Ramratan And Others vs The State Of Rajasthan

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 1960

Decision Date: 13 September, 1961

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah

Ramratan and Others appealed to the Supreme Court of India against a conviction for murder that had been obtained on the basis of the testimony of a single eyewitness. The judgment was delivered on 13 September 1961 by a Bench consisting of Justices K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta and J.C. Shah. The case is reported in the 1962 All‑India Reporter at page 424 and also appears in the 1962 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports, third part, page 590. The provision of law that lay at the centre of the dispute was Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the admissibility of former statements for the purpose of corroboration of a witness’s testimony.

The headnote of the report summarised the factual matrix and the legal question. The appellants had been found guilty of murder on the sole basis of the evidence of one prosecution witness. A second prosecution witness testified that the first witness had, immediately after the incident, informed him that the appellants were responsible for the killing. The issue that arose before the Supreme Court was whether the first witness was required to repeat in his trial testimony the statement he had allegedly made to the second witness, or whether the earlier statement could be admitted under Section 157 as corroborative evidence without such a recitation in court. The Court held that Section 137 of the Evidence Act did not impose a duty on the witness to be corroborated to declare in his testimony that he had made the earlier statement to the corroborating witness. What Section 157 required, the Court explained, was that the witness who was to be corroborated must present evidence in court concerning a particular fact; once that is done, any former statement made by the same witness relating to the same fact may be used to corroborate his testimony, even if he does not repeat the statement in court. The Court further examined earlier authorities, observing that the rulings in Mst Misri v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1934 Sind 100) and Nazar Singh v. The State (A.I.R. 1951 Pepsu 66) were wrongly decided on this point. As a general principle, the Court reiterated that a court may accept the testimony of a single witness even when it is uncorroborated, and that the necessity of corroboration depends on the specific circumstances of each case. The Court distinguished the decision in Vemireddy Satyanarayan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad (1956 S.C.R. 247) and affirmed the view expressed in Vedivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras (1957 S.C.R. 981). By these pronouncements, the Court clarified the law on the admissibility of former statements for corroboration and affirmed that the prosecution’s reliance on a single eyewitness did not, in the facts before it, violate the requirements of the Evidence Act.

The appeal arose under criminal appellate jurisdiction, identified as Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 1960, and was entertained by special leave. The appeal challenged the judgment and order dated 31 October 1960 rendered by the Rajasthan High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 1960 and Criminal Murder Reference No. 7 of 1960. Counsel for the appellants were senior advocates who appeared on behalf of the convicted persons, while counsel for the respondent, the State of Rajasthan, represented the prosecution. The judgment was pronounced on 13 September 1961, and the opinion was authored by Justice Wanchoo.

The factual background of the case concerned the murder of a man named Bhimsen, which occurred on 8 May 1959 at Mandi Pili Bangan at a time shortly before three o’clock in the afternoon. The prosecution’s narrative explained that a long‑standing enmity existed between the appellant Ramratan and the family of the deceased Bhimsen. This hostility stemmed from political rivalry during local panchayat elections, where the two parties had supported opposing candidates, and was further intensified because Ramratan had previously been prosecuted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, with Bhimsen having acted as a prosecution witness in that earlier case—a circumstance that had generated personal animosity. On the night of 7 May leading into 8 May 1959, Bhimsen and his father had brought a quantity of grain to the market for sale. Bhimsen returned early on the morning of 8 May, accompanied by his brother Ram Partap, arriving in a tractor‑trolley at approximately ten or eleven o’clock. The grain was to be sold through a merchant named Roopram and was stacked in front of Roopram’s shop in the market. Ram Partap, apparently showing little interest in the commercial transaction, drifted away, leaving his father Jawanaram and his brother Bhimsen at the shop. Shortly before three o’clock, while the grain was being weighed by a weighman named Lekhram, three of the appellants together with two other individuals named Moman and Ramsingh approached the scene armed with guns. At that moment, Ramratan is said to have shouted that the enemy should not be allowed to escape, thereby precipitating the violent incident that led to Bhimsen’s death.

The Court recorded that the animosity between the appellant Ramratan and the deceased Bhimsen originated from two sources. First, the two families had supported rival candidates in recent panchayat elections, which created political hostility. Second, prior to the incident, Ramratan had been prosecuted under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, and Bhimsen had been called as a prosecution witness in that case, a circumstance that further aggravated Ramratan’s resentment towards Bhimsen. On the night of May 7‑8, 1959, Bhimsen and his father transported a quantity of grain to the village of Pili Bangan for sale. The following morning, Bhimsen returned to the village around ten or eleven o’clock on his tractor‑trolly, accompanied by his brother Ram Partap, to bring additional grain. The grain was to be sold through a dealer named Roopram and was stacked in front of Roopram’s shop in the local market. While Ram Partap appeared uninterested in the sale and wandered away, he left his father Jawanaram and his brother Bhimsen at the shop.

Shortly before three o’clock in the afternoon, as the grain was being weighed by a man named Lekhram, three appellants and two other individuals, identified as Moman and Ramsingh, arrived at the scene armed with guns. Ramratan shouted that the perceived enemies should not be allowed to escape, noting that Bhimsen was attempting to enter Roopram’s shop to seek refuge. Before Bhimsen could reach the shop, Ramratan positioned himself approximately five feet away and discharged his firearm, striking Bhimsen. Bhimsen was wounded, fell to the ground, and died shortly thereafter.

Jawanaram raised his hands and pleaded with the assailants not to kill Bhimsen, but the appellant Hansraj also fired, striking Jawanaram’s left hand and causing a compound fracture. Maniram fired at Jawanaram as well, and in the ensuing chaos, pellets hit the weighman Lekhram, who was standing behind Jawanaram. After the shooting, all the assailants fled the scene. Roopram had closed his shop at the time of the incident and only emerged after the disturbance had ended. Jawanaram instructed Roopram to send a telegram to the Suratgarh police station and identified the five attackers. He then proceeded toward the police outpost in Pili Bangan to file a report, but shortly thereafter he encountered Constable Ramsingh, who was stationed nearby. Jawanaram gave his statement to Ramsingh at that moment, which was recorded as Exhibit P‑1. While the report was being taken, Ram Partap arrived as well. After the report was completed, Jawanaram was taken to the hospital, where his injuries were examined at three-thirty p.m.

Constable Ramsingh later returned to the spot and discovered Bhimsen’s dead body lying in front of Roopram’s shop. The head constable arrived later, left the area, and returned at five p.m. to commence an investigation. The Sub‑Inspector arrived at approximately six p.m., assumed control of the investigation, and completed it. Subsequently, the three appellants and the two others, who had previously been acquitted by the Sessions Judge, were prosecuted for the murder. The appellants maintained that they had not committed the offence and claimed that they had been implicated solely because of the existing enmity.

The trial court did not consider any defence evidence. The prosecution’s case rested chiefly on the statements of four witnesses: Jawanaram, his son Ram Partap, a shopkeeper named Roopram and a labourer named Lekhram. Jawanaram gave a full narrative of the incident as set out earlier. Ram Partap testified that he had approached the scene after seeing the assailants walk away, that he had taken cover at a distance and that he observed the whole episode from that position. Roopram said that he shut his shop when he heard a disturbance outside, that he did not see the assailants himself, and that when he emerged he was told by Jawanaram the names of the five alleged attackers and he then saw the dead body of Bhimsen. Roopram also reported hearing three gunshots from inside his shop and observed that both Jawanaram and Lekhram were injured; he added that Jawanaram left shortly afterwards to lodge a report. Lekhram recounted that while he was weighing grain, four or five gun‑armed men entered, shouted, and discharged firearms two or three times, resulting in injuries to Bhimsen, Jawanaram and himself, with Bhimsen dying on the spot. Lekhram could not confirm whether the five men standing in the dock were those who fired. Because certain answers given by Lekhram in cross‑examination were inconsistent, the prosecution treated him as a hostile witness. The Sessions Judge placed his confidence on Jawanaram’s statement and convicted the three appellants, while granting the benefit of doubt to the other two accused and acquitting them. He declined to rely on Ram Partap’s testimony, reasoning that Ram Partap had not reached the market until about six p.m. He also disregarded Lekhram’s evidence, finding it irrelevant to linking the appellants with the crime. Regarding Roopram, the judge held that his claim that Jawanaram had conveyed the names of the assailants to him immediately after the incident could not be used to corroborate Jawanaram’s account under section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, because Jawanaram had not recorded in his court statement that he had disclosed such names to Roopram. The judge further doubted whether the written report (Exhibit P‑1) had been made at three p.m., suspecting it might have been recorded any time up to six p.m. Nevertheless, he relied solely on Jawanaram’s testimony, sentencing Ramratan to death and the other two appellants to life imprisonment. The convicted individuals appealed to the High Court, and the Sessions Judge also referred the death sentence of Pamratan for confirmation. The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and primarily accepting Jawanaram’s evidence. The High Court also expressed the opinion that…

In this case, the facts placed Ram Partap at the scene of the incident in Pili Bagan, because he had arrived there with his brother Bhimsen at about ten or eleven in the morning. The High Court, however, concluded that it could not rely on Ram Partap’s testimony about what actually happened, holding that, from the position where he claimed to have been hidden, he would not have been able to see the occurrence clearly. The Court also regarded the evidence of Lekhram as having little value, observing that his testimony did not connect the appellants with the offence. Nonetheless, the High Court formed the view that the statement made by Roopram, in which he said that Jawanram had informed him immediately after the occurrence of the names of the five assailants, was admissible as evidence and could be used to corroborate Jawanram’s own statement. The Court regarded this statement of Roopram as admissible both under section 6 and under section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. Accordingly, the High Court upheld the conviction on the basis of Jawanram’s testimony, which it regarded as corroborated by Roopram’s statement. After refusing to grant a certificate of appeal, the appellants applied to this Court for special leave, which was granted, and the matter therefore now stands before this Court.

The appellants have raised two principal contentions. First, they argue that the High Court erred in holding that Roopram’s statement was admissible under section 6 and section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act and that it could be used to corroborate Jawanram’s statement. Second, they submit that if Roopram’s statement is excluded as inadmissible, only Jawanram’s statement remains to link the appellants to the crime, and that, in the circumstances of this case, that solitary piece of evidence is insufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants. The first issue that therefore arises on appeal is whether Roopram’s declaration that Jawanram told him immediately after the incident—when Roopram emerged from his shop—that the appellants and two others were responsible for the murder of Bhimsen and for the injuries to Lekhram and himself, can be admitted either under section 6 or under section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. This Court finds it necessary to consider the admissibility of Roopram’s statement under section 6 and, for the purpose of this discussion, to confine itself to the question of whether it can be admitted under section 157 as corroboration of Jawanram’s testimony. Counsel for the appellants relies on the authorities Mt. Misri v. Emperor (1) and Nazar Singh v. The State (2), which hold that unless the witness whose statement is to be corroborated expressly states in his courtroom testimony that he had communicated certain facts to another person, that other person is not permitted to testify that the witness told him those facts immediately after the incident. The argument advanced is that the statutory provision on corroboration requires such a prior acknowledgment by the primary witness.

The Court explained that the purpose of section 157 is not to require that a witness, when testifying in court, must first disclose that he had made a prior statement to the person who is now seeking to corroborate him. Accordingly, the Court rejected the contention that, unless the court‑testifying witness expressly says on the stand that he told certain things to the corroborating person, that person is powerless to testify that the witness had communicated those matters immediately after the incident, as argued on the basis of A.I.R. 1934 Sind 100 and A.I.R. 1931 Pepsu 66. The Court held that this contention is erroneous. Section 157 reads: “In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact, or at about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved.” From this language the Court identified two essential conditions for the provision to apply. First, the witness must give testimony in court concerning a particular fact. Second, the witness must have previously made a statement concerning the same fact either at or about the time the fact occurred, or before any authority legally competent to investigate it. When both conditions are satisfied, the earlier statement may be proved to corroborate the witness’s in‑court testimony. The earlier statement may be written or may be oral; if it is oral and was made to some person at or about the time of the occurrence, that person is competent to depose to the prior statement and thereby corroborate the courtroom testimony. The Court emphasised that section 157 imposes no requirement that, before the corroborating person testifies, the witness‑to‑be‑corroborated must have disclosed in his courtroom evidence that he had made the prior statement to that particular person. While it is common for the witness to mention that he communicated a prior statement to someone and for that person to then testify to the content of that communication, the Court held that such a preliminary disclosure is not indispensable. The provision merely obliges that the witness provide evidence of a fact in court; if he does so, any former statement relating to the same fact, made at or about the time of the fact, may be admitted as corroboration irrespective of whether the witness expressly referenced that prior communication during his testimony.

Section 157, as interpreted by the Court, requires only that a former statement made by a witness relate to the same fact as the testimony given in court and that the former statement be made at or about the time when the fact occurred. The provision does not obligate the witness whose testimony is to be corroborated to also state in his court evidence that he had made such a former statement to any particular person. In the Court’s view the language of Section 157 is clear and it sets out merely the two conditions previously identified for admitting a former statement as corroborative evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that the decisions in the Sind and Pepsu cases were erroneous in their requirement that the corroborated witness must also disclose his prior statement.

In the present matter, the witness Jawanaram was examined in court and he testified that the assailants of Bhimsen, Lekhram and himself were five individuals, whose names he named. Jawanaram’s testimony to be corroborated therefore consists of his in‑court statement that five persons attacked Bhimsen, Lekhram and himself. Under Section 157, his earlier statement concerning the same fact becomes admissible as corroboration if it was made at or about the time of the incident, or before any competent authority began an investigation. The Court focused on the first of these requirements, namely whether Jawanaram had made a prior statement about the same occurrence at or about the time it happened. The former statement that may serve as corroboration must describe the fact that Jawanaram saw five persons assaulting Bhimsen, Lekhram and himself, and it must have been made at or around the moment of the attack.

Roopram testified that Jawanaram, immediately after the incident, said that five persons, including the three appellants, had attacked Bhimsen, Lekhram and himself. This testimony therefore constitutes a former statement made by Jawanaram at or about the time of the attack. Such a statement can be proved by the person to whom it was addressed, and it may be admitted to corroborate Jawanaram’s in‑court evidence that five persons carried out the assault. It was not a prerequisite for Jawanaram to repeat in his own testimony that he had informed Roopram of the names of the five assailants immediately after the incident. The former statement that can be used for corroboration is the statement made at or about the time the fact occurred, which the court has already recorded through Jawanaram’s testimony. Section 157 does not require that, before a former statement may be proved as corroboration, the witness whose testimony is to be corroborated must also declare in his testimony that he had made the former statement. Of course, if the witness to be corroborated also says in his testimony that he had made the former statement to someone…

The Court explained that a statement made by a third person can increase the persuasiveness of the evidence offered by the person who is providing corroboration, just as the credibility of a corroborating witness may be reduced if the primary witness testifies that he never made any prior statement to anyone. However, the Court clarified that, in order to admit a former statement under section 157, it is not a requirement that the primary witness must also, in his testimony, affirm that he had made that former statement at or around the time the incident occurred. Accordingly, the Court held that even though Jawanram did not expressly state in his courtroom testimony that he had informed Roopram of the names of the five attackers, Roopram’s testimony that Jawanram had indeed made such a statement is admissible under section 157 as corroboration of Jawanram’s testimony that five persons attacked Bhimsen and the others. Regarding the weight to be given to this corroboration in the present matter, the Court observed that Roopram is an independent witness; therefore, even if Jawanram omitted in his evidence that he had conveyed the names of the assailants to Roopram—perhaps inadvertently, as the High Court suggested—the Court agrees with the High Court in accepting Roopram’s affirmation that Jawanram immediately identified the five individuals who assaulted Bhimsen, Lekhram and himself. Thus, Roopram’s evidence supports Jawanram’s statement in two respects: first, it confirms that an incident occurred in front of Jawanram’s shop in which Bhimsen was killed and both Jawanram and Lekhram sustained injuries; second, it validates Jawanram’s prior declaration concerning the identity of the participants, thereby satisfying the requirement of section 157. Consequently, the case does not lack corroboration of Jawanram’s testimony, even if he were the sole eyewitness of the episode. Turning to the second issue—that the solitary testimony of Jawanram should not be accepted in the circumstances—the Court noted that the learned counsel relied upon the decision in Vemireddy Satyanarayan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad (1). In that precedent, a single witness’s testimony was challenged on the ground that the witness might have been an accomplice. The Supreme Court held that the witness was not an accomplice, yet it remarked that corroboration on material points would still be desirable because the witness was the only source of evidence and it would be unsafe to convict four individuals solely on his uncorroborated testimony unless the Court was fully convinced of his truthfulness. The Court explained that the reasoning in that case was based on the fact that, although the witness was not an accomplice, his position was considered somewhat analogous to that of an accomplice, though not exactly the same. In the present case, however, Jawanram is neither an accomplice nor is he in any way analogous to one; he is an ordinary witness who was undoubtedly present at the time of the incident.

The Court observed that the requirement for corroboration of material particulars was specific to the circumstances of the earlier case and could not be separated from that context. In the present matter, the witness identified as Jawanaram is neither an accomplice nor a person analogous to an accomplice; he is an ordinary observer who was certainly present at the time the incident occurred. The position of a solitary witness of this nature had previously been examined by this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras (1). After referring to that decision, the Court had held that, as a general rule, a court may rely upon the testimony of a single witness even when the testimony is uncorroborated. The decision further stated that, unless a statute expressly mandates corroboration, a court should not impose a requirement for corroboration except in cases where the character of the single witness’s testimony, as a matter of prudence, makes corroboration essential. Accordingly, the necessity for corroboration of a solitary witness’s evidence must be determined by the specific facts and circumstances of each case. These general principles are applicable to the testimony of a single witness such as Jawanaram. However, the present Court has found that Jawanaram’s statement is supported by a former statement he gave to Roopram, so the testimony is not wholly uncorroborated.

The evidence furnished by Jawanaram was examined by both the Sessions Judge and the High Court. The Sessions Judge was prepared to convict the appellants on the basis of Jawanaram’s sole testimony, while the High Court also accepted that testimony and expressly noted that it was corroborated by Roopram’s statement. In the authority cited as [1957] S. C. R. 981, the Court noted that the evidence of Jawanaram had been accepted by both lower courts, whether or not corroboration was present, and expressed no reason to depart from the conclusions reached by those courts regarding the value of Jawanaram’s evidence. The criticisms raised against the acceptance of Jawanaram’s testimony were considered by both the Sessions Judge and the High Court, and despite those criticisms each court concluded that Jawanaram’s evidence was reliable. The present Court agrees with that assessment and holds that Jawanaram’s evidence may be relied upon in the circumstances of this case. Two principal arguments have been advanced to challenge Jawanaram’s testimony. The first argument contends that Jawanaram introduced Ram Partap in the First Information Report and that the Sessions Judge, at any rate, did not believe that Ram Partap was present in Pili Bangan before 6 p.m., although the High Court held the contrary view. The second argument alleges that Jawanaram did not make the first report at about 3 p.m., and that the Sessions Judge, at any rate, held that the report could have been made at any time up to

The Court noted that the earlier reference to six p.m. was contrary to the High Court’s finding, and after reviewing the material evidence it agreed with the High Court that, although Ram Partap may not have personally observed the incident, he certainly arrived at Pili Bangan at approximately two a.m. together with his brother Bhimsen. The constable named Ram Singh testified that Ram Partap was present when the report identified as Exhibit P‑1 was being prepared at about three p.m., a claim corroborated by the explicit mention of Ram Partap’s presence in that very report. The defence, however, pointed to a passage in the inquest report marked as Exhibit P‑4, which stated at its conclusion that Ram Partap, the son of Jawanaram, arrived during the final stages of the inquest’s preparation and was taken away with the corpse. The Court interpreted this passage to mean that Ram Partap was not there at the commencement of the inquest proceedings but joined them toward the end. Nevertheless, the Court held that this description could not be taken to imply that Ram Partap was absent from Pili Bangan before six p.m. Indeed, there was plentiful evidence, which the High Court had correctly accepted, indicating that Ram Partap had reached Pili Bangan at around ten or eleven a.m. Consequently, the criticism concerning the timing of the report identified as Exhibit P‑1 was, in the Court’s view, without merit, and the High Court’s assessment on that point was affirmed.

The Court further observed that there was no dispute that Jawanaram arrived at the hospital at three‑thirty p.m., as attested by Dr Sudershan Singh, and that he had been escorted there by the police. From this, it was evident that Jawanaram must have contacted the police before three‑thirty p.m. It logically followed that, having made such contact, Jawanaram would also have lodged a report of the incident, a fact that aligned precisely with the testimony of constable Ram Singh. The Court concurred with the High Court that, under the circumstances, there was no reason to reject Ram Singh’s statement. Although the Sessions Judge expressed skepticism about Ram Singh’s evidence on the ground that documentary records from the police outpost at Pili Bangan had not been produced, Ram Singh explained that Exhibit P‑1 bore no dispatch number because it had never been sent to the outpost. He added that he likely entered the relevant details—his departure, return, and the occurrence—into the outpost’s diary, although he could not recall the entries at the time of testimony. The Court held that the Sessions Judge’s refusal to accept Ram Singh’s oral evidence solely because the diary entries were not produced was improper. While it would have been preferable for the prosecution to produce the diary entries, the Court opined that even in the absence of such documents, the Sessions Judge could and should have summoned them for inspection if he wished to assess the credibility of the oral testimony.

The Court refused to disbelieve the oral testimony of Constable Ram Singh, who was described as a reliable witness. In the circumstances, the Court accepted the view of the High Court that the report cited by Constable Ram Singh had indeed been written at three p.m., as he had asserted. Consequently, the evidence of Jawanaram could not be rejected on the two grounds previously suggested. The Court also considered the argument that Jawanaram had named five assailants, of whom at least two had been acquitted, and that this purportedly showed that Jawanaram was not wholly reliable. The Court noted that the Sessions Judge had given the benefit of doubt to those two accused persons, without holding that Jawanaram’s evidence was false with respect to them. It appeared that those two individuals had not taken any active part in the incident, a factor that may have led the Sessions Judge to extend the benefit of doubt, but the Court found no reason to disbelieve Jawanaram’s testimony on that basis. Accordingly, the Court was of the opinion that both the Sessions Judge and the High Court were correct in relying upon Jawanaram’s statements. Jawanaram’s evidence was corroborated unequivocally by other witnesses, establishing that the incident had taken place at the shop of Roopram. Moreover, his claim that the three appellants and two others were the assailants was supported by his earlier statement made immediately after the incident, which had also been recorded by Roopram. In the circumstances, the Court held that the appellants had been rightly convicted. Two of the appellants, namely Maniram and Hansraj, were sentenced to life imprisonment, while Ramratan received the death sentence because he was identified as the person who shot Bhimsen, acted as the leader of the group, and was directly involved in the enmity with Jawanaram’s family. The Court agreed with the High Court that no extenuating circumstances existed that would justify reducing the death penalty imposed on Ramratan. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as lacking merit, and the conviction and sentences were upheld.