Saibal Kumar Gupta And Others vs B. K. Sen And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 1958

Decision Date: 13 January, 1961

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Raghubar Dayal, Subba Rao

In the matter titled Saibal Kumar Gupta and Others versus B. K. Sen and Another, the judgment was delivered on 13 January 1961 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, who also sat on the bench together with Justice Raghubar Dayal. The citation for this decision appears as 1961 AIR 633 and 1961 SCR (3) 460, with subsequent references recorded in various law reports for later years.

The factual background concerned the first respondent, who then held the position of Commissioner of the Corporation of Calcutta. He had been tried for an alleged offence under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, but the trial magistrate discharged him pursuant to section 253(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complainant filed a revision petition, and the Sessions Judge, finding that the Commissioner had induced the complainant’s witnesses, set aside the discharge order and directed that a fresh enquiry be conducted by another magistrate, who allowed the complainant to present additional evidence. The Commissioner appealed this decision by filing a revision in the High Court. A Division Bench of that Court issued a rule that stayed the further proceedings. While the High Court appeal was pending, the Corporation of Calcutta passed a resolution to constitute a Special Committee tasked with investigating allegations against certain officials of the Corporation who were purportedly exploiting their official positions for personal business. The resolution named Councillors S. K. Gupta, R. N. Majumdar and S. K. Roy as members of this Committee and limited its inquiry to matters concerning the Corporation. Subsequent to the resolution, the Mayor transferred to the Committee certain documents submitted by a Councillor that contained allegations against the Commissioner. The Commissioner contended that the Special Committee examined both the complainant and another individual, and subsequently issued a notice together with a questionnaire. The relevant excerpt of the questionnaire read: “As you probably know, we have been appointed to make an enquiry into certain allegations relating to the administration of the Corporation of Calcutta and especially into certain steps taken by you in the matter of assessment and appointments and a few other matters. We are giving you a synopsis of the cases in which the enquiry is being held and we shall be glad if you kindly give us some time between ten a.m. and eleven a.m. tomorrow (the 16th instant) so that we can get the facts from you.” The document continued with further details of the alleged improprieties, after which the first respondent filed a complaint in the High Court accusing the three appellants of committing contempt of the High Court.

It was alleged that between 4 January 1956 and 20 September 1957, which was approximately the period during which a case under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code was being tried, the respondent appointed several individuals to positions. The persons named were Anil Koyal, Jogendra Nath Mondal, Ahi Kanta Choudhury, Govinda Banerjee and Narendra Nath Naskar. Each of these appointees was said to be related respectively to Palan Koyal, Haradhan (alias Haridhan) Mondal, Tripti Choudhury, Thakur Raj Smriti Tirtha and Upendra Naskar, all of whom had been cited as witnesses in the criminal case. In addition, it was alleged that around the same time the respondent gave appointments to Tarak Nath Day, Hardhan Day, Pradip Bhaduri and Ardharigsu Mondal, among others, and also condoned a previous punishment imposed on Dhiren Mondal because those individuals were assisting the respondent in mounting a defence in the case. A further allegation stated that the respondent played a role in securing the appointment of another possible prosecution witness, Kamakshya Chatterjee, through a person identified as M. L. Ghose, who at that time was facing a demolition proceeding. Following these accusations, the first respondent filed a complaint in the High Court alleging that the appellants were guilty of contempt of both the High Court and the trial court. The High Court examined the complaint, found the appellants guilty, and sentenced them for contempt of court. The appellants subsequently filed the present appeal against that conviction.

The appellate court, by a majority judgment of Justices Imam and Raghubar Dayal, held that the appellants were not guilty of contempt and allowed the appeal. The court reasoned that the Special Committee formed by the Corporation could not be said to have constituted a parallel court of inquiry with respect to matters that were before the trial magistrate or the High Court. The court distinguished the present situation from a scenario in which a newspaper conducts a trial, emphasizing that the Special Committee had been directed by the Corporation to investigate alleged malpractices by its employees, including the making of unworthy appointments. The motive behind the inquiry was incidental to its main purpose and did not transform the committee into a body seeking to interfere with ongoing judicial proceedings. The record showed that the appellants never intended to influence the course of justice, nor did their conduct amount to such interference. They deliberately avoided commenting on any pending court proceedings or on issues arising from them. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Subba Rao observed that the appellants had apparently initiated an inquiry that exceeded the scope of the corporation’s resolution. He noted that, aware that criminal proceedings were pending, the appellants examined witnesses, served questionnaires, and allowed councillors and others to attend an inquiry that was not confidential. Justice Subba Rao reiterated settled law that a person commits contempt of court only when his act is intended, calculated, or likely to interfere with the administration of justice, citing authorities such as Read & Huggonson (1742) 2 Atk 469, The Queen v. Payne [1896] 1 QB 577, The Queen v. Gray [1900] 2 QB 36, R v Odham’s Press Ltd. [1956] 3 All ER 494, and R v Duffy.

In this matter, the Court referred to several earlier authorities, including Mohapatra, I.L.R. (1955) Cuttack 305, and Ganesh Shankay Vidyarthi’s case, A.I.R. 1929 All.81, as well as the English cases of Re Read & Huggonson (1742) 2 Atk. 469, The Queen v. Payne [1896] 1 Q.B. 577, The Queen v. Gray [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, R. v. Odham’s Press Ltd. [1956] 3 All E.R. 494, and R. v. Duffy. The Court observed that it could not be said that the enquiry launched by the committee to determine whether the first respondent had induced witnesses to give false testimony would have no serious impact on the proceedings that were already pending in the Magistrate’s Court or in the High Court. While a firmly minded Magistrate might not be swayed by the committee’s investigation, the Court held that such an enquiry could nevertheless influence a weaker mind and thereby disturb the proper administration of justice. Likewise, even if a High Court judge could withstand the effect of the enquiry, the Court noted that the public and the parties to a criminal case could reasonably fear that the committee’s findings might interfere with a fair hearing. Consequently, the contempt committed in the present case was not merely a technical breach but a serious transgression intended to disrupt and obstruct the due course of justice, and the Court affirmed that such conduct demanded decisive action.

The appeal arose from Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 1958, which challenged the judgment and order dated 24 April 1958 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 38 of 1958. Counsel for the appellants were instructed by representatives of the appellants, while counsel for the first respondent and the second respondent were instructed by representatives of those parties. The appeal was decided on 13 January 1961, with the judgment delivered by Justices Imam and Raghubar Dayal, and a separate judgment authored by Justice Subba Rao. The appellants had been convicted of contempt of court by the Calcutta High Court and each had been ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 500. They had applied to the High Court for a certificate that the case was suitable for appeal to the Supreme Court, and this certificate had been granted, leading to the present appeal. The factual background began on 19 March 1955, when Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury lodged a complaint before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate of Alipore against the respondent B. K. Sen under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. After examining many witnesses, the Magistrate declined to frame a charge and, by an order dated 13 July 1957, discharged the accused under section 253(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury then filed a revisional application before the Sessions Judge of 24 Parganas. By an order dated 22 November 1957, the Sessions Judge directed that a further enquiry be conducted. On 3 January 1958, while conducting the mandated further enquiry, the Magistrate permitted the prosecution to present additional evidence. Subsequently, on 3 February 1958, the accused B. K. Sen filed a revision petition in the Calcutta High Court contesting both the Sessions Judge’s order directing a further enquiry and the Magistrate’s order allowing the prosecution to tender further evidence.

The High Court subsequently issued a rule and stayed any further proceedings in the matter. At the time he filed his petition in the High Court seeking contempt of court proceedings against the appellants, the respondent B. K. Sen was serving as the Commissioner of the Calcutta Corporation. According to the petition, a special meeting of the Calcutta Corporation was held on 16 January 1958, during which the Mayor proposed the creation of a committee to consider necessary and appropriate steps for the purpose of eradicating alleged malpractices that were said to exist in various departments of the Corporation. At that meeting Satyananda Bhattacharjee made a series of unsubstantiated allegations against B. K. Sen. Two resolutions were passed at the same meeting; one of them authorised the Mayor to constitute a Special Committee in order to give effect to the suggestions and objectives that the Mayor had set out in his statement dated 10 January 1958.

On 14 February 1958, during an ordinary meeting of the Calcutta Corporation, Bhattacharjee again repeated the allegations he had raised at the earlier meeting of 16 January. The corporation then resolved to establish a Special Committee, and the appellants were elected as members of that committee. The purpose of the Special Committee was to investigate certain allegations made against some officials of the Corporation who were alleged to have exploited their high offices in order to carry on business in their own names. The resolution was worded as follows: “That a Special Committee consisting of Councillors Shri S. K. Gupta, Shri R. N. Majumdar and Shri S. K. Roy be set up to enquire into the allegations levelled against certain officials of the Corporation who are alleged to have been taking advantage of their high offices in carrying on business in their own names. The Committee will take up only those matters that relate to the Corporation.”

The record of the contempt proceedings before the High Court shows that on 26 March 1958, at another meeting of the Calcutta Corporation, Bhattacharjee informed the Mayor that on 14 February he had raised on the floor of the House certain charges against some senior officials of the Corporation, and that the Mayor had asked him to submit his papers to the Special Committee. Bhattacharjee further stated that the day before, during a sitting of the Special Committee, he had attempted to hand over to the Committee some papers that were in his possession, but the Committee had refused to accept them, declaring that it would investigate only “open case only”. Bhattacharjee then requested the Mayor to ask the Special Committee to investigate all of the allegations he had made. The Mayor responded by asking Bhattacharjee to hand the papers directly to him, and added that if the matter was not recorded in the proceedings, he would, on that very day, deem that all the papers should be sent to the Special Committee. According to B. K. Sen, on 11 April 1958, the Committee examined Bimala Kanta Roy.

During the proceedings, it was recorded that the petitioner acknowledged that his criminal case against B K Sen under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code was, at that time, still awaiting a decision from the High Court. Subsequently, Mr Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury made a further allegation that either the witnesses who had been called in that case or close relatives of those witnesses had been given appointments within the Corporation of Calcutta. In support of this claim, he specifically named one individual, Mr Tarak Nath Dey. The principal aim of Mr Roy Choudhury’s statement was to demonstrate that Mr Sen had misused the authority of his official position in order to create circumstances that made it impossible for the petitioner to call upon the relevant witnesses who could substantiate his case. In response to the allegation, the Special Committee arranged for Mr Tarak Nath Dey to appear before it and to be confronted with the accusations made by Mr Roy Choudhury. When examined by the Committee, Mr Dey denied that he acted as an agent of the wife of Mr Roy Choudhury, and he also denied that he was the “Tadbirkar” of Mr Sen. The Committee, however, proceeded to go beyond the mere examination of the statements and deliberately sought to gather evidence on matters that were directly and substantially in issue in the pending High Court proceeding. The petitioner, Mr B K Sen, further maintained in his petition that the members of the Special Committee had, in effect, created a parallel court of inquiry whose purpose was to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations raised by Mr Roy Choudhury. He contended that the actions of the Committee were deliberately intended to generate an atmosphere of prejudice against him and that such actions constituted an unwarranted interference with the free and impartial administration of justice. In his view, the conduct of the Committee was likely to prejudice the trial and could influence the decision of either the trial court or the High Court.

Following these events, the Special Committee issued a questionnaire to the petitioner. The questionnaire contained several specific allegations, as set out in the following terms. Paragraph III(a) alleged that between 4 January 1956 and 20 September 1957—approximately the period during which the case under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code was being tried—Mr Sen had appointed the following individuals: Anil Koyal, Jogendra Nath Mondal, Ahi Kanta Choudhury, Govinda Banerjee and Narendra Nath Naskar. The questionnaire further asserted that each of these appointees was related respectively to Palan Koyal, Haradhan (also known as Haridhan) Mondal, Tripti Choudhury, Thakur Raj Smriti Tirtha and Upendra Naskar, all of whom had been cited as witnesses in the pending case. Paragraph III(b) alleged that, at about the same time, Mr Sen had also appointed Tarak Nath Dey, Hardhan Dey, Pradip Bhaduri, Ardhangsu Mondal and others, and had condoned the punishment previously imposed on Dhiren Mondal because those individuals were assisting him in defending the case. Paragraph III(c) alleged that Mr Sen had been instrumental in securing the appointment of another potential prosecution witness, Kamakshya Chatterjee, through a person identified as M L Ghosh, even though a demolition case was pending against that witness. The petitioner’s case before the High Court was that the conduct of the members of the Special Committee amounted to gross contempt of both the High Court and the trial court. Accordingly, the petitioner sought relief on the ground that the Committee’s actions constituted a serious contempt of the courts.

K. Sen filed his petition in the High Court on 16 April 1958, seeking proceedings against the appellants for contempt of court. On the same day the High Court issued a notice to the appellants, directing them to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be instituted against them. The appellants filed their show‑cause response on 17 April 1958. The Court then issued a rule, requiring a further response to be filed no later than 23 April 1958. After hearing both sides on 24 April 1958, the High Court convicted the appellants, as previously recorded.

The sole issue for determination was whether the conduct of the appellants, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee, amounted to contempt of court. On behalf of the appellants it was argued that the inquiry conducted by the Special Committee was not intended to determine the guilt or innocence of B. K. Sen in the case pending under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. They maintained that the inquiry could not be characterized as a parallel proceeding to the criminal trial. The Special Committee, they said, had been created specifically to examine whether employees of the Calcutta Corporation had abused the powers vested in them, and it was not limited to investigating B. K. Sen alone.

The appellants further explained that the questionnaire sent to B. K. Sen referred to three separate incidents that bore no relation to the criminal case under section 497 pending in the Magistrate’s Court. The first incident concerned an agreement with a woman to construct a house for a price of Rs 40,000 and then sell it to her for Rs 50,000, an arrangement the appellants said indicated that B. K. Sen had engaged in a profit‑making business contrary to his conditions of service. The second incident related to a reduction in the valuation of certain premises belonging to individuals described as the Guptas, who were either his relatives or friends; the reduction was made long after their appeal had been disposed of and without any adequate justification being recorded. The third incident dealt with the assessment of B. K. Sen’s own house, where he had reduced its letting value to Rs 90 per month, consequently paying the Corporation tax on that amount, while in reality he was receiving rent of Rs 250 per month. The Land Acquisition Collector had expressed the opinion that the proper letting value of the premises should be Rs 281 per month.

According to the appellants, the entire purpose of the Special Committee’s inquiry was to ascertain whether B. K. Sen, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Corporation, had abused his position. They pointed out that the questionnaire, presented under clauses III(a), (b) and (c), did not assert that B. K. Sen had acted with the intention of suborning prosecution witnesses in the section 497 case, nor did it claim that he had acted to suppress evidence that might be produced against him. The appellants emphasized that throughout the questionnaire the wording consistently read “it is alleged,” and that no definitive allegation was made that B. K. Sen had actually engaged in improper conduct.

The Court observed that the letter accompanying the questionnaire expressly requested B K Sen to give the Committee time between ten a.m. and eleven a.m. on 16 April so that they could obtain the facts from him. In other words, the Special Committee had not accepted the allegations against B K Sen; it merely pointed out the nature of the allegations and sought his factual response. This conduct by the appellants as members of the Special Committee could not be said to transform them into a tribunal holding a parallel enquiry to the proceeding under section 497 against B K Sen. It was further submitted that even if the enquiry raised the question whether B K Sen acted with ulterior motives in the matters described in questionnaire 111(a), (b) and (c), that question would be merely incidental to the primary purpose of determining whether he, as Commissioner of the Calcutta Corporation, had abused his position. Before the conduct of the appellants could be characterised as contempt of court, it had to be shown that their conduct tended to prejudice B K Sen or was calculated to interfere with the due course of justice. It was also argued that for a person to be convicted of contempt, the act must amount to real contempt and be of a kind that warrants court action. In the present case, the incidental question of whether B K Sen acted improperly in making the appointments referred to in questionnaire 111(a), (b) and (c) for his own benefit was deemed too remote for a court to hold that it tended to or was calculated to interfere with the course of justice, and therefore did not constitute contempt requiring proceedings. Reliance was placed on section 99(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, which provides that every Special Committee shall comply with any instructions given to it by the Corporation. The appellants, as members of the Special Committee, had merely performed their public duty by obeying the Corporation’s instruction at its meeting on 26 March 1958, when the papers presented by Bhattacharjee were referred to the Special Committee. Even assuming that the appellants’ actions amounted in law to contempt, the Court held that such contempt was so slight as not to justify instituting contempt proceedings against them. The respondents in this appeal were B K Sen and the State of West Bengal. No submissions were made on behalf of the State of West Bengal. On behalf of B K Sen, it was contended that the facts asserted in his petition for contempt had not been disputed by the appellants. The appellants, in their affidavit, stated that they did not admit the factual assertions in the petition for contempt except those expressly admitted in their affidavit.

In the petition for contempt that had been filed in the High Court, the appellants did not dispute the filing at all. Their only response, given in an affidavit, was that they refused to accept any of the factual allegations contained in the petition except for those facts that they themselves had chosen to set out in the same affidavit. On behalf of B K Sen it was strongly emphasized that he had protested at a meeting of the Corporation held on 14 February 1958, arguing that the allegations made by Bhattacharjee should not be considered because the matters raised were already sub‑judice before the Calcutta High Court. Several other members of the Corporation voiced the same objection. According to the record of Bhattacharjee’s own statement made at a later Corporation meeting on 26 March 1958, the Committee had declined to receive the papers that Bhattacharjee had submitted and had declared that it would limit its inquiry to “open case only”. Nevertheless, despite their awareness that the subject was sub‑judice in the Calcutta High Court, the appellants proceeded, at a meeting of the Special Committee held on 11 April 1958, to examine Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury, who was the complainant in the criminal case under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code against B K Sen. In the same session they also examined Tarak Nath Dey in connection with the allegations raised by Bhattacharjee. By doing so, the appellants launched a parallel inquiry into a matter that was already pending before the Calcutta High Court. At that time the High Court was hearing a petition filed by B K Sen in which he challenged the validity of an order of the Sessions Judge that had directed a further inquiry in the case under section 497. A crucial issue to be resolved in that proceeding was whether B K Sen had indeed suborned the prosecution witnesses in the section 497 case or had otherwise obstructed the appearance of prosecution witnesses against him. The charges set out by Bhattacharjee in paragraphs 7 and 15 of Annex C made clear that he alleged B K Sen had tampered with prosecution witnesses in Garia with the assistance of Dhiren Mondal, and that some alleged acts of adultery had taken place at Garia. Furthermore, it was alleged that B K Sen had secured the cooperation of a prosecution witness, Kamakshya Chatterjee, by obtaining for him a position with the Central Bank of India Ltd., Calcutta. The appellants’ decision to conduct this parallel inquiry therefore tended to interfere with the orderly administration of justice and to prejudice B K Sen. Their conduct could not be characterized as a minor or inadvertent act because it was a deliberate and purposeful undertaking, not merely the distribution of a questionnaire without any substantive comment on the allegations raised by Bhattacharjee, Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury, or Tarak Nath Dey.

The Court observed that the appellants had conducted a separate inquiry into a question that was already before the Calcutta High Court, and that this parallel inquiry interfered with the pending determination and therefore amounted to contempt of that Court. On behalf of B. K. Sen, counsel argued that section 99(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act could not be invoked as a defence against a charge of contempt if the appellants’ conduct itself constituted contempt of the High Court. He further maintained that because the direction to the appellants originated from the Mayor rather than from the Calcutta Corporation, the provision of section 99(1) was inapplicable. The Court then set out to examine whether the appellants’ conduct legally qualified as real contempt of the Calcutta High Court and also of the magistrate before whom proceedings under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code were pending at the time the High Court issued its order convicting the appellants of contempt. A dispute existed between the appellants and B. K. Sen concerning whether the individuals named Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury and Tarak Nath Dey had been examined by the appellants. The appellants had offered no explicit denial; their statement that “save and except what was stated in their affidavit, nothing else was admitted” was insufficient to rebut B. K. Sen’s claim. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the two individuals had indeed been examined, the Court turned to the contents of paragraph 10 of B. K. Sen’s affidavit filed in the High Court. In that paragraph Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury alleged that prosecution witnesses, or their close relatives, had obtained appointments in the Corporation of Calcutta, and that Tarak Nath Dey acted as an agent for the wife of Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury and for B. K. Sen. Tarak Nath Dey, when examined, denied these allegations and confirmed that he was merely an employee of the Corporation. Paragraph 10 further explained that the sole purpose of examining Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury was to substantiate his allegation that B. K. Sen had abused his official position, creating circumstances that prevented Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury from producing relevant witnesses for his case.

Paragraph 11 of the same affidavit asserted that the examination of Tarak Nath Dey was intended to demonstrate a link between B. K. Sen and the wife of Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury, and to show that B. K. Sen had appointed Dey in return for services rendered in connection with the pending case under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the Court noted that the questionnaire labeled III (a), (b) and (c), which the appellants prepared, did not contain any claim that B. K. Sen’s appointment of the individuals was meant to suborn prosecution evidence in the section 497 matter or to obstruct Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury’s ability to produce relevant witnesses. The questionnaire merely sought information without expressly alleging that the appointments were intended to influence the ongoing criminal proceeding. Consequently, the Court found that the appellants’ questionnaire did not directly allege that the appointments were made for the purpose of prejudicing the case before the High Court, nor did it indicate an intent to interfere with the administration of justice in the pending criminal matter.

The Court observed that the appellants’ letter accompanying the questionnaire, together with the manner in which questionnaire III part (a), (b) and (c) were framed, demonstrated that the appellants did not accept every allegation advanced by Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury or by Bhattacharjee. The record showed no evidence that the appellants ever commented on the criminal proceeding under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code pending against B. K. Sen, nor on any matter related to that proceeding that was before the Calcutta High Court. Nevertheless, the Court noted that by taking up the papers filed by Bhattacharjee and by subsequently examining Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury and Tarak Nath Dey, the appellants had undertaken a parallel inquiry into matters that were already under investigation by a court of law. The Special Committee, consisting of the appellants, had been created by the Corporation for the purpose of investigating the conduct of the Corporation’s servants in matters affecting the Corporation’s affairs. The Committee’s mandate extended not only to the conduct of the Commissioner, B. K. Sen, but also to the conduct of other Corporation employees. The questionnaire sent to B. K. Sen referred to his conduct in relation to matters covered in questionnaires numbered 1 and 11, which the Court found to be unrelated to the section 497 case against him. Regarding questionnaire III part (a), (b) and (c), the primary issues for the Committee’s inquiry were (i) whether B. K. Sen had made the appointments in question and (ii) whether the appointees were either relatives of prosecution witnesses in the section 497 case or persons assisting B. K. Sen in his defence in that case. The questionnaire never alleged that B. K. Sen had made the appointments with the intention of suborning prosecution witnesses or of preventing Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury from producing witnesses to support his case. The Court held that the appointment of individuals who were relatives of prosecution witnesses or who were assisting the Commissioner in his defence would be a relevant consideration in determining whether B. K. Sen had abused his position as Commissioner of the Calcutta Corporation to make undeserving appointments. However, even assuming that such appointments had been made, the Committee might, after completing its inquiry, have concluded that the appointees were in fact suitably qualified and that B. K. Sen had not misused his office in making those appointments. The Court therefore found that the circumstances did not establish that the Special Committee had acted as a parallel court to decide issues directly related to the section 497 prosecution or the pending High Court proceedings.

The Court observed that it could not be established that the Special Committee had fashioned itself as a parallel court of inquiry to examine matters that were under consideration in the criminal case under section 497 against B K Sen, or matters that were pending before the High Court. The expression “court of parallel enquiry’’ was described as ambiguous, and the Court noted that it would be improper for a newspaper to conduct an independent investigation into a crime for which an individual has been arrested and to publish the findings, since such “trial by newspaper’’ would interfere with the administration of justice. However, the Court distinguished that situation from the present case, explaining that the Special Committee had undertaken an enquiry on the directions of the Corporation with the purpose of uncovering misconduct by its servants, which would primarily include the making of unqualified appointments. Determining the motive behind those appointments was considered only an incidental aspect of the enquiry. Consequently, the Court found it difficult to conclude that the Special Committee was conducting a parallel inquiry into matters awaiting decision by a court of law, nor that its actions interfered with the course of justice. Moreover, the affidavit of B K Sen did not allege that the Special Committee possessed knowledge that the High Court would decide whether he had suborned prosecution witnesses, and the High Court itself had made no such finding. The Court further held that, ordinarily, lack of knowledge of pending proceedings does not excuse contempt, but after reviewing the record, it concluded that the appellants never intended to interfere with the course of justice and made no comments on any pending legal proceedings or the issues involved.

Accordingly, the Court was of the view that the offence of contempt of court had not been established against the appellants. The appeal was therefore allowed, the conviction for contempt of court was set aside, and any fines that had been paid were to be refunded. The judgment also recorded a separate note from Justice Subba Rao, who, after reviewing the judgment prepared by Justice Imam, expressed regret that he could not agree with it, indicating a dissenting perspective on the matter.

In this matter the Court identified five specific issues that required examination: first, the character of the criminal proceedings that were pending before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate at Alipore and before the Calcutta High Court, and the precise questions that those proceedings were intended to resolve; second, the nature and subject‑matter of the inquiry that had been launched by the appellants; third, whether the acts attributed to the appellants amounted to contempt of court; fourth, assuming that contempt was established, whether it was appropriate to institute contempt proceedings against them; and fifth, whether the punishment that had been imposed on the appellants was excessive. The High Court judges were in a position to determine the contours of the criminal proceedings against the appellants because they possessed the complete record of the criminal revision case. Their judgment indicated that they had freely drawn from that record the facts necessary to answer the questions before them. However, the parties did not provide the relevant excerpts of the criminal proceedings for the Court’s perusal. Consequently, the Court proceeded on the basis of the allegations set out by the respondents in their petition before the High Court, to the extent that those allegations had not been expressly denied by the appellants, and on the factual findings recorded by the High Court judges. According to the factual chronology, on 19 March 1955 a person named Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury lodged a complaint before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Alipore, asserting that the first respondent, B. K. Sen, who was then Commissioner of the Corporation of Calcutta, had committed adultery with the complainant’s wife, Tripti Roy Choudhury, thereby violating section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. After a protracted trial that involved the examination of many witnesses, the magistrate issued an order on 13 July 1957 discharging the first respondent under section 253(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complainant maintained that his case was true but that the respondent had interfered with the prosecution witnesses, and the magistrate found that certain prosecution witnesses had been influenced by the respondent. Dissatisfied with the discharge, Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury filed a revision petition before the Sessions Judge of 24‑Parganas, invoking section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Sessions Judge accepted the contention that the respondent’s influence had caused several prosecution witnesses to be withheld from the court and, by an order dated 22 November 1957, set aside the magistrate’s discharge order and directed a further inquiry to be conducted by Sri C. L. Choudhury, a first‑class magistrate at Alipore.

In this case, the Court noted that C L Choudhury, a first‑class magistrate at Alipore, on 3 January 1958 issued an order that broadened the scope of the further inquiry and directed that new witnesses be examined. As a consequence, the prosecution was permitted to present additional evidence, the entire case was reopened, and the matter remained pending before that court. Subsequently, on 3 February 1958, respondent No 1 filed a criminal revision, identified as Criminal Revision Case No 149 of 1959, in the Calcutta High Court challenging the magistrate’s January‑3 order directing the examination of new witnesses. A division bench of the High Court then issued a rule staying all further proceedings in the magistrate’s court. The High Court was required to decide whether the allegation that respondent No 1 had suborned prosecution witnesses was true; the allegation claimed that some important witnesses had been prevented from attending court and that other witnesses had committed perjury in support of the respondent. If the criminal revision were dismissed and the trial before the magistrate were allowed to continue, the magistrate would also have to consider the same issue: whether the prosecution witnesses had been kept away from the witness‑box because respondent No 1 had tampered with them, and whether any of the witnesses who did appear had been influenced by the respondent. The Court observed that this question was crucial not only for determining the fate of the criminal revision petition but also for assessing the evidence before the magistrate. It may be recalled that on 3 February 1958 the High Court division bench stayed further proceedings in the magistrate’s court. On 16 January 1958, at a special meeting of the Calcutta Corporation, the Mayor proposed the creation of a committee to discuss necessary and appropriate steps to eliminate alleged malpractices in various departments of the Corporation. The Mayor further suggested that the Commissioner of the Corporation should submit his suggestions on the matter to the proposed committee. During that meeting, Councillor Satyananda Bhattacharjee lodged certain allegations against the Commissioner. The Corporation adopted two resolutions, one of which empowered the Mayor to constitute a Special Committee. On 14 February 1958 another meeting of the Corporation was convened. At that meeting Councillor Bhattacharjee repeated his allegations against the Commissioner and specifically referred to the criminal case that was then pending before the High Court. The respondent protested against the reference to matters that formed the subject‑matter of the pending court case. After some debate, the Corporation passed a resolution to appoint a Special Committee composed of Councillors S K Gupta, R N Majumdar and S K Roy to inquire into the allegations that certain officials of the Corporation were abusing their positions to conduct business in their own names.

In this case the Court observed that the resolution creating the Special Committee expressly limited the Committee’s jurisdiction to matters that pertained to the Corporation. The resolution authorised the Committee to investigate only officials of the Corporation who were alleged to be carrying on business in their own names, and it further clarified that the Committee would consider solely issues that related to the Corporation. The resolution did not, either expressly or by necessary implication, empower the Committee to conduct an inquiry against the Commissioner of the Corporation concerning any appointments he might have made with a view to suborning witnesses in the criminal case that was pending. Moreover, the final clause of the resolution expressly prohibited the Committee from embarking upon any inquiry into matters that did not relate to the Corporation. On 29 March 1958 a motion was moved in a meeting of the Corporation to remove the Commissioner from his office under section 19(3) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. Only thirty‑eight of the eighty‑six councillors supported the motion, and because the requisite majority was not obtained, the motion failed and was withdrawn. The record showed that Councillor Satyananda Bhattacharjee intended to hand over to the Special Committee certain papers that were relevant to the allegations he had raised against the Commissioner, but because the terms of reference of the Committee were narrowly limited, those papers could not be received by the Committee. Subsequently, on 26 March 1958, Councillor Bhattacharjee reiterated his complaint during the Corporation’s meeting. The Mayor then seized the documents from him, promised to forward them to the Special Committee, and thereafter delivered them to the Committee. Two of the documents that the Mayor transmitted to the Special Committee were later annexed to the affidavits filed by each of the appellants and were identified with the label “C”. The first of these documents comprised a series of charges that Councillor Bhattacharjee had levelled against the respondent, while the second document purported to be a copy of a petition filed by Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate of Alipore on 31 May 1955. In the first document Bhattacharjee enumerated, inter alia, the names of several prosecution witnesses and identified relatives of those witnesses to whom the Commissioner had allegedly granted appointments within the Corporation. He also named another prosecution witness and alleged that the Commissioner had secured an appointment for that individual at Central Bank Ltd., Calcutta, by exploiting the influence of a bank officer, and that the Commissioner had promised that officer that a pending case concerning his premises would be withdrawn. This document therefore set out in clear and unambiguous terms specific allegations that the first respondent had attempted to suborn prosecution witnesses in the criminal proceedings pending before the Magistrate’s Court and the High Court. The second document likewise contained specific allegations that the respondent was trying to influence witnesses by means of employees of the Corporation. On the basis of the allegations made by Satyananda Bhattacharjee and

In this matter, an inquiry was initiated by the Special Committee against the first respondent with respect to several allegations, including those relating to criminal proceedings pending against him. The respondent’s affidavit filed in rejoinder disclosed that the Committee held its meetings in the lady‑councillors’ room, and that from 25 March 1958 a blackboard placed outside the room displayed, in chalk, the words “Allegations Special Committee”. The first sitting of the Committee took place on 25 March 1958, attended by a Secretary and a stenographer. The stenographer’s notes were subsequently typed, and the proceedings were attended by Satyananda Bhattacharjee, Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury and other councillors, as reflected in the affidavit presented by the first respondent in the High Court.

On 11 April 1958, Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury was examined before the Committee. According to the affidavit filed by the first respondent, he acknowledged that he had filed a complaint against the first respondent under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, a complaint that was then pending before the High Court. He further disclosed the names of witnesses he had cited in support of his case and asserted that either those witnesses or their close relatives had secured appointments within the Corporation of Calcutta. He also identified one Tarak Nath Dey as an agent of his wife and as a “tadbirkar” of the respondent. The Committee subsequently examined Tarak Nath Dey, who was identified by Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury, and Dey denied the allegations made against him. Relying on the accusations presented by Satyananda Bhattacharjee and the testimony of Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury, the Committee issued a notice dated 15 April 1958 to the first respondent. The notice read: “As you probably know, we have been appointed to make an enquiry into certain allegations relating to the administration of the Corporation of Calcutta and specially into certain steps taken by you in the matter of assessment and appointments and a few other matters, we are giving you a synopsis of the cases in which the enquiry is being held and we shall be glad if you kindly give us some time between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. tomorrow (the 16th instant) so that we can get the facts from you.” The synopsis comprised three questions, and the Court focused on the third question, which alleged that between 4 January 1956 and 20 September 1957, contemporaneous with the trial of the case under section 497 IPC, the respondent had made appointments for several individuals, including Anil Koyal and Jogendra Nath Mondal, among others.

The allegation identified several individuals who were said to have been appointed by the respondent. These persons were named as Nath Mondal, Ahi Kanta Choudhury, Govinda Banerjee and Narendra Nath Naskar. In addition, it was alleged that at around the same time the respondent gave appointments to Tarak Nath Dey, Haradhan Dey, Pradip Bhaduri, Ardhangsu Mondal and others, and that the respondent condoned a punishment previously imposed on Dhiren Mondal because those persons were assisting him in preparing his defence in the criminal case. Furthermore, the allegation stated that the respondent played a key role in securing the appointment of another prospective prosecution witness, Kamakshya Chatterjee, through an individual identified as M. L. Ghosh, even though a demolition case was pending against that witness. After these allegations were made, the respondent filed a petition for contempt of court in the Calcutta High Court on 16 April 1958. On the same day the High Court issued a notice directing the petitioner to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted. The narrative that preceded the filing of the contempt petition revealed several crucial facts. Firstly, the resolution that had created the Special Committee did not expressly or implicitly empower the Committee to investigate the actions of the Commissioner in connection with the criminal case pending before the Magistrate’s Court and the High Court. The Committee was composed of three councillors of the Corporation: one, Saibal Kumar Gupta, who was a member of the Indian Civil Service; a second, who was a practising barrister; and a third, described simply as an educated person. As councillors, they would have been aware of the discussions that took place at the Corporation’s meetings, including the objections raised by the respondent and others that no inquiry should be launched into matters that were sub‑judice. They would also have known that, because of those objections, the resolution had been carefully drafted to avoid any intrusion into pending judicial proceedings. No additional resolution was passed by the Corporation to broaden the scope of the enquiry, and Section 91 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, did not empower the Mayor to enlarge that scope. Nevertheless, the Committee members, who were presumed to understand the limits of their authority, proceeded to initiate an inquiry that exceeded the powers granted by the resolution. Aware that criminal proceedings were underway, they examined witnesses, served a questionnaire on the respondent, and invited, or at least permitted, councillors and other persons, in addition to the staff assisting the Committee, to attend the meeting. The inquiry was conducted publicly and could not be described as confidential; it was carried out in a manner that made it known to all interested parties. Conducting an inquiry against the Commissioner inside the Corporation building, concerning an alleged offence of adultery, would inevitably have become a sensational news item and would have attracted the attention of the Corporation’s extensive staff and its many visitors.

With that background, the Court turned to a discussion of the law of contempt as it applied to the facts before it. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, does not contain a definition of the term “contempt of court.” In the classic judgment of Lord Hardwicke, L. C., in Re Read & Huggonson (1) (1742) 2 Atk. 469, it was held that the paramount duty of courts of justice is to protect their proceedings from misrepresentation and that nothing is more harmful than to prejudice public opinion against the parties to a cause before the cause has been fully heard. The learned Lord Chancellor subsequently classified contempt into three categories: scandalising the court, abusing parties in court, and prejudicing the public against the parties and the court before the cause is heard. Referring specifically to the third category, which is relevant to the present matter, the Lord Chancellor observed at page 471 that contempt may arise where conduct prejudices the public against persons before a trial is concluded, adding that preserving the purity of the streams of justice is of utmost importance so that parties may proceed safely for themselves and for their reputations.

To establish contempt of court, Lord Russell, C. J., explained that the petitioner must demonstrate that a publication was either clearly intended or, at a minimum, calculated to prejudice a pending trial (see The Queen v. Payne (1)). In The Queen v. Gray (2), “contempt of court” was described as conduct done with the purpose of obstructing or interfering with the proper course of justice or the lawful processes of the courts. Lord Goddard, C. J., in R. v. Odham’s Press Ltd. (3), after reviewing the relevant authorities, articulated a test for contempt at page 497, stating that the issue is whether the complained‑of matter is calculated to interfere with the course of justice. A similar formulation was adopted by Parker, C. J., in the later decision of R. v. Duffy & Others (4) at page 894, where he emphasized that the central inquiry in every case is whether the article was intended or calculated to prejudice the fair hearing of the proceedings.

Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd edition, vol. 8, at page 8, further clarified that it is sufficient for a comment to be clearly tending to prejudice the trial of the action in order to constitute contempt. Returning to the third category of contempt described by Lord Hardwicke, the learned author noted on page 8 that such misrepresentations may not only deter persons from stepping forward to give evidence, but also influence witnesses to give evidence only on one side, prejudice jurors, encourage parties to abandon or settle their claims, or discourage other individuals with legitimate causes of action from approaching the court.

The Court referred to the authorities reported in All E.R. 494 and All E.R. 891, which described conduct that gave evidence on one side while attempting to induce witnesses to give evidence on the opposite side, to prejudice jurors, to cause parties to abandon or settle their claims, or to deter persons with valid causes of action from approaching the Court. The same view had been endorsed and applied in Indian jurisprudence, for example in State v. Biswanath Mohapatra and in the case of Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi. Counsel for the appellants argued that not every such act amounted to contempt of court, insisting that a condition for exercising contempt jurisdiction was the presence of serious prejudice to the course of justice. The Court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether seriousness of the offence was a prerequisite for the jurisdiction itself or merely a factor for the judge’s discretion in exercising contempt powers, because, on the facts before it, the appellant’s conduct clearly tended to prejudice the fair hearing of the criminal proceedings against the first respondent. The Court emphasized that in criminal matters a court bore a stricter duty to safeguard the administration of justice than in civil disputes. Established authorities affirmed that a person committed contempt when his act was intended, calculated, or likely to interfere with the course of justice. The Court rejected the suggestion that the inquiry initiated by the Committee, which was tasked with determining whether witnesses for the prosecution in the pending criminal case had been suborned by the Commissioner through alleged devious methods, could not have serious repercussions for the proceedings before both the Magistrate’s Court and the High Court. To illustrate, the Court imagined a scenario in which the High Court dismissed the revision, leading the Magistrate to assume trial of the criminal case, while the prosecution, aware that an inquiry by a responsible committee would examine the conduct and credibility of its witnesses, might doubt the witnesses’ ability to testify truthfully. A truthful witness, who might otherwise favor the accused, could be tempted to lie to avoid the ignominy of perjury, especially if a relative of his had been appointed in the Corporation, even though that appointment had been on merit. Conversely, an untruthful witness could also be influenced to perjure himself with the aim of harming the Commissioner in the Committee’s inquiry.

In this case the Court considered that a witness could deliberately lie in the witness‑box with the intention of harming the Commissioner during the inquiry conducted by the Committee. It was observed that some honest witnesses might be reluctant to testify because, in the Committee’s inquiry, their motives could be questioned. Even if a resolute Magistrate mentally set aside the fact that a high‑level Committee was examining the same witnesses, the very existence of that inquiry could nevertheless influence a less firm mind without the Magistrate’s conscious awareness. Consequently, the Court reasoned that the Committee’s inquiry possessed an inherent tendency to impede the smooth and unbiased administration of justice. The Court further assumed a scenario in which the High Court did not stay the Committee’s proceedings, allowing the Committee to complete its work and to exonerate the Commissioner by concluding that the witnesses had not been induced or bribed by him. The Court held that such a finding would nevertheless affect both the witnesses and the Magistrate, because, against the backdrop of that exonerating finding, untruthful witnesses might feel emboldened to give false testimony with increased confidence, thereby potentially influencing the outcome of the criminal trial. The Court also contemplated the opposite situation in which the Committee, after completing its inquiry, determined that the witnesses had been suborned. In that circumstance, the Court noted that the finding would have a far‑reaching impact on the credibility of the witnesses and would likely deter them from speaking truthfully. From every conceivable angle, the Court concluded that the possibility of prejudice to the course of justice was evident. Regarding the role of the High Court, the Court acknowledged that a High Court Judge could be expected to remain uninfluenced by the Committee’s statements or conclusions; nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the public and the parties concerned could reasonably fear that the Committee’s inquiry or its findings might affect the fairness of the revision petition’s hearing. Based on the foregoing facts, the Court declared that the contempt in the present matter was not a mere technical lapse but a serious misconduct calculated to interfere with or obstruct the proper course of justice, and therefore it was an appropriate case for the court to intervene. The Court then addressed whether the learned Judges were correct in imposing a fine on the appellants. The High Court’s judgment showed that the learned Judges had acted with considerable leniency toward the appellants, having afforded them ample opportunity to apologise for their conduct. The judgment recorded the following passage: “It may be observed at this stage that during arguments each of the respondents was asked if he wished to apologise for any contempt that might be found against him. Each of the respondents expressed his inability to apologise. At the conclusion of the arguments we made known to the respondents that in our view they were guilty of contempt and asked if they or any of them desired to tender any apology to Court. Respondent No. 4, Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury, tendered an apology.”

The record indicates that after the hearing one respondent chose to make an apology to the Court, whereas the remaining respondents declined to offer any apology. In view of this circumstance the trial judges, as expressed by the reporting judge, decided that the behaviour of each appellant amounted to contempt of the Court. Accordingly each appellant was found guilty of contempt and was ordered to pay a monetary penalty of five hundred rupees. After imposing that penalty the trial court concluded that the appeal raised by the appellants could not succeed and therefore dismissed the appeal. The matter was then placed before the higher Court. The higher Court examined the findings of the trial judges and considered the arguments presented on behalf of the appellants. In accordance with the majority view of the bench the higher Court held that the conviction for contempt should be set aside. It further directed that any fine that might have been paid under the earlier order must be refunded to the appellants. Consequently the higher Court allowed the appeal and granted the relief sought by the appellants.