State of Uttar Pradesh vs Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 529 of 1958

Decision Date: 22 August, 1961

Coram: J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal

In this appeal the State of Uttar Pradesh was the petitioner and Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh was the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 22 August 1961 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justice J.C. Shah, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The case is reported in the 1963 All India Reports at page 799 and in the Supreme Court Reports, volume 3 of 1962, page 213, and it has been cited in later authorities such as R 1965 SC 1836, R 1969 SC 164, D 1978 SC 1450 and R 1985 SC 1582.The statutory framework relevant to the dispute includes provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act 1901, section 32, clauses (a) to (d), and the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 (U.P. 1 of 1951), sections 3(8), 4 and 63(b). The factual matrix began when the Government, by order, resumed the right of an ancestor identified only as “S” over the whole of the pargana known as “Syudpore Bhettree”. S challenged the authority of the Government to take his interest in the jagir before a civil court. While the civil suit was pending, settlement proceedings were initiated and, in 1832, the Settlement Officer reported that village zamindars had already established proprietary rights over 166 mahals of the pargana, whereas S’s proprietary right existed over only 12 mahals. The civil dispute was eventually compromised, and in 1838 a settlement was finalized with H, the son of S, who had died before the finalization. The settlement terms provided that for the 166 mahals settled with the zamindars, H and his heirs in perpetuity would receive an annual pension equal to one‑fourth of the collections after deducting the tehsildari charges, and for the remaining 12 mahals settled with H an allowance would be given in the form of a remission of one‑fourth of the assessed revenue. The Government intended this arrangement to deliver a clear one‑quarter share of the net revenue of the pargana as a pension. From 1838 onward the Treasury paid the allowance or pension each year to H and his descendants. In 1951 the Uttar Pradesh Legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1 of 1951, and under section 6(b) of that Act the revenue authorities ceased the payment of the allowance to the respondent. The respondent contended that, according to the notification issued under section 4 of the Act, his right to the pension did not terminate because the pension was neither land nor immovable property nor an estate within the meaning of the Act, but merely compensation for the loss of his ancestors’ rights over the estates comprising the “Syudpore Bhettree” pargana, and therefore it should not vest in the State. The Court held that the right to receive the allowance of Rs 30,612‑8‑0 for the 166 mahals from the Government under the settlement was not a right in respect of land or

In this case, the Court observed that the allowance at issue was not a revenue right but was given as consideration for the settlement of a civil‑court claim relating to the land, and because no specific provision existed, the allowance could not be described as “an area included under one entry in any of the registers” listed in clauses (a) to (d) of section 32 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901. The Court explained that the legislature’s purpose in enacting the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was to extinguish estates, remove all subsidiary rights in those estates, and eliminate the role of intermediaries between the State and the cultivator of the soil. Accordingly, a grant of confirmation of title that relates to a right or privilege over land or its revenue must be determined according to clause (b) of section 6 of the Act, but a right to receive an allowance granted as compensation for the extinguishment of a right to land or land revenue does not fall within that clause and therefore is not determined by it. The Court noted that the allowance did not possess the characteristics of land or land revenue; its amount had been measured only by equating it with a one‑fourth share of the net revenue of the portion of land that formed the subject matter of the suit in which the arrangement for payment of the allowance was made. The Court further stated that a person who receives an allowance from the State in consideration of the extinguishment of a right to land or land revenue is not a proprietor who is an assignee of land revenue, and if that person’s name does not appear in the revenue records under clauses (a) to (d) of section 32 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901, the provisions dealing with the computation of gross and net assets do not apply to him. The Court held that the Act was not intended to extinguish the right to receive an allowance that had been granted in 21 considerations of the extinguishment of a right to land or land revenue by operation of clause (b) of section 6 of the 1951 Act. The Court further held that the respondent was the proprietor of twelve mahals in the “Syudpore Bhettree” parganas. Those twelve mahals constituted an “estate” within the meaning of section 3(8) of the Act, and under section 4 the respondent’s right in that estate had vested in and been transferred to the State. Since the respondent’s right in the twelve mahals had ceased, the Court concluded that the right of remission could not be transformed into a positive right to receive the amount of the allowance. The judgment was issued in the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 529 of 1958, arising from the judgment and decree dated 6 March 1956 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 464 of 1954. Counsel for the appellants included C. B. Agwarwala, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, while counsel for the respondent comprised M. C. Setalvad, Attorney‑General of India, A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and S. P. Varma. The judgment was pronounced on 22 August 1961 by Justice Shah. In the background, the Court noted that under a treaty between the East India Company and Nawab Asafuddaula, the Province of Banaras had been ceded about the year 1775 to the Company, which subsequently granted a sanad.

The East India Company issued a sanad to Raja Chet Singh, the former ruler of Banaras, whereby the rights and powers that had previously belonged to the Raja were newly conferred. Raja Chet Singh subsequently granted, in perpetuity, the jagir of the pargana called Syudpore Bhettree to his Diwan Ousan Singh as remuneration for services rendered to his family. After Raja Chet Singh abdicated the throne, the East India Company confirmed the grant that the Raja had made in favour of Ousan Singh. Raja Chet Singh was succeeded by Raja Mahip Narain Singh, who executed a further sanad reaffirming the grant to Ousan Singh. During the land‑revenue settlements of the Province of Banaras around 1789‑90, the jagirs, including the pargana of Syudpore Bhettree, were deliberately omitted from the settlement. Ousan Singh died approximately in the year 1800, and his son Sheo Narain Singh succeeded him in the jagir. An inquiry conducted by the Collector of Ghazipore under Regulation 11 of 1819 examined the proprietary right claimed by the jagirdar. The Collector concluded that the original grant to Ousan Singh was a life estate only and did not create a heritable or transferable tenure. The Commissioner of Bihar and Banaras confirmed the Collector’s decision, while recommending that Sheo Narain Singh be allowed to retain possession of the parganas for the duration of his life. In 1828 the Government directed that a detailed settlement be negotiated with the village zamindars and offered Sheo Narain Singh a life allowance equal to one half of the revenue assessed on the pargana. Sheo Narain Singh refused the Government’s offer and instituted civil proceedings challenging the legality of the order that sought to resume the jagir. The Government re‑examined the matter and, in July 1830, revised the resumption order by declaring Sheo Narain Singh to be the Tahsildar of the pargana Syudpore Bhettree. The order further provided that the Tahsildarship would be hereditary, passing to the jagirdar’s descendants, provided the incumbent did not violate privileges of other classes existing at the time of settlement formation. Sheo Narain Singh died before the Government’s revised resolution could be communicated to him, and his son Harnarain Singh succeeded to the jagir. Harnarain Singh withdrew the pending suit and executed a compromise that incorporated the terms of the Government’s resolution. On August 19, 1831, the Secretary to the Government wrote to the Agent of the Governor‑General at Banaras. The letter requested that the Secretary to the Governor‑General in the Pension Department prepare a sanad granting the pargana Syudpore Bhettree to Harnarain Singh on an ‘istmrar’ tenure. The grant was to be for his personal benefit and for the benefit of his heirs and successors in perpetuity. It was also conditioned that three‑quarters of the Jamma assessed on the pargana be paid to the Government. The correspondence further directed that any claim to proprietary right over any village situated in the said pargana should be fully investigated.

In the proposal sent to Harnarain Singh, the Government stipulated that if any claim to a village or villages was proven to the Government’s satisfaction, those villages would be treated as separate from the original grant and a settlement would be made with the proprietors in the same manner as in other cases. The proposal further provided that the office of Tahsildar would be assigned to Harnarain Singh and would remain hereditary in his family provided that the conditions governing the duties of that office were not violated. Because of this assignment, the Government expected the individual proprietors of the villages to continue paying the Jamma – the land revenue – through Harnarain Singh or, if the Government appointed another family member, through that person. The Government also stipulated that one‑fourth of the Jamma collected from the villages that were separated from the grant would be deducted from the amount payable to the Government as compensation for the remuneration of the Tahsildar’s duties. In addition, the Government required that until a final settlement of the lands was completed, Harnarain Singh would continue to remit the Jamma directly to the Government.

This arrangement placed on Harnarain Singh the responsibility for all administrative expenses and any loss that might arise from reduced collections, which was a departure from the terms of the earlier compromise. Harnarain Singh declined to accept the offer of a sanad on the conditions outlined in the letter, and he also refused to take up the office of Tahsildar. Subsequently, settlement proceedings began, and on 16 November 1832 the Settlement Officer reported the results of a summary settlement of the parganas. The report indicated that in 166 mahals the village zamindars had established proprietary rights and that the revenue assessed on those villages amounted to Rs 1,28,1960. The officer further reported that 12 mahals, whose gross revenue was Rs 22,840, were settled with the jagirdar at a reduced revenue of Rs 17,130.

Because Harnarain Singh continued to refuse the Tahsildar office under the Government’s terms, the Board of Revenue proposed that he be allowed to receive one‑fourth of the net collections after deducting the cost of establishing the Tahsildar office, which would give him an annual income of Rs 36,322‑8‑0. The Board of Revenue therefore recommended that a sanad be issued under the authority of the Lieutenant‑Governor, conferring that pension of Rs 36,322‑8‑0 on Babu Harnarain Singh and his heirs in perpetuity. In a letter dated 13 September 1837, the Lieutenant‑Governor of the North‑Western Provinces recorded his view that the agreement would be better complied with if the allowance for Harnarain Singh’s twelve settled mahals were granted as a one‑fourth remission of revenue, fixing the Jamma at Rs 17,130 instead of Rs 22,940. For the villages settled with zamindars – the 166 mahals – the Lieutenant‑Governor proposed that Harnarain Singh receive annually a pension equal to one‑fourth of the collections after deducting the Tahsildari charge, which would amount to Rs 30,612‑8‑0. This position was communicated in a subsequent letter dated 19 October 1837 from the Secretary to the Lieutenant‑Governor of the North‑Western Provinces.

The Secretary to the Board of Revenue reported that the Lieutenant Governor had decided to follow the recommendation of the Board presented in its letter dated 26 September 1837. Accordingly, the Lieutenant Governor ordered that Harnarain Singh should receive one‑fourth of the net collections after the expenses of the Tahsildari establishment had been deducted. The amount specified for this share was Rs 30,612‑8‑0, which was to be taken from a net Jamma of the villages amounting to Rs 1,28,960. Regarding the twelve mahals that had been settled with Harnarain Singh, the order directed that his allowance be given in the form of a remission of one‑fourth of the assessed revenue.

Subsequently, a letter dated 14 September 1838 was sent by the Secretary to the Sadar Board of Revenue to the officiating Commissioner of the Fifth Division, Banaras. That correspondence affirmed that the Government’s intention was to grant a clear one‑fourth share of the net revenue of the entire pargana to the muqurrureedar as a pension. The letter explained that the method of paying a portion of this pension through a revenue remission on certain mauzas, which were supposedly settled directly with the muqurrureedar, had been proposed by the Board and accepted by the Government solely for the convenience of the parties involved. It was further clarified that neither the Government nor the Board intended to transfer any part of the muqurrureedar’s pension to his son or to any other individual.

The letter continued by stating that if the mauzas that were believed to have been settled with the muqurrureedar for his own use and benefit were actually held by another person on a distinct interest, the Board would need to modify the previously allowed arrangement. In such a case, the whole assessed revenue of those mauzas would be collected like that of all other mauzas, and after collection the muqurrureedar would be paid his clear one‑fourth share of the net collections.

Further, the correspondence noted that because these mauzas had been settled by the Government with the muqurrureedar, his responsibility for the Jumma—any portion of revenue that might fall into arrears, any arrangement made by him, or any domestic differences within his family—must be satisfied from his pension before the assignment of the one‑fourth share of the net collections could take effect. The Board was instructed to regard the muqurrureedar as the owner of these villages during his lifetime, and that family arrangements did not affect his ownership. However, if the muqurrureedar wished the entire revenue to be collected from these villages and to receive one‑fourth of that revenue directly from the Treasury instead of through a remission, he was free to make that election.

Finally, the letter affirmed that the muqurrureedar also had the liberty, as observed by the Board, to cause those mauzas to be transferred or sold in case of arrears, but his responsibility for the assessed Jumma fixed by the settlement act would remain unchanged. The correspondence acknowledged that the recommendations made by the Board of Revenue and the Secretary to the Government varied over time in the extensive correspondence, yet the final letter indicated that the ultimate arrangement had been clarified as described above.

It was established that an amount equal to one‑fourth of the net revenue of the one‑hundred‑sixty‑six mahals was to be paid each year as a pension to the jagirdar. Although a formal sanad was theoretically envisaged, it appears that such a document was never actually issued. Nevertheless, the parties accepted as common ground that the payment was made by the Treasury Office of the Collector of Ghazipur continuously from the year 1838 to Harnarain Singh and thereafter to his descendants. In the revenue records this payment to the jagirdar of “Syudpore Bhettree” was variously described as “malikana”, at other times as a “pension”, and occasionally as a “share in the revenue of the entire pargana”. In the year 1951 the Uttar Pradesh Legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1 of 1951. Relying on section 6(b) of that Act, the revenue authorities ceased the payment of the allowance to the descendants of Harnarain Singh. The respondent, who was a descendant of Harnarain Singh, then filed Writ Petition No. 464 of 1954 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, seeking a writ of mandamus that would require the State of Uttar Pradesh to refrain from interfering with his right to the regular receipt of the “pension, allowance or malikana” that was payable in lieu of the hereditary estate of Harnarain Singh in respect of the “Syudpore Bhettree” parganas, and also seeking an order for payment of the amount that had become due. The respondent contended, inter alia, that the notification issued under section 4 of the Act did not terminate his entitlement to the pension, particularly because the scheme of the Act and its principle of assessment did not provide for compensation for the extinction of his right to the allowance. He further argued that there was no connection between the pension and the estates that were intended to be acquired under Act 1 of 1951 or the zamindari system that the Act sought to abolish, because the pension was neither land nor immovable property nor an estate within the meaning of the Act. Rather, it was merely compensation payable to him in respect of the rights of his ancestors over the estates comprising the “Syudpore Bhettree” pargana, and therefore it could not be said to vest in the State. The High Court rejected certain preliminary objections to the maintainability of the petition—objections that are now the subject of the present appeal—and held that the respondent’s right to receive Rs 36,330 per annum did not constitute an “estate” as defined by the Act, and that the right had not been acquired under the Act; consequently, no compensation was payable for its extinguishment. According to the High Court’s interpretation of section 6 of the Act, only the rights of intermediaries with respect to land revenue of the lands comprising the estate were extinguished, while the rights of third parties arising from contracts with the State that did not relate to the rights and privileges of intermediaries, tenants, or other persons having an interest in land were left unaffected, and this view extended to the predecessors in interest of the respondent.

The respondent had been granted an annual allowance in exchange for abandoning the right to realise land‑revenue, and that arrangement continued despite the abolition of the zamindari system under the Act. The State of Uttar Pradesh therefore raised the question in this appeal as to whether the respondent’s right to receive the allowance created by the 1838 arrangement was extinguished by the vesting of the Sudpore Bhettree parganas in the State under section 4 of the Act. By reference to the preamble, the Court noted that the Act was enacted to abolish the zamindari system, which placed intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State, to acquire the rights, title and interest of those intermediaries, to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent upon such abolition and acquisition, and to make provisions for other matters connected therewith. Section 3(8), as retrospectively amended by Act 14 of 1958, defined “estate” to mean an area included under a single entry in any of the registers described in clauses (a) to (d), and, insofar as it related to a permanent tenure‑holder, an entry in the register described in clause (e) of section 32 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act 1901 as it stood immediately before the Act came into force, or subject to the restrictions mentioned with respect to the register described in clause (e) in any register maintained under any other Act, Rule, Regulation or Order relating to the preparation or maintenance of records of rights then in force, and also included a share in or of an estate. The term “intermediary” was defined, with reference to any estate, as a proprietor, under‑proprietor, sub‑proprietor, the kadar, permanent lessees in Avadh, or any permanent tenure‑holder of such estate or part thereof. “Land” was defined, except in sections 143 and 144, as land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry, and it expressly included pisciculture and poultry farming. Section 4 made provision for the vesting of estates in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Sub‑section (1) authorised the State Government, by notification, to declare that from a specified date all estates situated in Uttar Pradesh would vest in the State, and that from that date such estates would be transferred to and vest in the State free from all encumbrances, except as provided otherwise in the Act. Section 6 dealt with the consequences of an estate vesting in the State. Upon the publication of a notification under section 4, and notwithstanding any contract, document or other law then in force, the consequences laid down in clauses (a) to (j) of section 6 were to apply to the area to which the notification related.

The Court explained that the provisions set out in the notification applied to the specific area to which the notification related. Clause (a) stipulated that all rights, title and interest of intermediaries in every estate located in that area, including any interest in the sub‑soil, mines and minerals, ceased and vested in the State. Clause (b), which formed the core of the present dispute, provided that “All grants and confirmations of title of or to land in any estate so acquired, or of or to any right or privilege in respect of such land or its land revenue shall, whether liable to resumption or not determine.” Clause (c) declared that all rents, local rates and sayar that would have been payable for any period after the date of vesting, but for the acquisition, were to vest in and become payable to the State Government instead of to the intermediary. The clause further stated that where, under an agreement or contract made before the vesting date, any rent, cess, local rate or sayar for a later period had been paid to, compounded by, or released by an intermediary, such amount, notwithstanding the prior agreement, became recoverable by the State Government from that intermediary. Under clauses (d) and (e), the liability of intermediaries with respect to any estate for periods prior to the vesting date remained enforceable. Clause (f) provided that the interest of intermediaries in any estate was exempt from attachment or sale in execution of any decree or other court process, and that any attachment existing at the date of vesting, or any order for attachment passed before that date, ceased to be in force, subject to the provisions of section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. By clause (g) – though mistakenly labelled again as clause (a) in the text – mortgages with possession on any estate or part of an estate immediately preceding the vesting date were deemed to have been substituted by simple mortgages without prejudice to the rights of the State Government. Clause (h) specified that no claim or liability enforceable or incurred before the vesting date by or against an intermediary for any money charged on or secured by a mortgage of an estate or part thereof was, except as provided in section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, to be enforceable against his interest in the estate. Clause (i) stayed all suits and proceedings of a prescribed nature that were pending in any court at the date of vesting, as well as any proceedings, decrees or orders that had been passed in such suits before the vesting date. Finally, clause (j) provided that all mahals and their subdivisions existing immediately before the vesting date, together with all engagements for the payment of land revenue or rent by a proprietor, under‑proprietor, sub‑proprietor, co‑sharer or lambardar, ceased to be in force. The Court noted that sections 37 to 40 of the Act dealt with the preparation of the Compensation Assessment Roll of intermediaries with respect to mahals and the computation of gross assets of mahals, which would form the basis for determining compensation payable for loss of interest of the intermediaries.

In the statutory scheme, the preparation of the gross assets of mahals was required, and the Compensation Assessment Roll served as the basis for computing and paying compensation for the loss of interest of intermediaries. Section 42 of the Act prescribed the method for computing the gross assets of an intermediary, while section 44 provided the method for computing the net assets of an intermediary. Section 45 stipulated that, for proprietors to whom section 78 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901 applied, as well as for assignees of land revenue whose names were entered in the record of rights maintained under clauses (a) to (d) of section 32 of that Act, and for under‑proprietors, sub‑proprietors, permanent tenure‑holders and permanent lessees in Avadh, the provisions of sections 39 to 44 would apply, subject to any incidental changes or modifications that might be prescribed. Accordingly, the gross assets and net assets of such intermediaries were to be computed in conformity with those provisions. By definition, section 3(8) of the Act defined an “estate” as an area included under a single entry in the registers described in clauses (a) to (d) of the Land Revenue Act. The High Court had accepted the respondent’s contention that the allowance paid to him could not be regarded as an “estate”. That view was not contested before this Court by counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court observed that, in the absence of an express provision, the right to receive the allowance of Rs 30,612‑8‑0 from the Government under the arrangement could not be characterised as “an area included under one entry in any of the registers” referred to in the statutory clauses. Consequently, the initial portion of section 6(b) did not support the State’s claim. However, the respondent was a proprietor of twelve mahals, and the land of those mahals qualified as an “estate” within the meaning of section 3(8) of the Act. Under section 4, the respondent’s right in that estate had vested in and transferred to the State. It was acknowledged that the 1838 arrangement, confirming an earlier compromise, granted a remission of twenty‑five percent to the respondent’s predecessors in respect of land‑revenue payment. The Court noted that, even if the respondent’s right in the twelve mahals ceased, that cessation could not transform the remission right into a positive entitlement to receive the remission amount, because the remission right was attached to land‑revenue in the estate now vested in the State. Letters dated September 13 1837, October 19 1837 and June 15 1838 demonstrated clearly that the difference of Rs 5,710 between the original assessment and the Jamma recoverable was to be treated as remission of revenue. Since the respondent’s right in the twelve mahals had been transferred to the State by the notification under section 4, the consequences described in sub‑section (b) of section 6 with respect to those twelve mahals applied.

The Court held that it could not accept the view expressed by the High Court that the respondent was entitled to relief for the sum of Rs. 6710, which had been treated as a remission, on the basis that the respondent’s right remained unaffected by the notification issued under section 4 of the Act. The Court observed that the respondent’s claim to an allowance granted as consideration for relinquishing the right to the sixteen‑sixteen mahals rested on a more secure foundation. While it is correct that this allowance was calculated as one‑quarter of the revenue assessed on the sixteen‑sixteen mahals, the respondent, under the arrangement, possessed no interest in the land of those mahals nor in the land revenue payable thereon. The Government’s order had resumed the right of Sheo Narain Singh to the entire pargana “Syudpore Bhettree.” Sheo Narain Singh had challenged the Government’s authority to resume his interest in the jagir, and the dispute pending in the civil court was settled on terms finalized in the year 1838, whereby Harnarain Singh and his descendants were allotted an allowance equal to one‑quarter of the net revenue of the sixteen‑sixteen mahals. Because the annual allowance corresponded to a fourth share of the net revenue of those mahals, the Court concluded that the respondent’s right did not acquire the character of an interest in land or in land revenue. Under the arrangement, the whole land revenue was to be collected by the Government, and Harnarain Singh and his descendants had no interest or obligation in that collection. As consideration for surrendering the right to the land and its revenue, the respondent and his ancestors received an allowance of Rs. 30,612‑13‑0. Although the allowance was linked to the land revenue assessed on the land by being fixed as a percentage of that revenue, the percentage served merely as a measure indicating the source of the right in lieu of which the allowance was provided. The letters dated September 14 1838, July 7 1837 and June 15 1838 described the amount as a “pension.” The wording of element (b) is undoubtedly broad, and any right to a grant relating to land or land revenue would be governed by that clause. However, the Court noted that the allowance to Harnarain Singh was not in respect of land or its revenue; rather, it was granted as consideration for the settlement of a claim litigated in a civil court concerning that land. The primary objective of the legislature, as presented in the preamble of the Act, was to abolish the zamindari system, acquire the rights of intermediaries and pay compensation for the acquisition of those rights. By section 4, estates in the notified area vested in the State free from all encumbrances, and consequently, the rights of intermediaries, but not their pre‑existing liabilities, were extinguished from the date of vesting.

The Court explained that clauses (a), (c) to (f) and (b) of the relevant provision expressly deal with the rights and obligations of intermediaries and with the effect of a vesting notification upon those rights. Clause (g) was held to concern the derivative rights of mortgagees over estates. By virtue of clause (i), the mahals and sub‑divisions are abolished, and any engagements for the payment of land revenue or rent by proprietors, under‑proprietors, sub‑proprietors, co‑sharers and sub‑sharers cease to exist. The Court noted that section 6(b) contains no explicit reference to the right of intermediaries; the first part of that clause determines the grant and confirmation of title to land in an estate, while the second part determines the rights and privileges in land or in land revenue within those estates. The wording “in respect of” in the second part was interpreted to require a direct connection between a right or privilege and the land in an estate or its revenue. Accordingly, the legislature’s intention was to extinguish estates and all derivative rights therein, and to remove the interest of intermediaries between the State and the tiller of the soil. The Court further held that if a grant or confirmation of title is “in respect of” a right or privilege to land in an estate or its revenue, it must be determined under clause (b); however, a right to receive an allowance that is granted as consideration for the extinction of a right to land or land revenue does not fall within clause (b) by its own force. The allowance in question lacks the character of land or land revenue; its amount was measured only by equating it with a fourth share of the net revenue of a portion of land that formed the subject matter of the suit in which the arrangement for payment of the allowance was made. The Court observed that the Act contains no provision for compensation for a right of the nature claimed by the respondent, and this absence strongly supports the argument that such a right was not intended to be acquired or extinguished. Sections 37 to 44 were identified as dealing with the assessment of compensation payable to intermediaries. A Compensation Assessment Roll of intermediaries in respect of the mahals must be prepared, and detailed instructions for that purpose are contained in sections 39 to 44. Under section 45, in computing the gross and net assets of proprietors who are assignees of land revenue, as well as of under‑proprietors, sub‑proprietors, permanent tenure‑holders and permanent lessees in Avadh, the provisions of sections 39 to 44 apply, subject to any modifications and incidental changes that may be prescribed. The Court affirmed the common ground that section 78 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act does not apply to “Syudpore Bhettree” pargana. For proprietors who are assignees of land revenue and whose names are recorded in the record of rights maintained under section 32 clauses (a) to (d), the provisions of sections 39 to 44 may undoubtedly be applied, subject to prescribed modifications, and the computation of their gross and net assets may be accordingly made.

The Court observed that the respondent could not be described as an assignee of land revenue whose name appears in the record of rights, nor could he be classified as an under‑proprietor, sub‑proprietor, permanent tenure‑holder or permanent lessee. Section 45 was characterized as a “machinery provision” that merely implements the provisions of section 6 and does not expand the scope of that section by imposing consequences that are not already contained in it. Consequently, there was nothing in section 45 that justified the State’s counsel’s argument that a land‑holder’s right to receive a governmental allowance would be automatically extinguished without compensation simply because the holder was an assignee of land revenue for some parcel of land or held any of the other categories of interest listed in Avadh. The compensation scheme set out in sections 39 to 44 was intended to apply, among others, to proprietors of land who are recorded as assignees of land revenue under clauses (a) to (d) of section 32. However, the respondent was not a proprietor who was an assignee of land revenue, and even if he were, his name was not entered in the revenue record under the specified clauses. Because of this, the provisions relating to the calculation of gross and net assets could not be applied to him. The Court further noted that the Act contains no provision for awarding compensation to persons who hold an interest of the kind possessed by the respondent, which strongly supported the view that such an interest was not intended to be extinguished by the operation of section 6(b) of the 1951 Act.

Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court had been correct in granting the respondent’s application for the allowance of Rs 30,612‑13‑0, which was given as consideration for the extinguishment of Harnarain Singh’s right over 166 mahals. However, for the reasons already explained, the Court could not agree with the High Court’s view that the respondent was entitled to the remission of land revenue in respect of the 12 mahals of “Syudpore Bhettree”. The order of the High Court was therefore modified: the respondent’s petition concerning the remission of land revenue for the 12 mahals was dismissed, while the order confirming the allowance of Rs 30,612‑13‑0 was left unchanged. Subject to these modifications, the appeal was dismissed with costs.