the petitioners raised two subsidiary points: first, that the Delhi State Legislature could not supersede the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a Central enactment; and second, that the Legislature acted with dishonesty in passing the impugned Act. The Court indicated that it would address these arguments in the order in which they were presented.

It was also necessary to note that a preliminary objection, similar to that raised in the earlier petition, was asserted in the present case. The Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, argued that because the members failed to pay their annual subscriptions on time, all of them ceased to be members during the fiscal years 1950‑1951. Consequently, the elections held in 1955 were ineffective as there was no one qualified to vote, and the Board had ceased to exist before 1955, meaning that neither petitioner one nor petitioner two could maintain the writ petition. Various affidavits submitted by both parties addressed the issue of payment or non‑payment of subscriptions for the years 1949‑50 and 1950‑51, and the cash‑book extracts labelled Ex B covering the years 1951 to 1954 were also placed on record. The respondents asserted that no member had paid any subscription before the due dates for those two years, whereas the petitioners claimed that petitioner two and several other members had remitted their subscriptions to the Financial Secretary for the same periods. An affidavit from the then Financial Secretary was also produced. After considering the affidavits and the documentary evidence, the Court observed that the matter involved disputed facts that could not be satisfactorily resolved on the materials before it.

In this case the Court observed that the documentary record placed before it did not resolve the factual dispute, and therefore it was appropriate and convenient to address the legal questions raised concerning the constitutional validity of the statute that was challenged and the action taken under it. The Court then proceeded to examine the first contention advanced by the petitioners. That contention was presented in the following manner. The petitioners argued that Delhi had become a Part State when the Constitution of India came into force. Under article 239 of the Constitution, as it stood at that time, a Part State was to be administered by the President, who could, to the extent he deemed appropriate, act through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant‑Governor appointed by him, or through the government of a neighboring State. Article 240 gave Parliament the authority to, by law, create or continue for any Part State a legislative body, which could be wholly nominated, wholly elected, or a mixture of both, to serve as the legislature of that State. Exercising the power conferred by article 240, Parliament enacted the Government of Part‑States Act, 1951 (Central Act 49 of 1951), which provided for the constitution of a Legislative Assembly for certain Part‑C States, including a Legislative Assembly for Delhi. Section 21 of that Act specified the scope of the Assembly’s legislative power. It provided, inter alia, that the Legislative Assembly of a Part State could make laws for the entire State or any part thereof on any matter that was listed in the State List (List II) or in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. An exception concerning public order, police and related matters for the Delhi Assembly was noted, but the Court stated that the exception was not relevant to the present issue. Section 22 of the Act declared that if any provision of a law made by a Part‑State Legislative Assembly conflicted with any provision of a law made by Parliament, the parliamentary law would prevail, regardless of which was enacted earlier or later, and the conflicting provision of the Assembly’s law would be void to the extent of the inconsistency. The Court observed that the explanation attached to section 22 was also not relevant to the matter before it. The petitioners’ counsel emphasized that, according to section 21, the legislative competence of the Delhi State Legislature was confined to making laws for the whole or any part of Delhi on matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. The Court then reproduced the wording of item 32 of the State List (List II), which reads: “32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities, unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; co‑operative societies.”

Items 43 and 44 of the Union List, also known as List I, were recited by the Court in the following terms: “43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including co‑operative societies; 44. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities.” The advocate representing the petitioners advanced an argument based on these provisions. He contended that the old Board, which had been registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 and was identified as petitioner number one, should be characterized as a corporation whose objects were not limited to the territory of Delhi. Accordingly, any legislation affecting the Board could be placed within the ambit of item 44 of List I rather than within item 32 of List II. The advocate’s reasoning was expressed in two distinct components. First, he asserted that the old Board qualified as a corporation; second, he maintained that the Board’s objectives extended beyond the borders of a single State. On the basis of these premises, he urged that the Delhi State Legislature lacked the legislative competence to enact the impugned law because such a law would exceed the authority conferred by section 21 of the Act 49 of 1951. The Court noted that the argument would collapse if either premise proved false: if the Board were not a corporation, the impugned legislation would not fall under item 44 of List I; likewise, if the Board were a corporation but its objectives were confined solely to Delhi, item 44 would likewise be inapplicable. In response, the counsel for the respondent offered a three‑fold rejoinder. First, they claimed that the Board was not a corporation in the legal sense; second, they asserted that the Board’s objectives did not extend beyond the State of Delhi; and third, they contended that the impugned legislation could be justified under item 11 of List II, which pertains to “Education,” and under item 28 of the Concurrent List, which relates to “Charities and charitable institutions.” The Court identified the preliminary issue as the determination of whether the old Board qualified as a corporation in the legal meaning of the term. It explained that corporations may be divided into two principal classes: corporations aggregate and corporations sole, and that the present case did not involve a corporation sole. A corporation aggregate, the Court quoted, is “a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or at any subsequent period of its existence” (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 9, page 4). The Court emphasized that a corporation aggregate possesses only one capacity, that is, its corporate capacity, and may be classified as either a trading corporation or a non‑trading corporation. It then proceeded to discuss the typical examples of each category.

Corporations that engage in trade are commonly classified as (1) charter companies, (2) companies created by special acts of parliament, and (3) companies registered under the Companies Act. By contrast, non‑trading corporations include (1) municipal corporations, (2) district boards, (3) benevolent institutions, and (4) universities. A key feature of the legal notion of a corporation is that its existence is continuous; the original members and their successors are regarded in law as the individual corporators, distinct from the corporation itself, which is a separate legal person like an individual. Accordingly, a corporation must have a name, and, as a general rule, it can only act or express its will by executing a deed under its common seal. In England, a corporation is presently created by either a royal charter of incorporation from the Crown or by an act of Parliament, that is, by statutory authority. Long‑standing authority describes the essential ingredients of a corporation as follows: (1) lawful authority of incorporation, (2) the persons who are to be incorporated, (3) a name by which those persons are incorporated, (4) a place, and (5) words sufficient in law to indicate incorporation. No specific wording is required; any expression that shows an intention to incorporate is adequate. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred to several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, arguing that those provisions render the Board a corporation upon registration. It is therefore necessary to examine parts of that Act. The Act is titled “An Act for the registration of literary, scientific and charitable societies,” and its preamble states that it was enacted to improve the legal condition of societies formed for the promotion of literature, science, fine arts, the diffusion of useful knowledge, or charitable purposes. Section 1 provides that any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, charitable, or other purpose described in section 20 may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association and filing it with the Registrar of Joint‑stock Companies, constitute themselves as a society under the Act. Section 2 requires that the memorandum of association contain, among other particulars, the objects of the society. Section 3 deals with the registration procedure and the fees payable. Sections 5 and 6 are particularly relevant. Section 5 stipulates that any movable or immovable property belonging to a society registered under this Act, if not already vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested at that time in the governing body of the society, thereby making the governing body the holder of such property.

According to the statutory provisions, every society that is registered under the Act is deemed to own its movable and immovable property, even when such property has not been transferred to trustees. The law treats all civil and criminal proceedings involving the society as though the property of the society were at stake. Section 6 further provides that a registered society may either initiate legal action or be subject to legal action in the name of the president, the chairman, the principal secretary, or a trustee, as determined by the society’s own rules and regulations. In the absence of a specific rule, the governing body may appoint a suitable individual to represent the society for that particular occasion. The provision also supplies a safeguard for claimants: if a person has a claim or demand against the society and the governing body fails to nominate an appropriate defendant, the claimant is entitled to sue the president, the chairman, or the principal secretary of the trustees.

Section 7 addresses the continuity of legal actions, stipulating that suits or proceedings shall not be discontinued because of a change in the person sued; instead, the action may continue against the successor of the original party. Section 8 clarifies that when a judgment is rendered against an officer or person named on behalf of the society, the judgment is enforceable against the society’s property rather than against the personal assets of that officer or person. Section 10 allows a society to sue one of its own members under specified circumstances; if the member successfully defends the suit and is awarded costs, the member may choose to recover those costs either from the officer in whose name the suit was brought or from the society itself. Sections 13 and 14 deal with the dissolution of societies. Section 13 provides that at least three‑fifths of the members may resolve to dissolve the society, either immediately or at a later mutually agreed date, and that the governing body must then arrange for the settlement of the society’s assets, claims, and liabilities in accordance with its rules or, failing that, in a manner deemed appropriate by the governing body. In the event of any dispute among the governing body or the members regarding the dissolution, the matter is to be referred to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the district where the society’s principal building is situated, and that court may issue any order it considers necessary. The provision also requires that dissolution may occur only when three‑fifths of the members have expressed their desire for dissolution by voting in person or by proxy at a specially convened general meeting. Section 14 states that if, after settling all debts and liabilities, any property remains upon dissolution, such residual property must not be distributed among the members. Instead, the remaining assets are to be transferred to another society, as determined by a vote of at least three‑fifths of the members present personally or by proxy at the time of dissolution, or, failing such a vote, by the aforementioned court. This clause, however, does not apply to societies that have been founded or established by contributions of shareholders in the manner of a joint‑stock company.

Whenever a Government is a member of, contributes to, or otherwise has an interest in any society that is registered under this Act, the law requires that such society may not be dissolved unless the Government of the state in which the society is registered gives its consent. The Act further provides that if, after a society registered under this Act has been dissolved and after all its debts and liabilities have been satisfied, any property remains, that property must not be paid to or distributed among the members of the society or to any individual member. Instead, the surplus property must be given to another society. The recipient society is to be selected by a vote of at least three‑fifths of the members who are present in person or by proxy at the time of dissolution. If the members fail to make such a selection, the court identified earlier in the statute shall determine the disposition of the property. However, this rule does not apply to any society that was founded or established by contributions of shareholders in the manner of a joint‑stock company.

The matter before the Court was whether the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi, could be regarded as a corporation under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. After examining the relevant statutory provisions, the Court concluded that the Board was not a corporation. The decisive observation is that the various sections of the Act contain no language indicating an intention to incorporate the society, and in fact they demonstrate an absence of such intention. Section 2, for example, merely provides for the name and the objects of a society; it does not create corporate status. Section 5 states that property belonging to the society, if it is not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society, and in all civil and criminal proceedings the property is described as the property of the governing body. Although the section speaks of “property belonging to the society,” the ownership of that property is vested only in the trustees or the governing body at the relevant time. Consequently, the expression “property belonging to the society” does not confer a corporate capacity on the society for holding or acquiring property; it merely describes the property as held by the trustees or governing body.

Section 6 gives the society the right to sue or be sued in the name of its president, chairman, or other officer. Section 7 provides that a suit or proceeding in a civil court does not abate by reason of the death or incapacity of the person by whom the suit has been brought or against whom it has been brought. Section 8 reiterates that any judgment obtained in a suit brought by or against the society shall be enforced against the society itself. It has been submitted that Sections 6, 7 and 8 together dress the society with a legal personality and a perpetual succession. However, Section 10 further clarifies that, under certain circumstances, the members of the society may be sued as strangers by the society, and that costs awarded to a defendant in such a suit may be recovered, at the defendant’s election, from the officer in whose name the suit was instituted.

In discussing provisions that are closely analogous to sections 7, 8 and 9 of the English Trade Union Act 1871, the Court referred to the observations of Lord Lindley in the well‑known case of Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants ([1901] A.C. 426). Lord Lindley noted that the Act does not expressly prescribe the purpose for which a trade union may use the name under which it is registered and by which it is commonly known. Nevertheless, he explained that a trade union that is registered under the Act must possess a name. Such a union may acquire property, but because it is not incorporated, the law requires reliance on the traditional mechanism of trustees to acquire and hold that property and to sue or be sued in respect of it pursuant to sections 7, 8 and 9. He further clarified that although the trustees hold the legal title to the property, the beneficial ownership rests with the union itself. Accordingly, Lord Lindley concluded that the Act clearly indicates that the registered name may be employed to designate the union as an unincorporated society in legal proceedings as well as for business and other purposes.

The Court also cited the commentary in Trade Union Law by N. A. Citrine (1950 edition), page 143, which had been referred to by counsel for the petitioners. The commentary explains that the purpose of section 9 of the Trade Union Act was to provide a mechanism for instituting legal proceedings concerning the property of a registered trade union. Since the legislature did not intend to grant such unions corporate status giving them the power to hold property and to sue or be sued in their registered names, it was necessary to vest the union’s property in trustees and to allow those trustees to commence or defend legal actions on the union’s behalf. Section 8, having already provided for the vesting of the union’s property in its trustees, is supplemented by the present section, which empowers the trustees to bring or defend civil or criminal proceedings concerning the union’s property on its behalf.

Further, the Court referred to the House of Lords’ consideration of the position of a registered trade union in England in Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union ([1956] A.C. 104). In that appeal from the Court of Appeal, the Lords, including Lord MacDermott, Lord Keith of Avenholm and Lord Somervell of Harrow, examined earlier decisions such as Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. They held that a registered trade union does not constitute a juristic person that can be distinguished at any moment from the individual members who compose it. After reviewing the relevant provisions of the Trade Union Act 1871 and earlier authority, Lord MacDermott stated: “I base this opinion primarily on the statutes. The more closely they are examined the clearer it seems to be that the legislature, though minded to bestow upon registered unions some of the gifts and attributes of legal.”

In the earlier discussion, the judges observed that the legislation granting personality to trade unions did not intend to create new legal entities separate from their members, and was in fact reluctant to transform those unions into distinct corporations that would differ fundamentally from the combination of persons defined as trade unions. The minority opinion, expressed by Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord Porter, maintained that a registered trade union, although not incorporated, could nonetheless enter into contracts and be sued as a legal entity distinct from its individual members. The Court noted that the decisions cited made it clear that provisions comparable to sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 did not demonstrate any intention to incorporate a society. Rather, the reliance on trustees or the governing body to acquire and hold property indicated an absence of intent to give the society a corporate capacity for holding and acquiring property, as affirmed in the case reported at (1) [1901] A. C. 426. The Court further observed that the same conclusion applied to the provisions in sections 6, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which, while conferring certain privileges on a registered society, did not create a corporation because such privileges would be unnecessary if the society were incorporated. The Court then turned to sections 13 and 14 of the Act and found that they did not advance the petitioners’ position. Section 13 deals with the dissolution of societies and the adjustment of their affairs, providing that upon dissolution the necessary steps must be taken to dispose of and settle the society’s property, claims and liabilities according to the society’s rules, or, in the absence of rules, as the governing body deems appropriate. If any dispute arises among the governing body or the members, the matter is to be referred to the Court. The Court highlighted that this section again confers a legal power on the governing body that is separate from the society itself, because section 16 defines the governing body as the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees or any other body entrusted by the society’s rules and regulations with the management of its affairs. Consequently, the Court concluded that the aforementioned provisions do not establish the essential characteristic of a corporate aggregate, namely the intention to incorporate the society. The Court also observed that the scheme and provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 closely resemble those of the Friendly Societies Act, 1986 (59 and 69 Vict. 0.25), as amended by later enactments, and cited the authority of Dennis Lloyd in his 1938 edition of “Law relating to Unincorporated Association” for further support.

The Court cited the commentary on page sixty‑nine of a legal treatise that discussed the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act of eighteen ninety‑six as altered by later statutes. The author of that commentary observed that modern legislation continued the older Acts’ policy of denying corporate status to friendly societies. He explained that registration under the Act did not create incorporation; rather, it merely enabled the registered society to enjoy the privileges set out in the legislation. Those privileges were described as being of great significance, and some of them effectively granted the society a status that, in many respects, resembled that of a strictly incorporated corporation, even though the society was not technically incorporated. The author further noted that, by virtue of the provision that the society’s property must vest in the trustees then in office for the use and benefit of the society, its members and all persons claiming through the members according to the society’s rules, a form of perpetual succession was implied. He highlighted the especially noteworthy provision that the property would pass to succeeding trustees without the need for any assignment or transfer. In addition, although an unincorporated society could not sue or be sued in its own name, the statute conferred upon it the privilege of suing and being sued in the names of its trustees. The Court held that these observations, made with reference to the similar provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, accurately and succinctly summed up the legal position concerning the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act of eighteen sixty. The Court affirmed that those provisions undeniably grant certain important privileges to a society registered under the Act, and many of those privileges are analogous to those enjoyed by a corporation, yet there is no incorporation in the legal sense of the term. The petitioners had relied on the decision in Krishnan v. Sundaram, where the then Justice Kania described the position of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as being like that of a club or a joint‑stock company. The Court observed that that judgment did not discuss the question of incorporation, and therefore it could not be treated as an authoritative statement that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is a corporation. Similar observations without any discussion were found in Boppana Rukminamma v. Maganti Venkata Ramadas and in N. A. Nannier v. Official Assignee, Madras. However, the Court noted a more substantive discussion in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay, where Justice Bhagwati held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act was a legal entity distinct from its members and could sue and be sued in its own name. The Court clarified that the issue in that case was not whether such a society was “incorporated” in the strict legal sense, but rather whether it could institute or defend legal proceedings in the manner provided by sections six, seven and eight of the Act.

The Court noted that sections six and seven of the Societies Registration Act, together with section eight, permitted the use of the society’s registered name in legal proceedings. The learned judge explained the reasoning, stating, “I am of opinion that the provisions contained in ss. 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act are not inconsistent with the use of the registered name of the society in connection with legal proceedings. As Lord Lindley observed in Taffy Vale Railway Company`s case (supra), ‘I do not say that the use of the name is compulsory but it is at least permissive.’ If this is the true legal position of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, the objection that the plaintiffs and the defendants are one and the same and that the suit is not maintainable because the society is both plaintiff and defendant disappears. The plaintiffs are suing on behalf of themselves and all the members of the society, while the first defendant is the president of the society who represents the society. As already observed, once a society registers with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, it becomes a legal entity distinct from its members; consequently it is unreasonable to contend that the society is both plaintiff and first defendant in the same action. The Court added that it was unnecessary to examine the correctness of the reason given; it was sufficient to state that the decision does not rest on the premise that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is a corporation in the technical sense of incorporation, and even if it did, the Court could not accept it as correct. The precise question that arose later involved Servants of India Society, Poona v. The Charity Commissioner of Bombay. In that case the Servants of India Society was an institution registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, possessing substantial movable and immovable property in Bombay and elsewhere. The State of Bombay issued a notification under clause 1(4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Bombay Act XXIX of 1950) extending the provisions of that Act to societies formed for religious or charitable purposes and registered under the Societies Registration Act. An application was filed under section 8.18(1) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 for registration of the Servants of India Society. During the inquiry into that application, an objection was raised that because the Servants of India Society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, it was a corporation with objects extending beyond Bombay, and therefore legislation attempting to regulate the society fell under entry 44 of List I, rendering the State Legislature powerless to enact any law to regulate the society’s affairs.

In that case an objection was first recorded by the Assistant Charity Commissioner and then by the Charity Commissioner that the Servants of India Society, being a corporation registered under the Societies Registration Act and having objects extending beyond the State of Bombay, could not be regulated by a law enacted under entry 44 of List I because the State Legislature lacked authority to make such a law. The objection was subsequently considered, and an application was filed under section 8.72 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, before the Court of the District Judge, Poona. The decision of the District Judge was appealed to the Bombay High Court, where the appeal was heard by two judges, namely Justice Mudholkar, who at that time was a judge of the Bombay High Court, and Justice Patel. After referring to a number of earlier decisions, including the decision of Justice Bhagwati in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay (1), Justice Mudholkar held that the Servants of India Society, although registered under the Societies Registration Act, constituted a legal entity and could be described as a quasi‑corporation. He further observed that entry 44 of List I and the first part of entry 32 of List II, which deal with the incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, should be given a liberal construction so that quasi‑corporations would fall within those entries. Relying on a parallel reasoning concerning entry 7 of List III, which covers contracts, he argued that if quasi‑contracts are covered by entry 7, then quasi‑corporations must likewise be covered by entries 43 and 44 of List I as well as the first part of entry 32 of List II. Justice Patel, however, expressed a different view. He noted that entry 32 of the State List shows that matters of incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I (Union List entries 43 and 44) and universities, are expected to be dealt with by the Union List. He further pointed out that “unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations” and “co‑operatives societies” are expressly excepted from the Union List. The emphasis, he said, lies on the term “unincorporated.” Consequently, the real question is not whether an association is a legal entity or a quasi‑corporation, but whether it is incorporated or unincorporated. In his opinion, entries 43 and 44 of the Union List would therefore apply only to those societies and associations that are incorporated; societies that may possess a legal entity but remain unincorporated would not fall within the Union List. The matter was then referred to a third judge, Justice Gokhale, who expressed his view that societies registered under the Societies Registration Act are neither corporations nor quasi‑corporations, but are unincorporated societies as contemplated under the second part of entry 32 of the State List.

The Court explained that when a constitutional provision confers a specific legislative power alongside an undefined residuary power, the specific power must be given its ordinary meaning. However, when the Constitution contains two distinct powers that are both precisely defined, it is not appropriate to enlarge the scope of one power at the expense of the other. The Court agreed with this principle. It observed that entries 43 and 44 of List I, which refer to the incorporation, regulation and winding‑up of corporations, apply only to entities that have been incorporated and that are corporations in the full sense of the word. Likewise, the first part of entry 32 of List II, which mentions “incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporation,” relates exclusively to incorporated legal entities. The second part of entry 32 expressly deals with “unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations.” Thus, entry 32 is divided into two mutually exclusive categories: the first part governs incorporated societies that are true corporations, while the second part governs unincorporated societies. The Court held that there is no doubt which part of entry 32 applies to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, regardless of whether it is described as a quasi‑corporation or by any other label. Although such a society may possess certain features that resemble those of a corporation, it remains unincorporated and consequently falls within the second part of entry 32 of List II.

Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to answer the remaining questions concerning (1) whether the objects of the old Board extended beyond the State of Delhi, and (2) whether entries 11 of List II and 28 of List III could support the impugned legislation. The Court noted, however, that had it reached a different conclusion about the old Board’s corporate status, it might have been required to consider whether, under the Board’s rules, its objects were limited to Delhi or whether it could have legitimately established colleges outside Delhi without being ultra vires. In fact, the Court added that the activities of the old Board did not, at the time the impugned Act was passed, extend beyond the State of Delhi. The Court then turned to another aspect of the dispute, namely the wording of Section 3 of the impugned Act, which reads in part: “(1) With effect …”.

Section three of the statute provides that, from a date to be appointed by the Chief Commissioner through a notification in the official Gazette and hereinafter referred to as “the appointed day,” the entire management and control of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, which at that point were vested in the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, shall be transferred to a newly constituted body to be called the Tibbia College Board. Sub‑section two of the same provision declares that the Board shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, and that it may sue and be sued by the said name. By expressly stating that the new Board is a body corporate, sub‑section two confers upon the Board a full corporate status. The Court examined whether the impugned legislation therefore still falls within entry thirty‑two of List II, and concluded affirmatively for the reasons set out herein. The Court previously held that the old Board, although registered under the Societies Registration Act, was not a corporation; consequently, when the Delhi State Legislature enacted a law dissolving the old Board, it was dealing with an unincorporated society or association. The present legislation, however, creates a new Board and grants it corporate status, while simultaneously restricting the powers and duties of the new Board so that they are confined exclusively to the State of Delhi. The title of the Act expressly states that it is “an Act to provide for transfer of the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, founded by the late Hakim Ajmal Khan from its present trustees to a Board.” In other words, the Act concerns only the college situated in Delhi and the pharmaceutical institute attached to it. Section seven of the Act delineates the powers and duties of the new Board. It authorises the Board to maintain the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, with the purpose of imparting higher education in the Ayurvedic and Unani systems of medicine to both men and women and to promote and conduct research in those fields. It further empowers the Board to maintain and improve the Hindustani Dawa Khana and the Rasayanashala. The Board may make provisions for studies that incorporate, where necessary, principles of the modern system of medicine and surgery so as to adapt the scheme of studies for the Ayurvedic and Unani systems in line with contemporary exigencies. The Board is also authorised to assist in the production and publication of books that facilitate the attainment of the objectives set out in clauses (a) to (c). Additionally, the Board may receive gifts, donations, or benefactions from the Government, as well as bequests, donations, and transfers of movable or immovable property from trustees, donors, or other transferors, as appropriate. The Board may deal with any property belonging to or vested in it in any manner it deems fit for advancing the objects specified in clauses (a) to (d). Finally, the Board may undertake any other acts necessary, incidental, or conducive to achieving the purposes outlined in clauses (a) to (d).

The judgment explained that the objects listed in clauses (a) to (d) may be achieved by doing anything that is necessary, incidental or conducive to those objectives. Unlike the earlier Board, whose rules permitted it to set up colleges outside Delhi for teaching Ayurvedic and Unani systems, section 7 of the present Act limits the powers and duties of the newly created Board to matters concerning only the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College in Delhi and the pharmaceutical institute and laboratory that are attached to that college. This limitation is reinforced by the definition of the word “Board’’ found in sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4, and by the provisions that allow the chief commissioner to supersede the Board, to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, and to enable the Board to make regulations that are not inconsistent with the Act for the same purpose. None of the provisions of the impugned legislation, particularly those set out in section 8.9, confer on the new Board any authority or duty beyond what is connected with the college, its pharmaceutical institute and its laboratory, all of which are situated within the State of Delhi. Section 8.9 was then quoted in full. It states that, from the appointed day, the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi – a society that had been registered under the Registration of Societies Act, 1860 on 12 August 1911 under the name Anjuman‑i‑Tibbia and whose purpose, constitution and name had been amended on 25 November 1915 – shall stand dissolved. All movable and immovable property, together with all rights, powers and privileges that immediately before the appointed day belonged to or were vested in that society, shall vest in the new Board and shall be applied for the purposes for which the Board is constituted. The provision further provides that, from the appointed day, all debts and liabilities of the society shall be transferred to the Board and the Board shall discharge and satisfy them. Finally, any will, deed or other document, whether executed before or after the commencement of the Act, that contains any bequest, gift or trust in favour of the society shall, from the appointed day, be interpreted as if the Board had been named in place of the society. The Court observed that, although the language of section 8.9 makes clear that all rights, powers and privileges of the old Board vest in the new Board, those rights, powers and privileges are to be used only for the purposes for which the new Board was set up. Consequently, the Court read section 8.9 as subject to the limitations imposed by section 7 of the Act, concluding that the rights, powers and privileges transferred from the old Board are available to the new Board only for the limited purpose of administering the college, the attached pharmaceutical institute and laboratory located in Delhi.

In this case the Court observed that the words “for which the new Board is constituted” are decisive. They indicate that the rights, powers and privileges previously held by the old Board are transferred to the new Board only for the specific purpose for which the new Board has been created. Consequently, if the purpose of the new Board is limited to the operation of the college, pharmaceutical institute and laboratory situated in Delhi, then the objects of the new Board cannot extend beyond the territorial limits of the State of Delhi. The Court then summarized its conclusions. First, it held that registration under the Societies Registration Act did not make the old Board a corporation within the meaning of entry 44 of List I; rather, it remained an unincorporated society, although the Act conferred upon it certain privileges, some of which were similar to those enjoyed by corporations. Second, the legislation under challenge, by establishing the new Board, gave the new Board a corporate status but confined its powers and duties to the institutions in Delhi, and it limited the rights, powers and privileges that the new Board enjoys to those necessary for the purposes for which the new Board was constituted. Third, the Court determined that the impugned legislation falls within entry 32 of List II – the first part of that entry supports the incorporation of the new Board, while the second part supports the dissolution of the old Board. Accordingly, the legislation was within the legislative competence of the Delhi State Legislature. On this basis, the Court overruled the first ground of attack raised on behalf of the petitioners and indicated that it would now turn to the second ground of attack.

The petitioners had alleged that the Act violated Article 14 by being arbitrary and lacking any reasonable classification. In their petition they contended that many other institutions had faced similar allegations of mismanagement, yet the State had singled out the petitioner. They argued that, even assuming mismanagement by the petitioner, the Act made no reference to mismanagement as a ground for its enactment and therefore was an arbitrary piece of legislation without a rational basis. In response, the respondents submitted that the old Board had been grossly mismanaging its affairs. They pointed out that, prior to the passage of the Act, there was widespread discontent among the students of the institution and among the general public, leading to strong agitation against the trustees’ mismanagement. The respondents further noted that the mismanagement was so severe that, in early 1949, the institution experienced continuous student strikes, indicating a deteriorated situation that justified legislative intervention. The Court therefore examined these submissions to assess whether the classification made by the Act could be justified on reasonable grounds, as required by the equality clause of the Constitution.

The Court observed that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate any basis for their claim that other institutions were similarly situated or that the first petitioner had been singled out for unequal treatment. No names of comparable institutions had been provided. Referring to the earlier Sholapur decision, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, the Court noted that a majority of Judges had held that even a single corporation—or in the present case, a single society—could constitute a distinct class for legislative purposes if it possessed exceptional features not shared by others. The Court stated that courts should initially presume the constitutionality of legislation and should support it whenever a reasonable ground exists. The burden, therefore, rested on the party challenging the legislation to present material showing that the selection was arbitrary and without justification. Vague suggestions that other similar instances might exist were deemed insufficient, as emphasized by Justice Mukherjea in paragraphs 913‑914 of the report. Applying these principles to the present matter, the Court concluded that it could not uphold the petitioners’ contention that their right under Article 14 of the Constitution had been infringed.

Regarding Article 31, the Court found that clause (2) of that article, as it stood at the relevant time, was inapplicable because the impugned legislation neither concerned nor provided for the compulsory acquisition of property for a public purpose. The statute merely provided for the transfer of management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, from the old Board to a newly created Board, dissolving the former and conferring specific rights, powers, and privileges on the new body as set out in clause 8.7 of the Act. Consequently, the legislation did not fall within the ambit of Article 31(2) and could not be evaluated by the tests established there. Clause (1) of Article 31 likewise presented no violation, provided that the law effecting the transfer of management was valid, which the Court had already determined to be within the legislative competence of the Delhi State Legislature. Turning to the alleged breach of Article 19(1)(f), the Court noted that the property protected by that provision either belonged to the Board or to its members at the time of dissolution. Under clause 8.5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1960, such property was deemed vested in the governing body of the Board. If the Board had been dissolved by competent legislative action, it would cease to exist and could no longer lay claim to the property, although further analysis of the members’ precise rights would be required to resolve the petitioners’ remaining arguments.

The Court noted that under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, the property of the Board was deemed to be vested in its governing body. If the Board were dissolved by a competent legislative act, and given the earlier conclusions, the Board would cease to exist and a non‑existent Board could not claim any right to the property. Nevertheless, the Court observed that this point alone might not completely defeat the petitioners’ contention regarding their rights. The Court explained that if legal ownership of the property by the Board, or its vesting in the governing body, was merely a statutory mechanism allowing members to exercise rights over the property. In that situation, the dissolution of the Board and its governing body would simply give rise to the members’ own rights to that property. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to determine precisely what rights the members of the Board possessed in order to assess whether the changes introduced by the impugned Act infringed those rights as defined in Article 19(1)(f). While the society existed, the members’ entitlement was limited to ensuring that the property was used for the charitable objectives set out in the memorandum, and those objectives did not include any personal enjoyment. Furthermore, the members did not acquire any beneficial interest upon dissolution because clause 8.14 of the Act expressly denied the members any right to a distribution of the dissolved body’s assets. Consequently, the property had to be transferred to another society so that it would be managed by a charitable organization and employed for similar purposes. The only authority the members retained was the power to select the society to which the funds or property would be transferred, a decision requiring at least three‑fifths of the members present at a meeting. If the members failed to make such a determination, the responsibility to decide the disposition of the property would fall upon the civil court. The impugned legislation altered this privilege by vesting the property in a newly created body charged with administering it for the same purposes as the dissolved society. The critical question, therefore, was whether the members’ right to choose the body that would administer the dissolved society’s assets amounted to a right “to acquire, hold and dispose of property”. The Court then considered whether, if that right fell within Article 19(1)(f), the legislation could be saved by the exception contained in Article 19(5). The Court was clearly of the opinion that this right did not constitute a property right within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f). In interpreting the phrase “to dispose of” in Article 19(1)(f), the Court held that it refers to a kind of property that a citizen actually holds.

In the instant matter, the Court observed that the members of the dissolved society possessed no entitlement to hold the society’s property under the provisions of section 14 of the Societies Registration Act. Consequently, the alleged “right to hold” and the ancillary “right to dispose of” were not recognized as a property right within the meaning of article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Because the members could not claim a proprietary interest in the society’s assets, the Court concluded that there was no infringement of any constitutional right to property. Accordingly, the question whether the impugned legislation satisfied the limitations imposed by article 19(5) did not arise for determination. The petitioner's counsel relied upon two earlier decisions: State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1) and Dwarkadas Srinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (2). The Court held that neither precedent was applicable to the present facts. In the West Bengal case, a statute had altered the rights of a purchaser who, under section 37 of the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859, had acquired the authority to terminate all under‑tenancies and, with certain exceptions, to evict every under‑tenant. The purchaser exercised that right by issuing notices of ejectment and commencing a suit in 1946, which was decreed in his favour. While the appeal was pending, a new law stripped the purchaser of the very right that the court had previously recognised. The Court in that case found a violation of article 19(1)(f). The present Court noted, however, that the facts were wholly dissimilar because the respondent’s right in the West Bengal case derived from a statutory purchase right, not from membership in a society, and therefore the reasoning in that case could not be transplanted to the present dispute.

The Court then turned to the second authority cited by the petitioner's counsel. In Dwarkadas Srinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (1), the Government had appointed a Controller under the Essential Supplies Emergency Powers Act, 1946 to supervise a company’s mill operations. The Controller issued requisitions that the company’s Directors refused to obey. Subsequently, the Governor‑General promulgated an ordinance, later enacted as a statute, under which the Central Government delegated all its powers to the Government of Bombay. The Bombay Government appointed new Directors to assume control of the mills and their assets. Those Directors passed a resolution calling for a payment of Rs 50/- on each preference share, payable at a time specified in the resolution. The appellant, a holder of preference shares, was required to pay Rs 1,62,000/- in accordance with the resolution. He instituted suit challenging the validity of the ordinance and, by extension, the subsequent Act. The Court recorded these factual details to distinguish the Sholapur case from the matter before it, noting that in the Sholapur case the company had not been dissolved, the appellant retained his status as a preference shareholder, and he was still being asked to meet his unpaid share liability, thereby giving him a distinct basis for complaint under a different factual matrix.

The appeal before this Court arose from the suit that had been filed in the lower tribunal originally. This Court previously held that the ordinance challenged in the earlier case, together with the subsequent Act that replaced it, effectively authorized a deprivation of the company’s property within the meaning of Article 31 of the Constitution and that such deprivation occurred without any compensation. The Court further found that the ordinance violated the fundamental right of the appellant, who was a preference shareholder, because he had been required to pay the amounts that remained unpaid on his shares. The Court now points out a crucial difference between that earlier case and the present matter in terms of the legal issues involved. In the earlier case, identified as Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd, the citation being (1) [1954] S. C. R. 674, the company had not been dissolved or terminated by the impugned ordinance or by the Act that succeeded it. Moreover, the appellant in that case continued to hold preference shares and was still called upon to pay the outstanding monies on those shares. Because the appellant remained a shareholder whose property interest was directly affected, his grievance that the ordinance deprived him of his property without satisfying the requirements of Article 31 was understandable and legitimate. By contrast, the facts of the present case are entirely distinct, and the present petitioners do not claim a similar deprivation of property. After examining the provisions of the impugned legislation, this Court concluded that the legislation does not infringe any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Articles 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. Consequently, the two principal grounds on which the legislation had been challenged are dismissed by this Court after full consideration of the arguments.

The petitioners also argued that certain provisions of the impugned Act were inconsistent with the Societies Registration Act of 1860 and therefore, invoking Section 22 of the Government of Part States Act, 1951, should be declared void to the extent of such repugnancy. The Court observes that Section 22 deals only with a conflict between statutes enacted by Parliament, as used in the Constitution, and statutes enacted by the legislative assembly of a Part State. Since the Societies Registration Act, 1860 was not a law made by Parliament, Section 22 is inapplicable to the present controversy. The Court further notes that it has previously held that the Delhi State Legislature possessed the legislative competence to amend the Societies Registration Act, 1860 with respect to unincorporated societies. The Legislature also had the authority to enact a statute specifically for an individual unincorporated society and, if necessary, to create a new corporate entity, provided that the purpose of such entity was confined to the State of Delhi. In effect, the impugned legislation provides for the dissolution of the old Board, which was an unincorporated society, and for the establishment of a new corporate body to manage the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi. Because the legislation operates within the powers lawfully exercised by the Delhi State Legislature, no conflict with the Societies Registration Act arises. Accordingly, the Court rejects the contention that the impugned Act is void on the basis of repugnancy, and it affirms that the statutory scheme remains valid.

In this case, the Court observed that the legislation which dissolved the old Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi and created a new corporate body does not conflict with the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The petitioners also asserted that the legislation was colourable because the Delhi State Legislature had acted in bad faith when it enacted the law. The Court rejected this contention by relying on the principle articulated in K. C. Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa. In that decision, the Court explained that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not require an inquiry into whether the legislature acted honestly or in good faith. Rather, the doctrine concerns only whether the legislature possessed the constitutional power to make the law in question. If the legislature had the competence to enact the statute, the motives behind its action are irrelevant. Conversely, if the legislature lacked competence, the question of its motives does not arise at all. The Court further noted that a State’s constitution may allocate legislative authority among several bodies, each of which must operate within the sphere defined by its specific legislative entries, and that there may be additional limits imposed by fundamental rights. The issue, therefore, is whether the legislature, in a particular instance, exceeded the constitutional limits of its authority either in subject matter or in the manner of enactment. Such an excess may be overt, obvious or direct, but it can also be concealed, covert or indirect; it is the latter situation that the expression “colourable legislation” describes in judicial pronouncements. The expression implies that, although on its face a statute appears to be within the legislature’s power, in substance it actually oversteps those powers, with the overreach hidden behind a pretense or disguise. Applying this analysis, the Court found that the Delhi State Legislature did not exceed any of the limits placed upon it when it passed the impugned legislation. Because no transgression occurred, there was no question of a hidden disguise or pretense, and the Court saw no need to examine the motives that may have driven the legislature. The affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents contained sufficient material to demonstrate why the Delhi State Legislature deemed it necessary to dissolve the old Board and transfer the college’s management to a new Board. This consideration lay within the legislative domain and was not a matter for judicial investigation. Consequently, the Court concluded that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it with costs.

In this matter the petitioner, identified as the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, filed a petition under article 32 of the Constitution. The petition was presented through the college’s secretary, Hakim Mohammad Jamil Khan. The petitioner alleged that by virtue of Act 5 of 1952, commonly referred to as the Tibia College Act, 1952, the former Delhi State Legislative Assembly had dissolved the original Board of Trustees and had created a new entity called the Tibia College Board. All property, rights, powers, privileges, and the management and control of the college were said to have been transferred to this newly constituted board. The rationale for this legislative action was set out in the statement of objects and reasons that accompanied the bill. According to that statement, the legislation was intended to give the Delhi State Government authority to take over the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College because the institution had suffered prolonged mis‑management, resulting in a severely damaged reputation. By early 1949 the situation had worsened, leading to student strikes, misappropriation of funds and frequent interruptions of academic activities. The Delhi Collector then made an interim application to the civil court for the appointment of receivers. The court granted the request, and three receivers were placed in charge of the college’s assets and administration. Although this temporary arrangement was deemed effective for the time being, it was described as inadequate and short‑term, prompting the legislature to seek a permanent solution through the enactment of the Tibia College Act to regulate the college’s control, management and associated properties. The statement of objects and reasons was published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary Part II, section 2 on 18 July 1952.

The petitioner contended that its property had been taken away without any compensation and handed over to the new board, thereby violating article 31 of the Constitution. It also argued that the enactment itself was beyond the legislative competence of the Delhi Assembly. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr Purshottam Trikamdas advanced four specific contentions: first, that the Delhi Legislative Assembly lacked the authority to pass the impugned act; second, that even assuming such authority, the act violated articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution; third, that the Board of Trustees, being registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 – a Central legislation – could not be overridden by a state law; and fourth, that the legislation had been passed in bad faith. The speaker indicated that his analysis would focus mainly on the first and third contentions, as his views differed from those of his colleague on these points alone. The respondents countered by stating that the petitioner’s board, having been registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, was merely an unincorporated society and therefore fell within the legislative competence of the Delhi Assembly to regulate.

The Court observed that the legislature of the State of Delhi possessed the authority to enact a law affecting the Board of Trustees because the subject matter fell within the latter portion of Entry 32 of List II of the Constitution, which authorises the State to legislate with respect to “unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies, and co‑operative societies.” Mr Purshottam contended that once the Board of Trustees had been registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, it had effectively become a corporation, and because the corporation’s objects extended beyond the territorial limits of Delhi, the State Assembly was consequently powerless to make any law affecting the Board. The learned brother rejected this contention. An alternative argument was also advanced on behalf of the petitioner, relying upon certain judicial decisions and the opinion expressed by the Court in Servants of India Society, Poona v. The Charity Commissioner of Bombay (1960) 63 Bom L.R. 379, 381, asserting that the act of registration transformed the Board into at least a quasi‑corporation. This alternative contention was likewise rejected by the learned brother.

The Court further explained that, even assuming the petitioner’s premise that the Board had been transformed into a corporation by virtue of its registration under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the Delhi Legislative Assembly could not legislate concerning it under Entry 32. Although the first part of Entry 32 authorises the State to make laws affecting corporations, the Court agreed with the learned brother that the State’s legislative competence does not extend to a corporation whose objects lie beyond the limits of Delhi. The Court concurred that the essential characteristic of a corporation is its legal incorporation, a feature that the Societies Registration Act does not provide; consequently, the Board could not be described as a corporation. The Court acknowledged that the Board possessed some attributes of a corporation, but held that it was not a corporation in the strict sense; instead, it was “a near corporation” or “a quasi‑corporation,” a view previously articulated by the Court in the Servants of India Society case. Relying on Indian precedent and on the decision in The Taff Vale Railway Co. v. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 426, the Court had held that such a society constituted a legal entity and that a State legislature could not enact a law affecting it under the second part of Entry 32 of List II.

The Court noted that the question of whether a registered society enjoying powers comparable to those conferred by the Societies Registration Act qualified as a legal entity had been considered by the House of Lords in Bonsor v. Medicines’ Union [1956] A.C. 104. Lord Morton and Lord Parker, speaking for the majority, held that a society of this kind is a legal entity though not a corporation, thereby recognising an intermediate “semi‑corporation” status. Lord Keith further explained that such a society is both a legal entity and an association of individuals, describing it as a quasi‑corporation to the extent recognised by the governing statute and also as a voluntary association for other purposes. In contrast, Lords McDermott and Somervell did not accept the proposition that any intermediate semi‑corporate status exists.

In his analysis, the judge expressed respect for the majority view that denied any semi‑corporate status to a registered society, and he noted that this view had considerable merit. He further observed that leading scholars such as Professor Dennis Lloyd, citing the 1956 Monthly Law Reports at page 360, and Dr. Glanville William, referencing the 1957 edition of Salmond’s Jurisprudence at page 356, both endorsed the same position. The judge added that he had not found any recent treatise or article offering a contrary opinion. Turning to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act of 1860, which had been enacted by the Governor‑General in Council, he explained that upon registration a society acquired the capacity to sue and to be sued in the name of its President, Secretary or any other officer as prescribed by its rules or by its governing body. He pointed out that a suit filed by or against the society would not be dismissed on the ground of the death of the individual through whom the suit was instituted. Moreover, a judgment obtained against a person who had been sued as a representative of the society could not be enforced against that individual personally; instead, enforcement would be directed against the society’s property. The judge further observed that the society possessed the power to sue its own members for arrears of subscription, damages and similar claims, and that it could also enter into contracts in its own name. Upon dissolution, the society’s assets could not be distributed among its members; they had to be transferred to another society. He described all these features as characteristic of a separate legal entity comparable to a corporation. He contended that when the law bestows on a body all the ordinary powers of a legal person, the body functions as a corporation in all but name. However, he noted that a registered society could not hold property in the same manner as a corporation, and therefore it must be treated as a voluntary association composed of its members. Consequently, he concluded that such a body could be regarded as a quasi‑corporation or, in the words of Lords Morton and Porter, a near‑corporation. Recognising that a quasi‑corporation, or near‑corporation, enjoys legal entity status for certain purposes and is not merely a collection of its members, the judge turned to the question of whether the latter part of Entry 32 of the Constitution empowers a State legislature to legislate concerning legal entities. He examined the scope of that provision, noting that it authorises the making of laws relating to societies and associations that are unincorporated. He inferred that, under this provision, the legislature could not enact a law that would incorporate a society or association, since incorporation confers the status of a separate legal entity. He acknowledged that the provision grants the legislature wide discretion to confer various powers on a society, but he questioned whether such powers could be so extensive as to alter the society’s character and transform it into a legal entity, even for limited purposes. By definition, a society is a voluntary association that cannot exist independently of its members; it therefore lacks the status of a separate legal entity in any sense. The judge highlighted that the use of the term “unincorporated” in the entry confines the legislative power to societies and associations that remain unincorporated. Accordingly, he held that the entry does not permit the enactment of any law that would bestow upon a society the powers that would make it a legal entity. In his view, the entry also forbids legislation that would strip a society, which already possesses legal‑entity status under the Societies Registration Act of 1860, of any of the powers that such status entails, and it certainly does not allow the destruction of that entity. He concluded that any attempt to do so would require reliance on other constitutional entries that authorise legislation concerning legal entities.

The Court observed that the use of the term “unincorporated” in the entry limited the legislative power to societies and associations that were not incorporated. Accordingly, the Court held that the entry did not authorize the making of any law that would grant to a society powers that would transform it into a separate legal entity. Moreover, the Court stated that, a fortiori, the entry could not be used to enact a law that would deprive an already existing society, which was a legal entity, of any of the powers conferred upon it by statutes such as the Societies Registration Act, 1860, nor could it be employed to annihilate that entity. To achieve such an effect, the legislature would have to rely on other entries in the constitution, if any, that permit legislation concerning legal entities.

The Board, as the Court noted, had been registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. That Act was a statute enacted by the Indian legislature under the citation 24 and 25 Vict. ch. 67, passed in the year 1860. The Act conferred upon the Governor‑General‑in‑Council the authority to make laws for the whole of British India, and the extent of that authority was set out in section 8.22, which runs as follows: “The Governor‑General in Council shall have Power at Meetings for the Purpose of making Laws and Regulations aforesaid, and subject to the Provisions herein contained, to make Laws and Regulations for repealing, amending, or altering any Laws or Regulations whatever now in force or hereafter to be in force in the Indian Territories now under the Dominion of Her Majesty, and to make Laws and Regulations for all Persons, Whether British or Native, Foreigners or others, and for all Courts of Justice whatever, and for all Places and Things whatever within the said Territories, and for all Servants of the Government of India within the dominions of Princes and States in Alliance with Her Majesty; and the Laws and Regulations so to be made by the Governor‑General in Council shall control and supersede any Laws and Regulations in anywise repugnant thereto which shall have been made prior thereto by the Governors of the Presidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay respectively in Council, or the Governor or Lieutenant‑Governor in Council of any Presidency or other territory for which a council may be appointed, with Power to make law and Regulations, under and by virtue of this Act: Provided always, that the said Governor‑General in Council shall not have the power of making any Laws or Regulations which shall repeal or in any way affect any of the Provisions of this Act. Or any of the Provisions of the Acts of the Third and Fourth Years of King William the Fourth, Chapter Eighty‑five and the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Years of Her Majesty, Chapter Ninety‑five, and of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of Her Majesty, Chapter Seventy‑seven, which after the passing of this Act shall remain in force: or any Provisions of the Act of the Twenty‑first and Twenty‑second Years of Her Majesty, Chapter One Hundred and Six entitled an Act for …”

In the passage cited, the Court explained that various Acts of Parliament – including the better Government of India, the Act of the Twenty‑second and Twenty‑third years of Her Majesty (Chapter 41) and any Act enabling the Secretary of State in Council to raise money in the United Kingdom for the Government of India, as well as the Acts for punishing mutiny and desertion in Her Majesty’s Army and Indian Forces – were subject only to the provision contained in the Act of the Third and Fourth Years of King William IV (Chapter 85, section 73) concerning the Indian Articles of War. The Court further noted that any provision of any Act passed in the present session of Parliament, or any future Act, that affected Her Majesty’s Indian territories, their inhabitants, the authority of Parliament, the constitution and rights of the East India Company, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, could also be relevant where such provision touched upon the allegiance of any person to the Crown or the sovereignty of the Crown over any part of those territories. From this exposition, the Court concluded that the Governor‑General in Council possessed unfettered authority to make laws without being constrained by any legislative list, and therefore exercised plenary power to enact legislation on any conceivable subject that did not fall within the expressly excluded categories. Within the scope of that plenary power, the Governor‑General in Council could enact a law that bestowed upon a registered society the powers of a corporation, effectively converting the society into a corporate entity in all respects except for its name. The Court then contrasted this authority with that of a State Legislature, observing that although a State Legislature also enjoys plenary powers, its legislative competence is limited by the demarcated entries in the legislative lists and it cannot legislate on matters that lie clearly outside those lists. The Court identified that the respondents had relied on the latter part of Entry 32 of List II to assert that the Delhi Legislature had authority to enact the impugned law. Entry 32, however, refers to societies as associations of individuals rather than to separate legal entities that possess an existence independent of their members. Consequently, the Court held that Entry 32 could not empower the Delhi Legislature to pass a law that affected a separate legal entity such as the petitioner. The impugned Act, by its very terms, dissolved the petitioner—a distinct legal entity—and transferred its property, rights and other interests to a corporation that it created, thereby dealing with a legal entity rather than a mere association.

It was observed that the provision of the impugned Act dealt with a legal entity and the rights that belonged to that entity. Such a provision lay wholly outside the scope of the latter part of Entry 32 of List II, which related only to societies composed of individuals and not to separate legal persons. The Court explained that the State legislature could have relied on the first part of that entry only if the purpose of the society were confined to the territory of the Delhi State. Because the objects of the petitioner extended beyond Delhi, that possibility did not arise. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the entry was not limited solely to the incorporation of a corporation; it also encompassed the regulation or winding‑up of a corporation, a quasi‑corporation, or any other fictitious legal person. Since the essence of winding up is essentially the same as dissolution, the entry could, in theory, support a law dealing with dissolution. The Court further pointed out that, although India possessed a federal constitution in which the legislative fields of Parliament and the State legislatures were demarcated, there existed a concurrent field where both Parliament and the States could legislate, subject to certain conditions. Overlap among the entries in the three lists was therefore inevitable. Consequently, when a law was challenged on the ground of legislative competence, the proper inquiry was to determine its pith and substance. It was well settled that if, in its pith and substance, the law could be made under a particular entry, the mere incidental intrusion into another entry that did not pertain to the legislation could not be a ground for striking down the law as beyond the legislature’s competence.

To ascertain the pith and substance, the Court examined the impugned Act, which comprised sixteen sections. Section 3 concerned the incorporation of the Tibia College Board and the transfer of management and control of the Tibia College from the petitioner‑Board to the new Board. Section 9 dealt with the dissolution of the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi, and the transfer of its property to the Tibia College Board. The remaining sections addressed incidental matters such as definitions, the constitution of the Board, and the powers of the Board. The learned brother on the bench had concluded that, with respect to the dissolution of the old Board, the impugned law fell under the second part of Entry 32, while the incorporation of the new Board fell under its first part. The Court acknowledged that a legislature might derive authority to enact a law covering different topics from various entries in the legislative list. However, such a consideration was immaterial when, in a divided jurisdiction, a law was challenged on the ground that it encroached upon a field not open to the legislature. In that situation, the decisive question was the pith and substance of the law and the extent of any encroachment into another field. The Court therefore indicated that the degree of encroachment would guide the assessment of the law’s true nature and its constitutional validity.

In assessing the true nature, or pith and substance, of a statute, the Court examines the essential purpose for which the legislation was enacted. In the present case the impugned Act was directed primarily at dissolving the petitioner Board and at transferring all of its property, rights and other assets. The transfer was intended to be made in favour of a corporation that the Act itself created. Apart from sections three and nine, most provisions of the Act deal exclusively with matters relating to that newly created entity. However, a reading of the preamble together with sections three and nine shows that the creation and incorporation of the new Board was not the substantive purpose of the legislation. The sole reason for establishing the new Board was to receive the assets that until then belonged to the petitioner Board. Consequently the new Board served only a consequential purpose, and its incorporation cannot be described as the pith and substance of the impugned Act. Moreover, the activities of the petitioner were not limited to the State of Delhi, and therefore the Act cannot be justified by reference to the first part of Entry 2. The substance of the law is the dissolution of the petitioner Board, a legal entity, and the transfer of its property and rights to another body; this cannot be sustained by reliance on the latter part of Entry 32. The learned Solicitor General also relied on Entries 10 and 28 of List II in support of the legislation. The question, then, is whether the Delhi Legislature was competent to make the impugned law under those entries. It is not contested that the petitioner Board acted as a trustee, and the objects of the trust, as set out in the earlier judgment, indicate that it was established for charitable purposes. Thus the petitioner constitutes a charitable trust, and the purpose of the Act is to dissolve that trust and transfer its property. Entries 10 and 28 of List III read as follows: Entry 10 – “Trust and Trustees”; Entry 28 – “Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious legislatures”. These entries are not confined to trusts or charitable institutions that are unincorporated societies, as the latter part of Entry 32 of List II might suggest. Entry 10 clearly permits legislation concerning a trust or trustee that is a separate legal entity. Likewise, Entry 28 authorises legislation affecting charities and charitable institutions of any kind, whether they are voluntary associations of individuals or possess a corporate or semi‑corporate character, such as Hindu religious endowments, which are expressly included in that entry. Accordingly, the Delhi Legislature possessed the competence to enact a law dissolving a charitable trust and transferring its property, rights and other assets to another institution. Both entries therefore provide the requisite authority for the impugned legislation, even though they fall within the concurrent legislative field.

In this case, the Court noted that the impugned Act had been placed before the President for his assent and that he gave assent on 12 September 1952. Because the Act had obtained the President’s approval, the Court held that its validity could not be challenged on the ground that it conflicted with an existing law or with a law made by Parliament. The Court also said that it agreed with the observations made by the learned brother of the Court on the second and the fourth points raised by counsel for the petitioner. It added that it had nothing further to say on those matters. Regarding the third point, the petitioner argued that Section 22 of the Government of Part States Act, 1951 — the statute that had created a legislature for the Delhi State when it was a Part State — barred the Delhi legislature from making any law that was repugnant to an Act of Parliament. The petitioner further contended that because the impugned Act contained provisions that were inconsistent with the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the impugned Act was therefore ultra vires. The Court observed that Section 22 only prohibits a law that is repugnant to a law made by Parliament itself. It further noted that the Societies Registration Act does not fall within the class of statutes referred to in Section 22; consequently the petitioner's contention did not arise under the Court’s present analysis. The Court further explained that, upon registration under the Societies Registration Act, the petitioner‑Board became a quasi‑corporation and thus a separate legal entity. Although the Board’s existence depended on the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, the Delhi legislature was free to legislate with respect to the Board under its powers under List III, because such legislation did not create a law that was repugnant to the Societies Registration Act. The Court stressed that the Societies Registration Act continues to have full force and effect and is not altered by the impugned Act. It may be true that, by operation of the impugned law, the Board is no longer able to exercise its powers under the Societies Registration Act. However, that situation arises not because the provisions of the 1860 Act have been repealed, but because the Board has ceased to exist as a legal entity. Accordingly, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument. The petition was dismissed with costs, and the dismissal was ordered.