RAI SHIVENDRA BAHADUR vs The Governing Body of Nalanda College

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1961

Decision Date: 15 December, 1961

Coram: J.L. Kapur, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Rao Shivendra Bahadur versus The Governing Body of Nalanda College, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 15 December 1961. The case is reported in the 1962 volume of the Supreme Court Reports, supplementary part, at page 144, and is also cited as 1962 AIR 1210. The bench comprised Justice J L Kapur, Justice Bhuvneshwar P Sinha, Justice M Hidayatullah, Justice J C Shah and Justice J R Mudholkar. The petitioner, Rao Shivendra Bahadur, sought relief against the respondents, who were identified as the Governing Body of Nalanda College together with its President, Mr Krishna Kant Singh, its Secretary, Mr K B P N Singh, and Mr Ram Swarup Narain Sinha, who had been appointed Principal of the college.

The factual background recorded that Rao Shivendra Bahadur had been appointed Principal of Nalanda College, an institution affiliated to Bihar University, in 1958. In accordance with University Statute XVI, the appointment was communicated to the university; however, the university’s Syndicate did not give its required approval as mandated by Article 5 of the same statute. In 1960 a newly constituted governing body resolved to appoint a different individual as Principal and, pending that appointment, directed that the petitioner continue to discharge the duties of the office. The governing body subsequently interviewed several candidates, including the petitioner, and by means of a resolution authorised its Chairman to make the final selection. Dissatisfied with this procedure, the petitioner challenged the validity of the selection before the High Court of Patna, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution and seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the authorities to confirm his appointment.

The Court observed that a writ of mandamus may be issued only when a statute imposes a clear legal duty and the party seeking relief possesses a legal right enforceable under that statute. The Court held that in the present case the petitioner had not demonstrated the existence of such a statutory right that could be enforced by mandamus, and accordingly the writ could not be granted.

The appeal arose under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No 403 of 1961, taken by special leave from the Patna High Court’s judgment and order dated 19 July 1961 in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 404 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant were described in neutral terms, and counsel for the respondents were similarly identified without naming individuals. The judgment was delivered by Justice Kapur, who affirmed that the High Court’s dismissal of the petition under Article 226 was appropriate because the statutory conditions required for a mandamus writ were not satisfied.

In this case, the factual background was as follows: Nalanda College had been founded by a private individual in 1920, had become a degree‑granting institution in 1945 and had been affiliated with Bihar University in 1951. In March 1953 the Government appointed Mr D.P. Srivastava, a Government servant, as Principal of the college; the Government later withdrew him on 4 February 1958. It was alleged that an extraordinary meeting of the Governing Body of the college was held on 23 February 1958 at which the appellant was appointed Principal, that the University was duly informed of this appointment in accordance with the University Statutes, and that the appellant actually assumed charge of the office on 11 July 1958. A subsequent meeting on 27 July 1958 confirmed the appointment made on 23 February 1958. On 9 November 1959 the constitution of the Governing Body was altered and respondent No 2 became its Chairman. The Governing Body then revisited the proceedings of 23 February 1958 and, at a meeting on 31 January 1960, resolved to appoint a new Principal, while deciding that the appellant should continue to act as Principal until a new appointment was effected. The appellant, in his capacity as an ex‑officio member, was present at that meeting. He claimed that he lodged a complaint about the appointment with the Vice‑Chancellor of Bihar University and that the Vice‑Chancellor, by letter, advised him merely to observe how matters would develop. On 14 May 1960 the Governing Body resolved to advertise the principal’s post, a meeting at which the appellant was again present, and on 26 September 1960 it resolved to re‑advertise the post. Several candidates, including the appellant, were interviewed by the Governing Body, and on 18 December 1960 a resolution was passed authorising the Chairman to select a candidate from among those interviewed, the appellant being one of them. Pursuant to that resolution, the President of the college, respondent No 2, appointed respondent No 4 as Principal; respondent No 4 was at that time Principal of another college in Bihar. On 18 April 1961 the appellant was asked to hand over charge to the newly appointed Principal by 6 May 1961. Consequently, the petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of respondent No 4’s appointment on several grounds. The petitioner asserted that the appellant’s appointment had never been lawfully terminated, that any resolution rescinding the 23 February 1958 appointment was illegal because it had not been placed on the agenda and was void under specific provisions of the University Statute framed under the University of Bihar Act 1951 (Act 27 of 1951), that the new appointment was invalid because the Governing Body alone, at a duly convened meeting, possessed the authority to appoint a Principal and that such power could not be delegated to the President or the Secretary, and that the appointment had not received the required approval of the University. Additionally, the petitioner claimed that the appellant, being a better candidate, was entitled to promotion under Article 4(1)(b) of Statute XVI.

The respondents asserted that the appointment had been made by the University, that the appellant was a better candidate than respondent number four, and that the appellant was entitled to promotion under article 4(1)(b) of Statute XVI. The respondents denied those allegations. They pleaded three separate points. First, they claimed that the resolution dated February 23, 1958 was invalid because it failed to consider the cases of other teachers who were also eligible for promotion. Second, they argued that the appellant’s appointment had never received the approval of the Syndicate, as required by article 5 of Statute XVI. Third, they contended that since the appellant himself applied for the post of Principal after the new Governing Body had passed the resolutions, and because he offered himself for interview before that Governing Body, he could not now challenge the legality of the appointment, for he had neither approved nor disapproved the process. The High Court held that the appellant’s appointment was not valid because the Syndicate had not given its approval and nevertheless the petitioner had been allowed to assume the post of Principal without such approval. The Court further observed that the Governing Body’s decision to advertise for the post of Principal did not constitute punishment, termination of service, or demotion of the appellant; consequently, the action did not fall within articles 7, 8 or 9 of the Statutes. The Court also noted that the appellant had made no protest against the passage of the new resolution and, having submitted himself for selection, he could not now complain that another candidate had been chosen. Accordingly, the Court held that the appellant could not challenge the new appointment for two reasons: his own appointment was invalid and the appointment of respondent number four was valid because it had been approved by the University. A considerable controversy was raised before the Court as to whether the Statutes framed by the University under section 20 of the University of Bihar Act possessed the force of law and whether a writ under article 226 of the Constitution could be issued against the Governing Body of the College, that is, whether the appellant possessed a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the respondents. The Court explained that, in order for a mandamus to be issued to compel the respondents to act, it must be shown that the Statutes impose a legal duty and that the appellant has a legal right under those Statutes to enforce that performance. However, the Court found it wholly unnecessary to decide this question or to determine whether the Statutes impose on the Governing Body of the College a duty enforceable by a writ of mandamus, because even assuming the appellant’s contention that the College is a public body obliged to perform a public duty in appointing a Principal, the appellant had not demonstrated any enforceable right that could be invoked by mandamus. According to the Statutes, all appointments of teachers and staff must be made by the Governing Body, and no person may be appointed, removed or demoted except in accordance with the established Rules.

The Court noted that, although the governing statutes required that all appointments of teachers and staff be made in accordance with the Rules, the appellant had failed to demonstrate any legal entitlement that would justify an order directing his appointment or reinstatement. The Court further observed that no provision or article within the Statutes had been identified which conferred upon the appellant a right to be appointed to the position in question or to be reinstated after removal. In the absence of such a statutory right, the Court held that the appellant could not approach the Court and seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus, because a writ may be issued only when a clear legal right exists that the Court can enforce. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to examine any additional issues or arguments that might have been raised, since the fundamental requirement of a demonstrable right was not satisfied. On the basis of this reasoning, the Court concluded that the appeal could not succeed and therefore ordered that the appeal be dismissed. The order further directed that each party bear its own costs of the proceedings, reflecting the position that the appeal was unfounded. In summary, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirmed that no entitlement to appointment or reinstatement existed under the Statutes, and left the parties to bear the expenses incurred in the litigation.