Shri Mahadeo Paikaji Kolhe Yavatmal vs The State Of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petitions Nos. 93 and 125 of 1959

Decision Date: 04/04/1961

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this case the petitioners Shri Mahadeo Paikaji Kolhe of Yavatmal filed two writ petitions, numbered 93 and 125 of 1959, under article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitions challenged the constitutional validity of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958 (referred to as the Act), which sought to extend the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 to the Vidarbha and Kutch regions. The matter was placed before a five‑judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice K. C. Das Gupta, and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The citation for the decision is 1961 AIR 1517 and 1962 SCR (1) 733. The petitioners were represented by counsel while the State of Bombay was represented by the Additional Solicitor‑General of India and other counsel, and interveners were also allowed to appear. The judgment, delivered on 4 April 1961, set out the factual and legal background, identified the statutory provisions in question, and examined the earlier precedent of Sri Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, in which the earlier Bombay Act had been held valid because the lands covered fell within the definition of “estate” contained in the Bombay Land Revenue Code of 1879.

The petitioners argued that the lands in Amraoti and Yeotmal, which were the subject of the present dispute, were governed by the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, a statute that did not employ the word “estate.” Consequently they contended that the Act could not be protected by article 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution. The Court examined the relevant statutory definitions, specifically sections 2(17) and 2(18) of the impugned Act and sections 2(7) and 2(20) of the Madhya Pradesh Code read with sections 145 and 146 thereof. The Court found that these provisions left no doubt that the lands held by the petitioners were tenures and, in substance, estates. Because the petitioners possessed the lands under the State’s authority and paid land revenue thereon, the lands qualified as the local equivalents of an “estate” contemplated by article 31A(2)(a). Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioners’ contention failed and that the Act remained constitutionally valid.

The legislation that is being challenged is the Agricultural Lands Act of 1958, which will be referred to as the Act. In substance, the Act was drafted to bring to the Vidarbha region and the Cutch area—both of which had recently become part of the enlarged bilingual State of Bombay—the provisions that were originally contained in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act of 1956, known as Act XIII of 1956. The introductory statement of the Act makes clear that its purpose was to modify the law governing tenancies of agricultural land as well as sites used for related activities within those two territories of the State of Bombay, and to introduce certain additional rules concerning those lands.

When the legislature extended the provisions of the earlier Bombay Act XIII of 1956 to the Vidarbha and Cutch areas, it did so by following the same structure that had been established by that earlier Act. The underlying policy of the new legislation, the objective that it sought to achieve, and the means by which it intended to achieve that objective were all designed to be identical to those of the earlier Act. The constitutionality of the earlier Bombay Act (XIII of 1956) had previously been examined by this Court in the case of Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay. In that matter the challenge to the earlier Act was rejected and the Court held that the Act was consistent with the Constitution.

A key issue that arose in the earlier case was whether the later Act was protected by Article 31A clause (2)(a) of the Constitution. The answer to that question depended on another question: whether the lands to which the Act applied qualified as an “estate” within the meaning of Article 31A(2)(a). While deciding that issue, this Court examined the definition of “estate” contained in section 2(5) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code of 1879 and concluded that the term clearly covered the lands that fell within the scope of the Act. Consequently, the Court held that Article 31A(2)(a) was applicable to the Act.

Having regard to that earlier decision, the sole point raised by counsel Limaye on behalf of the petitioners in the present writ petitions is that the lands owned by the two petitioners do not constitute an “estate” as contemplated by Article 31A(2)(a). If that contention is rejected, the writ petitions must fail because the Act would then be shielded by the constitutional protection. Conversely, if the contention is accepted, the petitioners’ other arguments challenging the validity of certain specific provisions of the Act would then need to be examined.

The two petitioners are Namdeorao Baliramji and Mahadeo Paikaji Kolhe. The first petitioner resides in Amraoti, while the second resides in Yeotmal. The first petitioner owns approximately eighty acres of dry land located in Amraoti; of this, forty‑three acres are cultivated by him personally and the remaining portion is occupied by tenants. The second petitioner owns roughly one thousand one hundred sixty‑eight acres of dry land situated in Yeotmal; he personally cultivates four hundred acres, and the balance is held by tenants. In both cases the lands are subject to the payment of land revenue.

In this case the petitioners argued that the lands they possessed did not constitute an “estate” within the meaning of Article 31A (2) (a). That provision, inter alia, prescribed that the term “estate” with respect to any local area ought to be given the same meaning as the expression or its local equivalent possessed under the law relating to land tenures that was then in force in that area. It was undisputed that the applicable local law was the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (II of 1955), and consequently it was necessary to determine whether the petitioners’ lands could be regarded as an “estate” under that Code. Before embarking upon that enquiry, the Court found it useful to refer to the definitions contained in the impugned Act. Section 2(17) of the Act defined “land” to include, among other things, land used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes and the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land. Section 2(18) defined a “land‑holder” as a tenure‑holder whom the State Government, on account of the extent and value of the land or his interests therein, had declared to be a land‑holder for the purposes of the Act. Under the Madhya Pradesh Code, Section 27 defined a “holding” as a parcel of land separately assessed for land revenue, and Section 2(20) defined a “tenure‑holder” as a person holding from the State Government as a Bhumiswami or a Bhumidhari. Chapter XII of the Code dealt with tenure‑holders. Section 145 provided that there were two classes of tenure‑holders of lands held from the State, namely Bhumiswami and Bhumidhari. Section 146 dealt with Bhumiswami and stipulated that every person who, at the commencement of the Code, belonged to any of the classes specified in clauses (a) to (f) of that section would be called a Bhumiswami and would enjoy all rights and be subject to all liabilities conferred on a Bhumiswami by the Code. Among those classes was clause (e), which related to persons in respect of lands held by them as occupants in Berar. By reading these definitions together with the provisions of Section 146, it followed that the land in the possession of a Bhumiswami who was a tenure‑holder was, in substance, an estate. Although the word “estate” did not appear expressly in the Code, the Court noted that Article 31A (2) (a) required consideration not only of the term “estate” but also of its local equivalent. It was observed that in many areas the existing law on land tenures might not label an estate expressly, yet it described and defined a local equivalent. For this reason the constitutional provision deliberately employed both the term “estate” and its local equivalent. The petitioners held lands under the State and paid land revenue thereon, and thus their holdings fell within the class of local equivalents of the word “estate” contemplated by Article 31A (2) (a).

The petitioners were occupants of land that they held under the authority of the State, and they regularly discharged their obligations by paying the land revenue assessed on those lands. In view of this factual situation, the Court found no difficulty in determining that, according to the existing law governing land tenures, the parcels of land possessed by the petitioners corresponded to the locally defined equivalents of the word “estate” envisaged in Article 31A(2)(a). Accordingly, the classification of the petitioners’ lands within the ambit of the constitutional protection was established, and the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned Act fell outside the scope of Article 31A could not be sustained. The Court reiterated that it was not contested that, once Article 31A is held to apply to a particular class of land, the validity of any statute affecting that class cannot be further challenged on constitutional grounds. On the basis of this principle, the Court concluded that the writ petitions seeking to set aside the impugned legislation were untenable, and therefore the petitions were deemed to have failed. Consequently, the Court ordered the dismissal of the petitions and directed that the petitioners bear the costs of the proceedings, specifying that the costs comprised one set of hearing expenses. The order expressly provided that the costs awarded were to be paid by the petitioners, thereby placing the financial burden of the litigation upon the party who initiated the challenge. In sum, the Court dismissed the writ petitions with costs, affirming that the impugned Act remained protected by Article 31A and could not be subjected to further constitutional attack.