S. P. Jinadathappa vs R. P. Sharma and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 71 of 1958

Decision Date: 17 April, 1961

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter styled S. P. Jinadathappa versus R. P. Sharma and Others, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 17 April 1961. The case was reported in the 1961 All India Reporter at page 1523 and subsequently in the 1962 Supreme Court Reports (Second Series) at reference 22. The bench was composed of Justice A. K. Sarkar, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. C. Das Gupta, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioner, S. P. Jinadathappa, challenged the constitutional validity of a provision of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951, specifically section 3(3)(a), before the Court under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The respondent side consisted of R. P. Sharma and other parties, whose interests were represented by counsel for the respondent.

The headnote of the judgment explained that section 30(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951, empowered the Controller to designate any government body, local authority, public institution, officer of such bodies, or any other individual as a tenant for a vacant house. Once a tenant was selected under this provision, the owner of the property was legally obliged to let the premises to that tenant. The petitioner, who owned a house for which the Controller had selected a tenant under the cited provision, argued that section 3(3)(a) was unconstitutional because it imposed an unreasonable restriction on his fundamental right to property and violated article 14 of the Constitution by offering no guidance for tenant selection, thereby permitting arbitrary choices by the Controller. The Court held that the provision was valid and did not contravene article 14 or article 19(1)(f). It observed that every individual is a member of the public, and the restriction served the general public interest. The restriction was not unreasonable because it applied only when the owner did not intend to occupy the house himself, and there was no material difference between an individual being selected and a government or public entity being selected. The Act provided a mechanism for selecting a suitable tenant, supported by an appeal right to the District Judge and a further revision petition to the High Court, offering ample guidance to the Controller. All persons were entitled to apply for selection as a tenant, and owners could have their views considered, with the ultimate decision subject to judicial review by the highest State tribunal. The original jurisdiction of the case was writ petition No. 71 of 1958, filed under article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioner were S. K. Venkataranga Ayengar and S. J. S. Fernandez, while counsel for the respondent was B. R. L. Iyengar.

Counsel for respondent No. 1 and counsel for respondent No. 2 appeared before the Court, which delivered its judgment on 17 April 1961, authored by Justice Sarkar. The petition invoked Article 32 of the Constitution and sought to examine the constitutional validity of section 3(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (Mysore XXX of 1951). In simple terms, that provision authorises an authority created under the Act to choose any government, local authority, public institution, an officer of any of those bodies, or any other person as the tenant of a vacant house. Once such a tenant is selected, the owner is legally obligated to let the premises to that tenant. The petitioner, whose building had a tenant selected under this provision, contested the provision on the ground that it imposes an unreasonable restriction on his fundamental right to property guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and that it falls outside the protection of clause (5) of that article. The petitioner owned a building for which he had entered into an arrangement with a person named Misri Lal to carry out certain alterations and subsequently lease the premises to Misri Lal for use as a boarding house. Upon the vacancy of the house, the petitioner gave a notice as required by section 3(2)(a) of the Act to respondent No. 2, the Controller, who possessed the authority under section 3(3)(a) to select a tenant. The Controller then examined two applications for tenancy: one from Misri Lal and another from respondent No. 1, a private individual who operated a boarding‑house business. After consideration, the Controller chose respondent No. 1 as the tenant and fixed the rent at Rs 350 per month, which corresponded to the rent demanded by the petitioner. No specific terms of the tenancy were recorded, and the case did not raise any issue concerning such terms. Dissatisfied with this outcome because he preferred that the premises be let to Misri Lal, the petitioner appealed to the District Judge under section 15 of the Act. The District Judge upheld the Controller’s decision. The petitioner then sought revision before the High Court under section 17 of the Act, but the High Court declined to interfere. Before both the District Judge and the High Court, the petitioner argued that Misri Lal was a more suitable tenant than respondent No. 1; that argument was rejected. Having exhausted the remedies under the Act, the petitioner now challenges the Act itself through the present petition. The sole issue for consideration is whether section 3(3)(a) imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner’s right to property. No other part of the Act has been contested in this petition. The provision under challenge reads as follows: “S.”

Section 3(3)(a) of the Act states that when the Controller receives the intimation required under sub‑section (2), he shall, after taking into account any representation made by the landlord and after conducting such inquiry as he deems necessary, select a tenant for the house. The tenant may be the State Government, the Central Government, the Government of any other State in India, any local authority, any educational or other public institution, any officer of any Government, authority or institution, or any other person, hereinafter referred to as “the allotted”. The Controller shall then issue a written order, called the allotment order, directing the landlord to let the house to the allotted person at the rent specified therein and to deliver possession on the date specified in that order. The provision further provides that before making an allotment order in favour of any authority or person other than the State Government, the Central Government, a State Government or a local authority, the Controller must consider any representation made by the landlord regarding the suitability of the proposed tenant and shall not allot the house to any person whom, in the Controller’s opinion, is unsuitable.

The petitioner did not argue that the part of the provision allowing the Controller to select a Government, a local authority, a public institution or any of the officers mentioned imposes an unreasonable restriction on his right to property. According to the counsel for the petitioner, it was conceded that the selection of such a tenant serves a public purpose and that any restriction thereby imposed would be reasonable. Consequently, it appears that the petitioner does not contend that the mere power of the Controller to choose a tenant, by itself, amounts to an unreasonable limitation on property rights. Such a contention, had it been raised, would not have been well‑founded.

The Court observed that the Act concerns houses that are vacant and that it does not strip an owner of the right to reside in his own house. The statute is intended to make vacant houses, which the owner does not need for his own use, available to persons who lack accommodation. Because of the scarcity of housing, the legislature enacted the Act to regulate the letting of houses, to control rent, and to prevent unreasonable eviction, as reflected in the preamble to the Act.

The question was whether the Act, by empowering the Controller to select any person other than a Government, local authority, public institution or officer as the tenant, creates an unreasonable restriction on the owner's property right. The Court concluded that it does not. The Court reasoned that if the Controller is validly permitted to choose a Government, a local authority or any institution—an aspect that is not disputed—then it makes no material difference if, instead of such an entity, the Controller selects a private individual as the tenant. The provision’s purpose is to ensure that people in need obtain accommodation, and such selection serves the public interest without imposing an unreasonable burden on the owner, especially when the owner has indicated that he does not require the house for his own use.

In this case the Court observed that the statute authorized the Controller to appoint a private individual as the tenant of a vacant house. The purpose of that provision, the Court explained, was to secure accommodation for persons who were in need, and such persons were regarded as members of the public. By allocating the house to a member of the public, the restriction imposed on the owner was intended to serve a public purpose and therefore could not be characterised as unreasonable. The restriction operated only in those situations where the owner did not require the house for his own occupation. In those circumstances the Court held that it made no material difference to the owner whether the tenant appointed was a government body, a public institution or a private individual, because the owner’s own use was excluded. The Act also incorporated safeguards to protect the owner’s interests. An aggrieved owner could appeal the Controller’s decision to the District Judge and, if necessary, could seek revision before the High Court. These mechanisms, the Court said, provided a full guarantee that an unsuitable person would not be forced upon the owner as a tenant. Although the Act did not define the term “suitable person,” the Court concluded that a person of ordinary experience could recognise suitability, and the owner retained the right to have the suitability of the chosen tenant examined by the highest judicial authority.

The Court further noted that the explanation to section 3(3)(a) merely listed categories of persons who were expressly declared unsuitable as tenants. That explanation did not imply that every other individual automatically qualified as suitable. Rather, the suitability of any applicant not falling within the excluded categories had to be assessed on the merits of each case. The Court stressed that the explanation was intended only to remove from the Controller’s discretion those persons who were specifically described as unsuitable; it was not meant to prescribe a positive list of suitable tenants. The Court warned that if the statute had left the choice of tenant entirely to the house‑owner, the object of the legislation would likely be frustrated. An owner could then make secret arrangements that served his own financial interests, exploiting the scarcity of housing to impose disadvantageous terms on a tenant who had little bargaining power. Such a scenario would defeat the purpose of the Act, which was to prevent unreasonable evictions and to ensure that vacant houses were used for the public good. Consequently, the Court upheld the provision granting the Controller the power to select a tenant on behalf of the owner, finding no defect in that approach.

The petitioner argued that Article fourteen of the Constitution made the statutory provision unconstitutional. The basis of that argument was that the provision did not specify any criteria for choosing a tenant, thereby allowing the authority to act arbitrarily. The Court observed that such a contention could not be sustained by the petitioner, who is an owner, because the provision does not create a basis for discrimination between one owner and another. The Court further noted that if a tenant had sought to challenge the provision on the ground of Article fourteen, such a challenge would not have been substantive. However, no tenant raised that issue in the present proceedings. The Court held that the statute provides sufficient guidance to the authority charged with selecting a tenant. According to the Court, the first requirement is that any prospective tenant must be suitable for tenancy under the relevant criteria. The Court emphasized that every individual is entitled to apply for tenancy, thereby ensuring that all applicants have an equal opportunity to obtain the house. The authority must therefore make its selection from among the pool of applicants, assessing the comparative merits of each claim. The Court also recognized that the owner’s perspective must be taken into account, and that the authority is required to give due consideration to the owner’s views. Finally, the Court observed that any ultimate disagreement over the selection would be subject to judicial review, and if necessary, could be escalated to the highest tribunal in the State. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the challenge to the Act was without merit. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The Court ordered that the petitioner should bear the costs incurred by the respondent who appeared in the case. The final order recorded that the petition was dismissed.