Shivdeo Singh and Ors vs State Of Punjab and Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 265 of 1958

Decision Date: 8 February 1961

Coram: B.P. Sinha, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, N.R. Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter of Shivdeo Singh and others versus State of Punjab and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the eighth day of February, 1961. The case was assigned the citation 1963 AIR (SC) 1909 and was heard by a bench consisting of Chief Justice B. P. Sinha, Justice S. K. Das, Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice N. R. Ayyangar, and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The judgment was authored by Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The appeal, designated as Appeal (Civil) 265 of 1958, arose from a special leave petition filed against a decision of the Punjab High Court that had dismissed an appeal under the Letters Patent to the judgment of Justice Gosain in a writ petition. The appellant, Shivdeo Singh together with other petitioners, sought relief from the High Court’s dismissal of their earlier petition.

The factual background of the dispute concerned agricultural lands situated in the village of Bhaini Bangar in the district of Gurdaspur. In early 1950, these lands were allotted on a quasi‑permanent basis to a number of displaced persons, including the appellants, pursuant to the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and the rules formulated thereunder. In July of the same year, the Director of Rehabilitation (Rural) for Jullunder issued an order dated 10 July 1950, declaring Bhaini Bangar a “fauji” village and indicating that the land within its limits would have to be re‑allotted. The High Court record notes that the Director’s order effectively cancelled the earlier allotments that had been made to families classified as “non‑fauji.” The appellants were unquestionably part of the “non‑fauji” category. Subsequently, on 9 October 1951, the Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, Punjab, Mr Vikram Singh, authored an order containing a detailed observation. He listed twenty‑seven non‑fauji allottee families in the village, describing them as second‑grade land‑holders, and stated that they would all have to vacate if the village retained its “fauji” status. He identified the largest non‑fauji allottees as follows: Harbans Singh holding 14½ acres, Shivdev Singh holding 13¼ acres, Hari Singh holding 11¾ acres, Karam Singh holding 16 acres, and Mangal Singh holding 16 ⅜ acres, noting that a total of 107 ⅜ acres would be affected. The order warned that these persons would be ousted immediately to make room for four allottee families who possessed a decree from the High Court, and that the displaced non‑fauji families should be accommodated in a suitable “II‑grade” village, with the District Commissioner of Gurdaspur tasked to locate appropriate land. The Director further directed that any action should await the outcome of an appeal then pending before the Supreme Court. Shortly after the issuance of this order, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Punjab High Court seeking to have the order set aside.

In this matter the appellants initially filed a writ petition seeking to set aside the order that had been issued, and only the Director of Rehabilitation was joined as a party to that petition. The writ petition was permitted by Justice Khosla, who then sat on the bench. Subsequently, respondents numbered three through fourteen, who were members of families classified as “fauji” and for whom either an allotment had already been granted or was intended to be granted, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Their petition asked that they be impleaded as parties to the appellants’ writ petition and that the entire dispute be reheard. The High Court entertained this petition and Justice Khosla again allowed it. The appellants then appealed to the High Court under the Letters Patent; that appeal was dismissed, and the appellants consequently obtained special leave to appeal before this Court. The respondents did not argue that the Director of Rehabilitation lacked the authority to declare a village a “fauji” village, nor did they contend that an allotment made in favour of a displaced person could never be revoked. Their contention was that, according to Rules 14(6) and 49 of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950, the power to cancel an allotment could not be exercised after 22 July 1952, and that any cancellation made before that date could not be effected unless it was implemented before 15 June 1952. This argument relied on Rule 49, which was inserted on 22 July 1952 and provided that the rules contained in certain earlier notifications were repealed, subject to a proviso that any action taken under the repealed rules would be deemed to have been taken under the corresponding provision of the new rules, and that no order other than an appellate order could have effect if it was made after 25 May 1952 or, if made on or before that date, was not implemented or enforced by 15 June 1952. Counsel for the appellant, Mr Gopal Singh, submitted that the order dated 9 October 1951, issued by Mr Vikram Singh, was not a cancellation order at all but rather a proposal or a tentative, inchoate order. The Court examined that order in detail and observed that a mere reading of it did not support the counsel’s contention; the order, while stating certain intentions, did not contain the substantive elements necessary to constitute a definitive cancellation of the allotment.

The order issued by Mr Vikram Singh stated that the appellants were “likely” to be ousted immediately. The Court observed that the term “likely” modifies the timing of the ouster rather than the act itself. The same order further recorded that the appellants had strongly opposed the proposed action and that the District Commissioner of Gurdaspur would be requested to determine whether land could be found for the persons to be displaced from Bhaini Bangar. This language indicated that Mr Vikram Singh had already decided that the non‑military allottees of Bhaini Bangar, including the appellants, should be removed in order to make space for military families. However, the order also noted that immediate execution of the removal could not be carried out because an appeal was pending before this Court. The pending appeal concerned a challenge to a decision of the Punjab High Court in a petition filed by other non‑military allottees who had been removed from their lands so that those lands could be allotted to military families. After the Punjab High Court rendered its decision, the Director of Relief and Rehabilitation, Punjab, issued the order dated 9 October 1951 cancelling the allotments in favour of the appellants so that the lands could be given to the petitioners who had succeeded before the High Court.

The Court noted that the appellants themselves had treated the 9 October 1951 order as a final order, as evidenced by their request in the writ petition to the High Court that the order be set aside. It was only during the hearing that counsel for the appellants raised the contention that the order was not final. The Court held that the appellants could not now invoke a position that contradicted the stance they had adopted in their own petition. The next issue considered was whether the order of Mr Vikram Singh could be implemented after 15 June 1952. The action against the appellants had been taken under Punjab Government Notification No 8689‑S (Relief) dated 29 August 1951. Counsel pointed out that the rules contained in that notification were repealed by Notification No S R O 1290 dated 22 July 1952. Although Rule 49 preserved “anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by any of the rules,” the second proviso to Rule 49 barred the implementation of any order made under the repealed rules before 25 May 1952 unless that order had been implemented or enforced on or before 15 June 1952. Rule 49 was amended on 4 August 1952, and the second proviso was deleted. Consequently, the Court held that the failure to implement the order by 15 June 1952 did not prevent its implementation at a later date. Finally, the Court addressed the additional contention raised by counsel regarding the second order of Justice Khosla, which effectively reviewed his earlier order. Counsel argued that Article 226 of the Constitution did not empower the High Court to review its own judgment, a point that was subsequently examined by the Court.

The Court considered the contention that a High Court does not possess authority to review its own order and therefore held that the second order issued by Justice Khosla was beyond jurisdiction. The Court observed that Article 226 of the Constitution contains no provision that bars a High Court from exercising its inherent power of review. This power exists in every court of full jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice and to correct serious and obvious errors. The earlier order of Justice Khosla had an impact on individuals who were not parties to the original proceeding. Because those individuals sought to protect their interests, they approached the Court, and Justice Khosla entertained a second petition to provide them an opportunity to be heard. In granting that hearing, Justice Khosla was merely complying with the principles of natural justice that require an affected person to be given a chance to present his case. The respondents argued that they lacked the right to seek review since they had not been parties to the earlier proceedings. The Court reiterated that precisely because they were excluded from the first process, their interests were nevertheless to be affected by the High Court’s decision. Accordingly, it was appropriate for Justice Khosla to entertain the subsequent application. On these grounds, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the appellant.