T. V. R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities vs M. Raghava Mudaliar And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 204/1956

Decision Date: 27 January 1961

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

In this matter, the Supreme Court examined a dispute arising under Hindu law concerning alienation of property by a widow and the subsequent claim of a reversioner to set aside that alienation. The case, titled T. V. R. Subbu Chetty’s Family Charities versus M. Raghava Mudaliar and Others, was decided on 27 January 1961. The judgment was authored by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, with Justices K. N. Wanchoo and K. C. Das Gupta forming the bench. The reported citation for the decision is 1961 AIR 797 and 1961 SCR (3) 624, and it is referenced in subsequent reports such as 1971 SC 1041, 1972 SC 2069, and 1976 SC 807.

The factual background involved a Hindu deceased, identified as M, who left surviving relatives consisting of his mother, his widow, his sisters, a nephew (the son of one sister), and the daughters of another sister. A dispute emerged between the mother and the widow, which was resolved through arbitration. The settlement allocated distinct portions of one house to a sister of M, another portion to the son of a different sister and his sister, and a third portion to the daughter of a third sister. Certain properties were agreed to be sold under the settlement, and those properties were subsequently sold to the petitioner by the mother and the widow. After the deaths of the mother and the widow, the respondent R, asserting himself as the next reversioner of M, instituted a suit seeking recovery of the sold properties, contending that the alienation lacked legal necessity and was not binding upon him.

The petitioner argued two main points. First, that R was barred from contesting the settlement because he had derived a benefit from it and, through his subsequent conduct, had ratified the arrangement. Second, that the transfer of the properties was justified by legal necessity. The Court held that the transfer was not enforceable against R and that he was entitled to set it aside. Moreover, the settlement between the mother and the widow did not bind R. The Court explained that a person fully aware of his prospective reversionary rights who engages in a transaction that resolves his own claim and those of the other parties at that time cannot later retract from that agreement when the reversionary interest actually materializes. However, merely receiving a benefit from the transaction or failing to challenge its validity when it occurred does not automatically extinguish the reversioner’s rights. Whether the reversioner’s conduct amounts to a legally recognized ratification remains a factual determination. In the present case, the settlement was not a family arrangement; at the relevant time R was a minor and did not participate in any of the transactions, and there was no conduct on his part that could be deemed ratification of either the settlement or the alienation.

The court noted that the person who accepted the gift could not have been aware of any future entitlement as a possible reversioner, and therefore could not be said to have acted with knowledge of such rights. Moreover, the court observed that there was no legal necessity that required the transfer of the property in question. The judgment referred to several earlier decisions on similar points, namely Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram [1955] 2 S.C.R. 22, Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore [1952] S.C.R. 478, Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal (1918) L.R. 45 I.A. 118, Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72 and Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausakeb (1927) L.R. 54 I.A. 396. The case under consideration was Civil Appeal No. 204/1956, an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 23 February 1951 of the Madras High Court in O. S. Appeal No. 13/1948. Counsel for the appellant consisted of R. Keshva Aiyangar and M. S. K. Aiyangar, while counsel for respondent No. 1 was A. V. Viswanatha Sastri together with Naunit Lal, and counsel for respondent No. 6 was B. K. B. Naidu. The appeal was heard on 27 January 1961, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar. The appeal arose out of a suit filed by the respondent, M. Raghava Mudaliar, who claimed to be the reversioner of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar. In his suit the respondent alleged that after the death of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar on 22 March 1893 his estate passed into the possession of his widow, Manickammal, and that subsequently the widow Manickammal and Rengammal, the widowed mother of the deceased, alienated the properties without any legal necessity. The respondent asserted that such alienation was not binding on him and that he was therefore entitled to recover possession of the property free from any encumbrance or charge. The widow Manickammal died on 18 October 1941, while Rengammal died in June 1921. On the death of the widow, the reversionary interest fell open, giving rise to a cause of action for the respondent. Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar died without issue and was survived by his widow, his widowed mother, his sister Andalammal, and the respondent together with his sister Apurupammal, who were children of Ammakannu Ammal, the second sister of Madhava, and Ethirajammal, the daughter of the third sister of Madhava. The respondent impleaded as defendants the appellant Andalammal, Krishnasami Mudaliar, the son of Apurupammal (defendant 1), and Susila Bai Ammal, daughter of Ethirajammal (defendants 2 to 4), and joined the Udayavar Temple, represented by the sole trustee Bysani Krishnaiah Chetty, as defendant 5. After the death of her husband, Manickammal obtained letters of administration to his estate from the High Court at Madras. The relationship between the widow and her mother‑in‑law had become acrimonious, leading to disputes that were eventually settled under the guidance of certain arbitrators who mediated between them. The settlement reached was recorded in writing on 27 May 1893 (Exhibit D‑2). At this stage it was relevant to set out the principal terms of that settlement, which identified the properties concerned as Serial Numbers 1 to 5 and allocated the first item, a house consisting of three blocks, among the respondent and his sister Apurupammal, Ethirajammal, and Andalammal, each receiving one share.

According to the written settlement dated 27 May 1893, the property identified as Serial No. 1, which consisted of a house divided into three blocks, was to be shared among four persons: the respondent, his sister Apurupammal, Ethirajammal, and Andalammal, each receiving one equal share.

The property described as House No. 62, identified as Serial No. 2, together with the houses and shops numbered 126 and 127, listed as Serial No. 3, were agreed to be sold; the settlement stipulated that the proceeds of that sale first be applied to discharge the debts of the deceased Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar and his father, then to deduct the costs incurred in obtaining the letters of administration and the expenses of the sale, and finally that the remaining balance be divided equally between the two widows, subject to a payment of rupees 1,000 to the mother‑in‑law in lieu of her jewellery.

The two cawnies of land recorded as Serial No. 4 were to be transferred to the maternal uncle of the deceased Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar, while the movable assets listed as Serial No. 5 were to be divided equally, half to each of the two widows.

The agreement also contained a clause stating that if either party breached its terms, the other party could cancel the agreement, yet the breaching party’s title to the estate of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar that existed before the agreement would remain unaffected; the document was signed in the presence of four attesting witnesses.

Shortly after the settlement was finalized, Krishnasamy Mudaliar, identified as defendant 3, raised objections to the validity of the arrangement and disputed the widows’ authority to dispose of the property as prescribed; however, he was eventually persuaded to withdraw his objections, and on 10 September 1894 he executed a sale deed conveying his reversionary rights to the two widows for consideration, thereby purporting to recognize and grant them absolute title to the estate of the deceased, as reflected in Exhibit D‑3.

Following the execution of that deed, the two widows began to enjoy possession of the properties in accordance with the terms of the settlement. On 4 February 1895, the widows sold the property identified as Item No. 1 in Schedule 11 attached to the plaint—specifically the houses numbered 126 and 127 situated on Anna Pillai Street and Audiappa Naick Street—to Thatha Venkata Raghava Subbu Chetty. The appellant in the present appeal is the successor in title to the division of that Item No. 1, as indicated in Schedule II, and the appeal is limited solely to the question of that particular item.

Subsequently, on 27 May 1895, the two widows executed a composite deed of partition and administration of the deceased’s property, shown as Exhibit D‑5. By virtue of that deed, the three blocks comprising the house identified as Serial No. 1 in Exhibit D‑2 were delivered into the possession of the respective donees; the maternal uncle of the deceased received the two cawnies of land as previously stipulated; and the debts of the deceased were discharged together with the expenses incurred in obtaining the letters of administration.

It was under these circumstances that the respondent instituted Suit No 56 of 1946 on the Original Side of the Madras High Court, contending that the alienations made by the two widows were not binding upon him and that he was entitled to possession of the property left by the deceased Madhava Ramanuja. The schedule annexed to the plaint identified four items of property, but, as earlier noted, the present appeal concerned only item 1 of those four items. Regarding that item, the appellant asserted that the agreement between the two widows (Ex D‑2) and the subsequent composite deed executed pursuant to that agreement (Ex D‑5) constituted a family arrangement and that, as such, the arrangement bound the respondent. The appellant further alleged that the respondent had derived benefit from the arrangement and, by his conduct, had ratified it. In addition, the appellant pleaded that the transfer in favour of his predecessor was supported by legal necessity, and, incidentally, a plea of surrender was also raised by the appellant. Mr Justice Kunhiraman, who tried the suit, held that a family arrangement existed which bound the respondent, and he observed that the respondent had received benefit under that arrangement and was therefore precluded from challenging its validity. The learned judge also made observations indicating an inclination to uphold the appellant’s plea of surrender. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the respondent’s suit. The respondent appealed this dismissal and succeeded at the appellate level. The appellate court held that the impugned arrangement could not be described as a bona‑fide family settlement that would bind the respondent. Before that court it was conceded that the appellant’s plea of surrender could not be sustained and that the contention that the respondent was bound by the family arrangement also could not be maintained. Although the appellant argued that the respondent’s conduct precluded him from disputing the arrangement’s validity, the appellate court rejected that argument; likewise, it rejected the claim that the transfer to the appellant’s predecessor was justified by legal necessity. As a result, the appellate court allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the decree of the trial court, and decreed that the respondent was entitled to possession of the property. The court further directed that the suit be referred to the Official Referee for determination of the mesne profits claimed by the respondent. It was against this decree that the appellant approached this Court in appeal. The principal point urged before the Court by counsel for the appellant, Mr R Keshav Aiyangar, was that, in substance, the respondent had ratified the impugned transaction, had received benefit thereunder, and by his conduct had affirmed it, and therefore the respondent could not now challenge its validity.

The appellant argued that the respondent could not question the legal effect of the transaction because the respondent had, by his conduct, accepted and benefited from it, thereby forfeiting any right to contest its validity. To support this position, the appellant submitted the principle that a person who fully understands his legal rights and who consents to a transaction that might otherwise be set aside at his own initiative, and who then enjoys the advantages of that transaction, is thereafter barred from challenging its legality. The appellant relied on the decision of this Court in Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram (1) for that proposition. In that case, the Court held that an alienation made by a widow exercising her statutory powers is not automatically void; rather, it is voidable only by the reversioners, who may lose their right to set it aside either by an express affirmation or by conduct that treats the alienation as valid and binding. The Court further observed that a general principle, applicable across many areas of law, provides that a person who, with full awareness of his rights, once chooses to accept a transaction that is voidable at his instance and thereby elects not to exercise the right to avoid it, cannot later reverse that election and claim avoidance; his original election becomes binding.

The appellant contended that, although the respondent was not a direct party to the disputed family arrangement, the respondent’s conduct demonstrated an election to uphold the arrangement and that he had received benefit therefrom; consequently, the respondent should be precluded from withdrawing that election. While the Court recognized the correctness of the principle articulated above, it noted a difficulty for the appellant in applying that principle to the specific factual findings of the Sahu case. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to recount briefly the factual determinations on which the Sahu decision rested. In that earlier case, the Court examined whether the plaintiff, Mukand Ram, had assented to the family arrangement, emphasizing that because he was not a party to the arrangement, his assent to the arrangement itself, rather than to any other matter, had to be clearly established together with his knowledge of the relevant facts. After scrutinising the material evidence, the Court concluded that the totality of the evidence gave rise to a reasonable inference that the plaintiff’s assent was indeed to the arrangement itself, and that both his conduct and that of his brother, Kanhaiya Lal, were consistent only with that inference. In other words, the evaluation of the evidence justified the conclusion that Mukand Ram had elected to assent to the transaction and had obtained benefit from it, and therefore, the doctrine of election or ratification barred him from challenging the validity of the transaction.

The Court observed that the matter under consideration was the validity of the transaction that the plaintiff contested, and it emphasized that this point required careful analysis. It further pointed out that the case involved the minor sons, who were neither parties to the arrangement personally nor represented through any guardians, and who had also not asserted any title through Pato or her daughters. The Court expressly stated that, in respect of those minor sons, the property they received consisted of pure and simple gifts, and that the only assent that could be deduced from their mere acceptance was assent to the specific gift they obtained, not assent to similar gifts made to other persons. By highlighting this distinction, the Court underlined the contrast with the findings that had led to the conclusion that the plaintiff was barred from questioning the validity of the impugned transaction. The appellant subsequently relied on another authority of this Court, namely Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, wherein the Court had held that even if an award were found to be invalid, a plaintiff who disputed its validity could be prevented from making that claim on the ground of estoppel. In that precedent, Brijlal, against whom the plea of estoppel was effectively raised, had claimed a right to the estate in 1884, the same year in which the challenged transaction occurred, and that claim resulted in a settlement and the execution of the transaction. The Court in Dhiyan Singh determined that, even assuming the award was invalid, Brijlal’s conduct had precluded him from later challenging the award’s validity. The Court then observed that the facts of the present case closely resembled those addressed by the Privy Council in Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal, a similarity that guided its reasoning.

When the Court examined the Privy Council decision in Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal, it found that the Privy Council had considered Kanhai Lal to be estopped from contesting an arrangement to which he was a party after he had asserted a title based on an alleged adoption, and after that title had been taken into account in reaching a settlement and a compromise arrangement. The Privy Council held that the doctrine of estoppel applied, thereby binding Kanhai Lal, who later became a reversioner, to the earlier arrangement and preventing him from later claiming the status of a reversioner. Both decisions therefore stressed that a person who fully understands his rights as a potential reversioner and who engages in a transaction that settles his own claim as well as the claims of his adversaries cannot later retreat from that arrangement when the reversion actually materialises. The Court also noted two further Privy Council authorities, including Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, in which the Council dealt principally with the concept of surrender, its theoretical basis and essential features, thereby providing additional perspective on the principles relevant to the present dispute.

The Court considered a Privy Council decision reported in 1919 L.R. 45 I.A. 118 and 1918 L.R. 40 I.A. 72 that dealt with a reversioner who had obtained a mortgage from an alienor who was a Hindu widow. In that case the mortgage covered a portion of a property that had been alienated, and the question presented to the Council was whether the existence of the mortgage prevented the reversioner from challenging the validity of that alienation. The Privy Council held that the mortgage did not preclude the reversioner from contesting the alienation. The Council observed that it was well‑settled that a person who could be described as a presumptive reversionary heir possessed a title to challenge an alienation at the time it was made, but that he was under no obligation to do so immediately. He could wait until the widow’s death confirmed his status, a status that might later be defeated by birth or by adoption. The Council then examined the nature of the mortgage and the properties included in it. It noted that the mortgage consisted of two‑fourteenths of the mitta that the mortgagors held by right of succession, while the remaining share of their interest derived from the contested deed of gift. At the time the mortgage was created, the mortgagee did not know whether he would ever become a reversioner with a practical interest that would enable him to dispute the deed of gift. The Council asked why the mortgagee should be prevented from taking whatever the mortgagors could give or propose to give, and it held that to say that by accepting the mortgage the mortgagee barred himself from later asserting his title to a part of the mortgaged property was an unwarranted proposition. This decision demonstrated that the doctrines of election, estoppel, or ratification must be applied with great circumspection; the mere fact that a reversioner had received some benefit under a transaction or had not challenged the transaction when it occurred could not extinguish his rights once the reversion actually vested in him. The Court also referred to another Privy Council decision, Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb, reported in 1927 L.R. 54 I.A. 396. In that case the widow of the last male holder had alienated almost the entire property of her husband by executing three deeds on the same day, one of which was made in favour of a presumptive reversioner. The Privy Council held that the three deeds constituted a single, inseparably connected transaction entered into by all persons interested in the property. After the reversion fell open, the reversioners who had been parties to those deeds were precluded from disputing the two alienations because of their conduct. The Council described the three deeds as forming one transaction, and therefore a reversioner who had consented to the sale and the gift could not later challenge those dispositions once his actual reversionary right arose.

The Court observed that the three deeds in question were inseparably connected and that, in this view, Annagouda, who was the reversioner and who challenged two of the three deeds, had not only given his consent to the sale made to Shivgouda and the gift made to Basappa—both of the deeds that were being contested—but that those two dispositions formed part of the same overall transaction by which Annagouda himself acquired a portion of the estate. The Court then held that it is well‑settled law that when a person who is merely a presumptive reversioner participates in an arrangement that can properly be described as a family arrangement and receives a benefit under that arrangement, that person is barred from disputing the validity of the arrangement once the reversion actually vests in him and he becomes the true reversioner. The Court further explained that the doctrine of ratification may be invoked against a presumptive reversioner who, although not an original party to the transaction, later ratifies it with full knowledge of his rights by assenting to it and by taking the benefit that flows from it. Nevertheless, the Court clarified that the simple receipt of a benefit under an arrangement whereby a Hindu widow alienates the property of her deceased husband does not, by itself, prevent a presumptive reversioner from challenging the validity of that alienation when he later becomes the actual reversioner. The Court stressed that it is always a question of fact to determine whether the conduct of the alleged reversioner, on which a plea of ratification is based, legally amounts to a proper ratification. In light of these principles, the Court turned to the specific facts of the present appeal. It found that there was no doubt that the transaction carried out on 27 May 1893, which arose from a dispute between the two widows and involved the intervention of family well‑wishers, could not be described as a family arrangement within the meaning of Hindu law. This characterization had been admitted before the High Court and was not contested before the Court (see Exhibit D‑2). The Court also noted that the sale deed executed by the third defendant in favour of the two widows was of no assistance, because it was evidently a sale by that defendant of his own reversionary rights, rights that at that time were no better than a mere expectancy (spes successionis); consequently, that transaction (Exhibit D‑3) could not be used to validate the earlier arrangement between the two widows. Moreover, the composite document of 27 May 1895 (Exhibit D‑5) was, in substance, merely an alienation intended to give effect to the original arrangement between the two widows. Accordingly, when considering whether the respondent was pre‑cluded from challenging the validity of the impugned transaction, the Court stressed that the original transaction was not a family arrangement and that, at the relevant time, the respondent was a minor and, as acknowledged, was not a party to any of those transactions. The respondent, however, alleged that he had obtained a certificate or patta from the Collector concerning the property conveyed to him under Exhibit D‑5, and that he had deliberately withheld that patta.

In this case the Court observed that the respondent feared that if he produced the patta the document would be detrimental to his position. The Court found the respondent’s explanation for refusing to produce the patta to be unsatisfactory and noted that the explanation could not conceal any legitimate reason for withholding the document from the Court. During cross‑examination the respondent stated that his grandmother had given him a Collector’s certificate and that he had filed that certificate in Suit No. 495 of 1916 in the City Civil Court. He further asserted that the attorney representing him in that suit had not returned the certificate to him. The Court inferred that, although the respondent apparently possessed the certificate, he chose not to produce it. On the record, however, the Court possessed two certificates that had been issued to other donees in the same transaction, and the appellant could only presume that a similar certificate had been issued to the respondent. The Court concluded that the two certificates on the record did not support the appellant’s contention that the respondent had made any representation to the Collector before obtaining a patta in his favour. Moreover, the issuance of a patta is a routine step that follows the registration of a sale deed such as Exhibit D‑5. Once the sale deed is registered, the Collector ordinarily issues certificates to all persons who acquire immovable property under that deed. Consequently, the Court held that the respondent’s acceptance of a patta could not be construed as a ratification of the original sale transaction.

The Court also examined the matter of Civil Suit No. 495 of 1916, which had been filed in the City Civil Court at Madras by Apurupammal against the respondent and another party. In the written statement filed by the respondent, he purported to admit the validity of the transaction that was now being challenged. The Court noted that the plaintiff’s claim in that suit was based on the same transaction, and that the respondent, in paragraph 2 of his written statement, acknowledged that a compromise settlement had been reached because of disputes between the mother and the widow of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar, leading to certain transfers of property. The respondent’s admission was presented by the appellant as evidence that the respondent had ratified the transaction (Exhibit D‑15). However, the Court found this argument incomplete because the respondent expressly qualified the compromise settlement by stating that it was intended to operate only during the lifetime tenancy of the widow of Govinda Mudaliar (Exhibit P‑3). Interpreting the statement as a whole, the Court concluded that the respondent regarded the settlement as an alienation made by the widow, effective solely for the duration of her life and not beyond. Therefore, rather than supporting a claim of ratification, the respondent’s own words reinforced the view that the arrangement was limited to the widow’s lifetime and could not be used to substantiate a broader ratification by the respondent.

The respondent argued that he received the benefit with the knowledge and belief that the arrangement under which the benefit flowed was intended to operate only for the lifetime of the widow, and therefore he had no occasion to question its validity while the widow was still alive. A somewhat similar line of reasoning was advanced by referring to the respondent’s conduct in Civil Suit No 1117 of 1921, which had been filed in the Madras High Court by Masilamani Mudaly, the son of the sister of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar (Ex P‑16). In that suit the respondent had been impleaded as defendant 7. The plaintiff in that suit had challenged the validity of the same arrangement and had sought appropriate injunctions against defendant 6, Thuggi Kondiah Chetty, Trustee of Udayavar Koil, together with other defendants, to restrain them from dealing with the property to the prejudice of the plaintiff’s reversionary right. It was unnecessary to reproduce the pleadings of that suit or to detail the specific relief claimed; the only material point was that the reversioner had contested the arrangement in question. By his written statement the respondent claimed to support the plaintiff’s plea and added that he was not personally aware of any attempt by defendants 2 to 4 to alienate the properties with respect to their possession and enjoyment. The suit, however, never proceeded to trial because it was dismissed for want of prosecution. An argument was then raised that, since the respondent had supported the plaintiff, he should have positioned himself as the plaintiff when the original plaintiff allowed the suit to be dismissed for non‑prosecution. The Court considered this argument to be far‑fetched and held that it could not sustain a plea of ratification against the respondent.

If the respondent took possession of the property under an arrangement that was expressly understood to last only during the widow’s lifetime, the Court saw no justification for assuming that he ought to have pursued Civil Suit No 1117 of 1921 or to have challenged the arrangement at all. The final argument presented in support of the plea of ratification was based on oral evidence given by the respondent in the present proceedings. When questioned about the quarrels between the mother and the widow of the deceased Mudaliar, the respondent stated that they lived together and that there were disputes between them. Upon being asked whether he had obtained the property under the impugned arrangement, he replied that his grandmother had given him the house together with the Collector’s certificate, informing him that she would die soon and that, consequently, he could take the house. The respondent also admitted that, since the house had been delivered to him and to his sister, they were in possession of it and

According to the testimony, the respondent occupied the house and derived income from it. He later asserted that he had not become aware of the 1895 conveyance document until the year 1916, and that he first learned of the division of the estate between the two widows only in 1910. The opposing party contended that this statement was unreliable, arguing that the respondent’s apparent unwillingness to reveal the true facts indicated that he fully understood the contested transaction and its consequences. They further alleged that when he took possession of the portion of the property assigned to him, he was completely aware of his legal rights, that he knowingly accepted the benefits, and that his purpose was to give effect to, and thereby confirm, the entire arrangement. The Court found no substance in that allegation.

In evaluating the claim, the Court considered the statutory context existing before the enactment of Act II of 1929. At that time, a son of a sister, such as the respondent, had only limited prospects of becoming an actual reversioner; he would typically have been placed among the “bandhus” and would not have been expected to possess a vested reversionary interest. Consequently, it was unreasonable to presume that, at the moment he received the house as a gift, the respondent possessed knowledge of any future reversionary rights.

The Court also observed that the benefit the respondent received under the disputed 1895 transaction could, in substance, have been claimed by him under an earlier agreement dated 7 February 1887 between Govinda Mudaliar and Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar (Exhibit D‑1). The arrangement disclosed in that earlier document appears to have provided the foundation for the benefits granted both to the respondent and to the other children of the deceased Mudaliar’s sisters. The subsequent documents of 1893 and 1895 (Exhibits D‑2 and D‑5) seem merely to have given effect to that original arrangement.

Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondent was a minor in 1893. When he later took possession of the property after 1895, the evidence did not show that he understood the widows’ intention to treat the property as belonging outright to the respective donees and to convey absolute titles under the transaction. He also could not have been aware of any possible reversionary claim that might later accrue to him.

On this basis, the Court agreed with the High Court’s conclusion that the appellant had not succeeded in establishing a plea of ratification against the respondent. To reach a contrary conclusion would, as the Privy Council observed, amount to an “unwarrantable proposition” (reference 1, page 87). The Court then turned to the issue of legal necessity. The High Court had held that the contested transfer could not be justified on the ground of legal necessity, and the Court concurred with that finding. In assessing legal necessity, the Court recalled that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar had obtained letters of administration to the estate on 26 April 1893, and that, as was customary, the issuance of those letters imposed a limitation on her authority to deal with or transfer the property without the required sanction.

The Court observed that the widow had been informed that she could not manage or convey the disputed property without obtaining the required sanction. Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Sastri, argued that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar had been urged by her mother‑in‑law to enter into the disputed transaction under the pretense of a family arrangement, specifically to avoid obtaining the necessary sanction. The Court noted that the document produced as Exhibit D‑5 did not claim justification on the basis of legal necessity; rather, it sought to give effect to the original arrangement dated 1893, shown in Exhibit D‑2. The Court held that if the 1893 arrangement could not be regarded as a valid family arrangement, then the subsequent transfer would likewise be invalid. In examining the consideration stated in the deed, the Court found that out of a total amount of approximately Rs 10,000, only Rs 776 could be identified as representing debts owed by the deceased Mudaliar. The remaining sums could not be characterized as arising from legal necessity. Specifically, Rs 558 had been expended for the execution of the document, and Rs 409 had covered funeral expenses of the deceased Mudaliar, which the widow sought to reimburse herself; neither of these amounts satisfied the requirement of legal necessity. The Court further concluded that the other items of consideration did not purport to be for legal necessity either. Consequently, the Court determined that the disputed transfer could not be justified on the ground of legal necessity. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded against the appellant, and the appeal was dismissed.