Rani Purnima Devi And Another vs Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 373/587

Decision Date: 22 August 1961

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

In the matter titled Rani Purnima Devi and another versus Kumar Khabendra Narayan Dev and another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 22 August 1961. The judgment was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo, who sat with Justices K.C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal. The petitioners, identified as Rani Purnima Devi and another, sought relief against the respondents, identified as Kumar Khabendra Narayan Dev and another. The case arose from an application filed for the grant of letters of administration, wherein the will attached to the application bequeathed the entire property of the deceased testator to a person identified only as K, a distant relative of the testator. The will imposed a duty on K to maintain the testator’s widow and sister, yet it entirely omitted the testator’s daughter and other relatives. Several suspicious circumstances surrounded the execution of the will. Firstly, the signatures appearing on the will were not in the testator’s usual hand and were executed with ink that differed from that used elsewhere in the document. Secondly, it was established that the testator habitually signed blank papers for use in court matters and conveyed these signed blanks to his lawyer through his servants. The will was subsequently registered, but the registration occurred without the testator appearing before the sub‑registrar; instead, the sub‑registrar dispatched his clerk to the testator’s residence to effect the registration. Of the sixteen persons who had signed the will as attesting witnesses, only four were produced before the court to substantiate the will’s validity. The trial court concluded that the will had been duly executed and attested and consequently ordered the issuance of letters of administration with the will annexed to K. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the registration of the will dispelled the suspicious circumstances. However, the Supreme Court held that the due execution and attestation of the will had not been proved. The Court observed that, given the suspicious circumstances, the burden rested on the propounder of the will to demonstrate, by satisfactory evidence, that the execution and attestation were proper and that the registration had removed any doubts. The four attesting witnesses produced were found to be interested and unreliable, and no independent witnesses who had signed the will were produced. The Court further explained that the mere fact of registration is insufficient to eliminate suspicion unless the registration process unequivocally established to the testator that the document he was acknowledging was his will, and that he subsequently affirmed its execution. In the present case, the registration was carried out in a perfunctory manner, and the evidence failed to show that the testator recognized the document presented before the sub‑registrar’s clerk as his will. Consequently, even if the witnesses who testified about the registration were treated as attesting witnesses, they did not succeed in proving the due execution and attestation of the will. The Court applied the principle articulated in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, confirming that registration alone does not cure the infirmities of a suspiciously executed will.

The Court observed that the registration of the will had been carried out in a merely perfunctory manner and that the evidence did not demonstrate that the testator was aware that the document whose execution he admitted before the sub‑registrar’s clerk was, in fact, his will. Even if the witnesses who were produced to prove registration were treated as attesting witnesses, they failed to establish the proper execution and attestation of the will. Accordingly, the Court applied the principles set out in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, (1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 1426, to hold that the registration alone could not dispel the doubts concerning the genuineness of the will without a thorough scrutiny of the surrounding evidence.

The judgment concerned a civil appeal, numbered 373/587, which had been filed by special leave against a decree dated 2 February 1954 issued by the Assam High Court in the first appeal numbered 19 of 1950, a probate matter. The appeal was argued by counsel for the appellants and counsel for respondent No. 1, and was delivered on 22 August 1961 by Justice Wanchoo. The primary appellant was Rani Purnima Debi, the widow of Kumar Chandra Narayan Deb, hereafter referred to as the testator, who had died in June 1946. The second appellant was the testator’s married daughter. In August 1946, Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, hereafter the respondent, had applied before the District Delegate of Gauhati for the grant of letters of administration, attaching a will that he claimed had been executed by the testator on 29 December 1943 in favour of the respondent, whereby the testator purportedly bequeathed his entire property to the respondent subject to the condition that the respondent would maintain the testator’s widow and sister. The appellants filed objections to the grant of letters of administration on three principal grounds: first, that the will had not been duly and legally executed and attested; second, that the testator lacked a sound disposing mind at the time of execution; and third, that the will was the product of undue influence and coercion exercised by the respondent. While the respondent’s application was pending, another application for probate was made in August 1946 by Kumar Dwijendra Narayan Deb, claiming a second will allegedly executed by the testator a few months before his death. The appellants opposed this second will on the same three grounds and further alleged that it was a forgery. Dwijendra Narayan did not dispute the execution of the will favouring the respondent, but contended that it had been revoked by the later will in his own favour. The respondent, in turn, asserted that the will in favour of Kumar Dwijendra Narayan Deb was a forgery. The two suits arising from the respective probate applications were eventually tried together before the Subordinate Judge at Gauhati. The trial judge held that the will presented by Kumar Dwijendra Narayan Deb was not genuine and consequently dismissed his application. Regarding the will propounded by the respondent, the trial judge found that it had been duly executed and attested and that it was made by the testator at a time when he possessed a sound disposing mind.

The Court observed that the testator possessed a sound disposing state of mind and that the will was not executed under any undue influence or coercion. Accordingly, the respondent’s application for letters of administration, together with a copy of the will annexed, was granted. Following this order, three separate appeals were lodged before the High Court. One appeal was filed by the present appellants, who challenged the issuance of letters of administration in favour of the respondent. The remaining two appeals were filed by Kumar Dwijendra Narayan Deb; in one of his appeals he contested the grant of letters of administration to the respondent, and in the other he contested the Subordinate Judge’s finding that the will he had produced was not genuine.

The High Court heard all three appeals together. It affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the will presented by Kumar Dwijendra Narayan Deb was not genuine, and consequently dismissed the two appeals filed by him. That judgment of the High Court has become final, and the present appeal does not concern the will propounded by Dwijendra Narayan. In the appeal brought by the present appellants, the High Court likewise upheld the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal.

While hearing the appellants’ appeal, the High Court recognized that certain suspicious circumstances surrounded the execution of the will in favour of the respondent. Nevertheless, it held that the later registration of the will in January 1944 removed any doubt created by those suspicions. The Court therefore concluded that the will had been duly executed and attested, that the testator was of sound disposing mind at the time of execution, and that no undue influence or coercion had been exercised by the respondent in connection with the will.

The appeal before the High Court was decided by a Division Bench, and the two judges delivering the judgment gave separate but agreeing opinions. Justice Ram Labhaya, who authored the principal judgment, was not persuaded by the alleged suspicious circumstances and stated that any doubt was dispelled by the subsequent registration of the will. The learned Chief Justice, who concurred substantially with Justice Ram Labhaya, acknowledged the existence of suspicious circumstances relating to the execution and attestation of the will, yet also held that the registration of the will provided a complete answer to those doubts. Both judges therefore agreed to dismiss the appellants’ appeal.

Subsequently, the appellants obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, and the matter now comes before this Court for consideration. Before examining the facts of the present case, the Court notes that it is appropriate to set out the principles governing the proof of a will.

In the present case the Court first clarified the principles that govern the proof of a will, relying on the earlier authority of H Venkatachala Iyengar v B N Thimmajamma[1]. That decision held that the method of proving a will is generally the same as that used to prove any other document, except for the special requirement of attestation prescribed by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The Court explained that the burden of proving the existence and validity of the will rested on the person who propounded it. When no suspicious circumstances surrounded the execution of the will, the propounder needed only to establish, as required by law, that the testator possessed testamentary capacity and that the testator’s signature was genuine; such proof was sufficient to discharge the burden. However, the Court observed that if suspicious circumstances were present, the propounder had to explain those circumstances to the satisfaction of the Court before the will could be accepted as genuine. Where the allegations involved undue influence, fraud or coercion, the propounder bore the onus of proving the absence of such vitiating factors. Even in the absence of an explicit plea of undue influence, if the surrounding facts gave rise to doubt, the propounder was required to satisfy the conscience of the Court. The Court further explored what constitutes suspicious circumstances. It noted that a shaky or doubtful signature, even if supported by evidence, might not remove doubt about the authenticity of the signature. Likewise, a testator who appeared mentally weak or debilitated could raise legitimate concerns about capacity that evidence might not fully dispel. Dispositions in the will that seemed unnatural, improbable or unfair in the prevailing circumstances, or that suggested the testator’s free will was compromised, could also be regarded as suspicious. In such situations the Court expected that all legitimate suspicions be completely cleared before accepting the document as the testator’s last will. The Court added that when the propounder himself participated prominently in the execution of the will and stood to gain substantially, that situation was generally treated as a suspicious circumstance, requiring clear and satisfactory evidence to remove the doubt. Nevertheless, the Court stated that even where suspicious circumstances existed, if the propounder successfully eliminated those doubts, the Court would still grant probate, even if the will appeared unnatural or deprived close relatives of inheritance. Counsel for the parties argued that, given the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Court should be reluctant to disturb those findings. Yet, because the High Court had identified suspicious circumstances and because the two judges on that Bench had taken slightly different approaches, the Court allowed the counsel to address the entire evidentiary record to determine whether the registration of the will had indeed dispelled all doubts.

The Court examined the material evidence in order to decide whether the conclusion of the High Court—that the fact of registration had removed every suspicion concerning the will—was justified. Turning now to the facts relating to the execution of the will, the Court noted that the High Court had already expressed the view that suspicious circumstances attended the execution and that the will was unnatural. The testator was survived by his widow, his married daughter—both of whom were appellants in this proceeding—and an unmarried sister who depended on him for support. In addition, the testator had several other relatives who were materially nearer to him than the respondent named in the will.

Even if the married daughter and those nearer relatives were disregarded, the widow and the sister could reasonably be expected to receive proper provision, especially since the relationship between the testator and his wife and sister was not contested and was described as harmonious. Under those circumstances the Court expected a more substantial provision than what the will actually granted. The will merely provided that the respondent would “suitably maintain” the wife and the sister during their lifetimes, without specifying any amount of maintenance and without imposing any charge on the considerable property left by the testator. Consequently, the two women were left to the tender mercies of the respondent for their support.

The effect of the will was that the testator’s daughter was entirely disinherited. The testator had previously had several children, all of whom had died many years earlier, and at the time of his death only one daughter remained alive. She was married, and it was alleged on behalf of the propounder that the relationship between the testator and her husband was not very amicable. However, the evidence did not show that the testator’s relationship with his son‑in‑law was particularly strained at the time the will was executed. Moreover, there was no satisfactory evidence indicating that the testator’s relationship with his daughter was poor, even though his rapport with her husband might not have been optimal. Given that the daughter was said to be not well‑off, the Court expected that the testator would have made some provision for her.

The Court therefore concluded that the will was highly unnatural, creating a suspicious circumstance that required a satisfactory explanation before the respondent could be granted letters of administration. Another suspicious circumstance identified was that the sole benefit under the will—apart from the nominal maintenance obligations to the wife and sister—accrued to the respondent, who had also taken part in the execution of the will on the date it was executed. In such a scenario the respondent was required to dispel the suspicion by producing clear and satisfactory evidence. Whether the respondent succeeded in meeting that burden was to be examined later.

The judgment observed several suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. First, the signature appearing on the document did not match the testator’s usual signature. Consequently, the witnesses were interrogated about whether the testator had signed with his left or right hand, and it was shown that the testator’s right hand had suffered an injury sometime before the alleged execution. Second, the evidence established that the testator habitually signed blank sheets that were later used in his court cases and that these signed blanks were conveyed to his lawyer through the testator’s servants. Such signed blanks could have been in the possession of Rameswar Sarma, the testator’s lawyer, who had appeared as a witness to attest to the will and who, according to his own testimony, had been consulted by the testator on the matter. Those papers might also have been held by the testator’s local officials. This made it possible for a will to be fabricated on paper already bearing the testator’s signature, a circumstance that demanded explanation. Finally, the High Court had noted that the ink used for the signature differed from the ink used for the body of the will, suggesting that a different pen might have been employed. Although a variation in ink is not automatically suspicious, in the present case the existence of pre‑signed blank papers intensified the need for a satisfactory explanation. The Court therefore turned to the proof of execution to determine whether these suspicions had been dispelled.

The will was purportedly executed at Na‑hawli and bore the signatures of sixteen attesting witnesses, yet only three of those witnesses—Biswanath Bhattacharya, Rameswar Sarma, and Kulendra Narayan Deb—were examined on behalf of the respondent. The respondent himself also gave evidence as a witness. None of the three witnesses could be described as independent. Bhattacharya served as the respondent’s priest, making him a person with a vested interest. Kulendra Narayan Deb was the respondent’s first cousin, another close relation likely to favor the respondent. Rameswar Sarma, a lawyer, had worked for the testator during his lifetime and was questioned about whether he had become the respondent’s lawyer after the testator’s death; he denied such an appointment. Nonetheless, his son‑in‑law, Dayanand Goswami, who had already appeared for the respondent, affirmed that Sarma was the respondent’s current pleader. This indicated that Sarma attempted to present himself as an independent witness despite his direct connection to the respondent. Moreover, none of these three witnesses were residents of Na‑hawli, the place where the will was said to have been executed. Among the remaining thirteen attesting witnesses were individuals regarded as independent and respectable, such as Dr. Banshidhar Goswami, village elder Jammi‑ud‑din, and retired Sarishtedar Baneswar Deka, yet none were called to counter the suspicions already identified. Additionally, the testimony of the three examined witnesses failed to eliminate the doubts. For example, Bhattacharya testified that the testator had invited him to attend the respondent’s adoption as a son and that he traveled to Na‑hawli for that purpose on the alleged date of execution, a statement that did not address the underlying concerns.

The Court observed that the witness Rameswar Sarma attempted to appear as an independent witness by denying the statement made by his son‑in‑law, who had already testified that Sarma was connected with the respondent. In view of this denial, the Court concluded that Sarma could not be regarded as a disinterested witness, despite his effort to present himself as such. The Court further noted that none of the three witnesses – Biswanath Bhattacharya, Rameswar Sarma, and Kulendra Narayan Deb – were residents of Na‑hawli, the place where the will was executed. Among the sixteen individuals who attested the will there were persons who were both independent and respectable, including Banshidhar Goswami, a medical practitioner; Jammi‑ud‑din, an elder of the village; and Baneswar Deka, a retired Sarishtedar. However, the parties did not produce these witnesses to counter the suspicion created by the circumstances already described. The Court therefore held that, apart from the evident interest of the three principal witnesses, the actual evidence they gave failed to remove the doubt that had arisen. For example, Bhattacharya claimed that the testator had invited him to attend the adoption of the respondent as his son and that he traveled alone by bicycle to Na‑hawli on that day, without meeting anyone on the way. The Court found this story implausible, noting that a Purohit would more likely be invited to an adoption ceremony than to a will execution, and suggested that the narrative may have been fabricated to lend credibility to his testimony.

The Court then examined the inconsistencies in the testimonies concerning the execution of the will. Bhattacharya asserted that the testator’s wife was present at the execution and raised no objection, and he could not recall whether anyone suggested that she should also sign. Kulendra Narayan corroborated this version, adding that the wife had reportedly said the testator’s wishes had been fulfilled and that the respondent was her son. In contrast, the respondent testified that the testator’s wife, together with other women, was seated in the doorway of a room adjoining the portico and did not indicate that she was present at the moment the will was signed. Moreover, Rameswar Sarma stated that the appellant Rani was in an adjoining house about twenty yards away and did not come near her husband when the will was executed. The Court pointed out that the presence or absence of Rani at the time of execution was a material fact, and the divergent statements of the four witnesses on this point created a direct conflict. These contradictions, the Court held, further reinforced the inference that the narrative of the execution had been fabricated, and they did not alleviate the suspicion arising from the previously noted circumstances.

The Court observed that whether the appellant Rani was present at the time the will was executed was a matter of great significance. Of the four witnesses who gave testimony concerning the execution of the will, including the respondent, two affirmed one version of events while the other two gave a contradictory account. In the circumstances, the Court inferred that the narrative surrounding the execution appeared to have been fabricated, because such essential contradictions could not arise unless the story itself was unreliable. The Court further noted that these contradictions did not eliminate the suspicion raised by the facts already mentioned. Substantial reliance had been placed on the testimony of Rameswar Sarma, who had practiced as a pleader since 1929 and had become an advocate in 1948‑1949. He had acted as counsel for the testator during the last few years of the testator’s life. Ordinarily, the Court held, his evidence would merit great weight due to his professional connection with the testator and his standing as a lawyer. If his statements were accepted, much of the suspicion could be dispelled, since he had explained why the testator had made the will and had referred to the advice he had given to the testator, advice that was intended to benefit the daughter, the wife and the sister, which the testator had refused. However, the Court stressed that a witness of this caliber was expected to exhibit a strict regard for truth. The Court found that Sarma did not demonstrate such regard; he attempted to present himself as an independent witness by denying that he was acting as a lawyer for the respondent, even though his son‑in‑law had admitted that Sarma was presently engaged as the respondent’s pleader. Because he could conceal his connection with the respondent, the Court concluded that he could also have colluded with the respondent in preparing the will on signed blank papers that were known to be available to him and others. Consequently, the Court could place no reliance on his evidence.

Turning to the collective testimony of the three attesting witnesses and the respondent, the Court said that the evidence failed to remove the suspicion concerning the proper execution and attestation of the will. The High Court, the Court noted, was also aware that the evidence regarding the execution and attestation was not very adequate; the learned Chief Justice had observed that the proof of actual execution might be insufficient. Nevertheless, the High Court had held that additional evidence was unnecessary because of the pleadings of the parties. In that regard, the High Court had relied on the acceptance by Dwijendra Narayan Deb of the will in favour of the respondent. The Court expressed the view that such reliance was not justified as far as the appellants were concerned, since an admission by Dwijendra Narayan Deb, who must now be held to have produced a forged will, could not serve as an additional circumstance supporting the respondent’s inadequate evidence. The Court concluded that the High Court was not right to deem the evidence sufficient solely on the basis of the parties’ pleadings, and that the appellant’s demand for strict proof of due and lawful execution and attestation of the will remained unresolved.

In this case the Court observed that the admission by Diwijendra Narayan Deb, who must now be regarded as having presented a forged will, could not be treated as an additional circumstance that would bolster the respondent’s otherwise inadequate evidence. The Court further held that the High Court was not justified in deeming the evidence insufficient to establish proper execution and attestation of the will merely on the basis of the parties’ pleadings. Although the appellants did not expressly label the will advanced by the respondent as a forgery in the same manner they had done with the will presented by Diwijendra Narayan Deb, they nevertheless placed upon the respondent the burden of strict proof of lawful and proper execution and attestation of the will, thereby raising a substantive issue on that point. The matter was not one in which the execution and attestation of the will were admitted and the only controversies concerned the testator’s mental capacity or alleged undue influence or coercion. Even though the appellants refrained from describing the respondent’s will as a forgery, they nonetheless required the respondent to prove, beyond doubt, that the will had been executed and attested in accordance with legal requirements. In those circumstances, particularly considering the favorable facts noted by the High Court, it was the respondent’s duty to produce satisfactory evidence that would convince the Court that the suspicious circumstances had been eliminated. The Court found that the evidence, which the High Court had characterized as inadequate, could not plausibly dispel the evident suspicions surrounding the will. Accordingly, the Court expressed no hesitation in concluding—apart from the separate question of registration that would be addressed later—that the evidence presented constituted the entirety of proof available to demonstrate proper execution and attestation, and that the respondent had inevitably failed to satisfy the Court or to remove the obvious suspicions. Turning then to the issue of registration, the Court noted that the High Court had relied heavily on the fact that the will was registered to neutralize the doubts it had identified. The appellant’s counsel argued that registration might serve as an additional factor supporting the will’s authenticity and could be considered in assessing whether the suspicious circumstances were cleared. However, the Court held that, based on the facts of this case, the High Court was not correct in placing primary reliance on the registration in order to conclude that all doubts regarding this unusual will had been resolved. The Court affirmed that the will had indeed been registered.

On 27 January 1944 the will was entered in the register and an endorsement appeared on the document stating that the testator had acknowledged having executed it. The Court therefore found it necessary to examine the surrounding circumstances more closely than the High Court had done. It emerged that an application for registration of the will on commission had been filed on 16 January 1944 not by the testator himself but by the mukhtar‑i‑am of the testator. The application was presented before the Sub‑Registrar, who did not himself go to issue the commission; instead he dispatched a clerk named Arabali to act on his behalf. The application’s justification for issuing a commission – namely the “respectability” of the parties – was not supported by law and, in the Court’s view, no commission should have been issued at all. Arabali was a resident of the same locality in which the testator lived and he had known the testator previously. It was noteworthy that the person who approached the testator to confirm whether he had executed the will was this clerk rather than the Sub‑Registrar, who would ordinarily be a more responsible officer. According to Arabali’s evidence, he found the testifier to be “quite hale and hearty.” The testator subsequently emerged from an inner apartment onto the verandah of his house and expressly admitted that he had executed the will. Thereafter the testator signed at the bottom of the will as a token of his acknowledgment of its genuineness, and Dehiram Bora identified the testator. Arabali then conveyed the document to the Sub‑Registrar’s office where it was formally registered. The High Court had relied heavily on this registration to conclude that any suspicion surrounding the will’s execution had been dispelled. Before further analysis of this evidence, the Court noted a point that appeared to influence the High Court’s assessment of the value of registration. The High Court had thought that four witnesses had signed the will at the time of its registration. It was unclear whether the High Court meant that those four witnesses also acted as attesting parties. A perusal of the will as transcribed in the record (Ex. 3) showed that this was inaccurate: the only persons who signed at the bottom of the will when Arabali visited were Arabali himself, the testator, and Dehiram Bora. Counsel for the respondent could not explain how the High Court had formed the impression that four witnesses had signed at the bottom of the will, presumably as attesters, when the registration clerk arrived on commission. Consequently, the Court proceeded on the basis that the High Court was not correct in holding that four persons had signed the will, in whatever sense intended, at the time Arabali came for registration, and that any judgment of the High Court that was influenced by this erroneous view was therefore infirm.

In examining the facts surrounding the registration of the will, the Court observed that the record showed an infirmity in the High Court’s finding. The Court therefore turned to the actual events that occurred when Arabali appeared to register the will. Arabali testified that he examined the testator, Chandra Narayan Deb, at Majikuchi and that the testator admitted having executed the will. The Court noted that this was the sole statement made by Arabali on the matter. No evidence was produced to demonstrate that the will had been read aloud to the testator, nor that the testator had read it himself before acknowledging its execution. Moreover, Arabali’s testimony did not disclose the precise words exchanged between him and the testator, nor the exact reply given by the testator. While Arabali broadly asserted that he examined the testator who admitted the execution, the Court found this description insufficient to remove the serious doubt that lingered regarding the proper execution and attestation of the will. Arabali further reported that Dehiram Bora identified the testator, and that Dehiram Bora later signed the document at its foot. However, Arabali did not state that Dehiram Bora was present at the moment the testator admitted the execution, nor that the testator signed the will in front of Dehiram Bora, or that Dehiram Bora signed in the presence of the testator. Arabali did affirm that the testator signed at the bottom of the will while Arabali was present, but he omitted any reference to the presence of Dehiram Bora at that signing. The Court therefore emphasized this aspect, noting that an argument had been raised that even if the execution and attestation of the will dated 29 December 1943 were questionable, the will should nonetheless be considered duly executed and attested before Arabali and Dehiram Bora.

Turning to the evidence of Dehiram Bora, the Court recorded that his evidence began with a claim that he had been present when the will in favour of the respondent was executed by the testator. The Court found the meaning of this statement unclear because Dehiram Bora could not have been present at the actual execution on 29 December 1943. He subsequently stated that the will was registered at Majikuchi and that he identified the testator before the registration clerk, Arabali. After this identification, Dehiram Bora signed at the foot of the document as the identifier. In his examination‑in‑chief, Dehiram Bora limited his testimony to the fact that he signed at the bottom of the will as an identifier and did not say that Arabali had questioned the testator about the execution or that the testator had admitted execution. During cross‑examination, Dehiram Bora affirmed that the testator signed in his presence at the foot of the will. Nevertheless, he never testified that the will had been read to the testator, nor that the testator had read it himself and then admitted execution before signing. Consequently, the Court concluded that Dehiram Bora’s role was that of a person who identified the testator, not that of an attesting witness who confirmed the due execution and attestation required by law.

It was shown that no one read the will to the testator nor did the testator expressly acknowledge its execution before signing at the bottom. The only fact established was that the testator signed as the person who identified him. Consequently, if the two individuals, Arabali and Dehiram Bora, are to be considered attesting witnesses under section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), they unquestionably fail to satisfy the statutory requirement of proper execution and attestation of the will. The record therefore contains a plain statement from Arabali that he examined the testator, who admitted executing the will, and a statement from Dehiram Bora that he identified the testator before Arabali at that time. On the basis of those statements the will was subsequently entered in the register of the Sub‑Registrar. Another circumstance urged before the Court was that the will certainly existed in January 1944, as demonstrated by its registration. The argument was that, had the will not been genuine, the testator would have taken steps to revoke it, noting that the testator died almost twenty‑one years after the registration. This contention presupposes that the testator was aware of the will’s existence. If the testator did not know about the will, there could be no expectation that he would have revoked it, regardless of how long after his death the revocation might have occurred. Evidence of the testator’s knowledge is limited to the events of 29 December 1943 and the occasion when Arabali went to Majikuchi on commission to arrange the registration. The Court has already examined the evidence relating to those two dates and, finding it insufficient to establish proper execution and attestation, concludes that it is likewise insufficient to prove that the testator knew, after the end of January 1944, that such a will existed. In the absence of the testator’s knowledge of the will’s existence, this circumstance loses all its force. The Court acknowledges that registration of a will may, depending on the surrounding facts, support a finding of genuineness. However, mere registration alone does not automatically eliminate all doubt where suspicion remains, unless the registration evidence is scrutinised closely. If a detailed examination of the registration shows that the process made it clear to the testator that the document he was acknowledging was a will disposing of his property, and that he subsequently admitted its execution and signed in acknowledgment, then the registration would remove the doubt concerning the will’s authenticity.

The Court explained that the mere fact that a will has been registered does not, by itself, eliminate all doubts about its authenticity. If the registration was carried out in a thorough manner—where the officer who recorded the will read it to the testator, informed the testator that the document was a will, and otherwise ensured that the testator understood that he was acknowledging the execution of a will—then the registration can remove suspicion regarding the genuineness of the will. However, the Court emphasized that if the registration was performed merely as a formality, without the registering officer reading the document to the testator, without making clear to the testator that he was acknowledging the execution of a will, or without any other method of confirming the testator’s awareness (for example, by seeing the testator read the will), then the fact of registration adds little evidential value. The Court noted that it is not uncommon for a registration to occur when the person signing does not truly comprehend what is being registered. It cited several reported cases—Vellasaway Sarvai v. L. Sivaraman Servai, Surendra Nath Lahiri v. Jnanendra Nath Lahiri, and Girji Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh—where wills that had been registered were later found not to have been acted upon, illustrating that registration alone cannot dispel all suspicion surrounding execution and attestation.

Applying this principle to the present matter, the Court examined whether the evidence of registration showed that the testator understood he was acknowledging the execution of his will when he signed at the bottom of the document in the presence of Arabali. After a careful scrutiny of the evidence, the Court concluded that the registration evidence did not demonstrate that the testator knew he was signing a will. Consequently, the Court held that the bare fact of registration was insufficient to remove the suspicious circumstances identified in the case. The Court therefore found that the proponent had failed to overcome the doubts concerning the proper execution and attestation of the will. In light of this finding, the Court declined to grant any letters of administration to the respondent. The appeal was allowed, the judgments of the High Court and the trial court were set aside, and the suit arising from the respondent’s application for probate was dismissed. The appellants were awarded costs throughout against the respondent, Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, and the appeal was permitted.