Munlappan vs State of Madras

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1961

Decision Date: 27 September 1961

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, J.L. Kapur

The case of Munlappan versus State of Madras was decided on the twenty‑seventh day of September, 1961, by a bench comprising Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justices J. L. Kapur. The judgment is reported in 1962 AIR 1252 and 1962 SCR (3) 869, and it is also cited in RF 1983 SC 274 (pages 8 and 9). The matter before the Court concerned the admissibility of a dying declaration that was incomplete because the declarant died suddenly after uttering only part of his statement. The factual backdrop involved a stabbing of the deceased, identified as E, who was immediately taken to a police station. There, a Sub‑Inspector began recording E’s statement. After E managed to speak a single complete sentence, he was unable to continue, and it was subsequently discovered that he had died. The Sub‑Inspector then affixed the thumb impression of the deceased on the recorded statement, treating it as a dying declaration. The principal legal issue was whether such a declaration, interrupted by death, could be admitted as evidence and what probative value an incomplete dying declaration possessed. The Court held that a thumb impression taken after the declarant’s death must be disregarded. It further observed that corroboration is not always required when the dying declaration is full, categorical, and there is no indication that the maker had anything further to add. In the present case, the statement was deemed complete and unequivocal, and thus needed no corroboration and could be relied upon. The Court relied upon the authority in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958) SCR 552 and distinguished the earlier decision of Cyril Waugh v. The King (1950) AC 203.

The appeal arose from a criminal conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, with the accused having been sentenced to death for the murder of a person named Elumalai on the twenty‑fourth of January, 1960, at Kannankurichi. The appellate proceedings were initiated by special leave and were recorded as Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1961, referring to the judgment and order dated the thirtieth of August, 1960, of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 468 of 1960 and Trial No. 38 of 1960. Counsel for the appellant and for the respondent were instructed respectively. The factual narrative disclosed that two days before the fatal incident, the appellant, identified as Muniappan, and the deceased, Elumalai, had a dispute at a tea stall. Although the quarrel primarily involved the appellant and other individuals, Elumalai had intervened, made remarks about the appellant, and encouraged the opposing party to lodge a complaint. Two separate reports of the disturbance were filed, one by the appellant and another by his adversaries. On the day of the murder, at approximately half past twelve in the afternoon, the events leading to Elumalai’s injuries and subsequent death unfolded, giving rise to the evidentiary issue concerning the dying declaration and its thumb impression.

P.W. I Muthuswami Udayar was taking a bath when he heard Elumalai call out to him, using the word “Mama.” He hurried to the source of the cry and discovered Elumalai lying with several stab wounds on his body. Muthuswami questioned Elumalai, who then identified the appellant, Muniappan, as the person who had inflicted the injuries. Muthuswami rendered first‑aid to Elumalai, and at the same time Elian, also known as Kundaswami (P.W. 2), and K.R. Perumal (P.W. 3) arrived at the scene. The three men lifted the wounded victim and carried him about eighty yards to the police station house. While they were moving the victim, a Sub‑Inspector approached from the opposite direction, and Elumalai was placed on the verandah of the police station house. The Sub‑Inspector immediately began recording Elumalai’s statement. After Elumalai managed to utter a single complete sentence, he was unable to speak further. Although he was offered soda‑water to drink, he could not swallow it and, in fact, died at that moment.

Following the victim’s death the Sub‑Inspector took Elumalai’s thumb impression on the written statement that had been recorded, and four other witnesses also signed or placed their thumb marks on the document. Shortly thereafter, Muniappan arrived at the police station house and essentially surrendered to the authorities. The police seized one of Muniappan’s garments, which was stained with blood, and discovered in one of his pockets a sheath that appeared to belong to the knife that had caused the stab wounds. On the basis of a statement made by Muniappan, the police searched a garden and recovered a knife from that location; the knife was subsequently found to be stained with human blood. Further investigation revealed that the knife together with its sheath had been purchased by Muniappan from Ameer Khan (P.W. 6) on the evening of 23 January 1960. Consequently, the police charged Muniappan with the offence of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

The prosecution’s case against Muniappan rested on several pieces of evidence. These included the testimony of Ameer Khan (P.W. 6) regarding the purchase of the knife and sheath for six rupees, the testimony of witnesses concerning an incident that had occurred two days before the murder, the dying declaration made to Muthuswami (P.W. 1), the dying declaration recorded by the Sub‑Inspector in the presence of witnesses, an alleged statement that the accused had made to a doctor when his thumb injury was examined, and the evidence of the alleged eye‑witness Elian alias Kundaswami (P.W. 2). Both the trial court and the appellate court found Muniappan guilty of murder and imposed the death penalty. In the present appeal, it was contended that, with the eye‑witness testimony (P.W. 2) and the accused’s statement to the doctor excluded, the remaining evidence would be insufficient if the dying declaration recorded by the Sub‑Inspector were also excluded. The principal issue raised on appeal therefore concerned the admissibility and evidential value of that dying declaration, which was described as an incomplete document that had been completed by affixing the thumb impression of the deceased.

It was observed that the thumb impression of the deceased Elumalai was obtained after he had already died. Consequently, the thumb impression taken on the dying declaration must be disregarded. The Court did not accept the argument advanced by counsel for the appellant that the thumb impression was obtained for an improper or dishonest purpose in order to give the appearance of completion to a document that was otherwise incomplete. The Court found no reason to support such an allegation. The Sub‑Inspector, after recording the statements made by Elumalai, noted in his report that soon after Elumalai uttered those words his speech ceased and he died. The thumb impression was affixed to the document after this observation. The Court considered that the Sub‑Inspector, startled by the sudden collapse of Elumalai, was uncertain how to proceed and therefore thought it appropriate to record the thumb impression on the statement as it stood. While it might have been preferable for the Sub‑Inspector to leave the document untouched and not to add the thumb mark of a dead man, the Court was not persuaded that the Sub‑Inspector acted with any improper motive. The Sub‑Inspector had himself recorded that the deceased was dead before the thumb impression was taken, and this was corroborated by the testimony of the attesting witnesses. The essential fact, however, remained that the dying declaration was abruptly interrupted by the victim’s sudden death. The question before the Court was whether, in view of this interruption, the dying declaration could be admitted as evidence.

The appellant’s counsel relied on a Privy Council decision from Jamaica, reported in Cyril Waugh v. The King (1950) A.C. 203, to support the proposition that an incomplete dying declaration should be excluded. In that case, a man named Phillip Newby was shot and, while dying, made a statement that was recorded. Newby then fell into a coma and never recovered, leaving his declaration unfinished. The Privy Council held that the declaration could not be admitted because it was incomplete; the missing portion occurred when Newby slipped into a coma and died. The recorded part of Newby’s statement showed that he had not identified his attacker by name but had described the assailant only as “a man”. The incomplete sentence began to reveal that the assailant held an “old grudge” against Newby, a detail that might have identified the perpetrator had the sentence been finished. Because the incomplete statement provided no substantive clue and required supplementation by external evidence that was not part of Newby’s own words, the Privy Council deemed it valueless and excluded it. The Court noted that the reasoning for exclusion in that precedent was clear. Accordingly, the Court examined whether the present dying declaration possessed a similar character of incompleteness that would warrant its exclusion.

The Court recorded the dying declaration of the deceased as follows: “Sir, this day 24th January 1960, at 12.30 p.m., Muniappan, son of Kola Goundan of Kannankurichi, stabbed me in my body with a knife.” The declaration continued with the deceased’s words ceasing shortly thereafter, after which his life ended. The declaration was signed in the form of a left thumb impression by the deceased, Elumalai, and was witnessed by four individuals whose signatures appeared in the appropriate Tamil script, namely Muthuswami Udayar, K. R. Perumal, C. Kannan, and Kundaswami, together with a thumb impression of the Sub‑Inspector S. A. Amir dated the same 24th January 1960. The Court observed that the accusation against the appellant was complete within this statement and that there was no indication that Elumalai intended to add any further particulars. Consequently, the declaration was deemed a complete and categorical accusation against the appellant. The Court noted that, in light of its own decision in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, a dying declaration of this nature required little or no corroboration. The Court distinguished the Privy Council case, deeming it inapplicable to the present facts because the circumstances differed. The Privy Council judgment had earlier been considered by the Court in Abdul Sattar v. Mysore State, where the dying declaration, although incomplete, was unequivocally incriminating and was therefore acted upon. Counsel for the appellant attempted to differentiate Abdul Sattar on the basis that, in that case, corroboration existed and argued that an incomplete but categorical declaration could be acted upon only if corroborated. The Court disagreed with this contention, holding that corroboration is not invariably required when the dying declaration is complete, categorical, and leaves no room for further explanation, as is the case here.

The Court further observed that additional evidence supported the accusation against the appellant. A knife, the weapon described in the dying declaration, was recovered at some distance from the scene based on information supplied to the police by the appellant himself. Forensic examination revealed that the knife was stained with human blood. Moreover, the appellant possessed a sheath that the shopkeeper identified as the one that had been sold to Muniappan the day before the incident. The appellant’s conduct after the incident further implicated him: he surrendered to the police at 12.40 p.m., a mere ten minutes after the alleged stabbing. Upon surrender, the appellant was found to have an injury on the lateral side of the left thumb, which the Court inferred was sustained while attempting to stab Elumalai. The Court also referenced the presence of the thumb injury as supporting the contention that the appellant was the assailant. In combination, these facts—namely, the consistent dying declaration, the blood‑stained weapon, the identified sheath, the rapid surrender, and the thumb injury—formed a coherent body of evidence pointing to the appellant’s guilt. The Court concluded that the totality of the evidence satisfied the legal requirements for conviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

In this case the Court noted that the lethal injury identified as C.168 occurred when the appellant repeatedly struck the deceased, Elumalai, while simultaneously holding the victim with his left hand and wielding the weapon with his right hand, an act that demonstrated a deliberate assault with a deadly instrument. The Court further observed that a clear motive for the assault was established by a quarrel that had taken place only two days earlier, a dispute of which both parties had separately reported to the police, thereby creating a documented antecedent to the violence. In addition to the motive, the Court found corroboration of the appellant’s guilt through a dying declaration made by Elumalai to the first prosecution witness, Muthuswami, after Muthuswami arrived at the scene in response to the victim’s cry for help, a declaration that directly implicated the appellant. After considering the combined effect of the repeated blows, the recent quarrel, and the dying declaration, the Court was satisfied that the totality of the evidence presented was sufficient to justify a conviction of the appellant on the charge of murder. The Court characterized the dying declaration as categorical in nature, stating that it unequivocally accused the appellant of committing the crime and that there was no hesitation in accepting it as reliable evidence. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appeal could not succeed, ordered that the appeal be dismissed, and affirmed the conviction.