Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. And Ors. vs The Union Of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 25 September, 1961

Coram: B.P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, J.R. Mudholkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India heard three separate petitions that questioned the constitutionality of the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act of 1956 together with the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order of 1960. The bench comprised Justices B. P. Sinha, A. K. Sarkar, J. R. Mudholkar, K. C. Das Gupta and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, with Justice Mudholkar delivering the judgment. The first petition was filed by a private limited company that publishes daily and weekly newspapers in Marathi under the name “Sakal” from Poona, and by the two individuals who are the sole shareholders of that company. The second and third petitions were lodged by two readers of the “Sakal” newspaper, each also challenging the validity of the Act. Several parties intervened in support of the Union of India, the respondent, seeking to uphold the legislative enactment and the accompanying order. Because the arguments raised before the Court were common to all three petitions, the Court chose to examine the first petition in full, applying the same reasoning to the other two.

The newspaper “Sakal” began publication in 1932 and, according to the petitioners, it presently enjoys a net weekday circulation of fifty‑two thousand copies and a Sunday circulation of fifty‑six thousand copies across Maharashtra and Karnataka, thereby playing a leading role in disseminating news, shaping public opinion and influencing matters of public interest. The daily edition consists of six pages from Monday to Friday and four pages on one day of the week, and it is sold at a price of seven nP. The Sunday edition contains ten pages and is priced at twelve nP. Approximately forty percent of the newspaper’s space is devoted to advertising, while the remaining sixty percent carries news items, articles, features and editorial views. The petitioners assert that the paper is distinguished by its coverage of foreign news and dispatches on international affairs, that it does not align itself with any political party, and that readers turn to it for impartial assessment of controversial issues and for guidance. The effect of the impugned Act and the Order, as described by the petitioners, is to prescribe the number of pages that may be printed according to the price charged, to limit the number of supplements a newspaper may publish, to prohibit the publication and sale of newspapers that violate any order made under section 3 of the Act, and to regulate the size and area of advertising relative to other content. The legislation also provides for penalties in case of contravention of its provisions or of any order made thereunder.

The Court observed that in 1952 the Government of India established a Press Commission to investigate a wide range of matters concerning the press, and that one of the Commission’s recommendations was that Parliament should enact a statute similar to the legislation now before the Court. The respondent contended that the impugned law had been enacted specifically to give effect to that recommendation. Both parties, however, placed reliance on the factual findings of the Press Commission and invited the Court to accept those findings, while expressly stating that they did not necessarily accept every recommendation of the Commission. The petitioners then pointed out that the newspaper “Sakal” presently publishes thirty‑four pages for its readership on six days of the week. They argued that, because of the impugned Order, the newspaper would be forced either to raise its price from seven paise to eight paise per day or to cut its total number of pages down to twenty‑four. In addition, the petitioners noted that at present all newspapers are free to issue any number of supplements whenever they wish, but under the Order such supplements could be published only with the permission of the Government. According to the petitioners, the Order would consequently compel either a price increase or a reduction in the number of pages for practically every newspaper in the country and would also prevent the publication of supplements without the extra, unwarranted restrictions that do not exist at present. The petitioners maintained that both the Act and the Order were legislative measures designed to curtail the freedom of the press and, therefore, violated the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. They explained that if they continued to provide the same number of pages as before, the required price increase would adversely affect the newspaper’s circulation. Conversely, if they reduced the number of pages in order to comply with the Order, their right to disseminate news and views would be directly interfered with. In either scenario, they asserted, there would be an infringement of their constitutional right under Article 19(1)(a). Further, the petitioners highlighted that the Order reserves to the Central Government the power to permit the issue of supplements, except for those dated 26 January and 15 August, and that this reservation would place the newspaper at the mercy of the Government and thereby interfere with its freedom of expression. Finally, the petitioners argued that the Act and the Order violated Article 14 of the Constitution because their declared purpose was to arbitrarily promote the interests of certain newspapers at the expense of others. They contended that the provisions of the Act and the Order displayed obvious inequality, lacked any reasonable classification or basis, and bore no rational relationship between the imposed restrictions and the objectives purportedly sought to be achieved.

The petitioners argued that the provisions of the impugned Act and the accompanying Order would affect established newspapers only minimally, while newly emerging newspapers would face serious difficulty in progressing. They maintained that the purpose of the legislation, as interpreted by them, was to hinder the growth of papers that were still trying to establish a readership base. In response, counsel for the Union of India, representing the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, acknowledged that the stated objective of the Act was to regulate the price at which newspapers could be sold in relation to the number of pages they contained. The Union explained that this regulation was intended to prevent unfair competition among newspapers and to avert the formation of monopolistic combines, thereby ensuring that all newspapers could enjoy a fair opportunity to present a free discussion of public issues. According to the Union, the effect of the provisions was to set a ceiling on the amount of material a newspaper could provide to the public at a given price, and that this ceiling did not, in any manner, limit the petitioners’ ability to disseminate their ideas. While admitting that the impugned Order placed a restriction on the amount of space a newspaper could devote to the expression of ideas and to news, the Union argued that a newspaper could overcome this limitation by raising its price. The Union further asserted that an increase in price would not adversely affect the newspaper’s circulation. Even if, in the view of the Union, a rise in price caused a decline in circulation, the Union contended that such a circumstance would not amount to an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which protects the freedom of speech and expression. The Union also maintained that the legislation in question did not directly or indirectly deal with the subject of freedom of speech and expression, and consequently no violation of Article 19(1)(a) could be said to arise. In the Union’s view, the combined effect of the Act and the Order would actually promote the general right of newspapers to exercise freedom of speech and expression, and that neither the intention nor the practical operation of the law was designed to curtail or abridge the petitioners’ constitutional freedoms.

Further, counsel for the Union pointed out that all newspapers engage in the publication of advertisements, which constitutes a commercial activity distinct from the expression protected by Article 19(1)(a). Accordingly, the Union argued that it was necessary to distinguish between the advertising function of a newspaper and the exercise of free speech. The Union asserted that the Act and the Order sought to impose, in the public interest, reasonable restrictions on the commercial trading activities of newspapers. It was observed that the proportion of newspaper space devoted to advertisements typically ranged from forty‑six percent to fifty‑nine percent, and that the revenue generated from such advertisements enabled newspapers to sell copies at a price lower than the cost of production. Relying on observations made in the Report of the Press Commission, the Union contended that long‑standing newspapers, which had built up substantial and stable advertising revenues, were thereby placed in a more advantageous position. This, the Union suggested, justified the regulatory scheme as a means to balance the commercial aspects of newspaper publishing with the broader public interest, without unlawfully impeding the constitutional guarantee of free expression.

The respondent argued that newspapers which already enjoy a more advantageous position than newcomers in the field of journalism are able to squeeze out such newcomers, resulting in the destruction of the freedom of expression of others. It was further submitted that a free press cannot be a press composed of a few powerful combines, and that safeguarding press freedom requires securing a full scope for the development of smaller newspapers. The respondent also pointed out that any reduction in advertisement revenue that might arise from the operation of the Price Page Schedule could not be regarded as an infringement of the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). According to the respondent, the economies of newspapers and the maximum number of pages a newspaper can furnish while retaining a reasonable margin for advertisement space were worked out by the Press Commission, which also suggested a tentative Price Page Schedule. In formulating that schedule, the Press Commission took into account a range of factors, including the cost of newsprint, the cost of composing and printing, distribution expenses, commission payable, editorial and managerial expenses, and general overhead charges. The present Price Page Schedule, the respondent said, is based upon the schedule formulated by the Press Commission. It was further stated that the present measures have been adopted on the recommendation of the Press Commission, which, after observing that the proper functioning of democracy requires that every individual have an equal opportunity to put forward his opinions, suggested that steps should be taken to reduce differences arising from economic advantages and other causes so that newcomers could start with a fair chance of success. In this regard, the present rates have been prescribed. The respondent additionally pointed out that the bulk of Indian‑language newspapers priced at 7nP will not encounter any difficulty in complying with the order because they give five or fewer pages on weekdays. Only a few newspapers would be remotely affected by the order, and in those cases the issue of a large number of pages is attributable to factors unrelated to the exercise of freedom of speech and expression, but rather connected with their business activities. According to the respondent, newspapers are able to give more pages because of their large advertisement revenue or because they belong to a group or chain of newspapers that do not depend entirely on the income of each individual newspaper. It was further observed that the petitioners, in particular, are able to provide an additional number of pages because they devote a larger volume of space to advertisements than other newspapers, and that this practice does not constitute a lawful exercise of their right to freedom of speech and expression or of the right to disseminate news and views. The respondent, however, admitted that a newspaper is

The respondent argued that a newspaper that sells for less than its cost of production can increase the number of its pages only by raising its advertising revenue, and that this is the sole means by which a newspaper may expand its size. The respondent further maintained that the true purpose of the legislation under challenge was to prevent unfair competition, which it claimed had the effect of denying other publishers the right to propagate ideas through their newspapers. Accordingly, the respondent stated that the statute could not be said to infringe the freedom of expression of a newspaper; rather, it was intended to promote and encourage healthy journalism. According to the respondent, the provisions being contested would impact only those categories of newspapers that engage in unfair competition with smaller publications, a form of competition that the Press Commission had described as unhealthy and contrary to the interests of a thriving democracy. The respondent added that it was necessary to avoid unfair competition and to foster healthy competition by placing newspapers on a level playing field, and that this could be achieved only by directly restricting the publication of a large number of pages in relation to the price charged. It was further contended that the legislation aimed to prevent the concentration of ownership while leaving intact healthy competition among equals that are similarly situated. The respondent also pointed out that the statute had been enacted on the recommendation of the Press Commission and that the Price Page Schedule itself had been introduced in response to a demand made by the India Language Newspapers Association. It was noted that the amount of newsprint imported was based on the average number of pages of newspapers published in 1957, and therefore no newspaper possessed an unrestricted right to increase its pages beyond the 1957 figure. Moreover, the draft Price Page Schedule had been approved by the Indian Language Newspapers Association, which had further recommended that the life of the Price Page Act and its accompanying order be extended for another five to ten years. The respondent denied that any provision of the Act infringed the equality guarantee embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court observed that it had already given a brief indication of the effect of the impugned Act and Order, and that, in order to fully appreciate the arguments presented, it would be useful to set out a concise summary of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Order. The preamble of the Act was noted to declare that its object was to secure fuller opportunities of freedom of expression for newspapers by preventing unfair competition. This objective was to be achieved through the regulation of the prices charged for newspapers in relation to their number of pages, with the legislature expecting that such regulation would prevent unfair competition among newspapers.

The Court noted that the Act was intended to remain in force for a period of five years measured from the date it commenced, and that its provisions would cease to have effect at the end of that five‑year period except with respect to acts done or omitted before the expiry. The Act had been brought into operation on 7 September 1956, which meant that, under the literal terms of the legislation, it was scheduled to lapse on 6 September 1961. The Attorney‑General, however, informed the Court that the Government had proposed to prolong the life of the Act by an additional five‑year term, and the Court understood that, subsequently, the legislation had been extended for an indefinite period. Section 2 of the Act provides the statutory definitions of the terms “daily newspaper” and “newspaper”. Section 3 was identified as the core provision of the statute because it confers upon the Central Government the authority to regulate both the price and the number of pages of newspapers. Sub‑section (1) of Section 3 authorises the Government to prescribe the price of a newspaper in relation to its size and page count when the Government is of the opinion that such regulation is necessary to prevent unfair competition among newspapers, with particular reference to newspapers published in Indian languages. Sub‑section (1) also empowers the Government to regulate the amount of space that may be allocated for advertising in a newspaper. Sub‑section (2) provides that an order made under sub‑section (1) may be directed at newspapers generally or at any specific class of newspapers, and that the order may contain separate provisions for daily newspapers, for newspapers issued at other periodic intervals, and for different categories of newspapers. Sub‑section (3) requires the Central Government, while formulating the order, to keep in mind a reasonable degree of flexibility concerning the flow of news, the receipt of advertisements and other matters that are essential to the ordinary functioning of a newspaper. Sub‑section (4) makes it obligatory for the Central Government to consult, as it deems appropriate, the associations of publishers and the individual publishers who are likely to be affected by the proposed order before taking any action.

Section 4 of the Act forbids the publication or sale of any newspaper in the territories to which the Act applies if such publication or sale contravenes any of the provisions of an order made under Section 3. Section 5 mandates that newspapers must furnish periodic returns to the Press Registrar. Section 6 deals with penalties: sub‑section (1) prescribes punishments for the publication or sale of newspapers in violation of the provisions of Section 4, while sub‑section (2) provides for penalties for other forms of contravention that are not the subject of the present discussion. Section 7, the final provision of the statute, bars the courts from taking cognizance of offences committed under the Act unless a written complaint is filed either by the Press Registrar or by an officer duly authorised by the Registrar. From these provisions the Court observed that the Act could operate in practice only after the Central Government had exercised the power conferred by sub‑section (1) of Section 3 and issued an order regulating the matters listed in that section. The Court further recorded that, on 24 October 1960, the Central Government, acting under the authority of Section 3, proceeded to exercise its power as described above.

In this case, the Central Government, after consulting with the Association of Newspapers and Publishers that were likely to be affected, issued the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960, which became effective on 12 December 1960. The Order incorporated a schedule to the Act divided into two parts: Part I, which applied to daily newspapers published six days a week, and Part II, which applied to weekly newspapers. Under paragraph 3 of the Order, if the price charged for a daily newspaper corresponded to any of the prices listed in column 1 of Part I, then the aggregate number of pages of all issues printed during a six‑day week could not exceed the maximum number of pages specified opposite that price in the schedule. Paragraph 4 dealt specifically with the weekly editions of daily newspapers. Paragraph 5 then stipulated that the total number of pages of all issues of a daily newspaper could not surpass the maximum pages assigned under paragraphs 3 and 4, or under paragraph 3 alone, depending on whether the newspaper was published seven days a week or six days a week. A proviso to paragraph 5 added that where a newspaper issued a weekly edition referred to in clause (b) and charged a different price for that edition, the combined pages of all issues published in a week could not exceed the maximum pages set for that newspaper under paragraph 4 plus five‑sixths of the maximum pages assigned under paragraph 3. Paragraph 6 allowed the publication of up to six additional pages during the week. Paragraph 7 authorized the issuance of supplements on 26 January and 15 August each year and also permitted one supplement each quarter on such special occasions as the publisher deemed appropriate. Paragraph 8 gave the Central Government the power to permit extra supplements or special editions beyond those mentioned in paragraph 7 and to prescribe the number of pages such extra material could contain. Paragraph 9 moderated the strictness of paragraphs 4 to 6 by providing that a daily newspaper would only be considered in violation of the Order if, over any twelve‑consecutive‑week period, the total pages of all its issues exceeded the quota assigned for that period. A simple reading of both the Act and the Order clearly shows that the newspaper’s right to publish news, opinions, and to use as many pages as it wishes was made dependent on the price it charged its readers. Before the Order was promulgated, each newspaper could set any price it chose, thereby enjoying an unrestricted right to determine the extent of its pages without any regulatory limitation.

The Court observed that the State’s power to regulate the publication of news and views is clearly exercised by the Order, which limits the maximum number of pages a newspaper may publish at a given price. The Court considered whether such a limitation infringes the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression. Although the Constitution does not expressly mention a freedom of the press, the Court has previously held that press freedom is encompassed within the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by clause (1)(a) of Article 19, as noted in Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi ((1950) S.C.R. 605, 610). The Court emphasized that this freedom is not absolute because clause (2) of Article 19 permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions in specified circumstances. The provision states that nothing in sub‑clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. The Court noted that the State did not argue that the Act or the Order made under it could be justified on any of the grounds listed in this clause.

The Court further explained that the right to propagate ideas is intrinsic to the concept of freedom of speech and expression. Every citizen, for the purpose of disseminating his ideas, has a right to publish, distribute and circulate them, either orally or in writing. This right, subject to any law valid under Article 19(2), extends not only to the content of the expression but also to the volume of its circulation. In other words, a citizen may propagate his views and reach any class and number of readers, subject only to the limitations permissible under a law under Article 19(2). The Court could not deny that the impugned Order attempts to restrain this aspect of the right by prescribing a price‑page schedule. Moreover, the Court observed that fixing a minimum price for a given number of pages is not intended to ensure reasonable prices for newspaper buyers; rather, it appears designed to reduce the circulation of certain newspapers by setting prices that are likely to deter a segment of readers. The Court also remarked that it is undisputed that each newspaper formulates its own plan for conducting its business, taking into account factors such as the place of publication, the class of the reading public likely to subscribe, labour conditions, and the price of material, among others.

The newspaper determines its size, the mix of material such as news, commentary, reader opinions, advertisements and other items, and the price it will charge, based on considerations including the nature of the material, the availability of advertising and similar factors. The business plan that the newspaper formulates on this basis is threatened to be disturbed, if not completely overturned, by an order that the Central Government may issue under section 3(1) with the purpose of reducing newspaper circulation. Section 3(4) obliges the Government to consult the publishers’ associations before issuing such an order, but the Government is not required to accept the associations’ views. Even though consultation is mandated, the Government’s action in preparing the order remains a direct interference with a citizen’s freedom of speech and expression.

When the price‑page schedule becomes effective, a newspaper proprietor will be prohibited from charging less than a prescribed minimum price for a given number of pages, and any violation will attract a penalty. The proprietor will also be barred from publishing more than four supplements without obtaining prior permission from the Government. The order does not specify the conditions under which a proprietor may seek such special permission, leaving the decision entirely to the Government’s discretion. This discretionary power, dependent on the Government’s “sweet‑will and pleasure,” strikes at the very core of press independence. In Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India (1959 SCR 12), this Court held that although the press is subject to general laws, it is impermissible to subject the press to statutes that diminish or abridge the freedom of speech and expression, that aim to curtail circulation, that narrow the dissemination of information, or that force the press to rely on Government assistance. The Court further observed that a law imposing excessive and prohibitive burdens on the press, thereby restricting newspaper circulation, cannot be justified under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The Constitution must therefore be interpreted broadly, not narrowly or pedantically, to give effect to the fundamental rights it enshrines and to allow citizens to enjoy those rights fully.

In keeping with the principle that constitutional freedoms must be realised to the fullest extent permissible, the Court explained that the right to freedom of speech and expression inherently includes the right to publish and to circulate one’s ideas, opinions and views. This right may be exercised by any means of publication that are available, but it remains subject to the restrictions that may be validly imposed under clause (2) of Article 19. The Court identified the earliest decision in which this principle was expressly recognised as Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 594). In that case the Court held that freedom of speech and expression embraces the freedom to propagate ideas and that such freedom is secured through the freedom of circulation. The judgment also observed that freedom of speech and expression forms the foundation of all democratic institutions and is essential for the proper functioning of democratic processes. Subsequent pronouncements have consistently underscored that legislative limitations on this right must be narrowly and stringently measured. In State of Madras v. V. G. Row ([1952] S.C.R. 597) the Court examined the reasonableness of restrictions on a fundamental right and stated that the nature of the alleged infringement, the purpose underlying the restriction, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied, the disproportionality of the measure and the prevailing conditions at the time must all be considered in judicial assessment. In Dwarkadas Shriniwas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Wearing Co., Ltd. ([1954] S.C.R. 674) the Court emphasized that constitutional interpretation should focus on the substance and practical effect of a State act rather than merely its formal legal characterization, urging an enquiry into the actual loss or injury to the citizen rather than the mere method of restriction. Further, in Virendra v. State of Punjab ([1958] S.C.R. 308) the Court observed at page 319 that “It is certainly a serious encroachment on the valuable and cherished right or freedom of speech and expression if a newspaper is prevented from publishing its own or the views of its correspondents relating to or concerning what may be the burning topic of the day.”

The order that was challenged in the present proceedings required every newspaper that wished to retain its present number of pages to increase its selling price. The impact of raising newspaper prices on circulation had been examined by the Press Commission, whose report noted in paragraph 164 that the selling price of a paper naturally influences its circulation. The Commission cited the effect of price reductions adopted by two English‑language newspapers in Bombay. It recorded that before 27 October 1952 the Times of India, which enjoyed the highest circulation in Bombay, was sold at Rs 0‑2‑6, while the Free Press Journal and the National Standard, the next leading papers, were priced at Rs 0‑2‑0. On 27 October 1952 the Free Press Journal lowered its price to Rs 0‑1‑0 and, within a year, claimed to have doubled its circulation. On 1 July 1953 the National Standard was transformed into a Bombay edition of the Indian Express with a price of Rs 0‑1‑6, and within six months it also asserted that its circulation had doubled. During the same period the Times of India, which did not reduce its price, continued to retain its readership. The Commission concluded that the two papers, by cutting their prices, were able to tap a latent readership that had previously been unable to afford the higher prices. This observation was set out in paragraph 165 of the report, linking price policy directly to the ability of newspapers to reach a broader audience.

In the Press Commission’s report the relationship between the selling price of a newspaper and its circulation was illustrated with two distinct sets of data, one drawn from Bombay and the other from Madras. In Bombay, before 27 October 1952 the Times of India – the newspaper with the highest circulation in the city – was retailing at Rs 0‑2‑6 per copy, while the two next‑most‑read titles, the Free Press Journal and the National Standard, were priced at Rs 0‑2‑0. On 27 October 1952 the Free Press Journal reduced its price to Rs 0‑1‑0 and, within a year, asserted that its circulation had doubled. Subsequently, on 1 July 1953 the National Standard was re‑launched as the Bombay edition of the Indian Express and was sold for Rs 0‑1‑6; within six months it also claimed a doubling of its circulation. Throughout this period the Times of India, which did not alter its price, continued to retain its existing readership. The Commission therefore concluded that the two newspapers that lowered their price were able to attract a latent segment of the market that previously could not afford the higher price, thereby increasing their readership. Paragraph 165 of the same report provided a contrasting example from Madras. The two leading Tamil‑language dailies, Swadesamitran and Dinamani, anticipating a steep rise in the cost of newsprint toward the end of 1950, mutually agreed to raise their cover price from Rs 0‑1‑0 to Rs 0‑1‑6 per copy, effective 1 January 1951. Both papers ordinarily carried thirty to thirty‑six pages each week. The price hike produced an immediate and drastic fall in circulation for each. In response to the decline, the papers consented to revert to the original price. The initial decline in circulation manifested within three months; however, one newspaper required more than nine months to regain its former circulation, while the other had not yet recovered. The report also observed that the circulation of a competing paper, Thanthi, neither rose during the three‑month period of the price increase nor fell when the prices were restored. From these observations the Commission inferred that over thirty‑three thousand readers abandoned newspaper reading altogether because of the price increase. Although the period under review coincided with an acute drought in Tamil Nadu – a condition that contributed to a general reduction in newspaper sales – the Commission emphasized that the change in price had a profound and decisive effect on the circulation of the two leading papers.

Even though newspaper prices were relatively low, the Commission noted in paragraph 52 that a substantial number of people still found it difficult to meet even these modest costs. The report recorded that the most common reason cited by a large number of individuals and by representatives of various associations for not purchasing newspapers was the cost of the newspaper and the inability of households to spare the necessary amount. This observation formed a key basis for the Commission’s view that a modest increase in price, such as an additional one paisa, would adversely affect newspaper circulation.

In the judgment, the Court observed that the principal reason why households do not purchase newspapers is the cost of the newspaper and the inability of the family to allocate the required amount of money. The Court said that this finding rested on the testimony of a very large number of individual readers as well as on the statements of representatives of various newspaper associations. Relying on that evidence, the Court held that even a modest increase in the price of a newspaper, for example an increase of one nP., in order to maintain the present size of the paper, would have an adverse impact on its circulation. The Court then noted that some submissions argued that newspapers need not raise their prices but could instead reduce the number of pages they publish. The Court explained that compelling newspapers to shrink their size would force them to limit the dissemination of news and views, thereby directly infringing the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The submissions further suggested that the same objective could be achieved by reducing the space allocated to advertisements. In that view, newspapers could keep the same amount of space for news and views by decreasing, to a necessary extent, the portion devoted to advertisements. The Court pointed out that many newspapers allocate a disproportionately large area to advertisements and that some newspapers devote very large sections to advertising. However, the Court observed that the Act was intended to apply also to newspapers that carry no or only a few advertisements. The Court further observed that after the Act came into force and the relevant Order was implemented, a newspaper that had the right to publish any number of pages for its news and views would be restrained from doing so unless it raised its selling price as prescribed in the schedule to the Order. The Court concluded that this immediate effect of the Order would constitute a direct violation of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The Court then turned to section 3(1) of the Act, noting that the provision permitting allocation of space to advertisements also directly affected the freedom of circulation. The Court stated that if the area available for advertisements were curtailed, the price of the newspaper would necessarily rise, and that such a price rise would inevitably reduce circulation. The Court emphasized that this would not be a remote or speculative consequence but a direct result of limiting advertisement space. Finally, the Court considered the relationship between advertisement revenue and circulation. The Court observed that a newspaper’s advertising income is proportional to its circulation; a higher circulation yields larger advertising revenue. Consequently, if a newspaper with high circulation raised its price, its circulation would fall, leading to a decline in advertising revenue. The Court explained that this decline could force the newspaper either to cease operations or to raise its price further, which would again depress circulation and create a vicious cycle that could ultimately culminate in the newspaper’s closure. Conversely, the Court noted that reducing the space allotted to advertisements would lower a newspaper’s earnings and

In this case, the Court observed that if a newspaper's advertising space is reduced, the newspaper would be forced either to operate at a loss, to shut down, or to raise its price. Accordingly, the Court said that the regulation is directed specifically against the circulation of a newspaper, thereby affecting its readership. The Court explained that when a statute is intended to achieve that result, it directly interferes with the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court further stated that because the object of the impugned law is to affect the circulation of certain newspapers alleged to be engaged in unfair competition, it is difficult to see how the law can be justified. The Court reiterated that the right to freedom of speech and expression is an individual right afforded to every citizen under Article 19(1)(a). The Court observed that clause (2) of Article 19 contains no provision allowing the State to curtail this right on the basis of providing a benefit to the public at large or to a particular section of the public. The Court added that the State may not restrict or infringe one citizen’s freedom of speech in order to promote the general welfare of a group unless such restriction can be justified under a law that falls within the scope of clause (2) of Article 19. The Court accepted that the challenged provisions cannot be justified on the grounds mentioned in that clause as applicable. Representing the State, counsel argued that newspaper activities comprise two distinct aspects: the dissemination of news and views, and the commercial aspect. The State contended that these aspects are separate and that, under clause (6) of Article 19, reasonable restrictions may be placed on the commercial aspect in the interest of the general public. The Court quoted the text of clause (6), which reads: “Nothing in sub‑clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub‑clause…”. The Court concluded that while the State may have the power to impose reasonable restrictions on a citizen’s right to carry on business in the public interest, it cannot achieve that objective by directly and immediately curtailing another constitutional freedom that is not subject to the same restriction under clause (6). Consequently, the Court held that the freedom of speech cannot be withdrawn merely to regulate business activities, as such a withdrawal would lack constitutional justification. The Court clarified that freedom of speech may be limited only for reasons such as the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in matters of contempt of court and defamation.

The Court explained that freedom of speech and expression could not be limited on the same basis as the freedom to carry on a business, even when the restriction was claimed to be justified under clauses (3) to (6) of Article 19. It observed that the scheme of Article 19 was to list each freedom separately and then to specify the permissible limits and the purposes for which those limits could be imposed. Consequently, a citizen was entitled to enjoy every freedom guaranteed by clause (1) without the Constitution giving preference to any one of them. The plain meaning of clause (1) therefore required that the State could not enact a law that directly curtailed one freedom in order to secure the better enjoyment of another. The Court emphasized that this principle provided a strong reason for holding that the State could not impose a direct restriction on a particular freedom simply by placing a restriction that might otherwise be permissible on a different freedom. Viewing the issue from this perspective, the Court found that referring to the press as a business and characterising the restriction imposed by the impugned Act as a permissible limitation on the right to carry on the newspaper publishing business was entirely irrelevant to the question of whether the Act infringed the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). The only remaining issue, the Court said, was whether the impugned enactment directly impinged upon the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. A direct impingement would occur either by placing a restraint on that freedom itself or by placing a restraint on something that formed an essential part of that freedom. The Court noted that the freedom of a newspaper to publish any number of pages and to circulate its publication to any number of persons were each integral components of the freedom of speech and expression. A restriction on either of these aspects would constitute a direct infringement of the right. To illustrate this point, the Court imagined a hypothetical provision that limited newspaper ‘A’ or newspaper ‘B’ to a specified number of subscribers. It held unequivocally that such a law could not be validated under Article 19(1)(a) because it would directly curtail the freedom of expression, which includes the freedom of circulation and the ability of a citizen to propagate his views beyond any statutory limit. The Court further explained that even if the legislation achieved the same result through a schedule of rates, the impact on the freedom would remain direct, regardless of whether the restriction appeared indirect on its face. Finally, the Court observed that the Act, by enacting sections 4 and 5, directly prohibited a newspaper from exercising its right unless the newspaper complied with an order made under section 3, and that such a prohibition represented a direct invasion of the right under Article 19(1)(a) rather than an incidental or indirect effect.

Sections 4 and 5 of the impugned Act expressly prohibit a newspaper from exercising its right of publication if the newspaper fails to obey an order issued under section 3. The Court described this prohibition as a direct invasion of the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and not merely an incidental or indirect effect as was observed in the earlier Express Newspapers case, reported in (1959) S.C.R. 12. In that precedent, the Court examined a challenge to certain provisions of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, on the ground that they infringed the right protected by Article 19(1)(a). The challenge was rejected because the purpose of the legislation was to improve the conditions of working journalists, and because the Act did not directly interfere with the right of newspaper proprietors under Article 19(1)(a). The judgment distinguished between a direct and an indirect effect of a law on press freedom. At page 135, Justice Bhagwati, speaking for the Court, stated: “All the consequences which have been visualised in this behalf by the petitioners, viz., the tendency to curtail circulation and thereby narrow the scope of dissemination of information, fetters on the petitioners’ freedom to choose the means of exercising the right, likelihood of the independence of the press being undermined by having to seek government aid … would be remote and depend upon various factors which may or may not come into play. Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences or the measures enacted in the impugned Act, it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation.”

The Court further observed that the intent of the impugned Act to affect newspaper circulation makes its impact on the freedom of speech unmistakable, a fact that is evident from the preamble of the Act. The preamble reads: “An Act to provide for the regulation of the prices charged for newspapers in relation to their pages and of matters connected therewith for the purpose of preventing unfair competition among newspapers so that newspapers may have fuller opportunities of freedom of expression.” Consequently, the object of the Act is to regulate a matter – the price per page – that is directly linked to the circulation of a newspaper. Since circulation is an essential component of the freedom of speech, the Act must be regarded as legislation directed against that freedom. By targeting the fundamental attribute of the right – the ability to circulate one’s views to the widest possible audience – the Act seeks to enable smaller newspapers to obtain larger circulation while, in effect, restricting larger, financially stronger papers. The provisions therefore do not merely interfere incidentally with the right of speech; they impose a direct restriction in pursuit of a business‑related objective, a course that the Court deemed impermissible.

In this case the Court observed that the provision under review does not merely interfere incidentally with the right of freedom of speech; rather it interferes directly by attempting to regulate the business aspects of a newspaper. The Court held that such a direct interference is not permissible and that the judiciary must remain constantly vigilant in protecting what is perhaps the most valuable freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court explained that the importance of freedom of speech and expression lies at the heart of a democratic system, which depends upon the ability of citizens to influence the composition of legislatures and governments, and therefore this freedom must be preserved at all costs. Although the legislation was enacted based on the recommendation of the Press Commission, the Court noted that its true purpose is to affect the right of circulation of newspapers, a right that is essential for newspapers to shape public opinion. Consequently, the Court described the law as a potentially dangerous weapon that could be turned against democracy itself. The Court then rejected the argument that the Act and the accompanying Order could be justified simply because they implement a commission’s recommendation and were not driven by any ulterior motive. Citing the decision in Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) v. Union of India, the Court observed that when a statute is challenged on the ground of violating fundamental rights, the court may consider various factors such as the purpose of the legislation, the mischief it seeks to prevent, the remedy it proposes, and the true reason for that remedy. However, the Court found that this line of reasoning did not apply because the Act, together with the Order made under it, operates as a restraint on the freedom of speech and expression of newspapers. The Court stressed that even if the statute’s stated objective is to suppress unfair practices in the newspaper trade, that objective does not legitimize restrictions on the right of circulation. While the Court acknowledged that unfair practices may be condemnable, it held that such condemnation cannot serve as a basis for curbing the fundamental right to circulate a newspaper. The Court further examined the contention that the Act aims to prevent monopolies, which are often considered contrary to public interest. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that monopolies are always undesirable, the Court reiterated that the direct and immediate effect of the Act and the Order is to interfere with the freedom of circulation; therefore, the fact that the legislation seeks to suppress monopolies or unfair practices does not assist its validity. Finally, the Court emphasized that the desirability of an objective does not make every means of achieving it permissible. Even if the intended end is commendable, the means employed must not transgress constitutional limits, and any measure that directly impinges on a fundamental right cannot be upheld when its constitutionality is challenged, regardless of any other legal considerations.

In this case the Court observed that one of the purposes of the legislation was to give a measure of protection to small or newly established newspapers and that this purpose was apparently commendable. However, the Court held that even a desirable objective cannot justify the State encroaching on the freedom of other newspapers that is guaranteed to them by Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the State must seek alternative means of assistance that do not infringe on the constitutional right. It further reiterated that the only limitations that may lawfully be placed on the rights guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(a) are those expressly permitted by clause (2) of Article 19, and no other restrictions are permissible. Regarding Writ Petitions 67 and 68 of 1961, the Court noted that the relief granted in the principal petition would also satisfy the grievances of the petitioners in those two writs. Consequently, it considered it unnecessary to examine separately whether the petitioners, as newspaper readers, could claim a violation of their Article 19 (1)(a) right, and therefore the Court declined to pass any order on those petitions.

The Court then concluded that section 3 (1) of the Act, which constitutes the core provision of the legislation, is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order of 1960, which was issued under that provision, is also unconstitutional. Since the invalidation of section 3 (1) removes the essential basis of the Act, nothing remains enforceable under the Act. On this basis, the Court allowed the petition and ordered that the petitioners bear the costs. The petitioners in Writ Petitions 67 and 68 of 1961, together with the interveners, were each directed to pay their respective costs. The petition was thus allowed.