Mohan Lal Goenka And Another vs The State Of West Bengal on 18 April, 1961

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1957

Decision Date: 18 April, 1961

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Mohan Lal Goenka and another versus The State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the eighteenth day of April, 1961. The case was reported in the 1961 volume of the All India Reporter at page 1543 and in the 1962 volume of the Supreme Court Reporter (second series) at page 36. The bench that heard the appeal comprised Justice K. C. Das Gupta, Chief Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice S. K. Das, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The petitioners, one being the owner and the other the manager of a colliery, were charged under the Mines Creche Rules of 1946 for failing to provide a creche for women employees and for not appointing a creche‑in‑charge as mandated by those rules. Their principal arguments were twofold: first, that the Mines Creche Rules of 1946 had become nullified because the Mines Act of 1923, under which the rules were originally framed, had itself been repealed by the Mines Act of 1952; and second, that even if the rules survived, they could not be considered rules made under section 58(d) of the 1952 Act because the original provision, section 30(bb) of the 1923 Act, carried different requirements. Additionally, on behalf of the manager, a further contention was raised that the manager bore no liability for contravention of rule 7(1) because he had no statutory duty to appoint a creche‑in‑charge and thus could not be said to have omitted any required act.

The Court, delivering the opinion of Chief Justice Sinha, Justice S. K. Das, Justice Das Gupta and Justice Ayyangar, held that the regulations enacted under section 30 of the Mines Act of 1923 survived the repeal of that Act. Consequently, the Mines Creche Rules of 1946, which were framed under section 30(bb) of the 1923 Act, continued to operate in respect of the matters covered by section 58(d) of the Mines Act of 1952. The Court explained that where the two enactments overlapped, the rules remained in force by virtue of section 24 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 and were to be regarded as rules made under the 1952 Act. The Court further found that a breach of rule 7 of the Mines Creche Rules of 1946 amounted, in law, to a breach of a rule made under section 58(d) of the 1952 Act, within the meaning of section 73 of that Act. Under section 18(1) of the Mines Act of 1952, the manager, together with the owner and the agent, was deemed responsible for compliance with the Mines Creche Rules, and the manager’s failure to demonstrate that he had taken all reasonable measures to prevent the contravention rendered him liable for the offence.

The Court noted that under the Mines Creche Rules the agent and the owner each bore responsibility for ensuring compliance with those rules, which formed part of the conditions of employment for female labour engaged in “mining operations.” Section 18, sub‑section (2), provided that each of them would be deemed guilty of a contravention of any rule committed by “any person whosoever,” unless the person could demonstrate that he had taken all reasonable means to prevent such contravention. In the present case the manager had failed to prove that he had taken all reasonable steps to prevent the breach of Rule 7 by the owner, even though the wording of the rule itself imposed no duty on the manager. Consequently, the manager was to be held guilty of the contravention. The Court held that the earlier authority in State Government, M. P. v. Deodatta Diddi, A.I.R. (1956) Nag. 71, was not applicable, and it rejected the view expressed in G. D. Bhattar v. State, A.I.R. (1957) Cal. 483, which would have rendered the manager liable. Justice Mudholkar explained that, within the mining industry, a “mining operation” as contemplated by section 18 of the Mines Act meant an activity carried out for the purpose of extracting minerals and could not be extended to include the management of mines, such as the employment of labour or the provision of employee amenities. Accordingly, the manager of a mine could not be held vicariously liable for the owner’s failure to fulfil his own duty under Rule 7(1) of the Mines Creche Rules. While sub‑section (2) of section 18 could absolve the manager from vicarious liability if he could show that he had taken all reasonable means, including publishing and, to the best of his power, enforcing the provisions to prevent the contravention, the Court observed that neither the Act nor the Rules granted the manager any power to enforce the owner’s performance of his duty under sub‑rule (1) of Rule 7. Therefore, the manager was not liable for the breach of that rule.

The judgment recorded that the appeal arose under criminal appellate jurisdiction, identified as Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1957, and was taken from the judgment and order dated 12 July 1956 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 270 of 1956. Counsel for the appellants and the respondent were noted. The judgment of the Constitution Bench, consisting of Chief Justice Sinha, Justice S. K. Das, Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice N. R. Ayyangar, was delivered by Justice Das Gupta, while Justice Mudholkar delivered a separate judgment. The appeal, filed on a certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, challenged the High Court’s decision to uphold the conviction of the appellants under section 73 of the Indian Mines Act for contravention of Rule 7 of the Mines Creche Rules, 1946. Rule 3 of those rules required the owner of every mine to construct a creche in accordance with plans prepared and approved by the competent authority, and Rule 7 stipulated that the owner must appoint a “creche in‑charge” who satisfied the qualifications and training approved by the competent authority.

The rule stipulated that the person appointed as the creche attendant must be a woman who possessed the qualifications and training that the competent authority approved. The complaint that gave rise to the conviction of the two appellants alleged that they had violated Rule 7 of the Mines Creche Rules, 1946 because no creche attendant meeting that requirement had been appointed at the mine. One of the appellants, Mr Goenka, owned the Khas Jawbad Colliery, while the other appellant, Mr J N Gupta, acted as the manager of the same colliery. After the appellants’ appeal to the Court of Sessions was dismissed, they sought relief by filing a revision before the Calcutta High Court. The High Court rejected the revision, although it reduced the sentences imposed on the appellants. Nevertheless, the High Court issued a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, and on the basis of that certificate the present appeal before this Court was filed. The appellants raised two principal questions. First, they contended that the Mines Creche Rules, 1946 had become repealed because the Mines Act of 1923, under which those rules had originally been framed, was itself repealed by section 88 of the Mines Act of 1952. Second, they argued that because the Creche Rules had been framed under section 30(bb) of the 1923 Act, they could not be treated as rules made under the 1952 Act, since the corresponding provision in the later Act, namely section 58(b), imposes different requirements from those contained in section 30(bb) of the 1923 legislation. In the series of criminal appeals numbered 98 to 106 of 1959, this Court held that regulations made under section 29 of the Mines Act, 1923 continued to be effective despite the repeal of that Act. The same principle was applied to regulations framed under section 30 of the 1923 Act, and therefore the first contention of the appellants was rejected as untenable. The second issue was then examined. Section 30(bb) of the 1923 Act authorises the making of rules for the purpose stated in the following words: “For requiring the maintenance in mines, wherein any women are ordinarily employed, of suitable rooms to be reserved for the use of the children under the age of six years belonging to such women, and for prescribing, either generally or with particular reference to the number of women ordinarily employed in the mine, the number and standards of such rooms, and the nature and extent of the supervision to be provided therein.” In the Mines Act of 1952, section 58 gives the Central Government the power to make rules for any of the purposes mentioned therein. Clause (d) of that section reads: “For requiring the maintenance in mines, wherein any women are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, of suitable rooms to be reserved for the use of the children under the age of six years belonging to such women, and for prescribing either generally or with particular reference to the number of women employed in the mines, the number and standards …”.

In the judgment, the Court observed that clause (d) of section 58 of the Mines Act, 1952 read, “of such rooms, and the nature and extent of the amenities to be provided and the supervision to be exercised therein;”. The Court noted that this clause corresponded to clause (bb) of section 30 of the Mines Act, 1923, but that the provision in the 1952 Act was broader. Under the 1923 Act, rules made pursuant to section 30(bb) could require the maintenance of creches and could prescribe certain matters concerning those creches, but they applied only to mines “wherein any women are ordinarily employed”. By contrast, section 58(d) of the 1952 Act authorised the making of similar rules for the maintenance of creches and the prescription of related matters in respect of all mines “wherein any women are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months”. The appellants contended that the Creche Rules of 1946, which had been framed under section 30(bb) of the 1923 Act, should be interpreted as applying solely to mines where women are ordinarily employed. Accordingly, they argued that those rules could not be regarded as rules made under section 58(d) of the 1952 Act, because the latter required creches to be maintained in a larger class of mines, namely those where women had been employed at any time during the previous twelve months, even if women were not ordinarily employed there. The appellants further urged that the content of the rules could not be expanded merely because the 1952 Act permitted rules to be framed for mines other than those originally contemplated.

The Court found that the appellants’ argument possessed some merit and that it might indeed be difficult to conclude that the Mines Creche Rules of 1946, framed under section 30(bb) of the 1923 Act, automatically applied to every mine covered by section 58(d) of the 1952 Act. However, the Court held that this difficulty did not prevent the 1946 Creche Rules from operating as rules under the 1952 Act for mines “where women are ordinarily employed”. The Court pointed out that the description “mine wherein any women are ordinarily employed” includes, in the first place, mines where women are ordinarily employed and, in addition, embraces mines “where any women are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months”, even though the attribute of “women being ordinarily employed” may be absent. Assuming the correctness of the appellants’ premise that the rule’s content does not automatically extend, the Court concluded that the Mines Creche Rules of 1946 could still be reasonably deemed to be rules made under section 58(d) of the 1952 Act, although they might not exhaust the full purpose expressed in that provision. In other words, while section 58(d) of the 1952 Act allowed rules to be framed for a broader class of mines, the 1946 Creche Rules could validly function as such rules for the subset of mines where women are ordinarily employed, even if they do not cover the entire scope intended by the later statute.

In this case the Court observed that the Mines Creche Rules of 1946 applied to three categories of mines: (i) mines in which women are ordinarily employed; (ii) mines in which women are not ordinarily employed but are employed; and (iii) mines in which women are not ordinarily employed yet were employed on at least one day during the preceding twelve months. Accordingly, the Rules covered a portion of the matters that could be addressed by regulations made under section 58(d) of the 1952 Act. To the extent that the provisions of section 58(d) of the 1950 Act and section 30(bb) of the earlier enactment overlapped, the Rules continued to be in force by virtue of section 24 of the General Clauses Act. On examination of the evidence presented before the Magistrate, it was found that the Jawabad Mine was a mine where women were ordinarily employed. Therefore, for that mine the Mines Creche Rules functioned as rules made under the 1952 Act, and a breach of Rule 7 of the 1946 Creche Rules constituted, under the law, a breach of a rule made under the 1952 Act within the meaning of section 73 of that Act. The second appellant, Gupta, who was the manager of the colliery at the relevant time, raised an additional contention. He argued that Rule 7(1) did not impose any duty on the manager and therefore the manager could not be held liable for failing to appoint a person in charge of a creche. The resolution of that issue required an interpretation of section 18 of the Mines Act, 1952, which reads: “18. Duties and responsibilities of owners, agents and managers:— (1) The owner, agent and manager of every mine shall be responsible that all operations carried on in connection therewith are conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the regulations, rules and bye‑laws and of any orders made thereunder. (2) In the event of any contravention of any such provisions by any person whosoever, the owner, agent and manager of the mine shall each be deemed also to be guilty of such contravention unless he proves that he had taken all reasonable means, by publishing and to the best of his power enforcing those provisions, to prevent such contravention. (3) It shall not be a defence in any proceedings brought against an owner or agent of a mine under this section that a manager of the mine has been appointed in accordance with the provisions of this Act”. It was noted that the first sub‑section, in general terms, imposes on the owner, agent and manager a responsibility to ensure that all operations connected with the mine are carried out in compliance with the Act, its regulations, rules, bye‑laws and any orders made thereunder. The second sub‑section deals with the question of guilt of the owner,

The Court explained that, under the statutory provision, both the agent and the manager could be held liable for any breach of the regulations by “any person whosoever”, and that the third sub‑section expressly stated that the owner or the agent could not avoid liability simply because a manager had been appointed for the mine. The appellant’s first argument was that the Mines Creche Rules were unrelated to “operations carried on in the mines” and that section 18 was intended to apply only to the proper observance of those provisions of the Act which dealt directly with the work of extracting coal and associated activities. The Court considered this view to be an unduly narrow construction of the section. It observed that the employment of female labour was clearly connected with the extraction of coal in a mine and that every condition governing the employment of female workers should reasonably be regarded as inseparably linked with the “operations carried on” in the mines. The Court noted that the Mines Creche Rules were conditions of employment for female labour no less important than the provisions of, for example, section 46 of the Act. Section 46 prohibited the employment of women in underground mines and restricted the employment of women in surface mines to the hours between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m., subject to any variation authorized by the Central Government under the powers conferred by that section. Moreover, section 46 required that every woman be given a rest interval of at least eleven hours between the end of one day’s work and the beginning of the next period of work. The Court held that it could not be seriously argued that, if women were employed in a mine in breach of the provisions of section 46, the mine could still be said to be operating in compliance with the Act. Accordingly, the Court found no reason to exclude the employment of female labour without observance of the Mines Creche Rules from constituting “carrying on operations in connection with the mine” in violation of a rule made under the Act. The Court clarified that, in order for the operations connected with a mine to be regarded as having been conducted in accordance with the Act, its regulations, rules, bye‑laws and any orders made thereunder, it was necessary not only to comply with those provisions that dealt directly with coal‑raising work, but also to observe the provisions that regulated the conditions of employment of all persons engaged in the mining operations. The Court reiterated that the Mines Creche Rules undeniably formed part of the conditions of employment applicable to female labour involved in mining activities. Consequently, compliance with these rules was essential before the operations could be said to have been carried out in conformity with the rules made under the Act. In the Court’s view, the effect of section 18(1) was therefore to impose such comprehensive obligations.

In the case before the Court, it was held that the manager, the agent and the owner each bore responsibility for observing the Mines Creche Rules. The State argued that because responsibility was placed on all three persons, the manager could be penalised for a breach of the Creche Rules that was actually committed by the owner. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether section 18(1) on its own gave rise to that consequence, because section 18(2) removed any doubt. Section 18(2) expressly made the owner, the agent and the manager severally liable for any breach of regulations, regardless of which person actually committed the violation. Consequently, the person who actually contravened the provision was guilty, and each of the three persons was also deemed guilty even though the breach was not personally committed by them. The Court remarked that it would be illogical, in view of this provision, to hold that two of the three could escape liability for a contravention committed by the third. The manager‑appellant, however, contended that such a reading of section 18(2) should be avoided because it would be “thoroughly unjust”. He questioned how he could ensure compliance with a rule that, in its terms, imposed a duty only on the owner. The manager‑appellant’s argument was essentially that the Legislature had acted improperly by making the owner, the agent and the manager vicariously liable for violations committed by “any person whosoever”. The Court indicated that it was not concerned with assessing the wisdom of that legislative choice.

The Court observed that the Legislature had anticipated the possibility of injustice arising from such vicarious liability and therefore incorporated a special defence in subsection (3). Under this defence, if a rule or bye‑law imposes a duty on the manager and the owner is prosecuted, the owner may escape punishment by demonstrating that he took all reasonable steps to ensure the manager performed his duty. Sub‑section (3) therefore does not allow the mere appointment of a manager to serve as a defence. In the present matter, the rule in question imposed a duty on the owner, and the manager was the one prosecuted. The manager could avoid conviction only by showing that he had employed all reasonable means to prevent the owner from violating the rule. The Court concluded that the overall purpose of section 18 was to ensure that when the Act, its regulations, rules, bye‑laws or orders require something to be done or forbid something, liability attaches not only to the person expressly named but also to the owner, the agent and the manager, unless the person charged can prove that he took all reasonable measures to prevent the breach.

The law imposes a penalty on any person who violates the provisions of the rules, but it also creates an additional liability for the owner, the agent and the manager of a mine. Even when none of these persons is expressly named as the individual who is required or prohibited from performing a particular act, each of them may still be punished for a breach of the rule unless he can demonstrate that he employed all reasonable measures to avert the violation. In the case presently before the Court, the appellant who acted as manager failed to either suggest or prove that he had taken all reasonable steps to prevent the owner from breaching Rule 7 of the Mines Creche Rules. Consequently, the Court was compelled to deem the manager guilty of the contravention, despite the fact that the wording of the rule itself does not expressly impose a duty upon him. To support his argument that the statutes do not place any duty on a mine manager to enforce the Creche Rules, the counsel for the appellant cited a decision of the Nagpur High Court in State Government, M.P. v. Deodatta Diddi. That earlier case examined whether an agent named Deodatta Diddi, who managed the Rawanwara Khas Colliery, could be held liable for violating rule 3(1) of the Coal Mines Pithead Bath Rules, 1946, when the required pithead baths had not been constructed. Rule 3(1) obliges the owner of every coal mine to build pithead baths according to plans that conform to the rules and that have been approved by the competent authority. The Nagpur High Court held that only the owner could be considered to have contravened the rule and that the agent, even if he acted as the owner’s representative for the management of the colliery, bore no statutory duty in that regard. The Court further observed that the judges in that decision had not been made aware of section 18 of the Indian Mines Act, and therefore the decision offered no assistance to the present matter. The issue of whether an agent or a manager may be held responsible for the construction of pithead baths or mine creches was later considered by the Calcutta High Court in G.D. Bhattar v. State. In that proceeding both judges examined section 18 of the Mines Act, 1952, yet they reached opposite conclusions: one judge concluded that, under section 18, the manager would be liable for ensuring compliance with the rules, whereas the other judge disagreed. The present Court finds the former view to be the correct interpretation. Accordingly, every contention raised on behalf of the appellants fails, and the appeal is dismissed. Justice Mudholkar, while concurring with the order concerning Mohan Lal Goenka, expressed the opinion that the conviction of the co‑appellant Gupta, who served as a manager of the mines, could not be sustained. It has

In this case the Court observed that the rule of law applicable to the appointment of a person in charge of a mine creche was rule 7(1) of the Mines Creche Rules, 1946, as they existed on the date of the alleged breach. That rule placed the sole responsibility for appointing the creche in‑charge on the owner of the mine. Consequently the State argued that Mr Gupta, who served as the manager of the mine, could not be held personally liable for a breach that had been committed by the owner, Mr Mohan Lal Goenka. The State, however, relied upon section 18 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952) and submitted that the provisions of that section overrode the limited liability suggested by rule 7(1). The Court reproduced the text of section 18, which declares that the owner, the agent and the manager of every mine are each responsible for ensuring that all operations connected with the mine are conducted in accordance with the Act, its regulations, rules, bye‑laws and any orders made thereunder. The section further provides that any person who contravenes any such provision is deemed to have caused the contravention, and that the owner, agent and manager are each deemed guilty of the contravention unless they can demonstrate that they took all reasonable steps, within the limits of their power, to publish and enforce the relevant provisions so as to prevent the breach. The section contains a proviso that exempts an owner or agent from this deemed guilt if he proves, first, that he habitually did not take part in the management of the mine and did not take part in the matter in question; second, that he made all necessary financial and other provisions to enable the manager to perform his duties; and third, that the offence was committed without his knowledge, consent or connivance. Moreover, the section states that it shall not be a defence for an owner or agent to say that a manager was appointed in accordance with the Act.

The State contended that, under the language of section 18, the owner, the agent and the manager are all jointly liable for any breach of any provision of the Act, of any regulation, rule or bye‑law, unless one of the exceptions in sub‑section (2) is successfully raised. The Court noted that Mr Gupta had not relied on any of those statutory exceptions. Accordingly the Court concluded that the conviction of Mr Gupta was legally sound. The Court then examined the placement of section 18 within Chapter IV of the Mines Act, a chapter that is headed “Mining operations” and “Management of mines”. While the chapter itself addresses two separate subjects, the Court observed that section 18 deals exclusively with the first subject, namely “Mining operations”, a conclusion that follows from the wording of sub‑section (1) which speaks of responsibilities for “all operations carried on in connection therewith”, i.e., the operations of the mine itself. Hence, the Court inferred that the duties and responsibilities imposed by section 18 relate only to activities directly connected with mining operations, not to matters that fall under the management of the mine such as employment of labour or provision of amenities. The Court emphasized that the term “mining operations” in a mining statute must be given its ordinary industry meaning, which refers to activities undertaken for the purpose of extracting minerals, and must not be extended to include ancillary matters such as labour employment or welfare facilities, even though those matters assist the mining activity. The Court found no justification for such an expanded interpretation and noted that no argument to that effect had been presented by counsel. Accordingly, the Court held that a mine manager cannot be held vicariously liable for an omission that falls outside the scope of mining operations as defined by the statute.

In this case the Court observed that Section 18 must be interpreted as dealing only with duties that arise in connection with mining operations. The chapter in which the section appears distinguishes between the terms “Mining operations” and “Management of mines”. Matters such as the employment of labour, the provision of amenities to workers and related issues fall principally within the domain of “management” rather than within “mining operations”. Consequently, the expression “Mining operations” used in a mine‑related statute must be given its ordinary meaning as it is understood in the mining industry. Within the industry a mining operation is commonly understood to denote an activity carried out for the purpose of extracting minerals. The Court rejected the suggestion, advanced by counsel for the appellant, that the term should be given a broader construction that would include activities such as hiring labour or providing worker amenities, even though such labour is employed in the course of extraction. No justification for such an expansive meaning was found, and none was advanced at the Bar. On the basis of this interpretation the Court concluded that a mine manager cannot be held vicariously liable for the owner’s failure to fulfil the duty prescribed in rule 7(1) of the Mines Creche Rules. The Court provided an additional reason for reaching the same result. Section 18(2) states that a manager is not liable for any contravention by the owner of the Act, a regulation, a rule or a bye‑law unless the contravention relates to a matter for which an exception under subsection 2 might apply. In other words, vicarious liability can arise only if the manager himself also omitted to perform a duty that was within his power to perform. Sub‑section 2 further relieves a manager from liability if he can demonstrate that he had taken all reasonable steps, including publishing and, to the extent of his authority, enforcing the relevant provisions, to prevent the contravention. This language indicates that a manager may escape liability by undertaking certain preventive measures. The first part of this quotation is plainly applicable to the present facts. The second part would become relevant only if the manager possessed the authority to compel the owner to perform a specific duty. The Court found that neither the Act nor the Rules confer on the manager any power to enforce the owner’s obligations under sub‑rule (1) of rule 7. Because the manager lacks such enforcement power, he cannot be held liable for the owner’s breach of that duty. The Court illustrated this construction by referring to Section 17, which requires every mine owner or agent to appoint a manager who possesses the prescribed qualifications, and to Section 57(c), which provides for the framing of regulations prescribing those qualifications.

The Court examined whether regulations have been issued prescribing the qualifications required for a mine manager and, assuming such regulations exist, considered the situation where a person is appointed manager of a mine without possessing the prescribed qualification. The Court posed the question of whether that person would be held vicariously liable for any breach of duty committed by the owner or the owner’s agent, duties that are imposed on the owner and agent both by the regulation and by section 17 of the Act. It concluded that there is no difficulty in holding that the improperly qualified manager would not be liable, because the manager does not possess the authority to enforce the owner’s compliance with the duty imposed by the regulations. On that basis, the Court allowed the appeal of Gupta and set aside the conviction that had been entered against him. Nevertheless, in accordance with the majority’s opinion, the appeal filed on behalf of both appellants was dismissed, and the appeal was consequently dismissed.