Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer And Others vs Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 244 and 245 of 1958

Decision Date: 27 April 1961

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar, Subba Rao

In the case titled Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer and Others versus Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer and Another, the judgment was delivered on 27 April 1961 by the Supreme Court of India. The bench consisted of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Raghubar Dayal and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner was Sri Sinna Ramanuja Jeer and others, while the respondent was Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer and another. The judgment date was 27 April 1961 and the bench also included Justice Subbarao, K., who sat as chief justice alongside Justices Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P., Dayal, Raghubar and Mudholkar, J. R. The official citation of the decision is 1961 AIR 1720 and 1962 SCR (2) 509, with subsequent citator references R 1976 SC 2547 (25) and F 1977 SC 27 (7). The suit concerned a dispute under the Temple Honour Act, wherein the respondent, acting as aradanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple dedicated to Sri Ramanujacharya, sought a declaration of his right to the first theertham and other honours and perquisites in precedence over all other worshippers at the main Athinathalwar temple in Tirunelveli District. The respondent argued that his entitlement derived from his office in the Emberumanar temple. The matter progressed to the High Court, where a remand order led a Subordinate Judge to hold that the Emberumanar temple was a sub‑shrine attached to the main temple, making the respondent effectively an office‑holder in the main temple, and that the precedence claimed was part of his remuneration; consequently, the Subordinate Judge decreed the suits in favour of the respondent. On appeal, the District Judge reviewed the entire evidence, set aside the Subordinate Judge’s findings, and dismissed the suits as non‑maintainable. The appeals to the High Court were then heard by a single judge, who, after reconsidering the evidence, reversed the District Judge’s decision, reinstated the Subordinate Judge’s findings, and decreed the suits in favour of the respondent. The High Court further held that, as one of the theerthakars, the appellant could be deemed the holder of the office of arulipad in the main temple. The Court observed that, although Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not permit a civil court to entertain a suit for a plain declaration of religious honours and privileges, the court may entertain a suit that seeks to establish a person’s right to a temple office and the associated honours and privileges as part of the remuneration or perquisites of that office. The Court stipulated that an essential condition for the existence of a temple office is that its holder must be under a legal obligation to perform the duties attached to the office and must be liable to penalty for failure to do so. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there could be no independent office of theerthakar, because such a position did not entail obligatory duties, nor could there be an independent office of arulipad, as that term merely indicated the order in which theerthakars’ names were called by the archaka.

It was held that neither the office of theerthakar nor that of an arulipad imposed any mandatory duties, because the term arulipad merely indicated that the names of theerthakars were announced by the archaka in a prescribed sequence. The Court explained that the issue of whether the first theertham or any other honours bestowed upon a person were solely a token of respect during a temple visit, or whether they formed part of the remuneration attached to a particular office, must be resolved on the basis of evidence in each case. If the honours were to be regarded as remuneration, the parties must demonstrate that such honours constituted an essential component of the ritual that the recipient performed in his capacity as the holder of the office. The Court referred to several authorities that supported this approach, including Athan Sadagopachariar Swamigal v. Elayavalli Srinivasa‑chariar (1913) M.W.N. 289, Striman Sadagopa v. Krishna Tatachariyar (1863) 1 M.H.C.R. 301, Sri Rungachariar v. Rungasami Buttachar (1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 291, Vathiar Venkatachariar v. P. Ponappa Ayyangar (1918) 45 I.C. 959, and Sri Emberumanar jeer Swamigal v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras (1936) 71 M.L.J. 588. The Court further observed that it was well settled that the High Court possessed no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, regardless of how grave the perceived error might be. In the present matter, the Court found that the High Court had indeed erred in overturning the factual finding of the District Judge, which held that the Emberumanar temple was neither subordinate to nor a part of the Athinathalwar temple; consequently, an office‑holder of the Emberumanar temple could not become an office‑holder of the Athinathalwar temple. The judgment then proceeded to set out the details of the civil appeals, the parties involved, and the procedural history, noting that the appeals were filed by special leave against the High Court judgment dated 19 February 1953, which had set aside the decision of the District Judge, Tirunelveli, and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, dated 1945. The case concerned the maintainability of a suit regarding temple honours and perquisites in the Athinathalwar temple at Alwar Tirunagari, a historic shrine dedicated to Lord Vishnu, whose origins lie in antiquity and which had been celebrated by Vaishnavite saints during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

In the compound of the main shrine there exist three subsidiary shrines dedicated respectively to Nachiar, Nammalwar and Garuda, while the remaining minor shrines are situated outside the precincts of the principal temple. Every one of these temples maintains its own manager, its own archaka and a distinct endowment; nevertheless, because the Alwars and Acharyas whose idols occupy the smaller shrines were originally devotees of Sri Athinathalwar, a noteworthy and relatively new custom of mutual and regular exchange of visits between the idols of the subsidiary shrines and the idol of Athinathalwar has gradually developed over time. On certain prescribed days of the calendar year the idols from the minor shrines are carried to the main shrine so that they may be worshipped there; likewise, on particular occasions the idol of Athinathalwar is conveyed to the minor shrines, a practice that recalls the historic period when the Alwars and Acharyas themselves worshipped in the temple of Athinathalwar. Sri Ramanujacharya, celebrated throughout the nation as a preeminent devotee of Lord Vishnu and as the founder of a major school of Indian philosophy, passed away in the year 1127 A.D. In the thirteenth century a shrine was erected in his honor and his idol was installed in that shrine. Sri Ramanujacharya is also known by the names Udayavar or Emberumanar, and the shrine built in his memory is commonly called the Emberumanar temple. The individual who manages that temple and performs the archaka duties is referred to as the Emberumanar Jeer, and the Emberumanar temple is located outside the boundaries of the Athinathalwar temple. Visits are also made in both directions, with the idol of Emberumanar being taken to the Athinathalwar temple and the idol of Athinathalwar being taken to the Emberumanar shrine. The present Emberumanar Jeer is the plaintiff in the suits that gave rise to the present appeals. In the same district there exists a mutt known as the Vanamamalai Mutt; its head, who is a revered anyasi among South Indian Vaishnavites, is called the Vanamamalai Jeer and is named as the first defendant. The heads of the Ahobilam Mutt and the Tirukkurungudi Mutt appear as the second and third defendants respectively. The fourth defendant is the Executive Officer of the Sri Athinathalwar temple, who was appointed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board of Madras. Historical records show that, from at least the middle of the last century, disputes have arisen among the various Jeers and other persons concerning the order of priority for the distribution of certain honors when the Jeers attend the Sri Athinathalwar temple for worship. In the ghoshties—groups of worshippers gathered before the deity—on both ordinary and special days the Jeers receive honors appropriate to their rank. Such honors include the allocation of theertham, thulasi, satari, viniyogam and other comparable items. Each Jeer is assigned a specific place within the ghoshti and a clear internal order of precedence is observed among them. This order of precedence concerning the receipt of honors

The Court observed that the continual quarrels among the religious heads over the order of precedence for honours forced the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board, which was created under Act 1 of 1923 and had authority to administer endowments in the Madras State, to intervene and settle the disputes between the various Jeers. On 12 May 1927 the Board issued an order fixing the order of precedence for the distribution of honours on both ordinary and special days. By that order the Board recognized the Emberumanar Jeer’s right to receive the honours and perquisites ahead of the other Jeers on every day except the days of the Vaikasi festival, and even on the festival the Emberumanar Jeer was excluded on the seventh day. For the remaining festival days, that is, the first through sixth and the eighth through tenth days, the Board directed that the other Jeers should be shown the ordinary and special honours in precedence over the rest, including the Emberumanar Jeer. Dissatisfied with this order, the Emberumanar Jeer instituted O.S. No. 320 of 1933 in the Court of the District Munsif, Tirunelveli. That suit was later transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, where it was designated O.S. No. 45 of 1945. The suit was filed against the other Jeers and against the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, seeking a declaration that the Emberumanar Jeer was entitled to the first theertham and other perquisites in precedence over all the others in the ghoshties of the Sri Athinathalwar temple, on the ground that he held the office of the Emberumanar temple. After the filing of the suit, the Board issued a further order on 15 May 1935 altering the previously fixed order of precedence by giving the Vanamamalai Jeer precedence over the Emberumanar Jeer. In response, the Emberumanar Jeer commenced another suit, O.S. No. 201 of 1941, in the Court of the District Munsif, Srivaikuntam. That suit was subsequently transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin as O.S. No. 46 of 1945, and it was ordered to be tried together with O.S. No. 45 of 1945. The parties to both suits were made the Emberumanar Jeer, the Vanamamalai Jeer, the Ahobilam Jeer, the Tirukkurungudi Jeer, and the Executive Officer of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board. The Court noted that the suits had a chequered career, but it would refer only to those stages of the prolonged litigation that bore upon the questions raised in the present appeals. The suit originally numbered O.S. No. 320 of 1933 was finally renumbered O.S. No. 66 of 1936 and was disposed of on 25 March 1941 by the District Munsif, Tirunelveli. That learned Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable because the plaintiff possessed no legal right on which he could obtain relief in a civil court. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, reached the conclusion that, as …

In the earlier proceedings the plaintiff sought a declaration that he possessed a right of precedence to receive the theertham and related emoluments as part of the remuneration attached to his office of aradanaikar in the suit temple. The trial court held that the suit could not be dismissed on the preliminary ground that it fell within the ambit of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore set aside the decree of the District Munsif and remanded the matter for trial on the remaining issues. Both parties appealed the decision to the High Court of Madras, and the appeals were recorded as Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 1 and 155 of 1943. On 31 January 1945 Justice Chandrasekara Aiyar dismissed both appeals. In his judgment the learned judge advanced alternative theories and observed that, before the plaintiff could succeed, he must establish that his status as the aradanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple amounted to holding an office in the suit temple. Justice Chandrasekara Aiyar concurred with the Subordinate Judge that the suit could not be struck out at the initial stage without resolving this factual question.

Following the High Court’s dismissal, the case was returned to the Subordinate Judge at Tuticorin, who had the suit and the related suit renumbered as Original Suit Nos. 45 and 46 of 1945. The Subordinate Judge concluded that the Emberumanar temple functioned as a sub‑shrine attached to the main Sri Athinathalwar temple, and that the plaintiff, as aradanaikar of the sub‑shrine, was in effect an office‑holder of the main temple. He further held that the privilege of receiving the first theertham was an integral part of the remuneration for that office, rendering the suit a civil action governed by section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the basis of this finding, the Subordinate Judge decreed in favor of the plaintiff in both suits. Six aggrieved parties subsequently filed appeals against these decrees in the District Court, and the learned District Judge disposed of all of them in a common judgment on 23 January 1947. After reviewing the evidence, the District Judge determined that the two institutions were not so interdependent that an office‑holder of the Emberumanar temple would necessarily be an office‑holder of the Athinathalwar temple. Consequently, he found that the plaintiff did not hold an office in the main temple and was not entitled to sue for his claimed precedence rights, and he allowed the appeals, dismissed both suits, and awarded costs throughout. The plaintiff then filed second appeals before the Madras High Court, numbered Second Appeals Nos. 2120 and 2121 of 1947, which were heard by Justice Krishnaswami Nayudu. Justice Nayudu, on re‑examination of the evidence, disagreed with the District Judge’s conclusion and adopted the findings of the Subordinate Judge.

The learned Judge accepted the finding that had been recorded by the Subordinate Judge. He not only agreed that the plaintiff, in his capacity as the aradanaikar or archaka of the sub‑shrine, was effectively an office‑holder in the main temple, but he also went further and concluded that, being one of the theerthakars, the plaintiff could be treated as holding the office of arulipad in the main temple. On the basis of these conclusions, the Judge set aside the decree that had been issued by the District Judge and reinstated the decrees that had been rendered by the Subordinate Judge. Because the learned Judge did not grant permission to appeal to a division bench, the first defendant, identified as the Vanamamalai Jeer in the suits, obtained special leave and filed appeals against the judgment of the High Court.

The counsel for the appellant raised two principal submissions before the Court. Firstly, the counsel argued that a suit seeking a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to honours in a temple could not succeed unless the plaintiff demonstrated that he actually held an office in that temple and that the honours claimed were part of the perquisites attached to that office. Since, in the present case, the plaintiff asserted that he was an aradanaikar and trustee of only the Emberumanar temple and that, on that basis, he claimed honours in the Athinathalwar temple, the counsel contended that the suits should have been dismissed at the outset because the plaints did not disclose any civil claim falling within the ambit of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, the counsel maintained that the courts were not justified in allowing the plaintiff to create a new case that had not been set out in the plaints – namely, that the Emberumanar temple was a subordinate shrine of the Athinathalwar temple and that, therefore, the plaintiff was an office‑holder of the latter. Even assuming that the courts could permit the plaintiff to develop a new case at a late stage, the counsel pointed out that the District Court had clearly found, based on the evidence, that the Emberumanar temple was not a sub‑shrine of the Athinathalwar temple, and that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to overturn that finding on second appeal. In response, the counsel for the respondents argued that the plaintiff’s alternative case was not truly new, asserting that all material facts supporting that case had been disclosed in the plaints. The respondent’s counsel further maintained that the District Judge’s finding was not a mere factual determination but a legal inference drawn from proved facts, or a mixed question of fact and law. He also criticized the appellant’s counsel for disregarding the religious background and the mindset of the class of persons involved, and he urged that, when viewed from the correct perspective—as the High Court had done—it became clear that there existed an association between the two temples that could justify the plaintiff’s claim to honours.

The Court observed that when one temple is regarded as subordinate to another, it naturally follows that the officer of the subordinate shrine might seek to claim honours in the principal temple, even though the subordinate shrine forms only a part of the larger religious complex.

At the outset, the Court found it necessary to briefly outline the law governing the maintainability of suits in civil courts that relate to temple honours. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure delineates the category of suits that a civil court may entertain. It empowers a court to hear every suit of a civil nature, except those whose jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. Consequently, a court cannot entertain a suit that does not fall within the definition of a civil suit.

The Court explained that, on the face of it, suits that raise only questions of religious rites and ceremonies are not maintainable in a civil court because such suits do not involve the legal rights of the parties. However, the explanation to Section 9 clearly states that a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is deemed a civil suit, even if the existence of that right depends entirely on a decision relating to a religious rite or ceremony. This explanation conveys two important principles: first, that a suit concerning an office is a civil suit; and second, that the suit remains a civil suit even when the right to that office hinges wholly on a matter of religious practice.

The Court further clarified that questions about religious rites or ceremonies cannot, by themselves, constitute the subject‑matter of a civil suit independent of the underlying right. Honours shown or precedence given to religious dignitaries during temple ceremonies cannot be elevated above the religious rights or ceremonies themselves, because such honours form an integral part of the rites. The Court noted that honours such as the position in the procession, the place of standing, the receipt of the tulasi, and similar customs are not part of the remuneration or perquisites attached to an office; rather, they are merely tokens of welcome extended to an honoured guest within the temple precincts.

The Court remarked that one might even consider it a sacrilege to claim a right of precedence in the presence of the Almighty, since all devotees approach the deity as humble supplicants seeking blessings, not to assert self‑importance or demand preferential treatment. Nevertheless, a century of case law in the region has recognized certain rights accorded to devotees of different grades, and such rights have been fiercely defended and litigated in both criminal and civil courts. Accordingly, the Court indicated that it would not revisit the principle of honours from first principles but would instead review the existing law on the subject, aiming to ascertain and, if possible, clarify the legal position.

The Court observed that it would not reopen the issue of honours from foundational principles but would instead re‑examine the existing jurisprudence in order to determine, and if feasible to clarify, the current legal position. The earliest authority on the matter was the decision in Striman Sadagopa v. Kristna Tatachariyar. In that case the plaintiff, who served as the gurukkal of Sri Ahobilam Mutt, instituted proceedings against the trustees of Sri Devarajaswami temple at Conjeevaram. He claimed damages for injuries he alleged were caused by the trustees’ refusal to accord him certain honours and emoluments, and he also sought a declaration that his right to such honours and emoluments would continue in the future. The plaint was accompanied by two schedules that listed the specific honours claimed, which included garlands, coconuts, prasadams and other ceremonial items that customarily accompanied the recitation performed when the gurukkal visited the temple. The learned Chief Justice, Scotland, C.J., articulated the legal position by stating that the matters raised in the suit were “purely a matter of religious and sacred observance in connection with the worship and ceremonials at the pagoda, and is claimed by the plaintiff as a matter of devotional respect and display due to his priestly rank or as a votive offering made to him whilst passing in procession through the temples, and when brought to the presence of the principal idol.” He further explained that the plaintiff “is not officially connected in any way with the management or control of the pagoda, or its property or funds; and the alleged dues of his office have no doubt been owing to the great reverence at one time entertained for his sacred rank in the Hindu religion, and the importance from a religious point of view of his mere presence at the pagoda.” Concluding his analysis, the Chief Justice declared that “such honours and emoluments cannot in any respect be considered as remuneration for duties or ministrations performed by the plaintiff in the secular affairs or religious services of the pagoda.” This decision, having endured the test of time, established that a suit seeking enforcement of rights belonging to persons who hold offices connected with temple management and regulation, together with the honours and emoluments attached to those offices, is appropriately brought in a civil court. By contrast, a suit filed by a person who does not occupy an office in the temple, but who claims honours customarily shown to him as a matter of devotional respect and display because of his rank, does not constitute a civil action.

The principle articulated in the Striman Sadagopa case was reiterated in later judgments and subsequently applied by a division bench of the Madras High Court to a claim concerning the privilege of first theertham, among other rights, in the case of Sri Rungachariar v. Rungasami Buttachar. That appeal arose out of a suit seeking a declaration that the plaintiffs possessed a hereditary miras right, dating from time immemorial, to a series of offices—including Sthalathar, Kutumba First Theertham, Muntrapushpam, Vedaparayanam and Adyapakam—within the temple of Sri Parimala Ranganathaswami at Tiruvilandur. By virtue of that hereditary right, the plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to a one‑fourth share of the honours and emoluments pertaining to their offices, as detailed in schedule A of the plaint. The learned judges, after evaluating the evidence, concluded that the hereditary Sthalathars were obliged to perform, in addition to their supervisory duties, specific ceremonial responsibilities such as vedaparayanam, and that they were entitled to receive remuneration for performing those duties. The remuneration, the court observed, included the privilege of first theertham, which conferred upon the plaintiffs the designation of “theerthakars.” The judges further reasoned that, since the privilege of first theertham was attached to the hereditary office as part of the office’s remuneration, the court was required to protect the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of that office by declaratively defining the honour to which they were entitled. This decision therefore confirms the application of the earlier principle that rights and honours intrinsically linked to a hereditary temple office are enforceable in a civil proceeding.

Ranganathaswami at Tiruvilandur claimed, by virtue of a hereditary right, a one‑fourth share of the honours and emoluments that were attached to their offices, as enumerated in schedule A of the plaint. The learned judges, after examining the evidence, concluded that the plaintiffs, as hereditary Sthalathars, were obligated not only to perform the supervisory duties belonging to the office of Sthalathar but also to carry out ceremonial duties such as vedaparayanam. In return for performing those duties they were entitled to receive remuneration, and that remuneration expressly included the privilege of receiving the first theertham, which consequently entitled the plaintiffs to be referred to as “theerthakars”. The judges then observed that, accepting the findings that the privilege of the first theertham formed part of the hereditary office and therefore formed part of the remuneration, the court was required, in order to protect the plaintiffs in the enjoyment of their office, to declare the specific honour to which they were entitled. This decision thereby recognized that a suit seeking a declaration of a plaintiff’s right to an office and the associated honours, such as the first theertham, as part of the remuneration, was properly maintainable in a civil court, as earlier affirmed in Athan Sadagopachariar Swamigal v. Elayavalli Srinivasachariar (1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 291, 208. In that case the plaintiff, who was a trustee of the Pillalokacharyar temple, had instituted suit principally to restrain the first defendant from asserting that he was one of the Adhyapaka Mirasidars in the Nammalwar and Adinathar temples at Alwar Tirunagari. It was alleged that the first defendant occupied a position in the ghoshti that was immediately senior to the plaintiff’s rank. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar framed the pivotal question as whether a suit for the honours listed in the second item of the second schedule to the plaint could be entertained in a civil court. He noted that if those honours were not attached to any temple office, such a suit could not lie, making the initial inquiry a factual one: whether the honours were attached to the Adhyapaka Miras office. After weighing the evidence and referring to other relevant decisions, the judge held that there was no difficulty in concluding, on the basis of the evidence, that the plaintiffs, the first defendant, and the other five Adhyapaka Mirasidars derived their rank in the Goshti and their entitlement to distributions of prasadams not because those honours formed part of the Adhyapaka Miras office, but rather because they were Acharya Purushas or because their families had long been respected religious families, and that the mere respect accorded to their offices rendered them suitable for such honours.

The judge observed that a purely social and religious perspective could explain the desire for such honours, and that this observation alone would have been sufficient to resolve the appeal. Nevertheless, the judge continued to make further observations, even assuming that the honours mentioned in the 1913 reports (M.W.N. 289, 299, 300, 301) were attached to the emoluments of the seven Adhyapaka Mirasidars. Although those observations were obiter, the judge considered them worthy of quotation because of his extensive experience in Hindu religious matters and his well‑known reformist zeal aimed at eliminating superstitious ignorance and distorted practices that had clouded the Hindu religion.

The judge then articulated the next question of law, asking whether honours displayed in the presence of the deity could be legally attached to an office as emoluments, that is, whether any person could legally claim such honours as a right payable by the temple. He explained that when a trustee arranges for temple elephants, dancing girls, and offers prasadams to a high official or any other person, the purpose is to show “honours” to that individual. The trustee usually says that the temple deity itself condescends to treat the official or other persons as the deity’s guest and therefore bestows these “honours”. In the judge’s view, persons who receive such respect cannot claim those honours as a legal right; rather, they are merely favours bestowed by the temple deity. According to the strict interpretation of the Shastras, such “honours” are not honours at all but rather doles graciously given by the deity as a favour.

The judge illustrated the nature of these ceremonial gestures by describing two well‑known practices in a Vaishnava temple. First, the impression of the deity’s feet is placed upon the devotee’s head or shoulders. Second, the “leavings” of the food offered to the deity are distributed to a distinguished devotee. He noted that the sandal paste from the deity’s feet, the leftover food, and the garland worn by the deity are presented as marks of pure grace, not as rights or honours that the devotee can claim. He concluded that while devotees should humbly accept the deity’s leavings conveyed through the trustee or an archaka, any claim to receive “honour” in the deity’s presence constitutes a sinful, illegal, and un‑Shastraic demand.

Consequently, the judge respectfully limited the decision in Sri Bungachariar v. Bungaswami Buttachar(1) to situations where the receipt of the first theertham by an office‑holder has become an inseparable part of the ritual that the office‑holder must perform. He warned that the principle should be applied cautiously and not be extended beyond that narrow scope. The judge regarded these observations as weighty, noting that if they were appropriate in 1913, they should be even more compelling in 1961. He therefore affirmed the correctness of the earlier observations.

The Court accepted the earlier observations as establishing the correct legal principle that any person who asserts a right to a religious honour such as the first theertham must demonstrate not merely that he occupies a temple office and that he has historically received the first theertham during the Ghoshti ceremony, but also that the receipt of that first theertham has become an essential component of the ritual duties attached to his office. In other words, the entitlement to the first theertham must be shown to be both a manifestation of divine grace and an integral part of the remuneration for the office. The Court then referred to a division bench of the Madras High Court in Vathiar Venkatachariar v. P. Ponappa Ayyengar (2), where the question arose as to whether a claim to a religious honour involving the receipt of theerthams and prasadams in a prescribed order of precedence was valid. That case concerned the Athinathalwar temple and examined the issue of precedence among the theerthakars. The first question considered was whether a distinct theertham office existed in the temple. Justice Krishnan, delivering the leading judgment, rejected the existence of such an office and observed that among the theerthakars there were five or seven individuals known as Adhyapakamdars whose special duty was to recite certain Prabandams and who were remunerated by Inam lands; they could be described as the official reciters of the temple. Turning to the legal test for the existence of an office, the learned judge explained that the essential characteristic of an office is the presence of a duty or duties that the holder is legally bound to perform, and that failure to perform such duties may attract disciplinary measures such as suspension or dismissal, citing authorities (1) (1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad, 291, 298 and (2) (1918) 45 I.C. 959, 961, 962. Applying this test to the theerthakars and the Adhyapakamdars, the judge noted that the only distinction between the theerthakars and other worshippers, as shown by the evidence, was that the theerthakars were allotted specific spots in the temple from which to stand and recite, they received the honour of theertham and prasadam before the outsiders, and they possessed an ‘Arulapad’ whereby the archaka would call their names in a fixed order, to which they responded with the word ‘Nayinde’, meaning ‘I am here’. The judge concluded that this arrangement did not demonstrate that the theerthakars constituted a formal office; rather, they appeared to be a recognised and privileged class of worshippers who received special consideration through assigned places and a ceremonial precedence established by temple custom. Finally, after reviewing the evidence, the learned judge affirmed that, based on the material presented, the claim that the theerthakars held an obligatory office could not be substantiated.

In the case under consideration, the Court observed that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the Theerthakars were bound by any mandatory duty nor that any position designated as a Theertham office existed within the temple. Accordingly, the judgment concluded that no such office could be said to exist because the Theerthakars performed no obligatory functions. Since the plaintiffs could not show that the honor they claimed was attached to a religious office as remuneration or perquisite, the suit was dismissed. The judgment then referred to the earlier decision in Sri Emberumanar Jeer Swamigal v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, which was a single‑Judge ruling of the Madras High Court arising from a writ petition filed by Emberumanar Jeer challenging an order of the Religious Endowments Board. That petition was rejected on the ground that the Board’s order concerned an administrative matter, and therefore a writ of certiorari was not appropriate. Nevertheless, Justice Pandurang Row made observations that the Board’s determination concerned the order of distribution of theertham and related honors, which in his view did not constitute a determination of any legal right of the subjects. He explained that the rights referred to in the relevant rule are those that can be legally enforced, not merely ceremonial honors or precedence recognized as matter of courtesy. He further stated that the right to obtain theertham or honors in a particular order of precedence is not a civil right capable of enforcement or declaration by a civil court. Citing Sriman Sadagopa v. Kristna Tatachariyar, the Judge reiterated that the principle that civil courts cannot entertain claims to mere honors or privileges has long been settled and any attempt to circumvent it has failed. The Court noted, however, that earlier decisions indicated that while a suit directly for honors may not lie, a suit may be viable if the honors are attached to a defined office and constitute its emoluments. On appeal, a division bench comprising Chief Justice Leach and Justice Somayya affirmed this view, observing that questions concerning the distribution of theertham or other temple honors do not constitute matters affecting a legal right and therefore cannot be the subject of a suit. The present notes remark that the observations of Justice Pandurang Row and the division bench represent only a portion of the law, and that further citations are unnecessary because the decisions already cited suffice.

The Court first set out the applicable legal principles in a clear and concise manner for ease of reference. It stated that a suit seeking a declaration of religious honours and privileges in themselves cannot be entertained by a civil court. However, a suit that aims to establish a claimant’s right to a specific office within a temple, together with the honours and privileges that are attached to that office as part of its remuneration or perquisites, is maintainable in a civil court. The Court further explained that for an office to exist, the person occupying the alleged office must be under a legal duty to perform the functions attached to that office, and failure to perform those duties must expose the holder to some form of penalty. Applying this test, the Court observed that there could be no independent office of “theerthakar” because a theerthakar has no obligatory duties to perform, and likewise there could be no office of “arulipad,” a term that merely indicates that the names of the theerthakars are called out by the archaka in a prescribed order. The Court added that even if theertham or other honours are presented in a particular sequence to a person who holds an office, this does not automatically mean that such honours form part of the remuneration attached to the office. Whether the honours are integral to the duties of the office‑holder or are merely gestures of respect shown on a particular visit must be decided on the basis of the evidence, as it is a factual issue.

Having explained these principles, the Court turned to the specific contentions raised in the present case. The counsel for the appellant made a primary submission that, on the basis of the principles just outlined, the suit should have been dismissed at the outset because of the allegations contained in the plaint. The plaint, filed as Original Suit No. 45 of 1945, contains a claim in paragraph 4 that the plaintiff is the present Emberumanar Jeer and, by virtue of that position, serves as the aradhanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple, a role that he says was appointed and nominated by his predecessor, Sri Sadagopa Ramanuja Jeer, who died in 1930. In paragraph 7 of the same plaint, the plaintiff asserts his entitlement to certain honours. He states that, in his capacity as holder of the office of aradhanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple, and as the emoluments attached to that office, the Emberumanar Jeer is, by long‑standing custom, entitled to receive, at the ghoshties that are formed before all the sannidhies in the Adhinathalwar temple on every occasion of each day of the year without exception, the first theertham and other honours described in Schedule 1, together with the perquisites listed in Schedule 11. The plaintiff further claims that, as the office‑holder, he is entitled to these honours as part of the remuneration that historically accompanies his position.

The plaint continues in paragraph 9, where the plaintiff elaborates on his claim by stating that, in his capacity as holder of the

In the plaint the plaintiff asserted that, by virtue of his position as Aradhanalkar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple, he was entitled to receive certain special honours on the seventh day of the Vaikasi festival at the Athinathalwar temple. These special honours, described in Schedule III, included the tying of a silk garment and were distinguished from the ordinary honours listed in Schedules I and II. The plaintiff’s claim to both ordinary and special honours was grounded solely on his capacity as Aradhanalkar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple; the pleading contained no allegation that he held any office in the Athinathalwar temple itself. The defendants, in their written statements, expressly denied the plaintiff’s entitlement to those honours. The issues originally raised by the parties were confined to the allegations present in the pleadings. Had the courts confined their analysis to the pleadings, as was required, they would have dismissed the suit because the plaintiff was not an office‑holder in the Athinathalwar temple and therefore could not claim the perquisites attached to such an office. Instead, the courts proceeded beyond the pleadings in search of a plausible basis to sustain the plaintiff’s claim, a course that prevented an early dismissal. Consequently, the matter advanced to trial after the parties presented extensive evidence on alternative grounds, and the courts rendered decisions based on that evidence. The present discussion therefore turned to the alternative basis on which the plaintiff’s claim had been advanced in the lower courts, necessitating a review of the factual backdrop that underlies those arguments.

Initially, the District Munsif dismissed suit O.S. No. 320 of 1933 (recorded as O.S. No. 45 of 1945 in the Subordinate Judge’s file) on the ground that the plaintiff possessed no legal right that could be enforced in a civil proceeding. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge overturned that decree and ordered the suit to be retried. In paragraph 18 of his judgment, the Subordinate Judge observed that, based on the authorities cited, the plaintiff’s right of precedence to receive theertham, thulasi, satari, prasadam and other perquisites formed part of the emoluments of his office as Aradhanalkar in the Emberumanar temple, and therefore the suit could not be dismissed on the preliminary ground of bar under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. This observation was erroneous because the cited paragraphs of the plaint did not allege that the plaintiff held any office in the Athinathalwar temple. The mistaken premise led the Subordinate Judge to a conclusion that was not supported by the pleadings. When the matter reached the High Court on further appeal, the court noted this error. Justice Chandrasekara Aiyar, for the first time, permitted the plaintiff to articulate a new case. He contrasted two possible approaches: one consistent with the District Munsif’s view that the plaintiff, lacking an office in the Athinathalwar temple, could not claim the honours; and another, favored by the Subordinate Judge, that considered the alleged associations of the plaintiff with the temple as a basis for his claim. This set the stage for the continued adjudication of the plaintiff’s entitlement to the honours in question.

In the earlier judgment the learned Subordinate Judge had held that theertham, thulasi, satari, prasadam and other perquisites formed part of the emoluments of the office of aradanaikar in the suit temple and, therefore, the suit could not be dismissed on the preliminary ground that it was barred by Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court pointed out that this statement contained an obvious mistake because the paragraphs cited did not allege that the plaintiff held any office in the Athinathalwar temple. It was inferred that this mistake had led the learned Judge to reach the conclusion he did. On appeal to the High Court the error was highlighted, and Justice Chandrasekara Aiyar, for the first time, permitted the plaintiff to raise a new case. He expressed two possible approaches: one was the view adopted by the District Munsif that, since the plaintiff admittedly held no office in the Athinathalwar temple, he could not claim the said honours; the other was the view favoured by the Subordinate Judge that, because of the alleged associations, inter‑linking and inter‑dependence of the two temples, the aradanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple might be regarded as an office‑holder in the Athinathalwar temple. Justice Chandrasekara Aiyar did not finally decide the issue but observed that the concept of two temples or Mutts of equal rank, or of a primary institution with a subsidiary or adjunct linked for certain worship purposes, was not wholly alien to Hindu notions. He concluded that, before succeeding, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his position as aradanaikar and trustee of the Emberumanar temple amounted to holding an office in the suit temple. The origin of this new case, whether in the Subordinate Judge’s judgment or in Justice Chandrasekara Aiyar’s decision, was deemed irrelevant. The new issue had not been mentioned in the original plaint; however, after the remand both parties focused on this question and produced all relevant evidence. On remand the Subordinate Judge, in an elaborate judgment, examined the matter under three categories: historical, administrative and financial. Regarding the historical aspect, after reviewing the origins of the two temples, he concluded that the proposition that the Emberumanar temple was historically connected with the Athinathalwar temple could not be “poopoohed”. Under the administrative heading, he found that up to 1926 the Emberumanar temple functioned merely as a sub‑shrine attached to the larger Athinathalwar temple and that the trustees of the latter exercised administrative control over it. On the financial front, he determined that there was sufficient evidence to infer a close financial relationship between the two temples.

In examining the question of whether there existed a ceremonial and religious association between the two temples, the learned Subordinate Judge observed that the routine and day‑to‑day modes of worship at both temples displayed a noticeable similarity; however, he also concluded that there was no interlinking or interdependence between the two temples concerning those routine worship practices. Notwithstanding the absence of such interlinking in the ordinary worship, the Judge pointed out that the two temples were so closely associated in a number of other religious rites and ceremonies that a logical inference could be drawn that the Emberumanar temple functioned in reality as a sub‑shrine attached to the principal Athinathalwar temple. He further noted that, although the particular question in that precise form had not been presented before Justice Chandrasekara Aiyar, the matter was nevertheless open to his consideration. After a detailed review of the evidence, the Judge ultimately concluded that, in addition to the historical and secular connections already established, there also existed a ceremonial and religious association between the two temples, and consequently the Emberumanar temple was nothing other than a sub‑shrine of the main Athinathalwar temple. On the basis of that finding, the Judge held that the plaintiff, who was admittedly the aradhanaikar of the Emberumanar temple, was in effect an office‑holder of the main temple as well. When the various parties appealed the decrees of the Subordinate Judge, the learned District Judge of Tirunelveli revisited the evidence under the three heads—historical, administrative, and financial—and arrived at conclusions contrary to those of the Subordinate Judge. On the administrative point, he held that the Emberumanar temple was not subordinate to the Athinathalwar temple in the sense that the authorities of the latter could issue orders to the authorities of the former; thus, administratively, the two temples were independent. On the financial aspect, he was equally emphatic that the two institutions were not financially interdependent. Regarding the religious or ritual dimension, the District Judge observed that because both institutions were constructed at the same location, some connection between them was inevitable, and in a general sense the Emberumanar temple might be described as a sub‑shrine. Based on these facts, the Judge framed the question, “What is the inference to be derived?” He then answered, “I hold on the evidence that these institutions are not interdependent or intimately connected in such a way that an office‑holder of Emberumanar temple is necessarily an office‑holder of the Athinathalwar temple. I hold therefore that the plaintiff is not an office‑holder of the Athinathalwar temple and therefore he is not entitled to file a suit concerning his alleged right of precedence in being given theertham.” This conclusion was expressly characterized as a factual finding derived from the entire body of evidence. In the subsequent second appeal, the learned Judge of the High Court, after reviewing the same evidence, disagreed with the District Judge and adopted the earlier finding of the Subordinate Judge.

In this appeal the High Court judge, relying on reasoning similar to that of the lower courts, concluded that the plaintiff functioned as an office‑holder in the principal temple. The judge further stated that the plaintiff could also be regarded as occupying the position described as arulipad, and that, in that role, he was entitled to receive the first theertham together with the associated honors. The initial issue before the court concerned a question of fact. The learned District Judge, although reaching a conclusion different from that of the Subordinate Judge, after examining the whole record, found that the plaintiff was not an office‑holder of the Athinathalwar temple. It is now well established that the High Court does not have authority to entertain a second appeal on the basis of a mistaken finding of fact, even when that mistake appears to be serious. The judgment of the High Court does not reveal any permissible ground on which the finding of the District Judge could be disturbed. The second basis on which the High Court decided the case arose from a claim that was introduced for the first time before it. Neither the plaints nor the proceedings before either of the subordinate courts contained any allegation by the plaintiff that he held the office of arulipad. Consequently the High Court was not authorized to permit the plaintiff to raise such a claim for the first time in a second appeal. Moreover, the record shows that no office named arulipad exists. A two‑judge bench of the Madras High Court, in the case of Vathiar Venkatachariar v. P. Ponnappa Ayyengar, was confronted with the task of defining the term arulipad. In that case a claim was made to the office of theerthakar. After examining the evidence, the bench held that the plaintiffs had not established the existence of any mandatory duty attached to the theerthakar in the temple. In that context Justice Krishnan observed that the theerthakars have designated places in the temple from which they recite, and they receive the honors of thirtham and prasadam before outsiders obtain them; he added that they have what is termed an “arulipad”, meaning that the archaka calls their names in a prescribed order and, if present, they respond with the word “Nayinde”, which means “I am here”. This explanation makes clear that arulipad is not a separate office but merely describes the procedure by which the archaka summons the theerthakars to confirm their presence in the ghoshti. The present case contains no evidence that the plaintiff, even if he were a theerthakar, has any obligatory duty to perform in the Athinathalwar temple, and therefore he cannot be treated as an office‑holder in that capacity. This brings us to the submission of counsel for the respondent, which contends that, although it cannot be said that the Emberumanar temple is a part or subordinate of the Athinathalwar temple in the strict sense that all the (1) (1918) 45 I.C. 959. office‑holders of the former are the office‑holders of the

In this case, the Court observed that although the two temples were not legally merged, a strong ritual connection existed between them that the religious public regarded as making one subordinate to the other. The respondent’s counsel argued that this intimate religious relationship arose from historical, administrative and financial ties that had persisted for more than a hundred years. The Court noted that such an argument might possess some merit in a theological debate or before an ecclesiastical tribunal, but it could not be accepted in a civil proceeding. The judgment of Justice Krishnaswami Nayudu was then summarized, for his findings were taken as established facts and were not contested before the Court. According to that judgment, in all Vaishnavite temples the Alwars and the Acharyas occupied a prominent position in the temples’ religious ceremonies and observances. An attempt had been made to demonstrate an inter‑linking and inter‑dependence of the rituals of the two temples, yet, as the learned Subordinate Judge correctly observed, such inter‑dependence could not be proved with respect to the ordinary, day‑to‑day worship and rituals. The manner of performing divine service was uniform across Vaishnavite temples. Nevertheless, the Subordinate Judge found that, while the ritual of the main temple did not depend on that of the sub‑shrine, the Emberumanar deity, being an Acharya, was closely associated with the main temple deity during the principal festivals, especially the Margali and Vaikasi festivals, and during other religious ceremonies. Several Mandagapadis for the Athinatha Alwar were present in the Emberumanar temple, and a Sethu Thirumanjam involving both deities was performed on three occasions—twice at the Emberumanar temple and once at the main temple. In addition, an event called Alwar Sayanam, held on the tenth day of the Margali festival, took place in the main temple. Various other observances required the two deities to meet, and specific rituals were carried out. The Court explained that daily ritual in a Vaishnavite temple was routine, but on occasions such as the months of Margali and Vaikasi and on other festival days, the Alwars and Acharyas were required to meet the main deity and appropriate ceremonies were performed. It was deemed inconceivable for a temple where Vishnu was installed to function without the presence of the Alwars and Acharyas, who are devotees recognized with divine grace. The festivals associated with them depict incidents of such divine manifestation. The Court also mentioned that each Emberumanar Jeer, who was a Sanyasi, was installed in the Athinatha Alwar temple beneath its flagstaff, and the declaration of the succeeding Jeer’s status was made only in the presence of the main temple’s deity.

The record stated that a Sanyasi stood in the Athinatha Alwar temple beneath its flagstaff called the Dwajasthamba. The declaration of the status of the succeeding Jeer was made only when the deity of the main temple was present. It may also be added that at one time the share of tasdik allowance for the Emberumanar temple was paid through the trustee of the Athinathalwar temple. There was also an occasion when a trustee of the Emberumanar temple was dismissed by the trustee of the Athinathalwar temple. On the other hand, both temples operated under different managements, had separate office‑holders, distinct rituals, different budgets and separate endowments. In 1926 an application filed by the Emberumanar Jeer led the Religious Endowments Board to declare the Emberumanar temple an excepted temple. The declaration recognised the temple as a separate legal entity and confirmed that the Jeer was its hereditary trustee. The only question, therefore, was whether these facts allowed a court to hold that one temple was subordinate to the other. It also needed to be decided whether the office‑holders of one temple would become the office‑holders of the other. The facts clearly established that, both in fact and in law, the two institutions were different legal entities. In the past the trustees of the Athinathalwar temple sometimes disbursed tasdik allowances contributed by the Government to various temples, including the Emberumanar temple, for administrative convenience. It was common for the government to use the services of trustees of a larger temple to manage payments to smaller temples, and occasionally the amounts payable to the smaller temples lapsed. However, there was nothing on the record to show that such lapses were not due to negligence of the minor shrines’ trustees in failing to press the larger temple’s trustees for payment. It might also have been that the trustee of the larger temple, exercising supervisory authority, once dismissed a trustee of a smaller local shrine. Such an act could be explained by the larger temple’s paramount position in the locality. These actions may show that the trustee of the Athinathalwar temple had exercised supervisory control over minor temples in the past. However, that alone did not make the Emberumanar temple’s trustee an office‑holder of the larger temple. It was also known that previously the temples were supervised by the Revenue Board and later by various temple committees. The record could not support a suggestion that, because of this supervision, trustees of the minor temples were officers of the Revenue Board or of the temple committees. The Court also could not appreciate how the mutual visits of the idols to each other’s temple and the honors shown to the idols during such visits could affect the legal question.

The Court noted that the customs and honours described earlier do not have any bearing on the legal issue that required determination, although they demonstrate the deep‑rooted affection that the public associates between the deity and the devoted follower Ramanuja. The Court further explained that a friendly and respectful relationship between two distinct temples cannot, in the eyes of law, cause one temple to become a component of the other. Under established legal principles, two separate institutions may not be merged into a single entity merely because of sentimental attachment or affection that has developed between them. The Court observed that this line of argument had been correctly rejected by the learned District Judge, and it criticized the High Court for having erred in accepting that argument. Before concluding, the Court clarified that the present judgment was not intended to pass any opinion on the customary honours that are offered to either party within the temple of Athinathalwar. Accordingly, the Court held, in agreement with the District Judge, that the suits could not be entertained in a civil court. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and costs were awarded against the appellants throughout the proceedings. The appeals were thus allowed.