Shuganchand vs Prakash Chand And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 16 February, 1961

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In this matter the Supreme Court considered an appeal that had been granted special leave. The appeal originated from a suit that the petitioner, identified as Shuganchand, a follower of the Jain faith, had instituted to obtain possession of a specific immovable asset. The asset was a garden situated in a mouja, recorded under Khasra number 345 and Rakba 71 ⁄ 4, and the suit was directed against the alleged trespasser, Umacharan Pradhan, who was named as the respondent. While the suit was pending, the respondent, Umacharan, died, and his legal representatives, Prakash Chand together with two other individuals, were impleaded in his place. For the purposes of the proceeding the Court referred to the deceased respondent simply as “the respondent.” The petitioner asserted that the garden originally formed part of the estate of a man named Kanakmal, who had died in the financial year 1910‑1911. During his lifetime Kanakmal had adopted a son named Mannilal; Mannilal predeceased his adoptive father and left behind his widow, Sugan Bai. Consequently, at the time of Kanakmal’s death the surviving members of his family consisted of his widow, Jadav Bai, and his widowed daughter‑in‑law, Sugan Bai. In the years 1922‑1923 Sugan Bai formally adopted the petitioner, thus bringing him within the family lineage of Kanakmal. After Jadav Bai’s death in 1932, the petitioner filed the present suit for possession in 1936. The petitioner explained that upon reaching the age of majority he attempted to take possession of the land that he regarded as his ancestral inheritance, but discovered that the respondent’s father, Munshi Gajpat Rai, had entered into adverse possession of the garden in 1925. When the petitioner made a demand for the return of the property, the alleged trespasser refused to comply, compelling the petitioner to commence the suit.

The respondent contested the petitioner’s claim on several grounds. First, it was alleged that the respondent and his father had expended considerable resources to construct a building on the garden and to plant trees, thereby improving the property. Second, the respondent denied the titles of both Kanakmal and the petitioner, and also disputed that Kanakmal ever possessed the land, arguing that the suit was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. As an alternative relief, the respondent contended that the petitioner should not be granted possession unless he reimbursed the sum of Rs 15,000, which the respondent claimed had been spent by him and his father on the improvements and the building. Although these pleas appeared straightforward, the Court noted that the action for possession had taken a convoluted and protracted course. At the trial stage the learned trial judge framed seven specific issues. The judge concluded that the suit was filed within the prescribed limitation period, and that the genealogical chart submitted by the petitioner was accurate, establishing that, by virtue of his adoption, the petitioner had become a member of Kanakmal’s family and therefore possessed the legal standing to sue. The judge further confirmed that Kanakmal’s title to the land was duly established. Regarding the respondent’s claim of improvement, the judge held in the respondent’s favor, ordering that all materials constituting the super‑structure of the kothi and the garage erected by the respondent belonged to him and that he was entitled to remove those materials. The judge also rejected the petitioner’s claim for a sum of Rs 450. Consequently, the trial court issued a declaratory decree in favor of the petitioner, together with an order directing the respondent to deliver possession of the disputed garden to the petitioner. This decree was pronounced on 11 January 1944, indicating that the suit had been pending for eight years before disposal. Dissatisfied with the judgment, the respondent appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that, based on the evidence produced,...

The trial judge concluded that the appellant possessed a legal right to institute the suit for possession and that the title to the land genuinely belonged to Kanakmal, thereby establishing Kanakmal’s ownership. Concerning the respondent’s allegation that he had substantially improved the land and erected a building at considerable expense, the judge accepted the respondent’s claim. Accordingly, the judge ordered that every material constituting the entire super‑structure of the kothi and the garage constructed by the respondent vested in the respondent, and he was entitled to remove those materials from the property. In the same vein, the judge ruled in favour of the respondent on the appellant’s monetary claim for Rs 450, dismissing that particular request. Despite these findings, the court ultimately issued a declaratory decree granting the relief sought by the appellant and directed the respondent to surrender possession of the disputed property to the appellant. This final decree was pronounced on 11 January 1944, indicating that the suit had taken eight years to reach a conclusion. The respondent then appealed the decision and succeeded before the appellate court, which held that, based on the evidence produced by the appellant, it could not be established that the garden in dispute formed part of Kanakmal’s estate; consequently, Issue No 3 was decided against the appellant. The appellate court therefore allowed the appeal and dismissed the appellant’s suit, an order dated 2 September 1944. Undeterred, the appellant filed a further appeal before the High Court. The High Court set aside the district judge’s finding on Issue No 3, and without addressing the remaining issues that necessarily arose, it allowed the appellant’s appeal and decreed in his favour. The respondent challenged this judgment by filing a revisional application before the Judicial Committee, Huzur Durbar, Gwalior. The Durbar upheld the respondent’s revision and remanded the case to the first appellate court, directing it to consider Issues 1, 2 and 7, to make findings on those points, and to determine the appeal in accordance with those findings. This remand order was pronounced on 26 December 1949. The matter subsequently returned to the district judge, who resolved the remanded issues in favour of the appellant and issued a decree granting the appellant relief on 31 May 1950. The respondent again appealed, this time presenting a second appeal before the High Court. The High Court allowed the respondent’s appeal, dismissed the appellant’s suit, and held that, because Kanakmal’s wife was alive at the time of his death, she alone had the capacity to adopt for the purpose of acquiring Kanakmal’s estate; consequently, an adoption effected by the widowed daughter‑in‑law could not divest the estate that had vested in Kanakmal’s widow. This narrow ground formed the basis of the respondent’s success, and the High Court’s decision was pronounced on 1 February 1954. The appellant now challenges that High Court decision before this Court.

The appellant brought the appeal to this Court with special leave. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the High Court had erred in permitting the respondent to introduce a new point at a very late stage of the proceedings. It was further submitted that, in deciding that point against the appellant, the High Court had overlooked a crucial fact: at the time the present suit was instituted, Jadav Bai had already died and consequently there was no question of divesting the estate that had vested in her. Although the litigation had proceeded through a lengthy and complicated course, it is significant that throughout the earlier stages the parties never specifically and clearly raised the validity of the adoption nor the alleged inability of the adopted son to divest Jadav Bai’s estate. Various other disputes arose, but this particular aspect was not put before the court for determination until the matter reached the High Court on a second appeal at the final stage of the present proceedings. No party claimed that, after Jadav Bai’s death, any other heir could assert a preferential title against the appellant. The adoption of the appellant was held proved. Evidence showed that Jadav Bai was alive at the time of the adoption, gave her consent, and that the appellant thereafter lived with the family and was treated as a member of the household by both Jadav Bai and his adoptive mother. The plaint alleged, and the respondent failed to rebut, that the balance of the estate left by Kanakmal remained in the appellant’s possession. Accordingly, it appears clear that whether or not the appellant could have divested Jadav Bai’s estate while she was alive, upon her death he succeeded to the property by operation of succession. If Kanakmal’s title is proved and the respondent’s other pleas are rejected, there is no effective answer to the appellant’s claim for possession of the suit land. For this reason the Court regarded the High Court’s discussion of an academic point, raised for the first time in that form, as unnecessary and as having lost sight of the basic fact that Jadav Bai’s death, which occurred before the suit was filed, rendered the questioned point moot.

Confronted with this difficulty, counsel for the respondent, Mr Achliru Ram, attempted to raise a novel argument that had not been previously presented. He contended that it was a misnomer to describe the appellant as the adopted son of Mannilal and that, in fact, the appellant was merely an appointed heir. According to his submission, an heir appointed in such a manner would not acquire the full bundle of rights that attaches to a legally adopted son and therefore would not be entitled to lay claim to the estate of Kanakmal. This line of argument was advanced in reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in Dhanraj Joharmal v. Soni Bai, wherein the Privy Council observed that the evidence did not support a regular Hindu or Brahminical adoption and that the alleged adoption could not be deemed to confer the rights of collateral succession. Counsel did not dispute that, in the absence of proof of special customs, ordinary Hindu law would apply to Jains, even though Jains traditionally regard adoption as a purely secular matter without any spiritual benefit to the father. The Court noted that this newly raised point concerning the nature of the heirship had never been put to it for decision in the earlier stages of the litigation.

The appellant’s counsel argued that the appellant could not be treated as an adopted son and therefore could not claim the estate of Kanakmal. The counsel relied on the Privy Council decision in Dhanraj Joharmal v. Soni Bai, where the Lords observed that the evidence showed the alleged regular Hindu, or more precisely Brahminical, adoption of 1903 had been fabricated in order to give an ordinary Agarwalla adoption the rights of collateral succession. Because the adoption in that form had not actually occurred, the claim to collateral succession was rejected. The counsel did not dispute that, in the absence of proof of special customs, ordinary Hindu law applied to Jains. Although Jains do not regard a natural or adopted son as providing any spiritual benefit to the father and therefore view adoption as a purely secular matter, the rights of an adopted son are governed by ordinary Hindu law unless a contrary custom is established. Consequently, the counsel attempted to distinguish a proper adoption from a mere appointment of an heir and sought to invoke decisions of the Punjab High Court on appointed heirs. The Court did not permit the development of this contention because it was raised at a stage that was considered too late. The plaint had set out the appellant’s pedigree and claimed that he was the grandson of Kanakmal, and the appellant had produced evidence of his adoption, which suggested that Mannilal himself was the adopted son of Kanakmal. Various pleas had been raised, but none had alleged that the appellant was only an appointed heir, and the appellant’s case was therefore not different from that of an adopted son. The Court found it unreasonable to allow a new argument at this advanced stage of the litigation, especially since the suit for possession had already been unduly prolonged and there was no justification for extending it further.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The order passed by the High Court in the second appeal was set aside and the order of the District Court was restored, with costs awarded throughout. The appellant was directed to pay the court fees that he would have been required to pay had he not been permitted to file his appeal in forma pauperis. The amount of those fees was to be included in the appellant’s costs, which the respondents were ordered to pay. Counsel’s costs were to be taxed under Order 14, Rule 7(a).