Raja Rameshwar Rao And Another vs Raja Govind Rao

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 399 of 1957

Decision Date: 28 March, 1961

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar

Raja Rameshwar Rao and another filed a petition against Raja Govind Rao, and the matter was heard by a bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justice K.N. Wanchoo and Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar. The judgment was delivered on 28 March 1961 and is reported in 1961 AIR 1442 and 1962 SCR (1) 618. The dispute concerned a jagir‑grant made by the Nizam and the question of whether an adverse possession claim could give rise to a limited right that was equivalent to a permanent lease. The relevant statutory provision was article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908).

The headnote of the judgment explained that while a limited interest in property may be acquired by adverse possession, a permanent lease‑type interest cannot normally arise in a jagir, which is presumed to endure only for the lifetime of the grantee unless the original grant explicitly provides otherwise. The Court referred to several authorities, including Sankaran v. Periasami (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 467, Thakore Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal (1903) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 515, Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periayanan Chetti (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261, and Gulabdas Jujivandas v. The Collector of Surat (1878) L.R. 6 I‑A 54. The Court noted that in the former State of Hyderabad a son might ordinarily succeed to a father’s jagir, yet jagirs granted by the State were not deemed permanent or hereditary because the State retained the right to resume the grant. This principle was supported by citations to Raje Vinaykrao Nemiwant Brahmin v. Raje Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin, I.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526 and Ahmad‑un‑Nissa Begum v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Hyd. 163.

The Court further held that when a grant remained in a family across generations, each grantee held it only for his lifetime and the limitation period against each grantee began on the date he acquired title. Because a jagirdar could not grant a lease beyond his own lifetime unless the sanad or the law expressly empowered him, the period of adverse possession against one jagirdar could not be combined with that against another for the purposes of article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. In this respect a jagirdar was distinguished from the manager of a temple, as noted in Jagdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 59. The decision also distinguished the earlier case of Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periyannan Chetti (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261.

The matter arose on appeal in Civil Appeal No. 399 of 1957, filed under civil appellate jurisdiction. The appeal contested the judgment and decree dated 27 July 1954 of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in two civil appeals from 1954‑55. Counsel for the appellants included S. T. Desai, C. Krishna Reddi, T. Ramachandra Rao and M. S. K. Sastri, while the respondent was represented by Sadashiv Rao, J. B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley. The Court described the case as an appeal on a certificate granted by the former High Court of Hyderabad, noting that the respondent had instituted a suit in 1920 concerning the village of Timmapet.

The respondent asserted that the village of Timmapet had originally been granted in 1787 by the Nizam to his ancestor Harinarayan, who was also known as Raja Nemiwant Bahadur. After the death of Raja Harinarayan, the village was re‑conferred by a second sanad in 1811 on Harinarayan’s son, Raja Govind Narayan, and from that time it remained in the possession of the descendants of Raja Govind Narayan. In 1817 Raja Govind Narayan executed a lease, referred to as a Tahud, conveying the village to Raja Rama Krishna Rao, who was the forebear of the present defendants. enquiries concerning the status of the village, referred to as Inam inquiries, began in 1901, and at that stage the appellants lodged an objection on the ground that the village had been granted by the Nizam to their ancestors and that the respondent’s right was limited solely to the receipt of a pan‑mukta, that is, a fixed perpetual sum payable for land granted by a ruler or jagirdar. The respondent maintained that the lease monies were being paid regularly, although a default had occurred shortly before the present suit was instituted. Consequently, the respondent sued to recover the overdue lease money; the suit was decreed and the amount awarded by decree was recovered. In 1917 further disputes arose between the parties, and in 1918 the respondent demanded that the appellants vacate the village. The appellants refused to comply, and the respondent therefore instituted the present suit in 1920. In its pleading the respondent contended that the lease granted to the appellants was not permanent but could survive only for the lifetime of the grantor, and that, consequently, the respondent was entitled to possession of the village, especially because the appellants had begun to assert a title adverse to the respondent’s claim. The appellants opposed the suit, chiefly on the basis that the village had been granted as a bil‑makta with a fixed pan‑makta in their favour by the Nizam, so that the respondent was entitled only to the annual pan‑makta and could not lawfully dispossess them. As an alternative, the appellants also pleaded a defence of limitation, although their written statement did not specify whether the limitation should be assessed under article 142 or article 144 of the Limitation Act. The appellants raised additional defences, but those are not material to the present appeal. The trial court framed numerous issues, answered each in favour of the respondent, and ultimately decreed the suit, granting the plaintiff possession of the village and ordering the recovery of mesne profits at the rate of Rs 931‑12‑00 per year. Regarding the two principal defences, the trial court held that the village had not been granted by the Nizam to the appellants as they alleged, and accordingly found the appellants liable to ejectment because they could not claim a permanent right under the lease that had been granted to their ancestor by the respondent’s predecessor.

The trial court examined the question of limitation and concluded that the suit was not barred by article 142 of the Limitation Act. It appears that the issue of adverse possession was not raised before the trial court. Both the appellants and the respondent filed separate appeals to the High Court. The respondent’s appeal was limited to the amount of mesne profits, whereas the appellants restated their two principal arguments concerning the nature of their right and the applicability of the limitation defence.

The appeals were heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, but the judges on the bench differed in their opinions. Justice Schri Ran agreed with the trial court both on the characterization of the respondent’s rights and on the question of limitation, and he expressed the view that the appellants’ appeal should be dismissed. During the proceedings a plea of adverse possession was also advanced in relation to limitation; Justice Schripat Rau rejected that plea. Justice Schripat Rau further held that the respondent’s appeal should be allowed and that the annual mesne profit award should be increased to Rs 4,381‑12‑11.

Justice Khalilulzaman Siddiqu, however, seemed to favor the appellants on both the title and adverse‑possession issues and opined that the suit ought to be dismissed in its entirety. A third judge, Justice Ansari, concurred with Justice Schripat Rau on the questions of title and limitation, but observed that by the time he was to deliver his judgment the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, No LXIX of 1358‑F, had become effective from 1951. Consequently, possession could no longer be granted to the respondent, and Justice Ansari held that the respondent was entitled only to compensation payable under the abolition of jagirs.

Because Justice Ansari was compelled to differ from Justice Schripat Rau on the relief to be granted to the respondent in view of the abolition of jagirs, the matter was referred to a Full Bench of three judges pursuant to section 8 of the Hyderabad High Court Act. The Full Bench observed that Justice Ansari and Justice Schripat Rau were in agreement on the issues of title and limitation; therefore those matters would be decided by the judgment of Justice Ansari. Regarding the nature of the relief, the Full Bench upheld Justice Ansari’s view, which differed from that of Justice Schripat Rau.

Subsequently, the appellants applied for a certificate of leave to appeal to this Court, and that certificate was granted. Accordingly, the matter now stands before this Court. Counsel for the appellants has raised only two points. First, they submit that the evidence demonstrates that …

The appellant argued that the Nizam had issued a bilmakta sanad to them that expressly incorporated the village in question, and that consequently the appellant possessed a permanent right to the village subject only to the payment of a specified annual sum to the respondent. The appellant further contended that even if the Nizam’s bilmakta sanad did not expressly include the village, the appellant’s title had become perfected by adverse possession, converting their status into that of a permanent lessee of the respondent on the condition of paying a fixed yearly rent. The first issue that therefore arose for determination was whether the appellant had satisfactorily proved that the village formed part of the bilmakta sanad granted by the Nizam, and that the sanad conferred upon the appellant an unconditional, perpetual right to hold the village provided the annual payment was made. It was undisputed that the village had originally been granted in jagir to the ancestors of the respondent. It was also undisputed that in 1817 Raja Govind Narayan had issued a kowl in favour of the appellant’s ancestor. That kowl conveyed the village on a Tahud, that is, a lease, for a fixed annual sum of Rs 1027‑10‑0 payable by the ancestor. The kowl contained no explicit term indicating the duration of the lease; however, after specifying the fixed annual amount, the document required the grantee to rehabilitate any old or new riots and to pay the Tahud amount in fixed installments each crop season. On its plain language, the kowl could not be interpreted as granting a permanent lease at a fixed sum that could not be varied. The appellant nevertheless claimed that they had remained in uninterrupted possession of the village since 1817, continuously paying the same rent for more than a hundred years, and that this uninterrupted possession demonstrated that the village had been granted to them as a permanent lease. The court rejected this contention, holding that the mere fact of continuous possession and payment of the same rent for an extended period did not transform the 1817 kowl into a permanent lease when its express terms did not support such a conclusion. Accordingly, the lower courts were correct in finding that the kowl did not create a permanent lease right for the appellant at a fixed annual amount.

The appellant also relied upon events that transpired shortly after the issuance of the 1817 kowl. It appeared that the appellant’s ancestor, sometime after 1817, had submitted a vajab‑ul‑arz, that is, an application to the Nizam, containing several prayers. One of the prayers sought the grant of a bilmakta sanad, evidently in respect of certain Government lands that the appellant’s ancestors already possessed. Paragraph 6 of the vajab‑ul‑arz stated that the petitioner “regularly paid Government dues and expects that he should receive sanads of bilmakta with the seal of Diwani.” Paragraph 3 indicated that “from out of the Government Talukas whichever is entrusted on Tahud, your petitioner will pay the Tahud amount and will look after and improve the Taluka.” A careful reading of the vajab‑ul‑arz therefore showed that the ancestor of the appellant was praying to be issued a bilmakta sanad for lands he held from the Government. The application was accompanied by a list of villages that the ancestor claimed to hold. The list comprised eighty‑eight villages; the status of eighty‑five of those villages was clear and undisputed. However, three villages were specially noted in the list: Timmapet, Jagir Raja Nemivant, and the Makta of the Zamindar of Sugur. It was relevant to note that the appellant’s ancestor himself was the Zamindar of Sugur, which explained why he specifically prayed for a sanad concerning the Makta of that Zamindar.

The document stated that the petitioner had regularly paid Government dues and expected to receive sanads of bilmakta bearing the seal of Diwani. In paragraph three of the same document it was recorded that, for any Government Taluka assigned to Tahud, the petitioner would discharge the Tahud amount and would also look after and improve that Taluka. A careful reading of the vajab-ul-arz therefore left little doubt that the ancestor of the appellants was requesting that a bilmakta sanad be issued for the lands which he held from the Government. The vajab-ul-arz was accompanied by a list of villages that the ancestor claimed to hold. The list comprised eighty‑eight villages in total. For eighty‑five of those villages there was no dispute; they were evidently cultivated by the ancestor of the appellants under a grant from the Government. However, three villages were specially identified in the list. The first of those was Timmapet, described as a jagir of Raja Nemivant and a makta of the Zamindar of Sugur. It is relevant to note that the ancestor of the appellants was himself the Zamindar of Sugur, which explains why he prayed for a bilmakta sanad in relation to that village. The second village was Korotkal, which was attached to the jagir of Bahrami and described as a makta of the Zamindar of Sugur. The third entry was Palmur, together with the hamlet of Gattalpalli. These three villages were clearly of a different character from the other eighty‑five villages. Timmapet lay within the jagir belonging to the ancestor of the respondent and therefore could not normally be granted to the ancestor of the appellants. The village of Korotkal was an attached jagir that had been transferred to a person named Bakhshi Ismail Khan. By contrast, the village of Palmur had already been granted to the ancestor of the appellants. In strict terms, these three villages, because they were distinct, ought not to have been included in the list of villages for which a bilmakta sanad was sought. Nevertheless, the Government order in response to the vajab-ul-arz directed that a sanad bearing the seal of the Niabat Diwani be issued. The actual sanad that resulted from that order has not been strictly proved, although a copy of it appears in the judgment record that was filed. The Court therefore chose not to rely on that copy. It further appears that in the year 1880 a bilmakta sanad was issued again by the Nizam himself to the ancestor of the appellants upon the death of the previous holder. The bilmakta amount, that is, the fixed annual payment, was fixed at one lakh five thousand four hundred twelve rupees. This sum represented the revenue derived from the eighty‑five villages that were part of the original list of eighty‑eight villages attached to the vajab-ul-arz. The remaining three villages—Timmapet, Korotkal and Palmur—were also shown in the schedule of that sanad under the heading “Deduct 3 villages of separate Jagir”. The meaning of the words in that heading, and the inclusion of those three villages under it, required interpretation in the present suit. The respondent contended that the heading demonstrated that the bilmakta sanad granted

In this case the Court observed that the revenue of the three villages of Timmapet, Korotkal and Palmur, amounting to Rs 2,101, was not included in the fixed annual bilmakta amount of Rs 1,05,412 granted by the Nizam; consequently the respondent contended that the bilmakta grant deliberately excluded these villages. The respondent further argued that the reason the villages appeared in the schedule attached to the bilmakta deed was that the ancestor of the appellants had erroneously listed them in his original statement of lands (vajab‑ul‑arz), and that thereafter they were entered in the schedule of subsequent deeds but always shown as being deducted from the bilmakta. The Court agreed with this contention and held that the lower courts were correct in accepting it. The Court noted that the very absence of the villages’ revenue from the bilmakta sum demonstrated that they could not have formed part of the Nizam’s bilmakta grant. The Court therefore rejected the appellants’ argument that the revenue was omitted because the ancestor had to pay the revenues of Timmapet and Korotkal to other jagirdars and had given the revenue of Palmur as a free gift. The appearance of the three villages under the heading “deduct three villages of separate jagir” together with the exclusion of their revenue from the bilmakta amount reinforced the conclusion that they were not included in the bilmakta grant. The Court acknowledged that, although the villages were mentioned in the schedule, they should not have been so listed; the likely reason, in the Court’s view, was that the ancestor had previously included them in his own list, and the schedule merely reproduced that list. However, the manner of their inclusion indicated that they were not part of the Nizam’s grant. The Court also considered a document referred to as the Avarja, prepared in 1836, which likewise listed the three villages. The Court regarded the Avarja as merely a register noting the sanads issued on each day; thus the presence of the villages in the Avarja could be explained by their prior inclusion in the ancestor’s list and the corresponding vajab‑ul‑arz. The Court held that the Avarja did not, by itself, establish that the villages were granted as bilmakta by the Nizam, unless the sanads themselves demonstrated such a grant. Having examined the 1880 sanad on record, the Court found no difficulty in endorsing the lower courts’ finding that the bilmakta deed expressly excluded the three villages and was confined to the remaining villages for which the ancestor paid the fixed annual amount of Rs 1,05,412 to the Nizam.

It was established that the appellant’s predecessor had paid a fixed sum of Rs 1,05,412 each year to the Nizam as the agreed annual revenue. Counsel for the appellants argued that the Nizam, being an absolute sovereign, possessed the unfettered authority to withdraw any portion of land from a jagirdar and to re‑grant it to any other person at his discretion. While that proposition is undeniably correct, the Court observed that even an absolute ruler, when depriving a jagirdar of land, would be bound to inform the affected jagirdar that his grant had been partially or wholly withdrawn. Moreover, the sovereign would be required to express, in clear and explicit terms within the new grant, that the land being conveyed to a different person originated from the jagirdar’s former possession. Consequently, whenever land had previously been given to a jagirdar, the documentary instrument effecting a subsequent transfer must contain an unmistakable statement that the earlier grant was cancelled and that the same land was now being allotted to another party.

Upon examination of the 1880 sanad, the Court found no explicit clause indicating that the village of Timmapet—originally granted as part of a jagir to the respondent’s ancestor—had been removed, either wholly or partly, from his possession. The document did not stipulate that the respondent’s ancestor would thereafter receive only a fixed monetary sum from the appellant’s predecessor in respect of Timmapet. The recital in the sanad also contained the ambiguous term “etc.” in several places, providing no clear description of the lands involved. Because of this ambiguity, the Court turned to the accompanying schedule for guidance. The schedule listed the three villages, including Timmapet, under the heading “deduct three villages of separate jagir,” which led the Court to infer that these villages were excluded from the bil‑makta sanad. No inference could be drawn that the Nizam intended to strip a portion of the respondent’s ancestor’s rights in Timmapet and to vest those rights in the appellant’s ancestor. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the respondent’s ancestors had ever been notified that the Nizam had withdrawn any portion of their entitlement in Timmapet. In fact, a later grant dated 1918 confirmed Timmapet and other villages as a perpetual zat‑jagir in favour of the respondent, subject only to a two per cent payment of the haq‑malkana. At that time the appellant’s ancestor had raised a claim to his status as bil‑makta holder of Timmapet, but the contention remained unresolved. After a full review of the material, the Court concluded unequivocally that the appellant’s ancestor had never received a bil‑makta sanad from the Nizam that included Timmapet. Accordingly, any rights the appellant claimed over Timmapet must derive solely from the 1817 kowl, which, as previously noted, did not create a permanent lease. The appellant’s case, therefore, based on the alleged title created by the Nizam’s sanads, could not stand.

The Court observed that the appellants’ claim to title based on the sanads issued by the Nizam could not succeed. Turning then to the issue of limitation, the Court considered the appellants’ argument that they had acquired a permanent lease‑hold over the disputed land by adverse possession, an alleged development that began in 1875. According to the record, a dispute arose at that time between the ancestors of the parties concerning the village. The respondent’s ancestor is said to have applied to the Government, after which the Revenue Member issued an order directing the delivery of possession of the village to him. In response, the appellant’s ancestor filed a representation before the Prime Minister challenging that order. In that representation it was contended that, more than eighty years earlier, the respondent’s ancestor had granted the village to the appellant’s ancestor by way of a bil‑makta arrangement, that the appellant’s ancestor had remained in possession ever since, and that he had continually paid the stipulated amount. Accordingly, the appellant’s ancestor prayed that the order directing delivery of possession to the respondent’s ancestor be set aside. Notably, the representation alleged that the bil‑makta was effected by the respondent’s ancestor, not by the Nizam or the Government. The Prime Minister, however, directed that because the appellant’s ancestor had been in possession for an extended period, no order could now dispossess him. The respondent’s ancestor subsequently attempted, without success, to have the Prime Minister’s order modified, and consequently the appellant’s ancestor continued in possession of the village. The appellants argued that this sequence demonstrated that their ancestor had claimed the right of a permanent lessee against the respondent’s ancestor, a claim that the respondent’s ancestor had contested and failed to overturn. The Court therefore concluded that the appellant’s ancestor’s claim of adverse possession of a limited interest was made with the knowledge of the respondent’s ancestor, and that, twelve years after 1875, such adverse title would have become perfected, rendering the present ejectment suit barred by article 144. The Court noted that adverse possession may apply to a limited interest as well as to full ownership, citing the authorities Sankaran v. Periasami, Thakore Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal, and Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periayanan Chetti. The present case, however, involved an original kowl granted by a jagirdar, raising the question whether, in a jagir, an adverse possession of a limited interest akin to a permanent lease can arise. To answer that, the Court indicated that it must examine the characteristics of a jagir, beginning with its first incident.

In this case the Court observed that, at first glance, the estate in question should be regarded as an estate granted for the duration of the life of the grantee, as stated in the earlier decision of Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. The Collector of Surat. The facts of the present dispute support the view that the jagir originally conferred upon Raja Harinarayan in the year 1787 was a life‑grant, because after Raja Harinarayan’s death a new sanad was issued to his son, Raja Govind Narayan, in 1811. A comparable inference can be drawn from the later event in which, in 1880, a bilmakta sanad was issued to Raja Rameshwar Rao—who is an ancestor of the present appellants—upon the death of his father, even though earlier sanads had been granted to previous holders of the bilmakta. The appellants, however, argue that after the year 1811 no further sanads were issued to the descendants of Raja Govind Narayan, and they contend that this absence of subsequent sanads demonstrates that the jagir became hereditary rather than being limited to the lifetime of the original grantee after the death of Raja Govind Narayan. While it is true that the record contains no sanads that were expressly granted to the later descendants of Raja Govind Narayan, the appellants have also failed to produce any evidence showing that no such sanads were ever issued because of a change in State policy. The appellants relied on several authorities, including citations to reports of the Madras, Bombay and other courts, and on a publication of the Government of Hyderabad titled “Jagir Administration”, volume one, page three, which states that “Zaot or personal grants were originally tenable for lifetime only. If, however, the Sanad conferring such grant contains any words indicative of permanency the grant was treated as one in perpetuity. Formerly on the death of the grantee, the Jagir was attached and re‑issued in favour of his eldest son by another Sanad.” The appellants argue that the practice of attaching a jagir on the death of the grantee and re‑issuing a new sanad to the eldest son fell into disuse in Hyderabad, and that consequently jagirs became hereditary. The Court noted, firstly, that the quoted passage does not specify the date at which the practice of attachment and re‑issuance ceased. Secondly, the passage confirms that, unless the terms of the original grant expressly indicate a perpetual nature, the grant remains a life‑tenure. The sanad that created the jagir for Raja Govind Narayan is on record and contains no language indicating a perpetual grant; therefore the Court concluded that the grant to him must be treated as a life‑grant. Moreover, the fact that a fresh sanad was issued to Raja Govind Narayan when he succeeded to the jagir demonstrates that the system of issuing a new sanad on each succession was still operational at that time. Accordingly, the Court held that, in the case of Raja Govind Narayan, the jagir was granted to him only for his lifetime.

The Court observed that a jagir was granted solely for the lifetime of its holder. It noted that reliance had been placed on the decision in Raje Vinaykrao Nemiwant Brahmin v. Raje Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin, where a letter dated 1877 from the Government of India, Foreign Department, was quoted. The letter stated that “The Governor‑General in Council also accepts the view that these inams are held in accordance with the custom of the Hyderabad State, which permits the continuance of such jagheers to posterity, notwithstanding the absence of specific provision on the point, but at the same time reserves to the State the right of resuming such grants at pleasure.” The Court pointed out that even this correspondence acknowledged that the State retained the power to resume a grant at its discretion. Consequently, the Court held that the existence of such a reserving clause meant that jagirs in Hyderabad could not be described as permanent or hereditary, even though, in practice, a son might succeed his father in the ordinary course of events. The Court further referred to the opinion of a five‑judge bench of the former High Court of Hyderabad in Ahmad‑un‑Nissa Begum v. State, where Justice Ansari, after examining two Privy Council cases and certain firmans of the Ruler, declared that the cumulative effect of the authorities showed that jagir tenures in the State consisted of usufructuary rights in land that terminated on the death of each grantee, were inalienable during his life, and that the heirs of a deceased holder received the estate as fresh grantees. The right to confer the estate, the Court said, was vested in the Ruler and could be exercised at his absolute discretion. Nevertheless, the Court noted, the jagirdars enjoyed valuable rights during their lives, including the management of their estates, enjoyment of usufructs and other important privileges that provided them with considerable monetary benefits. This view of Justice Ansari was endorsed by all the other learned Judges on the Bench. Accordingly, the Court held that the absence of sanads granting the successors of Raja Govind Narayan, or even the fact that no such sanads were produced, did not alter the essential character of jagirdari tenure in Hyderabad. It observed that only in 1918, for the first time, was there a record that a particular village together with other villages was conferred in perpetuity on the respondent. There was no evidence that, before that date, the respondent’s ancestors possessed permanent hereditary rights in the jagir. Therefore, the Court affirmed the initial presumption that jagirs were only for the lifetime of the grantee and that this presumption must prevail in the present case until the 1918 sanad is considered. Up to that point, the Court held, the jagirs were held by the various ancestors of the respondent only for their lives, as reflected in the citation A.I.R. 1952 Hyd. 163, 167.

In a situation where a grant is perpetuated within a family from one generation to the next and each grantee holds the grant only for his own lifetime, the period of limitation against any particular grantee began to run from the moment his title arose. The Privy Council expressed this principle in Jagdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan (1), observing that where each grantee possessed an estate for life, the limitation would commence against an heir from the date his title was acquired on the death of the preceding heir. Because a jagir was granted solely for the lifetime of the grantee and because the grantee’s son received a fresh grant when he succeeded, a jagirdar could not create an alienation that survived beyond his lifetime. Consequently, a jagirdar could not grant a permanent lease unless the specific sanad or the law of the State expressly authorized it. The same rule applied to the running of limitation: it started against an heir from the moment his title accrued on the predecessor’s death. Therefore, the appellants could not rely on the events of 1875 during the tenure of Raja Ramarao as the commencement point for adverse possession against the respondent.

The respondent, according to the evidence, succeeded to the jagir in 1910; thus, the limitation period for him began in that year. The suit was instituted in 1920, meaning that, as regards the respondent, the limitation period had not run long enough to perfect any title by adverse possession. Counsel for the appellant referred to Daivasikhamani (2), a case where the Privy Council held the suits barred under Article 144 of the Limitation Act. That case involved a permanent kowl of temple lands granted by a manager, and the court, based on specific facts, found that the lessee had acquired permanent rights by adverse possession even though a temple manager generally lacked authority to grant a permanent lease except in limited circumstances. The present case was distinguished from Daivasikhamani. A manager’s lease may be voidable but is not void ab initio, and unless a succeeding manager avoided it, the lease could remain operative. Moreover, in the temple case the temple owned the property and no hereditary succession was involved. In contrast, a jagir holder was not the owner; his son succeeded as a new grantee, not by inheritance. A jagirdar could not make a permanent alienation of any part of the jagir; any such alienation might be effective only during his lifetime and would become void after his death, allowing the succeeding jagirdar simply to disregard it. Accordingly, unlike the temple manager scenario, adverse possession could not be used to prescribe a permanent interest in a jagir because the limitation against each heir started from the moment his title accrued upon the death of the previous holder.

The Court observed that the person who holds the jagir at any given time is not the owner of the land; when his son succeeds, the son acquires the land as a new grantee and not by virtue of any hereditary right. Accordingly, a jagirdar does not possess any authority to make a permanent alienation of any portion of the jagir that has been granted to him. Even if a jagirdar were to create a permanent alienation, for example by executing a permanent lease, such an arrangement may remain effective only during the jagirdar’s own lifetime. After the death of the jagirdar, the permanent lease becomes void and inoperative, and the succeeding jagirdar is under no obligation to avoid it; he may simply disregard it as a void instrument.

Because of this principle, the Court held that the situation differs fundamentally from the case of a permanent lease granted by a manager of a temple, where the temple is the owner of the property. In the temple scenario, a limited permanent interest may, in theory, be acquired by adverse possession, and a long lapse of time may lead the court to infer that the alienation was made in circumstances that justify a permanent lease. In contrast, with a jagir, the limitation period would commence against the heir only from the moment the heir’s title vests upon the death of the preceding holder, and no benefit can be derived from the passage of time against the former holder of the jagir. Consequently, it is impossible for an adverse possessor to acquire a limited permanent interest in a jagir in the same way that might be possible in a temple‑grant situation.

The Court further noted that, unlike temple grants, no inference of a permanent lease can be drawn from a prolonged lapse of time when the lease has been granted by a jagirdar. On this basis, the Court concluded that the appellants’ contention that they had prescribed for a limited interest of a permanent lessee against the respondent could not be sustained. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings.