State of Orissa and Anr vs Murlidhar Jena

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 129 of 1961

Decision Date: 8 August 1961

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subbarao, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, R. Dayal

State of Orissa and Anr v. Murlidhar Jena, decided on 8 August 1961, was heard by a Bench consisting of P. B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah, R. Dayal and K. Subbarao. The appeal was filed as Appeal (Civil) 129 of 1961, with the State of Orissa and another as petitioners and Murlidhar Jena as the respondent. The judgment was reported in 1963 AIR (SC) 404 and was authored by Justice Gajendragadkar.

The respondent, Murlidhar Jena, was an officer of the Excise Department employed by the State of Orissa. Over the course of his service he attained the rank of Senior Superintendent of Excise and was posted in Ganjam District. While serving in that capacity an enquiry was instituted against him, and the enquiry framed three principal charges. The first charge alleged that he had placed himself under a personal obligation to an excise vendor named Harshabardhan Patnaik by regularly receiving cash and gifts in kind from the vendor. The second charge alleged that he had purchased a 1951 model Austin car at a concessional rate, a transaction that was purportedly effected through the firm of Messrs Barjorji of Balasore, which had an interest in Mr. Patnaik’s shop. The third charge alleged that certain gold ornaments had been prepared for him by the same vendor through a goldsmith of Berhampur named Chhotalal.

A preliminary investigation into these allegations was carried out by the Enforcement Department. Upon completion of that investigation, formal enquiry proceedings were launched against the respondent and were referred to the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951. During the enquiry oral evidence was adduced against the respondent and documentary material was produced in support of the case. The Tribunal held that the first two charges were proved beyond doubt, while it found the third charge not proved, although it noted that serious suspicion still persisted regarding the third allegation. Consequently, the Tribunal recommended that the respondent be dismissed from service.

The recommendation was placed before the Public Service Commission, which concurred with the Tribunal’s view. Acting on the entire matter, the State issued a fresh notice to the respondent requiring him to show cause why he should not be dismissed, and on 17 September 1956 passed an order dismissing him from service. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the Orissa High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the dismissal order. In that petition he also impleaded the Secretary of the Political and Services Department (Administrative Tribunal Section) as a respondent. The High Court, after examining the record, held in substance that the findings of the Administrative Tribunal, which had been accepted by the State, were not supported by any evidence, and therefore set aside those findings as well as the order of dismissal. The State appealed that judgment by special leave to the Supreme Court.

The High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, held that the findings of the Administrative Tribunal were supported by no evidence at all. Accordingly, the High Court set aside those findings and the dismissal order that had been passed based on them. The appellants have approached this Court by way of special leave, seeking relief from the order of the High Court which had nullified the dismissal order. In the present appeal, counsel for the appellants, Mr Viswanatha Sastri, contended that the High Court’s conclusion that the Tribunal’s findings lacked evidential support was plainly erroneous. He further submitted that the High Court had, in fact, attempted to re‑appreciate the evidence, an act for which it possessed no jurisdiction. It is a well‑settled principle that, in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227, a High Court may not function as an appellate body to re‑examine the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental inquiry. Consequently, if this Court is convinced that the High Court in the present case undertook a fresh evaluation of the evidence, such action would fall outside its jurisdiction. At the same time, it is also an established principle that where the findings of an Administrative Tribunal are demonstrably unsupported by any evidence, the High Court is justified in setting aside those findings. The narrow issue that must now be resolved is whether the High Court was correct in holding that there was no evidence upon which the Tribunal’s findings could be sustained.

Before addressing that issue, the Court found it necessary to outline the principal charges that were framed against the respondent during the departmental enquiry and the corresponding findings of the Tribunal. The first charge, detailed in six paragraphs, alleged instances of corruption. The charge narrated that, on the dates specified, the respondent either personally or through his peon had received gifts, either in cash or in kind, amounting to illegal gratification. The earliest alleged receipt of such consideration occurred on 6 February 1952, and the latest was on 18 March 1952. The second charge concerned the purchase of a 1951 model Austin car for a price of Rs 10,213‑2‑0 from Mr Patnaik, facilitated through Messrs Barjorji of Balasore. The Tribunal found that the respondent obtained a discount of Rs 826 on that purchase. It was further alleged that the respondent had drawn a car advance of Rs 3,000 in October 1951 and that he sold his old car for Rs 2,400, receiving the proceeds by cheque which he encashed on 2 November 1951, a fortnight after the new Austin car had been registered on 19 October 1951. The prosecution argued that the advance could not have been used for the purchase of the new vehicle and that Messrs Barjorji had granted an unusually large discount and had effectively subsidised a substantial portion of the price. The third charge related to gold ornaments allegedly prepared for the respondent by Mr Patnaik.

The charge related to the gold ornaments was that they had allegedly been prepared for the respondent by Mr. Patnaik. Regarding the first charge, which concerned the receipt of illegal gratification in cash or kind, the Tribunal examined both oral testimony and two documentary exhibits identified as Exhibits 6 and 7. According to the Tribunal, these exhibits constituted the account books maintained by Mr. Patnaik. Exhibit 6 was described as a regular, orderly account book, whereas Exhibit 7 was a rough, less formal ledger. Both books had been lawfully attached and seized, and the seizure was verified by the signature of Mr. Patnaik himself.

The Tribunal compared the entries in the two books and found that every regular and legitimate entry appearing in Exhibit 6 was also recorded in Exhibit 7. However, the irregular and illegitimate payments that were recorded in the rough book, Exhibit 7, had not been copied into the regular book, Exhibit 6. The Tribunal treated these entries as intrinsic evidence and noted that the two books had been seized at the same time and from the same location, reinforcing their authenticity.

The Tribunal also evaluated the testimony of Biswanth Sahni, who had been examined as a witness. Sahni, a clerk at a warehouse, initially declared in the investigation that he had prepared all the entries in Exhibit 1. Later, he re‑tracted this statement before the Tribunal, saying that he could not identify who had actually written the entries that bore his signature. The Tribunal placed Sahni’s revised statement on record; he admitted that he had signed the entries without examining them because he had been asked to do so. Finding Sahni’s evidence untrustworthy, the Tribunal concluded that the circumstances and the documentary evidence demonstrated that both Exhibits 6 and 7 were indeed the account books kept by Mr. Patnaik.

In order to resolve the issue raised by the first charge, the Tribunal sought to identify the person referred to as “Chatrapur Saheb” in Exhibit 7. Several payments recorded in the ledger were made to “Chatrapur Saheb,” and the Tribunal determined that, in the context of the case, this term could refer to no one other than the respondent. Consequently, the Tribunal held that all the items listed in the first charge had been paid either directly to the respondent or through his peon, and therefore were proved.

Among the items covered by the first charge was the receipt of a fan. The Tribunal examined the evidence concerning the fan exhaustively, considered the respondent’s explanations, and reached the conclusion that the fan had been bought for the respondent from Bharat Electrical Stores in Berhampur. The purchase price of Rs 143 had been paid in two instalments by Mr. Patnaik: Rs 100 on 22 May 1952 and Rs 43 on 27 May 1952.

The Tribunal found that the payments in question were demonstrated by cash memoranda issued by the vendor, and each of those memoranda corresponded with the entries recorded in Exhibit 7. The cash memoranda clearly identified the respondent as the purchaser of the fan because his name appeared as the buyer on the documents. The Tribunal rejected the respondent’s narrative that he had taken the fan on a trial basis through Sub‑Inspector Sasmal and subsequently returned it through the same officer because he was not satisfied with it. After examining the vendor’s evidence, the Tribunal concluded that the respondent’s appearance as purchaser on the cash memoranda was because he had accompanied Mr Patnaik to buy the fan. The Tribunal carefully scrutinised the alternative explanations offered by the respondent for the presence of his name on the memoranda and dismissed them as fanciful. Consequently, the Tribunal held that every item comprising the first charge was proved. Turning to the second charge concerning the purchase of a motor vehicle, the Tribunal noted that the respondent obtained a substantial discount on the price. It also observed that the respondent chose to acquire the car not from the ordinary dealer in Berhampur, as would normally be expected in a routine transaction, but through the firm Messrs Barjorji. The Tribunal examined the correspondence exchanged between Barjorji and the respondent, including a letter in which the respondent informed Barjorji that he was unlikely to be transferred from his posting for an extended period, and a reply from Barjorji in which he asked the respondent to read the letter and subsequently destroy it. From these facts, the Tribunal inferred that the respondent had exercised his official influence to secure a concession and favourable treatment that a dealer dealing in ordinary business would not extend to a regular customer. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the second charge framed against the respondent was also proved.

The Tribunal’s assessment of the third and final charge, which related to the alleged acquisition of ornaments, was that the evidence presented in support of this charge was neither concrete nor sufficiently satisfactory, although the Tribunal did acknowledge that a serious suspicion lingered regarding the officer’s involvement. It is important to note that the findings of the Tribunal on the first two charges were subsequently contested before the High Court on the ground that they were not founded on any evidential basis. In evaluating the respondent’s contention that the impugned findings lacked evidential support, the High Court was persuaded by two principal considerations. First, the High Court held that, by relying on evidence that had been produced during the investigation, the Tribunal had reneged on the solemn assurance it had previously given to the respondent that such evidence would not be used against him. Second, the High Court found that the Tribunal was not justified in relying on

The Court observed that the entries recorded in the rough account book identified as Exhibit 7 were alleged to have been kept by Mr Patnaik, yet the document itself had not been proved. Consequently, the Court found it necessary to examine whether the two conclusions drawn by the Tribunal on this point were properly founded. The record shows that on 16 December 1954 the Secretary of the Tribunal replied to the respondent’s request for copies of witness statements taken during the enforcement investigation. In that reply the Secretary stated that any statements of witnesses that might have been given before the Enforcement were not in the Tribunal’s custody and therefore would not be considered in evaluating the respondent’s case; consequently there was no occasion to provide the respondent with copies of such evidence. The same reply was issued again on 4 January 1955, reiterating that the Tribunal could not supply copies of documents which it did not possess. However, the record also shows that on 18 January 1956 the Tribunal informed the respondent that, although it could not presently furnish copies of documents not in its possession, it would provide such copies if and when the original documents were produced before the Tribunal. From these communications the Court concluded that the Tribunal had clearly indicated that it could not furnish copies of any document unless that document was actually exhibited before it, and that the respondent was assured that copies would be supplied as soon as the original documents were tendered. The High Court had construed the Secretary’s replies as containing an unequivocal assurance that evidence recorded by the Enforcement during the preliminary investigation would never be used against the respondent. The Court found this construction to be inconsistent with the wording of the assurances. In fact, the Tribunal’s statements made it clear that once the documents were tendered before it, copies would be provided to the respondent, which necessarily meant that some of the investigation‑recorded evidence could be admitted and that the respondent would receive copies of that evidence.

The Court further noted that during the Tribunal proceedings the matter of producing a prior statement of the witness identified as Sahni arose. It had already been established that Sahni had withdrawn his earlier statement in which he had admitted authoring Exhibit 7, and that the Tribunal had therefore put his later statement to the witness and exhibited it in the case. The Court pointed out that, had the respondent deemed it necessary to obtain a copy of Sahni’s earlier statement, he could readily have secured such a copy and could also have requested an adjournment of the proceedings to enable him to cross‑examine the witness on that statement. The respondent, however, chose not to seek either the copy or an adjournment. The Court inferred that the respondent’s decision was motivated by the fact that the witness was supportive of his position and that the witness had altered his statement with the intention of assisting the respondent.

The Court observed that the High Court had erred in concluding that the Tribunal had given the respondent an unconditional assurance and then withdrawn it. In the Court’s view, the High Court’s first ground for interfering with the Tribunal’s findings lacked any substance. The Court then turned to the second ground, which concerned the proof of Exhibit 7. While it was technically correct, under the strict provisions of the Evidence Act, that the witness Sahni had retracted his earlier statement and therefore there was no direct evidence identifying the author of Exhibit 7, the Court noted that the Tribunal’s enquiry was not bound by the rigid rules of that Act. Rule 7(2) of the applicable procedural rules required the tribunal to conduct its enquiry guided by principles of equity and natural justice, without being constrained by formal procedural and evidential rules. Consequently, in assessing whether the Tribunal was justified in treating Exhibit 7 as a rough cash book kept at the behest of Mr Patnaik, the Court held that the tribunal correctly considered all relevant facts and circumstances. These included the time and place of the search and seizure of the two account books, Mr Patnaik’s attestation of the seizure, the nature of the entries in both books, and the testimony of Sahni himself. Having weighed these factors, the Tribunal concluded that Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 6 were correlated books of account, that Exhibit 6 copied legitimate entries from Exhibit 7, and that it did not deliberately replicate entries relating to illegal transactions. The search and seizure had been prompted by allegations that Mr Patnaik maintained multiple books that would reveal illegal gratifications to the respondent. Given this factual matrix, the Tribunal was entitled to rely on Exhibit 7, and it also referred to Sahni’s statement, which had been duly tendered, proved and exhibited in the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court found that it was not within the High Court’s authority to hold that the Tribunal’s findings were unsupported by any evidence.

In addition, the Court noted that the Tribunal’s finding regarding the purchase of a fan could be justified independently of Exhibit 7. The Tribunal had carefully examined cash memos issued by the vendor on two occasions, each memo indicating that the respondent was the purchaser. After rejecting the respondent’s explanation, the Tribunal held that the purchase had been made by Mr Patnaik for the benefit of the respondent. This conclusion was therefore based on evidence other than Exhibit 7. Even if Exhibit 7 were not properly proved, the Court reasoned, there was no basis to disturb the Tribunal’s final conclusion or the dismissal order against the respondent. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had not committed any illegality in taking Exhibit 7 into consideration, given the relevant circumstances and the facts established during the inquiry.

In this case the Tribunal examined the evidence relating to the purchase of the fan and, after rejecting the explanation offered by the respondent, concluded that the purchase had been made by Mr Patnaik for the benefit of the respondent. The Tribunal’s charge therefore appeared to be supported by evidence other than Exhibit 7; consequently, even if Exhibit 7 were not properly proved, there was no reason to interfere with the Tribunal’s final finding and with the order that dismissed the respondent’s case. The Court did not consider the Tribunal’s reliance on Exhibit 7 to be illegal in view of the relevant circumstances and the facts that had been proved during the proceeding.

The Court noted two further matters that required reference. First, the High Court had observed that the oral evidence “admittedly did not support the case against the respondent.” The Court held that the use of the word “admittedly” was an over‑statement and that the discussion that followed indicated an attempt by the High Court to appreciate the evidence, an approach that is not ordinarily available in writ proceedings. The same criticism applied to the High Court’s discussion of the meaning of the expression “Chatrapur Saheb.” The High Court had stated that, in the absence of clear evidence, the Tribunal’s inference that “Chatrapur Saheb” referred to the respondent could not be justified. By making this observation, the High Court again seemed to be undertaking an appreciation of the evidence, whereas the Tribunal’s judgment showed that it had considered several facts and circumstances in determining the identity of the person indicated by “Chatrapur Saheb.” Whether the Tribunal’s evidence was satisfactory and sufficient for its conclusion was not a question for a writ petition. The Court observed that the High Court’s initial approach at the beginning of its judgment was appropriate, but that later the High Court appeared to have been persuaded to evaluate the evidence itself, a step the Court found unreasonable and illegitimate.

The Court also addressed the High Court’s comment that the Tribunal should have examined Barjorji before relying on the statements contained in his letter to Mr Patnaik. While acknowledging that there was some merit in that argument, the Court pointed out that the Tribunal’s finding regarding the purchase of the Austin car was based on several other considerations, all of which had been duly proved. Regarding the main features of that transaction, there was no serious controversy between the parties; the dispute was limited to the effect of those broader features, which was a factual issue that fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court concluded by stating that it had carefully considered the matters raised.

The Court examined the reasons that the High Court had set out in the judgment that is now before this appeal. After a careful review, the Court was not persuaded by the argument advanced by counsel for the respondent, identified as Mr. Sinha, that the High Court was correct in holding that the Tribunal’s findings against the respondent were unsupported by any evidence. Whether the High Court or this Court agrees with the substance of the Tribunal’s findings is a separate question. The precise issue that must be decided is whether the Tribunal’s conclusions can be overturned on the limited ground that they lack evidentiary support. The Court finds it difficult to accept the proposition that no evidence exists to back the Tribunal’s findings against the respondent. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order issued by the High Court is set aside, and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. No order as to costs will be made. The Court also noted that the matter did not warrant any further procedural steps, and therefore it declined to award costs to either party, leaving the parties to bear their own expenses. The decision therefore restores the position prior to the writ petition.