Singhal Ajit Kumar and Another vs Ujayarsingh And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 462 of 1957

Decision Date: 16 March 1961

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, Subbarao K., Subba Rao

In the matter titled Singhal Ajit Kumar and Another versus Ujayarsingh and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 16 March 1961. The opinion was authored by Justice Raghubar Dayal, who sat on a bench that also included Justice Subbarao, K. and Justice Dayal, Raghubar. The petitioners were identified as Singhal Ajit Kumar and another individual, while the respondents were named as Ujayarsingh and others. The case was recorded under the citation 1961 AIR 1334 and also appeared in the 1962 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports, volume 1, page 347. The legal issue concerned the inheritance rights under Hindu law applicable to a Sudra Hindu who died leaving two widows and an illegitimate son born of a continuously and exclusively kept concubine. The central question was whether the illegitimate son was entitled to succeed to the share of the estate that belonged to the widows after their deaths, given that the son had previously inherited a one‑half share upon the death of his father.

The headnote explained that the deceased Sudra Hindu’s estate was initially divided, with the illegitimate son receiving a moiety and the two widows sharing the remaining moiety. After the widows died without leaving any daughters or grandsons, the reversioners filed a suit seeking possession of the entire estate. The illegitimate son argued that he was lawfully entitled to the half share he had received at his father’s death, and that the same half should pass to him upon the widows’ deaths. The Court held that the illegitimate son did indeed succeed to half of the estate at the time of his father’s death and that he also succeeded to the other half when the widows died. The Court clarified that, under Hindu law, an illegitimate son possesses the status of a son but has no rights by birth and therefore cannot demand partition of his father’s property while the father is alive. Upon the father’s death, the illegitimate son is entitled to inherit the father’s self‑acquired property alongside any legitimate son. If the legitimate son predeceases him, the illegitimate son inherits the entire property by survivorship. In the absence of a legitimate son, the illegitimate son is entitled to a one‑half share when a widow, a daughter, or a daughter’s son of the last male holder exists, and he succeeds to the whole estate if none of those heirs are present. The Court further explained that when a widow inherits half of the estate, her death reopens succession to the half held by the last male, and the illegitimate son, having the status of a son, has a preferential claim over other reversioners. The Court referenced several authorities, including Raja Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra v. Nityarnund Mansingh (1890) L.R. 17 I.A. 128, Kamulammal v. Visvanathaswami Naicker (1922) L.R. 50 I.A. 32, Vallaiyappa Chetty v. Natarajan (1931) I.L.R. 55 Mad. 1, and Bhagwantrao v. Punjaram (1938) I.L.R. 1938 Nag. 255, while distinguishing Karuppayee Ammal v. Ramaswami (1932) I.L.R. 55 Mad. 856. The judgment was delivered in a civil appeal (No. 462 of 1957) arising by special leave from a decree dated 18 April 1952 of the former Nagpur High Court in First Appeal No. 88 of 1942. Counsel for the appellant and respondent were presented, and the judgment was pronounced by Justice Subbarao, who noted that the appeal by special leave was directed against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur.

In this appeal the Court examined the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur, which had affirmed the decision of the Second Additional District Judge of Jabalpur in Civil Suit No 9‑A of 1942. That suit had been instituted by respondents numbered two through seven, each asserting that they were the rightful reversioners of the estate of Raja Ajitsingh. Raja Ajitsingh was the ruler of the Saliya Estate, an estate comprising seventy‑three villages together with other property situated in the Jabalpur and Saugor districts. He died on 2 January 1910 leaving behind two widows, Rani Khuman Kuar and Rani Anant Kuar, and an illegitimate son named Ramraghuraj Singh. Rani Anant Kuar died around 1914, and Rani Khuman Kuar survived until 1 February 1922. Following the death of the Raja, the Court of Wards assumed control of the estate on behalf of the widows in 1913 and retained possession until 27 March 1923. After the death of Rani Khuman Kuar, the local Government issued a notification designating Ramraghuraj Singh as the successor to the estate; nevertheless, for reasons not clarified in the record, the Court of Wards continued to manage the estate on his behalf from 23 September 1923. Ramraghuraj Singh died on 23 April 1932, and on his death the first respondent, his son, was declared a ward of the Court of Wards, which thereafter continued to administer the estate on the son’s behalf. Respondents 2 to 6, claiming to be the reversioners of Raja Ajitsingh’s estate, filed a suit on 15 June 1935 seeking recovery of possession of the estate. The appellants, identified as numbers 1 and 2, were alleged to be assignees pendente lite of the interest of those alleged reversioners.

The plaintiffs contended that Ramraghuraj Singh was the son of a woman named Jhutti by her husband Sukhai, and that because Raja Ajitsingh had no legitimate issue, the Raja and his widows had treated the boy as their own son. They further argued that the Lodhi community to which Raja Ajitsingh belonged was not a Sudra caste, and therefore, even if Ramraghuraj Singh were an illegitimate son, he was not entitled to a share of the estate. Accordingly, the plaintiffs maintained that on the death of the widows, half of their share in the estate would devolve upon the reversioners, excluding the illegitimate son. In addition, they submitted that the Court of Wards’ possession of the entire estate from 2 January 1910 to 1 February 1922 was adverse to the alleged rights of the illegitimate son, and that such adverse possession caused the son to lose any title he might have had.

The first respondent presented a contrasting narrative. He asserted that Raja Ajitsingh belonged to the Sudra caste and that Ramraghuraj Singh was born to the Raja by a continuously and exclusively kept concubine named Raj Dulari. He further claimed that the widows never questioned Ramraghuraj Singh’s right to a share in the property of Raja Ajitsingh, thereby negating any possibility of a claim of adverse possession. Finally, the respondent argued that after the death of the widows, succession to the estate opened for one half share, and that the illegitimate son, being the nearest heir, succeeded to that share as well.

In the matter before the courts, the succession to the estate of Raja Ajit Singh was the subject of detailed consideration. The facts established that, after the death of the widows of Raja Ajit Singh, the estate opened out to a one‑half share, and the illegitimate son, being the nearest heir, succeeded to that share as well. Both the trial court and the High Court arrived at an identical set of findings. First, they held that Raja Ajit Singh belonged to the Sudra caste. Second, they found that Raja Raghuraj Singh was the son of Raja Ajit Singh by a continuously and exclusively kept concubine named Raj Dulari, who had entered the concubinage of Raja Ajit Singh after the death of her husband. Third, they concluded that, as the illegitimate son of Raja Ajit Singh, Ramraghuraj Singh was entitled to a moiety of the estate of his putative father, while the two widows of Raja Ajit Singh succeeded to the other moiety. Fourth, they observed that there was no daughter or daughter's son; consequently, after the widows’ deaths, Ramraghuraj Singh, being the sole surviving heir of his putative father, inherited the moiety of the estate that had been held by the widows during their lifetimes. Fifth, they stated that Ramraghuraj Singh remained in joint possession of the estate together with the widows, and although the Court of Wards had assumed superintendence on behalf of the Ranies, he was never dispossessed during the widows’ lifetimes; therefore, his title could not be lost by adverse possession. Sixth, they held that the plaintiffs’ suit was barred by section 26 of the Central Provinces Court of Wards Act. Seventh, they found that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the limitation period. The trial court, however, expressed the view that the plaintiffs had not been shown to be the reversioners of Raja Ajit Singh, whereas the High Court held that they had been proved to be so. As a result, the trial court dismissed the suit, and the High Court affirmed that dismissal on appeal. The second appellant died, and his legal representatives were not brought on record, causing the appeal as to that appellant to abate; the first appellant alone continued with the appeal. The Supreme Court ordinarily accepts the concurrent findings of the lower courts unless exceptional circumstances are shown, and no such circumstances were presented in this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court accepted the findings that Raja Ajit Singh was a member of the Sudra caste and that Ramraghuraj Singh was his son by the concubine Raj Dulari. The principal issue on appeal was whether an illegitimate son of a Sudra, having already succeeded to a half share of his putative father's self‑acquired property, could also succeed to the other half share held by the widow after her death, a question that depended upon the extent of the illegitimate son’s right to inherit the self‑acquired property of his putative father.

In this case the Court examined the source of an illegitimate son’s right to inherit the self‑acquired property of his putative father. The Court found that the authority for such a right resided in the Hindu law treatises. The Mitakshara commentary on the texts of Manu and Yajnavalkya, in Chapter 1, section 12, contains three verses that describe the circumstances under which a son born to a Sudra father and a female slave may receive a share. The first verse states that while the father is alive the son may obtain a share at the father’s discretion, but if the father has died the brothers must give the son half of a share, and if there are no brothers the son may inherit the whole estate unless there are daughters or sons of daughters, in which case he is limited to half a share. The second verse reiterates that after the father’s death the son of a female slave is entitled to one‑half of a brother’s portion when there are sons of a wedded wife; if there are no such sons, the son may take the whole estate provided there are no daughters of a wife or sons of daughters, otherwise he receives only half a share. The third verse clarifies that a son born to a man of a regenerated tribe and a female slave does not obtain a share by the father’s choice nor the entire estate after the father’s death; instead, if he is obedient, he is entitled only to a modest maintenance. The passages do not mention a widow. The Dattaka Chandrika, in verses 30 and 31, adds that when an heir exists even down to a daughter’s son, the son born to a female slave does not take the whole estate but shares equally with such an heir.

The Court then referred to the leading authority on the rights of an illegitimate son, namely the Judicial Committee decision in Raja Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra v. Nityanund Mansingh. In that case a Raja left a legitimate son and an illegitimate son. When the legitimate son, who had succeeded the Raja, died, the Committee held that the illegitimate son succeeded to the estate by survivorship. Sir Richard Couch, delivering the judgment, quoted the same two verses from Mitakshara, Chapter 1, section 12, and explained at length that the first verse shows that during the father’s lifetime the law permits the son to receive a share at the father’s discretion, but it does not confer an inherent right to a share at birth comparable to that of a legitimate son. The commentary further notes that once the father is dead, the brothers must allot the son half of a share, and the same expression “the son of the female slave participates for half a share only” recurs. On this basis the Court adopted the view of the Bombay High Court that, within an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara school, an illegitimate son becomes entitled to the whole immovable property of the family if the legitimate son dies without male issue. The Court also cited the Judicial Committee’s ruling in Kamulammal v. Visvanathaswami Naicker, which held that in a contest between a widow and an illegitimate son for the putative father’s property, the illegitimate son is allotted half of the property while the widow receives the other half.

In the passage cited, the verses from the Mitakshara state that when the father is dead, “the brothers should make him partaker of the moiety of a share.” The second verse therefore commands the brothers to allow the individual to take a half‑share, and a later expression repeats the same idea: “The son of the female slave participates for half a share only.” Relying on this interpretation, the Court accepted the view of the Bombay High Court and held that, within an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara, an illegitimate son acquires the entire immovable property of the family if the legitimate son dies without any male issue. The Judicial Committee revisited the position of an illegitimate son in Kamulammal v. Visvanathaswami Naicker (2). In that case it was held that, when a widow and an illegitimate son contend for the property of the deceased father, the illegitimate son is entitled to one half of the property and the widow to the other half. Sir Lawrence Jenkins observed at page 37 that the dispute was between the illegitimate son and the widow, and although the widow is not named in the textual source, it is well settled that, as a preferential heir of the daughter’s son, she is included among those who share with the illegitimate son; further, it would be unnecessary to speculate why the text omitted her name.

The status of the illegitimate son was examined again by the Privy Council in Vellaiyappa Chetty v. Natarajan (1). The question arose concerning the illegitimate son’s right to maintenance from joint‑family property after his father’s death, where the father possessed no separate property. The Judicial Committee held that the illegitimate son, as a member of the family, was entitled to maintenance out of the joint‑family property held by the collaterals with whom the father was joint. In addressing the question of status, Sir Dinshah Mulla, speaking for the Court, after reviewing the relevant Hindu‑law texts and preceding decisions, concluded at page 15 that “on a consideration of the texts and the cases on the subject their Lordships are of opinion that the illegitimate son of a Sudra by a continuous concubine has the status of a son, and that he is a member of the family; that the share of inheritance given to him is not merely in lieu of maintenance, but in recognition of his status as a son; … It is not necessary to multiply decisions. The law pertaining to the right of inheritance of an illegitimate son to his putative father’s self‑acquired property may be stated as follows: an illegitimate son has the status of a son under Hindu law and he is a member of the family. However, his rights are limited compared to those of a son born in wedlock. He has no right by birth and therefore cannot demand partition during his father’s lifetime. During the father’s lifetime the law permits the illegitimate son to receive only such share as his father may give him. Upon the father’s death he takes his father’s self‑acquired property together with the legitimate son, and if the legitimate son dies, he succeeds to the entire property by survivorship. Even when there is no legitimate son, the illegitimate son is entitled to a moiety of his father’s estate when a widow, daughter or daughter’s son of the last male holder exists; in the absence of any of those three heirs, he succeeds to the whole estate of his father. From these premises it follows that an illegitimate son, subject to the limitations prescribed by Hindu‑law texts, enjoys the status of a son and is an heir to the self‑acquired property of his putative father.”

The Court explained that an illegitimate son does not acquire any right of inheritance by birth, and consequently he is not entitled to demand a partition of his father’s property while his father is alive. During the father’s lifetime the law permits the illegitimate son to receive only such portion as his father may voluntarily give him, as reflected in the authority (1931) I.L. R. 55 Mad. 1. However, on the death of the father the illegitimate son becomes entitled to his father’s self‑acquired property together with any legitimate son. If the legitimate son predeceases him, the illegitimate son succeeds to the entire estate by survivorship. In a situation where there is no legitimate son, the illegitimate son is entitled to one half of the father’s estate when a widow, a daughter or the daughter’s son of the last male holder is alive. In the absence of any of those three heirs, the illegitimate son succeeds to the whole estate of his father. From these premises the Court concluded that, except for the limitations prescribed by Hindu Law texts, the illegitimate son enjoys the status of a son and is an heir to the self‑acquired property of his putative father. Having recognised that right, the Court questioned on what principle the illegitimate son could be deprived of his right to the other half of his father’s property after the widow’s death. Under Hindu Law, the widow’s death opens the succession to reversioners, and the nearest heir to the last full owner at that moment becomes entitled to possession. In a competition between an illegitimate son and other reversioners, the illegitimate son is certainly a nearer heir to the last male holder than the other reversioners. If he was the nearest heir, yielding only a half‑share to the widow at the father’s death, the Court asked how he could cease to be a nearer heir by the intervening estate of the widow. Since, on the widow’s death, the estate reverts to the last male holder, the succession must be traced back to him, and by that tracing the illegitimate son enjoys a preferential claim over all other reversioners. The Court noted that Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th edition, at page 637, controverts this position by stating that the illegitimate son, though he inherits on the death of his putative father, cannot become a reversionary heir on the death of the widow or daughter because he is “undoubtedly neither a sagotra nor a bhinnagotra sapinda of the last male holder within the text of Manu.” The Court expressed regret that it could not accept this proposition, for accepting it would mean speaking in two voices. Once it is established that, for the purpose of succession, an illegitimate son of a Sudra has the status of a son and is entitled to succeed to his putative father’s entire self‑acquired property in the absence of a son, widow, daughter or daughter’s son, and to a share when those heirs exist, the Court could see no escape from the logical consequence that the illegitimate son must also succeed to the other half‑share when succession opens after the widow’s death.

It was held that the illegitimate son was entitled to succeed to the remaining half share of the estate once the succession opened after the widow’s death. The widow’s intervening interest merely delayed the opening of succession with respect to that half share; it did not create a new line of descent or divert the succession into a different channel, because the widow could not constitute herself a fresh stock of descent. The author of Mayne’s Hindu Law attempted to support his view by referring to a decision of the Madras High Court in Karuppayee Ammal v. Ramaswami. However, a careful examination of that judgment reveals that it does not lay down the proposition asserted by the author. In the case before the Madras High Court, the last male owner of a Sudra estate died, leaving his widow in possession of one moiety of the estate and his illegitimate son in possession of the other moiety. Subsequently the widow died, and the survivors included a son of the daughter of the last male owner together with the aforementioned illegitimate son. The Madras High Court ruled that the son of the daughter was entitled to the moiety that had vested in the widow, and that the illegitimate son was not entitled to any portion of that moiety. The court explained its reasoning at page 868, stating: “The principle underlying the doctrine of reverter is that the last male‑holder’s estate is inherited by females who have no free right of alienation and who hold a peculiar kind of estate called ‘woman’s estate’; on the death of such a female the then heir of the last male‑holder succeeds to the last male‑holder’s estate. By its very nature the doctrine cannot legitimately apply to a case where, on the death of the last male‑holder, the estate vests not in a female heir but also in a male heir. In such circumstances the doctrine does not strictly apply, nor has it, to our knowledge, been applied.” (1932) I.L.R. 55 Mad. 856. Consequently, the decision makes clear that when a daughter’s son succeeds to an estate, the doctrine of reverter finds no further application. The learned judges also expressly left open the question of what would happen if the last daughter died without leaving a son, remarking, “We are not now concerned with the question as to what would become of the property if the last of the daughters died without leaving a daughter‑son, in such circumstances.” Therefore, that decision cannot be invoked to support the contention that, in a situation where the doctrine of reverter applies, the illegitimate son is excluded from succession. By contrast, the Nagpur High Court in Bhagwantrao v. Punjaram correctly concluded that when a partition allocated a share to a widow between a legitimate and an illegitimate son, the illegitimate son became entitled to a share of the property upon the widow’s death. Accordingly, the Court held that on the death of the widow, the illegitimate son—who is the father of the first respondent—succeeded to the remaining half share of the estate.

The Court observed that the appellant claimed the illegitimate son inherited the other half share of the estate of his presumed father, Raja Ajit Singh. The appellant further contended that the widows had acquired an absolute interest in Raja Ajit Singh’s estate by adverse possession, and that consequently the property should pass not to Raja Ajit Singh’s heirs but to the heirs of the widows. Both lower courts had ruled against the appellant on the issue of adverse possession. However, counsel for the appellant argued that the matter presented a mixed question of fact and law. He maintained that the lower courts had overlooked the fact that the Court of Wards, acting on behalf of the widows, held the estate adversely to Ramraghuraj Singh with respect to his half share. The appellant’s counsel asserted that the widows’ failure to deny Ramraghuraj Singh’s title during the Court of Wards’ management, and their admission of his title, could not affect the determination of adverse possession.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the appellant’s contention were correct, the Court found no logical way in which that legal position would aid the appellant’s case. The Court of Wards, the Court noted, had only managed the widows’ limited estate, and the appellant had not shown that the Court of Wards had obtained an absolute interest on behalf of the widows in the half share belonging to Ramraghuraj Singh in the suit properties (see (1) I.L.R. 1938 Nag. 255). The plaintiffs themselves claimed to be heirs of Raja Ajit Singh on the basis that succession would open when the widows died. If the plaintiffs’ claim that the widows had acquired an absolute interest in half of the property were accepted, the plaintiffs would be improperly before the Court, because their suit was not filed to recover the property as heirs of the widows.

The Court clarified that the widows could only acquire title by adverse possession in respect of Ramraghuraj Singh’s share in their capacity as owners of a limited estate. Regarding their own half share, they held it as the widow’s estate; concerning the other half‑share belonging to Ramraghuraj Singh, any right they acquired by adverse possession was likewise limited to that estate. Consequently, when the widows died, succession to Raja Ajit Singh’s estate would open, and the illegitimate son, being the nearest heir, would succeed to the entire estate. Accordingly, the Court rejected the appellant’s contention.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal fails. No costs were awarded to the respondent because the respondent’s counsel was absent from the Court at the time the judgment was delivered. The appeal was therefore dismissed.