Smt. Padmini Kunwar Ju Sahiba vs State of Vindhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 250 of 1956

Decision Date: 21 February 1961

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta

In the matter titled Smt. Padmini Kunwar Ju Sahiba versus State of Vindhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 21 February 1961. The decision was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo and was delivered by a bench consisting of Justices K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar and K.C. Das Gupta. The case was cited as 1961 AIR 1204 and also appeared in the Supreme Court Reports, volume 3, page 907. The operative legislation was the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952, specifically section 2(1)(c), which defined the term “jagirdar” and related concepts such as “Ijaredar” and “Lambardari lease.” The headnote explained that in 1945 the ruler of Panna had granted a Lambardari lease over certain villages to the appellant. Subsequently, a notification dated 1 January 1954, issued under the said Abolition Act, claimed that the appellant’s right under that lease was resumed. The appellant argued that she was not a jagirdar within the meaning of the Act and therefore the notification lacked legal authority. The State contended that the appellant was an “Ijaredar” and thereby fell within the inclusive definition of “jagirdar” in section 2(1)(c). The Court held that the appellant did not qualify as a jagirdar and that her right under the Lambardari lease could not be resumed under the Abolition Act. It further explained that in the context of section 2(1)(c) the term “Ijaredar” referred to a person holding an Ijara, which was a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right, distinct from other kinds of leases. The Lambardari lease granted to the appellant was not a mere farm of land revenue; it conferred rights in the land itself and therefore was not a simple Ijara. Consequently, the appellant was not a mere “Ijaredar” and was not covered by the definition of “jagirdar” in the statute. The Court applied the reasoning of Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1955 2 S.C.R. 303. The judgment arose from Civil Appeal No. 250 of 1956, an appeal against the order dated 17 January 1955 of the former Judicial Commissioner’s Court in Vindhya Pradesh, which had arisen from Miscellaneous Civil Writ Application No. 105 of 1954. Counsel for the appellant were G. S. Pathak and G. C. Mathur, while counsel for the respondent were B. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar. The Court’s decision was delivered on 21 February 1961, and the judgment began with Justice Wanchoo stating that the appeal concerned a certificate granted by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh and proceeded to recount the essential facts, including the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashment of the Deputy Commissioner’s order dated 29 December 1953, which had resumed the appellant’s rights in certain villages pursuant to a government notification dated 20 December 1953 under section 5 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952.

The Court noted that the petition sought to have set aside the order issued under the notification of the Act which directed that all jagirs possessing a gross annual income of one thousand rupees or more be resumed. The petitioner, a lady, asserted that on 7 December 1945 His Highness the Maharaja of Panna had granted her, as a special case, a Lambardari lease over certain villages for a period of thirty years, and that she had remained in possession of those villages in accordance with the terms of that lease. She argued that she did not fall within the definition of “jagirdar” contained in the Act; consequently the notification could not be said to apply to her lands, and the order made by the Deputy Commissioner pursuant to that notification was without legal authority and ought to be set aside. She further maintained that she was not a jagirdar under any law, rule, regulation or order governing jagirdars that was in force anywhere in the State, and therefore her lands could not be resumed in the manner adopted by the government.

The State opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioner was indeed a jagirdar within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act. The learned Judicial Commissioner examined the submissions and held that the petitioner qualified as an Ijaredar and, therefore, as a jagirdar within the meaning of section 2(1)(c) of the Act. Acting on that finding, the Judicial Commissioner dismissed the petition. An application for a certificate of appeal to this Court was subsequently filed and granted, bringing the present appeal before the Court. The sole question for determination was whether the petitioner could be described as an Ijaredar within the meaning of section 2(1)(c) of the Act.

Section 2(1)(c) defines “jagirdar” as any person recognised as a jagirdar under any law, rule, regulation or order governing jagirdars in force in any part of the State and expressly includes an Ilakedar, a Pawaidar, a sub‑Pawaidar (whether in direct relation with the Government or otherwise), an ljaredar, an Ubaridar, a Zamindar, a Muafidar and a grantee of jagir land from a jagirdar. Section 2(1)(d) defines “jagir land” as any land in which, or in relation to which, any jagirdar has rights as such with respect to land revenue or any other kind of revenue. Under section 5 the Act provides that, as soon as may be after the commencement of the Act, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix a date for the resumption of any class of jagir lands and may fix different dates for different classes of jagir lands. The notification that resumed jagir lands having a gross annual income of one thousand rupees or more was issued under this provision. The Court observed that it was not in dispute that the lands in question had not been granted to the petitioner by the Ruler of Panna as a jagir, nor was it disputed that the petitioner was not recognised as a jagirdar under any law, rule, regulation or order governing jagirdars in any part of the State.

In the present matter the appellant was not recognised as a jagirdar under any law, rule, regulation or order governing jagirdars that were in force in any part of the State. The State argued that the appellant fell within the inclusive part of the definition of “jagirdar” contained in section 2(1)(c) because she was an Ijaredar. The inclusive part of that definition, however, had not been defined anywhere in the Act. Some of the terms appearing in the inclusive part were ordinary words, while others were not. For instance, the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Code referred to a Pawaidar, a sub‑Pawaidar and an Ilakedar who was a senior Pawaidar. It was not clear whether the remaining words in the inclusive part of the definition occurred in any other statutes that were applicable in the various territories that later formed the State of Vindhya Pradesh, although the term “Ubaridar” seemed to be uncommon and appeared to possess a special local significance. Consequently, it was reasonable to hold that, where such words appeared in any law in force in any part of the State, they should be given the meaning conferred by that law; but where they did not appear in any such law, they should be given their ordinary meaning. The Judicial Commissioner, in his judgment, observed that “an Ijaredar as such has not been defined under any law relating to land revenue and tenancy in force in any part of Vindhya Pradesh.” Accordingly, the word “Ijaredar” had to be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. The ordinary meaning of the word “Ijara”, from which “Ijaredar” is derived, denoted a lease or farm of land revenue or another proprietary right, as distinguished from a patta or a lease of land for cultivation, although on some occasions it was used simply to refer to any lease of land. The question that then arose was what meaning should be attached to “Ijaredar” in section 2(1)(c) of the Act. It was deemed that, considering the context in which the term was used, it must acquire the colour of that context and could not be understood to mean any lease of land of any kind. In the setting of the provision, “Ijaredar” should be confined to a person who holds an Ijara, that is, a lease or farm of land revenue or another proprietary right, as distinguished from other kinds of leases. The subsequent issue was whether the lease in the present case constituted a lease of land revenue or another proprietary right, as opposed to a lease of land of a different character. The lease in question was described as a Lambardari lease, although it appeared that the system of Lambardari leases had been abolished in the State of Panna long ago, as indicated in paragraph (2) of Chapter II of the Revenue Administration Manual of the Panna State.

In the Revenue Administration Manual of the Panna State, which was prepared by J E Goudge, the Settlement Officer for the Bundelkhand States, in the year 1907, a specific paragraph stated that the system of Lambardari leases had been abolished and that future rent would be realised by the Darbar directly from each tenant through the village zamindars. The zamindar in that locality was described as a petty village official whose sole function was to collect rents; he did not possess any proprietary interest in the land from which the rents were collected. The passage further indicated that a Lambardari lease originally constituted a type of lease of land revenue, but that such leases had long ago been abolished in the area relevant to the present case. Although the lease under consideration was labelled a Lambardari lease, the Court noted that the label alone was not determinative and that the substance of the lease needed to be examined to decide whether it was in fact a lease of land revenue.

The lease itself began by stating that the villages covered by the lease generated an average annual income of Rs 1,242½, payable in two instalments in the months of June and December. The lease was to endure for a period of thirty years, and the lessee was required to pay the entire amount of Rs 1,242½ as lease money, an amount that would remain fixed for the whole thirty‑year term. The lease further provided that, should any settlement occur during that period which increased the revenue, or should the Lambardar herself increase the income by inhabiting the villages, the Lambardar would be entitled to retain the additional benefit arising from such increase. Conversely, the lease stipulated that if, for any reason, the rent of the land were decreased, the Lambardar would not be entitled to a corresponding reduction in the lease money. From these provisions, the Court observed that the Lambardar stood to gain nothing from the lease except in the event of a future settlement that raised revenue.

Additionally, the lease contained a clause that if, during the term of the lease, the Lambardar made any improvements—such as planting groves and orchards or constructing large or small dams—she would, at the end of the lease, be entitled to sell or mortgage those improvements and to enjoy the benefits derived from them. Finally, an important provision stated that the lessee’s right to mortgage and sell the lands would be governed by the laws of the State, and that any subsequent amendment to those laws would thereafter govern those rights. These various clauses demonstrated, in the Court’s view, that the appellant was obtaining more than a simple lease of land revenue; the appellant was acquiring actual rights in the land, including the right to cultivate it. Reading the lease as a whole, it did not appear to be merely a lease of land revenue or another proprietary right, but rather a conveyance of broader rights in the land.

The lessee obtained a right over all lands that were not actually cultivated by tenants at the time the lease was executed. Under the lease, the lessee was authorized to carry out improvements on the land, to establish groves and orchards, and to construct both large and small dams. Furthermore, the lessee was permitted to mortgage and to sell any portions of the land that she might bring under her own cultivation, provided that such actions complied with the laws of the State. Because of these extensive rights, it was difficult to regard the arrangement merely as an Ijara, nor could the appellant be described as a mere Ijaredar in the sense of that term as previously defined. Although the lease did contain an element that resembled a lease of land revenue, that component was not likely to generate any profit for the appellant, and the lease as a whole extended far beyond a simple Ijara. It effectively granted the appellant rights in lands that were not being cultivated by tenants at the moment of the lease. Consequently, the Court could not concur with the learned Judicial Commissioner’s view that the transaction evidenced by the lease was a mere Ijara and that the appellant was a mere Ijaredar falling within section 2(1)(c). In the Court’s opinion, the lease conferred substantive rights in land and was therefore not an Ijara. The appellant’s situation was held to be analogous to the case presented in Petition No. 392 of 1954 concerning the Khandela estate, where the Court in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan held that a lease involving an annual assessment of Rs 80,001 was not covered by the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The present case was found to be similar, and the lease could not render the appellant a mere Ijaredar within the meaning of section 2(1)(c). Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the order of the Deputy Commissioner rescinding the appellant’s villages was set aside, and the appellant was directed to receive compensation from the State of Madhya Pradesh, the successor to the State of Vindhya Pradesh. The appeal was thus allowed. (1) [1955] A S.C.R. 367.