Sikander Jehan Begum And Another vs Andhra Pradesh State Government

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 279 of 1960

Decision Date: 20 December, 1961

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

In this matter the petitioners, identified as Sikander Jehan Begum and another, instituted proceedings against the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The case was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 20 December 1961, with the bench comprising P. B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and J. C. Shah. The judgment is reported in 1962 AIR 996 and in the Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports, volume 2, page 226. The statutory provision under consideration was Section 13(2) of the Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 (Act 10 of 1952), which sought to give finality to certain orders relating to Atiyat grants and jagirs and to exclude civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over them. The constitutional issues raised involved Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners claimed succession to the properties, including the Atiyat jagirs, of their brother, a Nawab of Hyderabad who died in 1944. Following his death, a Firman issued by the Nizam transferred his estate to government supervision pending determination of the rightful successors. After the Police action of 1948, the Nizam, advised by the Military Governor, issued another Firman establishing a tribunal to investigate the succession question. The tribunal’s report identified certain successors, but the petitioners were not among them. Subsequently, the Nizam delegated his authority to the Military Governor, whose functions later passed to the Chief Minister after the Constitution came into force in 1950. The Chief Minister affirmed the tribunal’s report by an order dated 3 April 1950. Two widows of the deceased Nawab challenged the Chief Minister’s order through a writ petition in the High Court, but their challenge was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act became operative on 14 March 1952, and Section 13(2) stipulated that any orders issued between 19 September 1948 and the commencement of the Act, whether by the Military Governor, the Chief Civil Administrator, the Chief Minister of Hyderabad, or the Revenue Minister acting under powers conferred by the Chief Minister, would be deemed final and could not be questioned in any court of law. The petitioners filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and also sought special leave to appeal the High Court’s decision. They relied on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Ammeerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, [1953] S.C.R. 404, arguing that Section 13(2) denied them the right to raise succession‑related questions before a civil court, thereby violating Article 14.

In this matter, the Court examined the claim that the restriction on seeking succession in a civil court violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court rejected that claim, holding that the contention had to be negatived. The Legislature, when it enacted the provision in question, intended to confirm all orders issued between the beginning of the police action and the date on which the Act became operative, and to prevent those orders from being reopened either before the Atiyat courts or before any civil court. The Court observed that during that interval a number of historic events occurred in the State of Hyderabad, and that the Legislature deliberately treated the orders passed in that period as a distinct class. Because the orders were classified as a separate group, no objection could be raised under Article 14 on the ground of discrimination, and the earlier decision that the petitioners relied upon could not be applied. Moreover, Section 13(2) did not merely validate the order that was under dispute in the present case; it validated every order issued in the defined period and applied only to Atiyat Jagir property, a type of property to which the personal law of the parties could not be applied. The Court noted that, under Hyderabad law, a Jagir did not pass by inheritance on the death of the jagirdar; instead, its devolution always involved a resumption by the Government followed by a fresh grant. Consequently, no individual claiming succession to a Jagir possessed a right to sue in a civil court, and any person who obtained the estate did so by virtue of a re‑grant made by the State through the decision of the Chief Minister. The earlier authority, Ammeerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (1953) S.C.R. 404, was therefore distinguished and held inapplicable. Given the special nature of the property involved, the Court further concluded that the impugned provision did not offend Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

The judgment related to Civil Appeal No 279 of 1960, which was filed by special leave against the order dated 30 June 1952 of the former Hyderabad High Court in Writ Application No 13 of 1950, and to Petition No 197 of 1956, a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking enforcement of fundamental rights. The appeal and the petition were brought by the same parties. Counsel appearing for the appellants and petitioners included the Attorney‑General of India and several other counsel, while the respondents were represented by a separate team of advocates. The case was decided on 20 December 1961, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar. Both the writ petition and the civil appeal raised a concise question concerning the validity of Section 13, sub‑section 2 of the Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 (No X of 1952), hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” The Court observed that the question was limited in scope, but that the surrounding facts were somewhat complex and therefore required a detailed statement at the beginning of the judgment.

In order to enable a proper appreciation of the background of the dispute, the Court noted that Sikander Jehan Begum and Khurshid Jehan Teleyawar Begum were the petitioners in the writ petition and the appellants in the civil appeal. They were the legitimate sisters of Nawab Kamal Yar Jung, who had died on 26 January 1944. According to the petition, the deceased Nawab was survived by three legitimate wives and two legitimate sisters, but he left no legitimate children. Nevertheless, the Nawab had taken several concubines, referred to as Khawases, and he fathered three illegitimate sons and one illegitimate daughter. These four illegitimate children were identified as respondents Nos. 6‑9 in the writ petition. The concubines who gave birth to these children were themselves identified as respondents Nos. 10 & 11. Respondents Nos. 6‑11 asserted that they were the legitimate heirs of the Nawab, contending that respondents Nos. 10 & 11 should be treated as the Nawab’s lawful wives, thereby making their children legitimate heirs. A contested issue of succession to the Nawab’s estate therefore gave rise to the present controversy.

The Court further explained that the Nawab belonged to a prominent noble family of the Hyderabad State and possessed extensive jagir as well as non‑jagir properties. Shortly after his death, on 8 February 1944, the Nizam appointed a Commission of Enquiry to conduct a regular investigation into the inheritance (“Virasat”) of the late Nawab. By a firman issued for that purpose, the Nizam directed that the government should take over the estate of the deceased Nawab, place it under governmental supervision, and, after determining the rightful successor, arrange for the delivery of the property to the appropriate person. Consequently, the government assumed possession of the Nawab’s properties and continued to hold them. On 17 September 1948, police action began and concluded on 26 September 1948, the date on which the Military Governor assumed charge of the administration of the Hyderabad State. On 9 November 1948, the Commission of Enquiry that had been appointed by the Nizam submitted its report. The report concluded that, based on the Commission’s findings, Husain Khan, Tahawar Husain Khan, Sadiq Husain and Khatija Begum were the legitimate and lawful son and daughter of the late Nawab, and that, apart from Riyasatunnisa Begum, Lal Bee and Azizunnisa Begum—who were the Nawab’s wives—no other person could be recognized as entitled to succeed to his estate. The Court observed that this report apparently did not receive the sanction or approval of the Nizam. Subsequently, on 22 November 1948, the Nizam issued another firman constituting a new special Tribunal, acting on the recommendation of the Military Governor, to rehear the Virasat enquiry. The Tribunal was empowered to record fresh evidence if necessary. The Tribunal rendered its report on 3 April 1949. The majority of the Tribunal held that the three widows of the late Nawab were his legitimate wives and therefore each should receive an equal one‑twelfth share of the estate. The Tribunal further expressed the opinion that Sheerin Bua and Parichehra Bua were the Mutha wives and that their sons—Syed Mohd., Hussain Khan, Syed Tahawar Hussain Khan and Syed Sadiq Hussain Khan—were the legitimate sons of the Nawab, entitling them collectively to an additional one‑twelfth share. The remaining one‑second share, according to the majority, was to be allotted to Khedja Begum, whom the majority considered the legitimate daughter of the late Nawab.

In the Tribunal’s majority opinion, it was held that Sheerin Bua and Parichehra Bua were the Mutha wives of the late Nawab and that their sons Syed Mohd., Hussain Khan, Syed Tahawar Hussain Khan and Syed Sadiq Hussain Khan were the legitimate offspring of the late Nawab. Consequently, the Tribunal decided that those four individuals together should receive a share of one‑twelfth of the estate. The Tribunal further concluded that the remaining one‑half share should be allotted to Khedja Begum, whom the majority regarded as the lawful daughter of the late Nawab. After the Military Governor assumed control of the administration of the State of Hyderabad, the Nizam issued a Firman on 19 September 1948 that delegated all administrative authority to the Military Governor. By a subsequent Firman dated 7 August 1949, the Nizam clarified that the powers transferred to the Military Governor also included the authority to make Regulations, and that this power would continue to be deemed part of the Governor’s remit. Later, the Chief Minister succeeded the Military Governor, and the Nizam issued a Firman on 1 December 1949 terminating the Governor’s delegated powers and conferring them upon the Chief Minister, thereby vesting the Chief Minister with the full administrative powers previously held by the Nizam. While the Military Governor was in charge, he exercised his delegated legislative powers and enacted several Regulations. One of those was the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 F, which came into force on 15 August 1949. This Regulation integrated all Jagir lands into State lands from the appointed date and transferred their administration to a Jagir Administrator appointed by the Government. It also provided for cash payments from the net income of the Jagirs to the Jagirdar, Hissedars or other maintenance holders as an interim measure pending final determination of the compensation for the Jagirs. A subsequent Regulation, the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 F, became effective on 25 January 1950 and established a procedure for paying compensation based on the commuted value of each Jagir, to be calculated by the Jagir Administrator in accordance with the Regulation’s provisions. The Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, and on 3 April 1950 the report of the second Commission was confirmed by the Chief Minister. As a result of that confirmation, the shares of the three sons, the daughter, and the three widows of the late Nawab were formally declared. Each son was allotted a share of one‑fourth, the daughter received a share of one‑half, and the three widows collectively received a share of one‑half of the estate.

It was declared that Sheereen Bua and Parichehra Bua, who were the Mamtua wives of the late Nawab, were entitled only to Guzara (maintenance). This order, issued by the Chief Minister, created the dispute that is before the Court today. The widows of the late Nawab – Ahmedunnisa Begum and Azizunnisa Begum – challenged the validity of the Government’s decision recorded in the Chief Minister’s confirmatory order by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad on 20 June 1950. They argued that the impugned decision was beyond the Government’s authority, void, and sought a writ of certiorari to set it aside. In addition, they asked for appropriate orders against those who had been declared entitled to shares in the late Nawab’s property. The writ petition was first heard by a division bench of the Hyderabad High Court, which found that the petition raised several questions of constitutional importance. Consequently, on 24 August 1950 the bench referred the petition for disposal before a full bench. A full bench comprising three learned judges heard the matter on 20 March 1951, held that the questions were of such vital importance that a larger bench should consider them, and therefore referred the issues to a larger full bench of five judges. After the larger bench answered the questions, the matter was sent back to the three‑judge full bench, which, in accordance with the answers given, dismissed the writ petition on 30 June 1952. In the interim, the Act on which the dispute ultimately turned came into force on 14 March 1952. The two widows then applied to the High Court for a certificate authorising an appeal to this Court, and the certificate was granted. However, on 27 December 1955 the widows purported to compromise their dispute with the opponents and expressed a desire not to pursue the appeal before the Supreme Court any further. When Sikander Jehan Begum and Khurshid Jehan Begum learned of these developments, they immediately filed an application before this Court requesting that their names be substituted as appellants in the pending appeal at the instance of the two widows, undertaking to deposit the necessary security for costs and printing charges. This application was returned to the petitioners on the ground that it did not lie before this Court because the record had not been formally transmitted. The petitioners then made a similar application before the High Court, while the widows applied for permission to withdraw their appeal. Both applications were set down for hearing before the High Court on 16 August 1955. The High Court rejected the petitioners’ request for transposition of names and allowed the widows’ application, granting them leave to withdraw their appeal.

The widows filed an application that was granted, allowing them to withdraw their appeal. Subsequently, on August 8 1955, the petitioners filed a separate application before the High Court seeking permission to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment rendered in the writ petition. The High Court rejected this application on March 20 1956. After that refusal, the petitioners applied for special leave before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accorded that special leave. Consequently, Civil Appeal No 279 of 1960 entered this Court’s docket on the basis of that special leave. Prior to the filing of this civil appeal, the petitioners had initiated writ petition No 197 of 1956, which forms the factual backdrop of the present dispute. Both parties agree that the decision reached in the writ petition will control the outcome of the present civil appeal. The Court has already noted that the two proceedings present the same legal issue.

Before addressing the legal issue, the Court finds it necessary to outline the principal features of the statute governing the matter. The Act was enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to Atiyat grants, including inquiries concerning such grants, claims to succession, and any right, title, or interest in Atiyat lands, together with matters ancillary to them. Section 15 of the Act repeals all earlier circulars on the subject, except to the extent preserved by clauses (a) and (b) of that section. Sections 3 through 7 set out the general provisions applicable to Atiyat grants. Section 3 provides that any Atiyat grant existing at the commencement of the Act shall remain vested in its holder and in the holder’s successors, subject to the conditions specified in the grant. Section 4 deals with inquiries concerning Atiyat grants situated in jagirs. Section 5 prescribes the consequences of breaching the conditions attached to a Muntakhab or a Vasiqa. Section 6 prohibits the alienation of Atiyat grants and grants an exemption from attachment by a Court, although a proviso allows half of the income from an Atiyat grant to be attached in execution of a decree through the Revenue Department. Section 7 declares that succession to Atiyat grants will henceforth be governed by the personal law applicable to the last holder of the grant. Sections 8 through 11 address the constitution, jurisdiction, and procedure of Atiyat Courts. Section 8 establishes a hierarchy of four categories of courts, whose powers may be delegated by the Government through a notification issued under section 9. Section 10 stipulates that the jurisdiction and procedure of the Atiyat Courts shall be as laid down in the schedule and also provides that the time limits and manner for filing appeals against decisions of those courts shall be prescribed. Section 11 deals with the appellate process and, as a result of its provisions, the decision of the Board of Revenue is deemed final.

The Act contains a group of five sections that address miscellaneous matters. Section fourteen empowers the Government to make rules for the purposes of the Act. Section fifteen functions as the repealing provision, removing prior statutes that are inconsistent with the present legislation. Section sixteen stipulates that the Act will cease to apply to any Inam whenever the Hyderabad Enfranchised Inams Act, 1952 is made applicable to that Inam at any future time. After laying out these provisions, the legislature turned to sections twelve and thirteen, which require careful analysis because they affect the relationship between the newly created Atiyat Courts and the existing civil courts.

Section twelve states that the final decision of a civil court on matters of succession, legitimacy, divorce or any other question of personal law must be given effect by an Atiyat Court once that decision is brought to the court’s notice by the interested party or otherwise, regardless of whether the Atiyat Court gave its own decision before or after the civil court’s decision. This provision makes it clear that, although the Act establishes a hierarchy of Atiyat Courts to adjudicate succession to Atiyat estates, the ultimate rulings of civil courts on the specified personal law issues are binding on the parties and must be respected by the Atiyat Courts. Consequently, even if a civil court pronounces its judgment after an Atiyat Court has already decided the same issue, the civil court’s later judgment prevails. In such a circumstance, the earlier Atiyat Court decision must yield to the later civil court decision, and the question of succession is to be determined according to the civil court’s ruling. Section thirteen then provides that, except as expressly provided in the Act, a decision of an Atiyat Court is final and cannot be questioned in any court of law. Sub‑section two of that section adds that orders issued in matters relating to Atiyat grants, including jagirs, after 18 September 1948 and before the commencement of this Act by the Military Governor, the Chief Civil Administrator, the Chief Minister of Hyderabad or the Revenue Minister acting under powers given—or purportedly given—by the Chief Minister, shall be treated as final orders validly passed by a competent authority under the law in force at the time. Those orders, therefore, shall not be open to challenge in any court. The effect of sub‑section two is to validate all orders issued by the named authorities between 18 September 1948, the start of the police action, and 14 March 1952, the date on which this Act began to operate. The legislature’s purpose in doing so was to ensure that decisions made during that period would not be reopened for review before either the Atiyat Courts or the civil courts.

It was observed that both the start of police operations and the enactment of the statute were events of great historical importance in the former State of Hyderabad, and therefore treating that interval as possessing unusual significance could not be faulted. Consequently, the Court held that if the Legislature elected to treat the orders issued during that interval as forming a separate class, such classification did not, in itself, violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners, however, contended that the effect of the impugned provision was to deprive them of their entitlement to have succession questions determined by a civil court, and that this denial amounted to discrimination contrary to Article 14. To support this contention they relied upon the decision of this Court in Ammeerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum. The Court expressed that this reliance was unconvincing. In Ammeerunnissa Begum the Legislature had clearly singled out two groups—two women and their children—who claimed descent from the late Nawab Waliudowla, and had barred them from establishing their rights under the personal law that governed the community in courts of law. That legislation manifested unmistakable unconstitutional discrimination on its face. The present case, the Court noted, differed fundamentally. Section 13(2) of the Act did not merely validate orders relating to the present enquiry; rather, it sought to validate every order issued between the two prescribed dates concerning all enquiries that were pending at that time. This represents a crucial distinction. Moreover, the Court indicated that, as will be explained later, the nature of the property over which the petitioners claimed rights is essentially different from the property involved in Ammeerunnissa Begum. In the latter case the dispute concerned hereditary property whose succession had to be adjudicated according to the personal law applicable to the parties. In the present matter the succession of “Atiyat” property does not arise as a matter of right belonging to the heirs of the last holder. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the argument founded on Ammeerunnissa Begum could not succeed. The petitioners also raised a different challenge to the validity of Section 13(2). They argued that during the prescribed period a large number of cases remained pending before the authorities. By chance or accident, orders were passed by the relevant authorities in the present case and perhaps in some other cases, while similar cases existed on which no orders were issued within the prescribed period. By singling out only those cases in which orders had been passed, the impugned provision, they asserted, created an irrational classification that infringed Article 14. The Court observed that the mere accident of some orders being passed and others not being passed could not constitute a rational basis for such a classification.

In the course of the hearing, the Court observed that the petition had not supplied any factual material to support the contention that the two categories of cases were being classified arbitrarily. The petition did not allege the existence of any cases in which the authorities had failed to pass orders, and therefore those cases would not fall within the ambit of section 13 (2). When the Court posed this point to the learned Attorney‑General, who was arguing on behalf of the petitioners, he acknowledged that without the requisite material the argument could not be maintained. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to examine the substantive merits of the classification claim. The Court added, however, that on an initial examination the distinction drawn between cases where orders had been issued and those where they had not did not appear to be irrational or unreasonable.

The learned Attorney‑General next advanced a different contention, asserting that section 13 (2) infringed article 14 because it deprived every citizen of the right to have succession matters determined by a civil court. He argued that the petitioners, if they wished to assert a claim to the estate in question, should be able to enforce that claim in a court of law, and that the impugned provision denied them this right, thereby constituting discrimination. The Court noted that this argument was substantially the same as the one earlier raised based on the decision in Ammeerunnissa Begum. To evaluate the claim, the Court examined the nature of the property that the petitioners sought to claim by succession. The High Court, while dealing with a writ petition filed by the widows of the late Nawab, had examined several Firmans. Those Firmans indicated that on the death of the holder of a jagir, the estate reverted to the State; although the State usually re‑granted the estate to the person identified as the successor after an enquiry, in law the jagir was resumed on the holder’s death and did not automatically pass to his heirs. The Court also observed that while jagirdars were alive they were not allowed to alienate the property, and it was not necessary for the estate to be granted to all of the jagirdar’s heirs upon his death. Moreover, the Court found that a suit concerning a jagir could not be instituted in a civil court without the prior special permission of the Nizam. The Firman dated 16 December 1901, cited by the High Court, demonstrated that the heirs of deceased jagir holders could not insist on a hereditary right to succeed to the estate because no Atiyat grant was inheritable. Another Firman issued later reinforced the principle that the grantor retained absolute authority to re‑grant or withhold the estate, a right that lay beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.

The Firman dated 28, 1928 demonstrated that the grantor of a Jagir could not have his powers limited by the rules designed for the Atiyat Courts and that the grantor possessed an absolute authority to either re‑grant the estate to a successor or to refuse such a grant. Consequently, the court observed that a Jagir amounted only to usufructuary rights in land, and that the state's revenue law did not apply to those rights. The court noted that Jagirs were inalienable and terminated automatically upon the death of the grantee, and that each Jagirdar, even if an heir, was treated as a new grantee. The power to confer a Jagir was therefore unrestricted, absolute, and outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The court also recognized that, upon the death of a Jagirdar, an enquiry concerning succession was commonly conducted either by the Atiyat Courts or by a specially appointed commission or tribunal. It further observed that, in practice, the Nizam usually awarded the estate to the person he identified as the successor of the deceased Jagirdar. However, the court emphasized that such practice did not change the fundamental legal nature of the Jagir. This legal character is supported by earlier Firmans issued by the Nizam relating to enquiries of the Atiyat estates. Circular No. 34 of 1341F had laid down rules for conducting enquiries and making decisions in Inam cases. That circular was later replaced by Circular No. 10 of 1338F, dated June 13, 1929. The later circular contains several sections prescribing how enquiries should be held and decisions made in Inam matters. While a detailed recitation of those sections is unnecessary, it suffices to state that the circular envisaged three classes of officers empowered to conduct the enquiry. These officers were authorized to conduct the enquiry in a manner generally consistent with the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. The circular provided for appeals from the decision of a lower‑rank officer to a higher‑rank officer. Ultimately, the process culminated when the Nizam‑e‑Atiyat expressed his opinion and forwarded it to the Honourable Revenue Member. The Revenue Member then gave his own opinion, and after considering all opinions, the Nizam would issue a Firman, which the Firman declared to be binding on the parties. Thus, although formal provisions existed for conducting the enquiry, the enquiry was essentially consultative, and the Nizam was not legally bound by the opinions of the officers conducting it. The fact that the Nizam usually accepted the enquiry’s conclusions does not alter the legal position that he could, if he wished, reject those opinions and refrain from issuing a grant.

The Court observed that under the circulars issued by the Nizam for conducting enquiries into questions of succession to jagirs, it was clear that jagirs were not inheritable. Accordingly, on the death of a jagirdar, the legal position was that the estate would be resumed by the State and then re‑granted at the Nizam’s absolute discretion. Because the re‑grant was a matter of discretionary authority, any person claiming to be the successor of the deceased jagirdar possessed no right to approach a civil court to establish such a claim. In effect, there was no claim of succession at all; the question of re‑grant rested solely with the Nizam. After the Nizam’s rule ended, the only change was that the property vested in the State upon the jagirdar’s death, and the State could then re‑grant the estate to a successor, again at its discretion. Consequently, the Court held that the argument that denying the petitioners the right to pursue a claim in a civil court under section 13(2) violated Article 14 of the Constitution could not be sustained. The property involved in the present case was not comparable to the property in the Ameerunnissa case, where the property was heritable and succession was governed by personal law. In the present matter, there was no right of succession; whoever received the estate did so by virtue of a re‑grant made by the State following the Chief Minister’s decision. Hence, the challenge to the validity of section 13(2) on the ground that it contravenes Article 14 could not succeed. Moreover, given the special nature of the property, the petitioners could not also challenge section 13(2) on the basis that it infringed Article 19(1)(f). The Court then turned to another issue concerning the non‑Atiyat estate left by the deceased Nawab Kamal Yar Jung. It noted that the Firman appointing the first commission of enquiry referred generally to the Nawab’s estate and was not limited to the Atiyat estate. Similarly, the Nizam’s order directing the Government to take possession of the Nawab’s property appeared to have been implemented with respect to both the Atiyat and non‑Atiyat portions. The Chief Minister’s order confirming the report of the subsequently appointed special tribunal was also vague and seemed to cover both categories of estate. The petitioners contended that, irrespective of the position regarding the Atiyat estate, the Chief Minister lacked authority to issue an order concerning the non‑Atiyat estate, and even the Nizam could not have appointed an enquiry commission for that part of the estate. The Court acknowledged this contention and prepared to address it in the subsequent discussion.

The Court observed that the Nizam had never authorised an Enquiry Commission to investigate the non‑Atiyat estate, and consequently any question of succession to that estate had to be settled in accordance with the personal law governing the parties and had to be heard and determined by the ordinary civil courts. This legal position was accepted without objection by counsel for the State and also by counsel for the respondents. The Court further indicated that parallel civil proceedings were already underway concerning the same property, namely Civil Suit No. 139 of 1355F, which involved several of the parties in dispute. Because all parties agreed that the order issued by the Chief Minister did not encompass the non‑Atiyat estate, the Court deemed it sufficient to clarify that the Chief Minister’s order is inapplicable to the non‑Atiyat estate and that any issues relating to title over that estate must be litigated in the civil courts. In view of these findings, the writ petition filed before the Court and the appeal against the order were each dismissed, and costs were awarded, including one set of hearing costs. Accordingly, both the petition and the appeal were dismissed with costs.