Sriratnavaramaraja vs Smt. Vimla

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 624 of 1960

Decision Date: 27 February, 1961

Coram: J.C. Shah, J.L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah

In the matter titled Sriratnavaramaraja versus Smt. Vimla, a judgment was delivered on 27 February 1961 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Justice C. J. Shah, Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice M. Hidayatullah. The appeal, recorded as Civil Appeal No. 624 of 1960, was taken by special leave from an order dated 30 May 1960 of the Mysore High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 1098 of 1959. The appellant was represented by counsel K. R. Karanth and R. Gopalakrishna, while the respondent was represented by counsel A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishna. Counsel B. R. L. Iyengar and T. M. Sen appeared on behalf of the State of Mysore on notice issued by the Court.

The plaintiff, Smt. Vimla, had instituted Suit No. 73 of 1956 before the Subordinate Judge of South Kanara, seeking a decree for possession of lands, buildings and house‑sites described in Schedule A, movable property described in Schedule B, mesne profits relating to the Schedule A properties, and a decree for possession, management and accounting of properties described in Schedule C, together with institutions alleged to constitute private family religious endowments listed in Schedule D. The plaintiff asserted that on the death of her father, Shri Dharmasthala Manjayya Heggade, on 31 August 1955, she became entitled to the properties, and that the defendant had wrongfully taken possession of them. The plaintiff valued the properties in Schedules C and D under Section 28 of the Madras Court‑Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 at a sum of Rs. 21,000 and paid a court‑fee of Rs. 275. She also valued the lands in Schedule A for jurisdictional purposes at thirty times the assessment and valued the buildings separately, paying court‑fee accordingly.

The Subordinate Judge, acting on an objection from his office, ruled on 28 June 1956 that the Rs. 34,577 paid by the plaintiff as court‑fee was adequate. Subsequently, the defendant filed a written statement on 9 September 1950, contesting the valuation of the properties and the court‑fee demanded. The trial court raised the issue of adequacy of the court‑fee paid by the plaintiff. The defendant applied on 13 February 1957 for the appointment of a Commissioner to value the properties, but the court dismissed the application and affirmed the adequacy of the court‑fee. The defendant then preferred Revision Petition 272 of 1957 before the High Court, challenging the order determining court‑fees.

The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant could raise a grievance concerning the valuation of the disputed properties and thereby contest the court‑fee as a matter between the plaintiff and himself, and whether the defendant could invoke the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction against the order adjudicating court‑fees payable on the plaint. The Court held that the Court‑Fees Act is a revenue‑collecting statute and must not be employed as a technical tool by a defendant to impede the progress of a suit by seeking revision in the High Court. Section 12(2) of the Madras Court‑Fees Act, 1955, was interpreted to permit the defendant only to assist the court in reaching a just decision on the question of court‑fees, not to create a substantive right to challenge the fee. Consequently, the Court found that the High Court had gravely erred in entertaining the revision application on the basis of court‑fees where no jurisdictional issue was involved.

In the suit the plaintiff asserted that the value of the property covered by the Madras Court‑fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 was Rs 21,000 and consequently she paid a court‑fee of Rs 275. She also stated that, for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction, the lands described in schedule A were valued at thirty times their assessment, and that the buildings were valued separately with a corresponding court‑fee paid on that basis. On 28 June 1956 the Subordinate Judge, after considering an objection raised by his own office, held that the sum of Rs 34,577 that the plaintiff had paid as court‑fee was sufficient. Thereafter a series of procedural steps unfolded, for which few precedents are available. On 9 September 1950 the defendant filed his written statement, in which he objected, among other matters, to the valuation of the suit properties and to the amount of court‑fee claimed. The trial court subsequently questioned whether the court‑fee paid by the plaintiff was indeed adequate. On 13 February 1957 the defendant applied for the appointment of a Commissioner to assess the value of the properties. That application was rejected, the court declaring that the fee already paid was adequate. The defendant then preferred Revision Petition 272 of 1957 before the High Court of Judicature at Bangalore. That revision set aside the Subordinate Judge’s order and directed the trial court to determine the value of the properties for court‑fee purposes in accordance with law, to give both parties a full opportunity to be heard, and, if necessary, to appoint a Commissioner to ascertain the present market value of the properties and to decide the issue afresh on its merits.

Pursuant to the High Court’s direction, the Subordinate Judge appointed a Commissioner. The Commissioner submitted an initial report of valuation. The defendant raised objections to that report, prompting the Commissioner to prepare a further report. On further direction of the Subordinate Judge a supplemental report was also filed. After hearing the arguments of both parties, the Subordinate Judge concluded that the properties listed in schedule D were “extra commercial” and that a fixed court‑fee was payable for the claim of possession of those properties. He also observed that the schedule D properties were “trust properties” and that section 28 of the Madras Court‑fees and Suits Valuation Act applied because the dispute related to the right of management among persons claiming to be rival trustees. The Judge further held that houses erected on revenue‑paying lands must be valued at their market price rather than at thirty times the land assessment. Accordingly, he fixed the value of the lands in schedule A at Rs 7,74,665 and the value of the house‑sites at Rs 27,625. The plaintiff then paid the additional court‑fee as directed. Dissatisfied with this order, both the plaintiff and the defendant each filed separate petitions in revision before the High Court of Mysore. The High Court, after hearing the Advocate‑General of the State, largely affirmed the Subordinate Judge’s order, except with respect to an institution described as “Nelliyadi Beedu,” where it directed the trial court to determine whether that institution was “extra commercial” after allowing both parties to present their contentions and evidence.

The High Court had directed the trial court to determine whether the institution was “extra commercial” after providing both parties an opportunity to present their contentions and to lead evidence on that issue. The defendant, dissatisfied with that order, filed an appeal to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, seeking special leave. The Court‑fees Act, the Court observed, was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and was not intended to furnish a litigant with a weapon of defence that could obstruct the trial of an action. By recognising the defendant’s entitlement to contest the valuation of the properties in dispute as if it were a matter directly between him and the plaintiff, and by entertaining the defendant’s petitions in revision before the High Court against the order adjudging the court‑fee payable on the plaint, the progress of the suit on its merits had been effectively frustrated for nearly five years. The Court found it difficult to appreciate any grievance that the defendant could legitimately claim by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question of whether the plaintiff had paid adequate court‑fee on his plaint. The adequacy of the court‑fee is principally a question that lies between the plaintiff and the State, and it is not evident how an order concerning that adequacy could render the defendant aggrieved. Moreover, the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly limited to the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of that provision, namely refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the subordinate court, assumption of jurisdiction which the court does not possess, or the court’s acting illegally or with material irregularity. Even if the defendant honestly believed that the plaintiff had not paid the proper fee, the defendant possessed no right to approach the superior court by appeal or revision against the order fixing the court‑fee payable on the plaint. Counsel for the defendant argued that Act 14 of 1955, enacted by the Madras Legislature and applicable to the suit, invested the defendant not only with a right to contest, in the trial court, whether the plaintiff had paid adequate court‑fee, but also with a right to move the High Court in revision if an order contrary to his submission were passed. That argument relied on sub‑section (2) of Section 12, which provides that any defendant may, by his written statement filed before the first hearing of the suit or before evidence is recorded on the merits, plead that the subject‑matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is insufficient, and that all questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded affecting the defendant, on the merits of the claim. The Court noted, however, that this provision merely enables the defendant to raise a contention regarding the proper court‑fee payable on a plaint and to assist the court in arriving at a just decision on that question; it does not confer any authority on the defendant to approach the High Court in revision against the decision of the court of first instance on the matter of court‑fee. The Court further observed that no provision of the Madras Court‑fees Act or any other statute had been identified that would empower the defendant to move the High Court in revision on the issue of court‑fee payable on a plaint.

The Court explained that the provision allowed a defendant only to argue that the fee paid on the plaint was insufficient and to help the trial court reach a fair decision on that issue. The provision did not give the defendant any statutory right to approach the High Court in revision against the decision of the first‑instance court concerning the amount of court‑fee payable. The Court observed that it had not been shown any clause in the Madras Court‑fees Act, or in any other law, that permitted a defendant to seek revision in the High Court on a question of court‑fee. While section 19 of the Act authorised the trial court, for the purpose of determining whether the suit’s subject‑matter had been properly valued or whether the fee paid was adequate, to conduct an enquiry it deemed appropriate and to appoint a commissioner to investigate locally and report back, this power was directed solely at assisting the trial court. The Court noted that Chapter III of the Act reflected the Legislature’s desire to ensure the proper collection of court‑fees from litigants, but the detailed provisions did not equip a defendant with a technical tool to delay or obstruct the proceeding by filing a revision petition in the High Court against a fee‑determination order. In the Court’s view, the High Court had seriously erred in entertaining revision applications raised by the defendant on the ground of court‑fee when no jurisdictional question was involved. Consequently, the appeal was rejected, the costs were awarded against the appellant, and the appeal was dismissed.