Thakur Bahadur Singh vs The State Of Rajasthan And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 200 of 1955

Decision Date: 17 March, 1961

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

In the matter of Thakur Bahadur Singh versus the State of Rajasthan and others, the Supreme Court heard arguments on 17 March 1961. The bench comprised Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice K. N. Gupta. The case was reported in 1961 AIR 1338 and 1962 SCR (1) 438. The issues concerned the Resumption of Jagirs, extinguishment of tribute, the nature of a hukamnama, the demand for a hukamnama and the provisions of the Marwar Land Revenue Act of 1949 (Marwar 40 of 1949), sections 185(1) and 190(1), and the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act of 1952 (Rajasthan 6 of 1952), sections 2(r), 4(a) and 8. The petitioner, Thakur Bahadur Singh, had his right to succeed to the jagir of his father, who died in July 1946, recognised by the Government. A renewal order in his favour was issued on 8 March 1952. Under section 190 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, the succeeding heir was required to execute, within one month of receiving the renewal order, a “kabuliyat” for the payment of the hukamnama and any other fees prescribed by the Act. The amount calculated for the petitioner amounted to Rs 30,000, which the State of Rajasthan demanded. While these proceedings were occurring, the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 had been enacted and came into force on 16 February 1952. Section 4(a) of that Act declared that “the liability of all jagirdars to pay tribute to the Government under any existing jagir law shall cease.” The term “tribute” was defined in section 2(r) as “in relation to a jagir, includes rekh, rakam, chatund, chakri or other charge of a similar nature.” The petitioner challenged the legality of the demand, contending that the liability to pay the hukamnama fell within the definition of tribute and therefore should have been extinguished by section 4(a). The Court examined the definition and concluded that, although the definition in section 2(r) was broad, the operative use of the word “tribute” in the Act referred only to recurring charges that could be linked to specific fiscal years. The hukamnama, being an ad hoc levy, did not qualify as a tribute under this construction. Consequently, the liability to pay the hukamnama was not covered by the exemption in section 4(a) and remained enforceable. The Court supported its reasoning by referring to the earlier decision in Thakur Narpat Sinah v. State of Rajasthan, I.L.R. (1955) Rajasthan 534. The judgment arose from original jurisdiction under Petition No. 200 of 1955, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights, and the opinion was authored by S. K. Kapoor.

Counsel for the petitioner, Ganpat Rai, appeared before the Court, and counsel for the respondents, G. C. Kasliwal and D. Gupta, also appeared. The judgment was pronounced on 17 March 1961 and was delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The Court first referred to Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter the Rajasthan Act), which provides: “4. All lands liable to pay land revenue.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any existing jagir law or any other law, all jagir lands shall, as from the commencement of this Act, be liable to payment of land revenue to the Government; and as from such commencement, the liability of— (a) all Jagirdars to pay tribute to the Government under any existing Jagir Law shall cease, and”. The expression “tribute”, the liability to which was therefore extinguished from and after the commencement of the Act, was defined in Section 2(r) of the same Act as follows: “‘Tribute’ in relation to a jagir, includes rekh, rakam, chatund, chakri or other charge of a similar nature; and”. The Court noted that, had this provision not existed, the petitioner would still have been liable to pay the Government a levy called ‘hukamnama’ under Section 190 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, 1949 (hereinafter the Marwar Act), which had codified the earlier law of that State. The essential question raised by the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was whether the petitioner’s liability to pay the hukamnama – the nature of which the Court would explain later – had been extinguished by the provision of the Rajasthan Act, a question that depended on whether such a payment could be understood as falling within the expression “tribute”. Relying on Section 4(a) of the Rajasthan Act, the petitioner contested the demand made by the State and challenged the legality of the claim. To appreciate the controversy, the Court set out certain facts and relevant provisions of the Marwar Act. Thakur Nathu Singh, who held a “Scheduled Jagir” under the Marwar Act, died in July 1946, leaving the petitioner, Thakur Bahadur Singh, as his next heir. Under the Marwar Act, “Scheduled Jagirs” are not alienable and their line of succession is prescribed by Section 182, which states: “Succession shall be governed in the case of Scheduled Jagirs by the rule of primogeniture.” However, succession under this rule was not automatic; it required recognition by the Government and a renewal granted in favour of the successor before the title to the jagir could be perfected. The Court then highlighted Sections 183 to 185 of the Marwar Act as being pertinent. Section 183 provides that “All grants of Scheduled Jagirs are only for the life‑time of the holder, and no person is entitled to succeed to such jagir until his succession is recognized and the grant is renewed in his favour by His Highness.” Section 184 adds that, “Subject always to His Highness’s pleasure, the grant of a Scheduled Jagir, on the death of the holder, shall be renewed…”

Section 185(1) of the Marwar Act provides that a Scheduled Jagir, upon the death of its holder and until the grant is renewed in favour of the rightful successor, shall be resumed by the Government and placed under direct management. However, the provision also states that, in the absence of any special order from His Highness, a claimant who is a direct male line descendant of the last holder may be allowed to retain possession of the jagir pending the Government’s order on the claim. The petitioner, Thakur Bahadur Singh, was recognised as the next heir of his father and the Government issued an order dated 18 March 1952 granting renewal of the Jagir in his favour.

Section 190 of the same Act imposes a duty on any heir whose succession has been recognised and whose grant has been renewed to make certain payments. Sub‑section (1) requires the person in whose favour the renewal is ordered to execute, within one month of receiving notice of the order, a document called “Kabuliyat” for the payment of the Hukamnama and other fees specified in sub‑sections (2) and (3). The scale of fees fixed under the Act amounted to Rs 30,000, and the State of Rajasthan demanded that sum from the petitioner.

Before the order of recognition and renewal was issued, the Rajasthan Act of 1952 had been passed. After receiving the President’s assent on 13 February 1952, it came into force on 16 February 1952 upon publication in the Gazette. Section 4 of that Act, whose terms have been set out earlier, extinguished the liability of Jagirdars to pay “all tribute” to the Government. The central issue raised in the petition was whether the liability to pay the Hukamnama or other fees under section 190 of the Marwar Act constituted a “tribute” within the meaning of section 4 of the Rajasthan Act, and therefore whether such liability was extinguished on 16 February 1952.

Both parties accepted the factual premise, subject to the submission of the learned Advocate‑General for the respondent State, that if the Hukamnama demanded from the petitioner was a tribute within section 4, it would no longer be enforceable after the Rajasthan Act came into force. The petitioner’s status as a Jagirdar was not in dispute, and the demand for the Hukamnama was described as a demand arising under an existing Jagir law, namely the Marwar Act. Consequently, the precise question for determination was whether the payment required by section 190 was covered by the exemption in section 4 of the Rajasthan Act, a question that had previously been considered by the Rajasthan High Court in 1955 on identical facts.

In the matter before this Court, a Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, in the decision reported as Thakur Narpat Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (1) I.L.R. [1955] Rajasthan 534, held that the levy known as “hukamnama” and the fees payable under section 190 of the Marwar Act did not fall within section 4(a) of the Rajasthan Act. Consequently, the submissions before this Court were divided between those who sought to support the reasoning set out in that judgment and those who challenged its correctness. Because the contentions before us directly depended on the reasoning employed by the learned Judges of the Rajasthan High Court, it became necessary to scrutinise the basis of the High Court’s conclusion, which was adverse to the petitioner’s claim.

Before undertaking that examination, it was essential to address a point raised by the learned Advocate‑General for the State of Rajasthan. The Advocate‑General argued that section 4 of the Rajasthan Act was not retrospective and that, since the recognition of the petitioner’s title and the renewal of his jagir grant were recorded as having effect from July 1946—the date when the succession opened—the Act could not be used to extinguish an obligation that had arisen years before the Act came into force, even though the orders of recognition and renewal were passed only in March 1952. In the present circumstances, and considering that the State had not raised this argument in its answer to the writ petition, the Court deemed it inappropriate to allow the Advocate‑General to pursue that submission at this stage.

The Court will now turn to the correctness of the conclusion reached by the Rajasthan High Court. The ratio of that decision can be summarised as follows: under the law governing jagir grants and their tenure in Marwar, a “hukamnama” is a levy imposed for the purpose of recognising the succession of a person to a scheduled jagir of his deceased ancestor. The specific dues termed “Rekh” and “Chakri,” which are enumerated in the definition contained in section 2(r) of the Rajasthan Act, are levies that arise in Marwar; “Rekh” amounts to eight per cent of the gross rental value of an estate, while “Chakri” represents the cash equivalent of the obligation to supply horsemen, camels, or foot‑soldiers, the amount depending on the value of the estate. Similar charges are known as “Rakam” in the State of Bikaner and “Chatund” in the State of Udaipur, both of which are components of the State of Rajasthan. All of these charges—Rekh, Rakam, Chatund and Chakri—are annual, recurring payments made by jagirdars. Consequently, when the definition in section 2(r) concludes with the words “other charges of a similar nature,” those general words must be confined to charges that are also recurring. By contrast, the “hukamnama” and the other dues payable under section 190 of the Marwar Act were not recurring payments; they were made in consideration of the ruler’s discretionary act of recognising a succession and renewing the jagir in favour of the next heir, that is, payments due to the ruler for exercising his sovereign right over the ownership of the land.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that the payments referred to as “hukamnama” and other dues payable under section 190 of the Marwar Act were not recurring in nature. These payments were made because the ruler exercised his discretion to recognise a succession and to grant renewal of a jagir in favour of the next heir. In other words, the payments were made to the ruler as acknowledgment of his sovereign right to own the land, a right that was expressly embodied in sections 169 and 170 of the Marwar Act. Section 169 provided that “the ownership of all land vests in His Highness and all jagirs, bhoms, sansans, dolis or similar proprietary interests are held and shall be deemed to be held as grant‑ from His Highness.” Section 170 continued that “all grants shall be held by the original grantee or his successors during His Highness’ pleasure.” Consequently, the payments required under section 190 were of a different character from the payments enumerated in subsection (r) of section 2 of the Rajasthan Act and therefore could not be understood within the meaning of the expression “tribute” as used in that definition.

The petitioner's learned counsel challenged the reasoning of the High Court, contending that the Court had not given sufficient weight to the fact that the definition in subsection (r) of section 2 was an inclusive definition and could therefore encompass payments that did not fall within the specifically listed types. To support this submission, counsel relied on dictionary definitions of the word “tribute.” In Webster’s New International Dictionary, one definition reads: “A tax, impost, duty, rental, or the like, paid by a subject vassal to his sovereign or lord.” The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume I‑T, defines “tribute” as “a tax or impost paid by one prince or state to another in acknowledgement of submission or as the price of peace, security and protection.” Counsel argued that, if the word were understood according to its ordinary dictionary meaning without reference to any statutory definition, the element of recurrence would not be a necessary attribute of the concept of a “tribute.” The submission further maintained that the learned judges of the Rajasthan High Court erred in restricting the meaning of “tribute” to the enumerated payments and the phrase “other charges of a similar nature,” without recognising that the definition was meant to be inclusive rather than exhaustive or merely illustrative. The Court acknowledged that these submissions possessed merit and noted that the argument, as framed, and the construction of subsection (r) had not been fully considered by the High Court.

In this matter, the Court observed that the aspect raised by the petitioner had not been addressed by the learned judges of the Rajasthan High Court. Consequently, the Court found it necessary to examine whether the petitioner’s submission could be sustained under the statutory scheme. The primary issue for determination was whether the term ‘tribute’ employed in the Rajasthan Act encompassed the particular category of payments that were the subject of the controversy. Beyond the explicit saving clause at the beginning of section 2, which provides that the definitions shall apply ‘unless the context otherwise requires’, the meaning of ‘tribute’ must be derived from a holistic reading of the Act’s provisions rather than solely from section 4(a) read in conjunction with the definition. On close analysis, the question of construction that the Court had to resolve could be articulated as follows: the four dues specifically listed in subsection 2(r) are recurring annual payments. The phrase ‘other charges of a like nature’ that follows those enumerated dues must, by implication, possess the same recurring and annual character as the listed items. This interpretation formed the basis of the Rajasthan High Court’s decision, and the correctness of that approach up to that point had not been challenged. However, because the definition is described as ‘inclusive’ rather than as an exhaustive list, it is argued that the term must also embrace payments beyond those expressly mentioned. The Court added that the inclusive wording may have been adopted out of caution, intending not to exclude any levy that jagirdars were obliged to make to the Government, given the State’s composition of several former princely entities with varied terminology for such payments. Counsel for the petitioner contended that every payment made by a jagirdar to the Government, irrespective of its nature or the consideration involved, falls within the ambit of ‘tribute’. If the word ‘tribute’ appeared only in section 4(a) of the operative provisions, the petitioner's reliance on its plain dictionary meaning might have been persuasive. Nevertheless, the Act employs the term ‘tribute’ in multiple sections and contexts, leading the Court to conclude that the true scope of this somewhat indefinite expression must be discerned from the entirety of the legislation. The Court noted that the English word ‘tribute’ had no exact counterpart in the local languages, and therefore it was adopted as a convenient collective label for certain imposts levied by the rulers of the various States that later merged to form Rajasthan.

The Court observed that because the term “tribute” had no exact equivalent in the local languages of Rajasthan, the framers of the Rajasthan Act most likely employed it as a convenient shorthand for certain imposts levied by the former rulers of the various princely states. Consequently, the Court warned that reliance on the ordinary dictionary definition of the English word “tribute” could be misleading when trying to ascertain the intention of the Act’s drafters. The Court therefore decided to examine the other sections of the enactment that also employed the word “tribute” so as to discover the meaning that the legislators intended. Before proceeding with that analysis, the Court noted that section 4(a) of the Rajasthan Act stipulated that the payment of land revenue calculated under the Act was to replace the “tribute” that had previously been demandable or actually paid. Accordingly, the method by which land revenue was determined under the Act would shed light on what the “tribute” was being substituted for. The Court had already set out the terms of section 4, which provided that, in lieu of paying “tribute,” all lands were to become liable for the payment of land revenue. The amount of land revenue payable by a Jagirdar was fixed by section 8, and that amount was in part based on the annual rental income that could be derived from the jagir, as computed under sections 6 and 7. For the purpose of the present discussion, section 8 was particularly significant because the amount of “tribute” payable formed one of the factors used to determine the amount of land revenue payable. The Court then reproduced the full text of section 8:

“S. 8. Amount of land revenue payable.—The land revenue payable by a Jagirdar in respect of his jagir lands shall be— (a) for the agricultural year 1951‑52, an amount equal to the amount of tribute payable by him to the Government for that year; (b) for the agricultural year 1952‑53 and each of the six succeeding agricultural years— (i) in the case of jagir lands the annual rental income of which as determined under section 6 or section 7, exceeds five hundred rupees but does not exceed five thousand rupees, one sixteenth of such rental income or the amount of the tribute which was payable by the Jagirdar for the agricultural year 1950‑51, whichever is greater; (ii) in the case of jagir lands the rental income of which as determined under section 6 or section 7 exceeds five thousand rupees, one‑eighth of such annual rental income or the amount of the tribute which was payable by the Jagirdar for the agricultural year 1950‑51, whichever is greater. Explanation.—For the purpose of this clause the amount of tribute payable by a Jagirdar to the Government for the agricultural year 1950‑51 shall be deemed to be the amount of such tribute less the amount of any tribute payable to such Jagirdar by any person to whom the Jagirdar may have granted any of his jagir lands; (c) for the agricultural year 1959‑60 and subsequent years, one fourth of the rental income from the jagir lands as determined under sections 6 and 7; Provided that— (i) where no tribute was payable.”

After presenting the provision, the Court emphasized that the language of section 8 made clear that the calculation of land revenue was directly linked to the amount of tribute that had been payable in the year 1950‑51, and that the provision included a safeguard in the form of an explanation to adjust the tribute amount by subtracting any tribute that the Jagirdar himself might have been required to receive from others. The Court further noted that the provision laid down a graduated scale based on the level of rental income, and that it also contained a transitional rule for years after 1959‑60, setting land revenue at a fixed fraction of the rental income. The inclusion of the “Provided that” clause indicated that the legislature intended to address situations where no tribute was payable, thereby affecting the liability of the Jagirdar for land revenue in the inaugural agricultural year of the Act.

The provision states that if a Jagirdar had paid the entire tribute before the Act commenced, or if the whole tribute was discharged prior to the commencement, the jagir lands shall be considered exempt from land‑revenue liability for the agricultural year 1951‑52. In the second alternative, where the Jagirdar had paid only a portion of the tribute before the commencement of the Act, the land revenue that must be paid for the agricultural year 1951‑52 shall be equal to the balance of the tribute that would have been payable for that year if the Act had not been enacted. The third alternative empowers the Government to direct that, for the purposes of clauses (b) and (e) of the same section, the rental income of any jagir land for any of the agricultural years referred to in those clauses may be determined or re‑determined on the basis of the actual rental income that accrued to the Jagirdar from the jagir in the relevant year or years.

It is clear from the language of the section that the reference to tribute concerns the payment that is due for the specific years mentioned, namely 1951‑52 or 1950‑51, and that such tribute can only be the recurring payments described in the definition contained in section 2(r), which are characterised as payments for a particular year. Moreover, under section 8(b) the land revenue payable for the seven agricultural years from 1952‑53 to 1959‑60 is to be calculated either as a fraction of the annual rental income or as “the amount of the tribute which would be payable by the Jagirdar for the year 1950‑51, whichever is greater”. It would be unreasonable to construe a one‑time payment of a hukamnama made in 1950‑51 as part of the tribute for that year and to consequently hold the Jagirdar liable for the same hukamnama in the calculation of land revenue for each of the seven succeeding years. The primary purpose of the Rajasthan Act was to resume jagir lands by removing intermediaries, and the tribute payable by former Jagirdars is factored into the computation of compensation payable to them upon resumption. The second schedule of the Act sets out the principles governing such compensation. In general, compensation is calculated on the basis of a multiple of the net income of the basic year as defined in rule 1 of the second schedule. Net income is derived by first ascertaining the gross income of the Jagirdar from various sources, including rental income, and then deducting certain outgoings, among which is the “tribute”. Rule 4 of schedule 2 provides that the net income of a Jagirdar for the basic year shall be computed by deducting from his gross income the amount that the Jagirdar would have been liable to pay to the Government as tribute, and, where applicable, the amount payable by a grantee from the Jagirdar to the Jagirdar for the basic year on any account other than land revenue.

Rule 4 of Schedule II required that, for the basic year, the net income of a Jagirdar be reduced by (i) the amount that the Jagirdar would have been liable to pay to the Government as tribute if the Act had not been enacted, and (ii) any sums of a recurring nature that were due to the Government from the Jagirdar, or, in the case of a grantee, that were payable by the Jagirdar to the grantee, for the basic year on any account other than land‑revenue. The provision further stated that these deductions were to be made before arriving at the net income figure that formed the basis for compensation calculations. The Court observed that it was inconceivable that the legislators who drafted the Act intended a one‑time payment of a hukamnama in the basic year to have a permanent effect on the amount of compensation that a Jagirdar would receive under the extracted provisions.

Beyond the compensation for the resumption of the jagir as provided by the Rajasthan Act, the Jagirdars were also entitled to a rehabilitation grant pursuant to Chapter VIII A of the same Act. Schedule III set out the method for computing this grant, classifying Jagirdars on a graduated scale into various categories according to the gross income derived from their estates. A proviso accompanying this schedule required that, when calculating the rehabilitation grant for a Jagirdar in a particular category, marginal adjustments be made so that a Jagirdar with a higher net income would not receive a rehabilitation amount that was lower than that payable to a Jagirdar with a lower net income. The proviso further stipulated that, in comparing Jagirdars with differing levels of income for the purpose of the first marginal‑adjustment rule, the following criteria must be observed: (i) Jagirdars who were paying tribute should be compared only with other Jagirdars who were also paying tribute; (ii) Jagiddars who were not paying tribute should be compared only with other Jagiddars who were not paying tribute; (iii) Jagirdars who were paying any sums of a recurring nature referred to in sub‑clause (ii) of clause 4 of the Second Schedule should be compared only with Jagiddars who were paying such sums; and (iv) where Jagiddars were paying tribute or other recurring sums at different rates, the Government would prescribe a uniform percentage of gross income at which the amount of tribute or such recurring sums for each Jagiddar would be calculated, irrespective of the actual amounts that the individual Jagiddars were paying.

The Court noted that the earlier discussion on the construction of the term “tribute” in rule 4 of Schedule II applied equally to its use in the provision extracted from Schedule III. Although section 2(r) of the Rajasthan Act described the definition of tribute as “inclusive,” the Court found, after examining the operative provisions of the Act, that the term could logically refer only to recurring payments that could be attributed to particular years. Consequently, the Court concluded that the word did not encompass ad‑hoc payments such as hukamnamas or patta‑fees, which are not recurring in nature.

The Court noted that the expression “tribute” was intended to refer only to recurring payments that were calculated on an annual basis and not to irregular, ad hoc levies such as hukamnamas and patta‑fees. It observed that although the words at the conclusion of section 2(r) – “other charges of a similar nature” – might not exhaust every payment that the term tribute could denote, the remainder of the Act unmistakably indicated that tribute was to be understood in a special sense, taking into account the local law and customary usage. Consequently, the Court refused to adopt a broader interpretation based merely on the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word. The Court further stated that the provision it had highlighted was sufficient to demonstrate that the construction advanced by counsel for the petitioner would place the Jagirdars at a serious disadvantage and would deprive them of rights that could never have been intended by the legislature. In reaching this conclusion, the Court arrived at the same result as the learned judges of the Rajasthan High Court, although it followed a different line of reasoning. Accordingly, under the Court’s construction of the term “tribute” in section 4 of the Rajasthan Act, the petitioner could assert no legal or legitimate grievance against the enforcement of the payment claimed from him. The petition was therefore dismissed, and the Court ordered that no costs be awarded.