Maharana Shri Jayvantsinghji... vs The State Of Gujrat

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 22 December 1961

Coram: S.K. Das, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar

The Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 22 December 1961 in the matter of Maharana Shri Jayvantsinghji Ranmalsinghji and others versus the State of Gujrat. The case was authored by Justice S.K. Das and decided by a bench consisting of Justice S.K. Das, Chief Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice A.K. Sarkar, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and Justice J.R. Mudholkar. The petitioners, identified as Maharana Shri Jayvantsinghji Ranmalsinghji and other related parties, challenged the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958, specifically sections 3, 4 and 6, on the ground that these provisions infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 31 and 31‑A of the Constitution of India. The official citation for this judgment is reported in 1962 AIR 821 and 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 411, with additional references appearing in subsequent reports such as RF 1963 SC 864, RF 1970 SC 564, F 1971 SC1992, RF 1977 SC2121, and R 1979 SC1550. The legislation under scrutiny, the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Bombay LVII of 1958), was examined with reference to its effect on land tenure arrangements, particularly whether it created a new class of permanent tenants and whether it was within the competence of the State Legislature to enact, given the absence of protection under Article 31‑A.

The petitioners, who were former tenure‑holders, argued that sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Amendment Act, by deeming certain non‑permanent tenants to become permanent tenants from the commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, allowed those tenants to acquire occupancy rights by paying only six times the assessment or rent as prescribed in section 5A of that Act. This was in stark contrast to the requirement under section 32H of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (as amended in 1956), which demanded payment of twenty to two hundred times the assessment. The petitioners maintained that this disparity effectively deprived them of the rights they had acquired on the “tillers’ day” of 1 April 1957, when they ceased to be tenure‑holders. They further asserted that the impugned legislation was colourable, because it ostensibly re‑defined the category of permanent tenant and altered evidentiary rules, yet in substance reduced the purchase price to which they were entitled under section 32H. The petitioners contended that the State Legislature lacked authority to enact such provisions, as they were not saved by Article 31‑A. The Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justices Sinha and Das, held that there could be no doubt that section 4 of the impugned Act, when properly construed, created a new class of permanent tenants that was not contemplated by section 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and that did not exist on the “tillers’ day”. The dissenting opinion of Justices A.K. Sarkar and J.R. Mudholkar concluded that sections 3, 4 and 6, to the extent that they deemed some tenants as permanent tenants in possession of Taluqdari land, were unconstitutional and void, because the change in definition and evidentiary rule merely served to reduce the purchase price due to the petitioners under section 32H on the “tillers’ day”.

In this case, the Court observed that the statute, when properly interpreted, introduced a new class of permanent tenants that the earlier provision s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, had never envisaged and that did not exist on the “tillers’ day.” The Court explained that the combined operation of sections 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act meant that a tenure‑holder who failed to make an application under s. 6 within six months from the commencement of the Act for a declaration that a tenant under him was not a permanent tenant would have the tenant’s name recorded as a permanent tenant, provided the tenant satisfied the conditions laid down by s. 4. Once recorded, the tenant would be deemed, under s. 3, to be a permanent tenant and, under s. 4, all the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act 1949 would apply to him. The Court held that this combined effect effectively stripped the tenure‑holder of any genuine opportunity to contest the tenant’s claim and consequently deprived him of the purchase price prescribed by s. 32H of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The Court further noted that the petitioners’ entitlement to that purchase price from those tenants who were non‑permanent on 1 April 1957 constituted a property right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and that the impugned sections adversely affected that right with retrospective effect. Testing section 6 against Article 19(5), the Court said it could not be described as a reasonable restriction in the public interest, referring to Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [1958] S.C.R. 1122 and Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489. The Court also held that Article 31A of the Constitution was inapplicable because the relationship between the tenure‑holders and the tenants had changed from landlord‑tenant to creditor‑debtor on 1 April 1957, and the impugned Act, which affected such rights, fell outside the protection of that article. In view of the true scope and effect of sections 3, 4 and 6, the Court concluded that the Act could not be placed within any entry of List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule and was therefore a piece of colourable legislation, citing K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] S.C.R. 1.

Further, per the dissenting opinion of Justices Sarkar and Mudholkar, the Court explained that section 4 of the impugned Act did not broaden the definition of a permanent tenant, nor did it divest the landlord of any property vested in him on the “tillers’ day,” nor did it confer any new property on the tenant. Instead, the provision merely applied to a permanent tenant who faced the burden of proving the nature of his tenancy, by creating a presumption of permanency in his favour. The Court clarified that if, in fact, the tenancy was not permanent and had been extinguished by law but the tenant was tentatively recorded as permanent, the landlord retained the right to rebut the presumption in a proceeding instituted under s. 6 of the Act. This observation underscored that the statute’s operation was limited to raising a presumption rather than effecting any substantive transfer of property rights.

The Court explained that a landlord who wished to rebut the presumption that a tenancy was permanent could do so by producing documents in his possession or otherwise demonstrating that the tenancy was in fact not permanent. If the landlord succeeded in this proof, the tenancy would be considered extinguished under section 32(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and the landlord could then claim compensation or the purchase money prescribed in section 32H(1)(II) of that Act. The Court noted that this right to claim compensation was not affected in any manner by the impugned Act. In the event that the landlord failed to establish that the tenancy was not permanent, the landlord would be entitled to receive the purchase price fixed under section 5A of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, a provision that had not been contested. The Court cited the decision in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691, to support this interpretation. Furthermore, the Court held that the impugned Act dealt exclusively with matters arising out of the landlord‑tenant relationship and was not intended to apply where such a relationship did not exist. Accordingly, the legislation fell within the legislative competence conferred by entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and therefore could not be described as colourable. Because the Act did not infringe Article 31(1) and was protected by Article 31A, its constitutional validity could not be attacked on the grounds of Articles 14 or 19(1)(f).

The Court further observed that the distinction drawn by the Act between tenure villages and non‑tenure villages represented a legitimate classification based on the availability of material needed to raise the inference or presumption of permanency, and that this classification bore a reasonable nexus to the purpose of the legislation. According to Justice Ayyangar, there was no foundation for the argument that section 4 of the impugned Act merely supplied a rule of evidence for identifying permanent tenants under section 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, without expanding the category of such tenants. Instead, the Act created a positive rule of law deeming any person in possession of a tenure‑land holding to be a permanent tenant upon satisfaction of three specified conditions. This intention was evident from section 6(1), which provided that every person who met the definition of a permanent tenant under section 4 would automatically be entered as a permanent tenant in the record of rights by the Mamlatdar, unless the tenure‑holder lodged a written objection on the limited grounds permitted by section 4. The Court stressed that sections 4(b) and 6(1) must be read together as an integrated whole, and that the overall object of the enactment was to define and create a new class of permanent tenants rather than merely to supply an evidentiary rule for the pre‑existing law. The judgment was rendered in the original jurisdiction of petitions numbered 120 of 1958 and others, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights, and was delivered by Justices G. S. Pathak, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, and Rameshwar.

Counsel for the petitioners, including representatives for Petitions 120, 147, 148, 149, 150 and 156 of 1958, appeared before the Court. Counsel for the respondents, among them the Solicitor‑General of India and advocates for respondents numbered 5 and 6, also appeared. The judgment was delivered on 22 December 1961. The judgment of the Chief Justice and Justice Sinha was delivered by Justice Das, while the judgment of Justices Sarkar and Mudholkar was delivered by Justice Mudholkar, and Justice Ayyangar delivered a separate judgment.

Justice S. K. Das observed that the thirteen writ petitions presented a single legal question: the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958, specifically sections 3 and 4 read with section 6. The Act was thereafter referred to as the impugned Act, 1958. The petitioners contended that under the impugned Act, some individuals who were not permanent tenants were deemed to be permanent tenants from the commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949. As a consequence, those deemed permanent tenants became entitled to acquire land on payment of six times the assessment or six times the rent, rather than the minimum of twenty times the assessment required for an “occupant” under section 5A of the 1949 Act. The petitioners argued that this alteration deprived them of rights they had acquired on tillers’ day, 1 April 1957, through sections 32 and related provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended. They claimed that this deprivation violated fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. In addition, the petitioners asserted that the impugned Act was colourable legislation; it purported to amend a rule of evidence but, in fact, stripped them of property without compensation and transferred it to others, thereby exceeding the legislative competence of the State Legislature under the two legislative lists.

Justice Das noted that to evaluate the arguments raised in all the petitions, which had been heard together, it was necessary to examine the effect and interaction of several statutory provisions. The analysis would have to consider the Bombay Land Revenue Code of 1879, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 as amended, the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, and the impugned Act, 1958. The Court indicated that a detailed reading of the relevant provisions of these Acts would follow, after first stating the factual background common to the petitions.

Four principal statutes formed the framework of the dispute. The first was the Bombay Land Revenue Code of 1879, known as the Revenue Code. The second was the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 1948, which had been amended from time to time and was referred to as the Tenancy Act, 1948. The third was the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1979. The fourth was the legislation that was being challenged, the Act of 1958. The Court indicated that it would later examine the relevant provisions of each of these statutes, but first it found it necessary to set out the factual background that gave rise to the petitions.

Although the factual circumstances varied slightly from petition to petition, the underlying facts were substantially similar. For brevity the Court described in detail the facts of Petition No. 120 of 1958, because the legal question presented was identical in all the petitions. All of the petitioners were former taluqdars. In the case of Petition No. 120 the petitioner had been the taluqdar of two estates, namely Sanand and Koth, situated in the Ahmedabad district of the former State of Bombay, which is now part of the State of Gujarat. The two estates together comprised twenty‑four Taluqdari villages. The petitioner held absolute ownership of all the land in those estates, subject only to the obligation to pay land revenue to the Government. Within those estates there were tenants, some of whom were classified as permanent tenants and others as non‑permanent tenants.

In 1949 the Bombay Provincial Legislature enacted the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, which became effective on 15 August 1950. The effect of that Act was to abolish the Taluqdari tenancy system. Certain property such as wells, tanks, waste lands and uncultivated lands were taken over by the State, and the former taluqdar was re‑characterised as an “occupant” in accordance with the definition contained in the Revenue Code. As an occupant the former taluqdar was required to pay land revenue under the provisions of the Revenue Code.

The Revenue Code, in Section 3(16), defined an “occupant” as a holder in actual possession of unalienated land who was not a tenant; however, where the holder in actual possession was a tenant, the landlord or the superior landlord, as the case might be, would be deemed to be the occupant. In 1955 the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 was amended by the insertion of Section 5A. That amendment granted a permanent tenant who was in possession of Taluqdari land the right to become an occupant if the tenant paid six times the assessed amount for acquiring the right of occupancy. In practical terms, once a permanent tenant paid the amount prescribed in Section 5A, the tenant stepped into the position of the former taluqdar, entered into a direct relationship with the State for the payment of land revenue, and acquired all the rights and obligations of an occupant under the Revenue Code. Initially the right created by Section 5A was to be available for a limited period, but the provision was subsequently extended until the year 1962, as recorded in the bar memorandum. The Court noted the necessity of explaining the meaning of “permanent tenant” before proceeding further.

In order to determine the meaning of the expression “permanent tenant,” the Court observed that Section 16 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 incorporated the provisions of the Revenue Code and sought to bring the two statutes into harmony. Consequently, the proper reference for understanding a permanent tenant is Section 83 of the Revenue Code. That provision states that where the antiquity of a tenancy prevents the presentation of satisfactory evidence of its commencement, and where no reliable evidence exists concerning the intended duration of the tenancy—whether by agreement between landlord and tenant, by the title claimed by either party, or by local custom—the tenure of the tenant, as against his immediate landlord, shall be presumed to be co‑extensive with the landlord’s own tenure and with that of any superior title‑holder. The provision further provides that where evidence is lacking regarding the capacity in which a person holds land, it shall be presumed that the person is in possession as a tenant. The Court noted that the term “permanent tenant” does not actually appear in the wording of Section 83. Instead, the section creates a presumption that the tenant’s tenancy lasts as long as the landlord’s tenure in two specific situations: (1) when the tenancy is so ancient that its beginning cannot be satisfactorily proved, and (2) when there is no satisfactory proof of any agreed period of tenancy or any local usage indicating its duration.

The Court then turned to a later statutory development introduced by the Bombay Act XIII of 1956, which inserted a definition of “permanent tenant” into Section 2(10‑A) of the Tenancy Act, 1948. The definition was articulated as follows: a “permanent tenant” means a person who, immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955—referred to as the Amending Act—either (a) holds land as a mulgenidar or mirasdar, or (b) holds the land on a permanent lease by custom, agreement, or by virtue of a court decree or order; and additionally, a person whose tenancy’s commencement or duration cannot be satisfactorily proved because of its antiquity. The definition also expressly includes a tenant whose name, or the name of his predecessor‑in‑title, was entered in any record of rights, public record, or other revenue record as a permanent tenant immediately before the Amending Act took effect. The Court further mentioned Section 87A of the Tenancy Act, which was also inserted by the same Bombay Act, noting its relevance to the broader statutory scheme.

In the Bombay Act of 1956, section 47 provided that nothing in that Act would modify the provisions of any Land Tenures Abolition Act listed in Schedule III of the same Act, to the extent that those provisions dealt with the conferment of a right of an occupant in favour of any inferior holder or tenant with respect to land held by the occupant. Schedule III to the Tenancy Act of 1948 contained a list of the Land Tenures Abolition Acts, and among those statutes was the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949. Consequently, the operation of section 87A of the Tenancy Act was that the Tenancy Act of 1948 could not affect the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949 insofar as section 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act granted a permanent tenant occupying any taluqdari land the right to acquire that land on payment of the sums specified in that section. The submissions before the Court were premised on the proposition that, prior to the commencement of the impugned Act of 1958, the status of a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari land was to be determined by the criteria laid down in section 83 of the Revenue Code, that is, by the two circumstances enumerated in that provision. The Court then examined the position of tenants who were not classified as permanent. No entitlement was conferred upon such tenants by section 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, a provision that had been inserted into that Act in 1955 by Bombay Act I of 1955. The rights of those non‑permanent tenants remained governed by the Tenancy Act of 1948, which itself underwent substantial amendment in 1956 through Bombay Act XIII of 1956. The amendments of relevance were contained in section 32 and a series of succeeding sections. The effect of those sections had earlier been considered by this Court in the case of Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay. After reciting the provisions of sections 32 to 32R, the Court explained that the landlord’s title to the land passed immediately to the tenant on the “tillers’ day,” thereby effecting a completed purchase or sale between the landlord and the tenant. The tenant was afforded a period of grace, known as locus penitentiae, during which he could declare whether he was prepared to purchase the land he occupied as a tenant. If the tenant failed to appear before the Tribunal or expressly stated that he was not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal was required to issue a written order declaring the tenant’s unwillingness and declaring the purchase ineffective. Such a declaration by the Tribunal was the only mechanism by which the purchase could be rendered ineffective. In the absence of any such declaration, the purchase remained legally effective from the tillers’ day and continued to operate, with the tenant’s sole obligation being to pay the price in the manner prescribed by the Tribunal. The Court further noted that if the tenant subsequently defaulted in paying the price, either in a lump sum or in instalments as directed by the Tribunal, section 32M would declare the purchase ineffective, and the land would then become subject to disposal by the Collector in accordance with the provisions governing such a situation.

In this case, the Court explained that when a tenant fails to pay the price that the Tribunal has fixed—whether in a single lump sum or in instalments—section 32M declares the purchase to be ineffective. In such a circumstance, the land becomes the property of the Collector, who must dispose of it according to the procedure laid down in that section. The Court further observed that the purchase remains effective from the tillers’ day up to the moment the tenant commits such a default, and that there is no notion of a conditional sale between the landlord and the tenant. The title, which originally belonged to the landlord, passes to the tenant on the tillers’ day or on any alternative period that the law specifies for that purpose. This title, however, is defeasible; it can be lost only if the tenant either fails to appear before the Tribunal, states that he does not wish to purchase the land, or defaults in paying the price as determined by the Tribunal. Consequently, the tenant acquires a vested interest in the land that can be taken away only in those specific situations, and it cannot be said that the landlord’s title is suspended for any definite or indefinite period. The Court noted that the tillers’ day referred to in the earlier discussion was the first day of April 1957. The petitioners argued that, according to the Court’s earlier decision, the title to the lands held by tenants who were entitled to the benefits of sections 32 to 32R passed immediately to those tenants on the tillers’ day, and that a complete purchase or sale had therefore taken place between the petitioners and the tenants. They further contended that permanent tenants occupying taluqdari lands were governed by section 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, and that nothing in the Tenancy Act, 1948, altered the rights granted under that section. By contrast, non‑permanent tenants of taluqdari lands became purchasers of their holdings on the tillers’ day, subject to the obligation to pay the purchase price prescribed in section 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948. Section 32H provides that, for non‑permanent tenants, the purchase price is the aggregate of several components: first, an amount determined by the Tribunal that is not less than twenty times and not more than two hundred times the land’s assessment; second, the value of any structures, wells, embankments, permanent fixtures, and trees that the landlord had constructed or planted on the land; third, any arrears of rent lawfully due on the tillers’ day or on its postponed date; and fourth, any amounts that the landlord had paid or that were recovered from the landlord as land revenue and other cesses, as specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub‑section (1) of section 10A.

In the provisions under sub‑section (1) of section 10A, the tenant is required to pay the amounts specified in clauses (c) and (d); failure to do so triggers the consequences outlined in those clauses. The statute includes two explanatory notes, labeled Explanation 1 and Explanation 2, though their text is omitted here. Paragraph (1A) addresses a situation where a tenant, who is not covered by subsections (1) and (2) of section 10A, has made payments of land revenue and other cesses after the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 came into force. If the landlord failed to pay those dues, the tenant may have paid them on his own behalf. The law provides that a sum equal to the total amount the tenant paid up to the date when the purchase price is determined shall be deducted from the aggregate amount that would otherwise be determined under sub‑section (1).

Paragraph (1B) deals with the calculation of interest and adjustments to the amount arrived at under sub‑sections (1) and (1A). Sub‑paragraph (a) directs that interest at the rate of four and a half per cent per annum be computed on that amount for the period beginning on the date on which the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land under section 32 and ending on the date when the purchase price is finally determined. Sub‑paragraph (b) stipulates two further adjustments: first, the interest calculated under sub‑paragraph (a) shall be added to the amount; second, any rent that the tenant may have paid to the landlord, together with the value of any products of trees planted by the landlord and subsequently removed by the landlord during the same period, shall be deducted from the resulting figure.

The statute also empowers the State Government, as set out in sub‑paragraph (2), to issue either a general or a special order fixing different minimum and maximum limits for the purpose of sub‑clause (a) of clause (ii) of sub‑section (1). This power may be exercised with respect to any category of land held by tenants in any backward area. In fixing such minima and maxima, the Government must consider the rent payable for the land and the various factors enumerated in sub‑section (3) of section 63A.

A comparison of the purchase‑price formulae revealed a noticeable disparity. Section 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, fixes the purchase price for the right of occupancy at roughly six times the assessment fixed for the land. By contrast, section 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948, sets a minimum purchase price at twenty times the assessment and a maximum at two hundred times the assessment, although these limits may be reduced for lands held by tenants in backward areas. The petitioners’ principal grievance stems from the treatment of non‑permanent tenants. On 1 April 1957, the title to their lands passed to the tenants, and the petitioners ceased to be landlords, becoming entitled only to the purchase price prescribed in section 32H. The impugned Act of 1958, however, by a single legislative step, re‑characterised almost all non‑permanent tenants as permanent tenants, thereby

The petitioners complained that the impugned Act of 1958 deprived them of the higher purchase price that they were entitled to receive under section 32H and the following sections of the Tenancy Act, 1948. In petition No 120 of 1958 the petitioners asserted that, as a result of the provisions of the impugned Act, they would suffer a loss of approximately Rs 14 lacs. The Court then examined several provisions of the impugned Act of 1958. The short title of the statute is “An Act further to define permanent tenants, inferior holders and permanent holders for the purposes of certain Land Tenure Abolition laws and to provide for certain other matters.” The respondents argued that the Act merely alters a rule of evidence; however, the Court noted that even the long title declares that the legislation is intended to define permanent tenants, which shows that it does more than merely change evidentiary rules. Section 2 of the Act is the interpretation section. It specifies that the expression “Land Tenure Abolition law” refers, with respect to a permanent tenant, to the Acts listed in Part I of the Schedule. The Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 appears in that Schedule. The Act further defines “tenure‑holder” to include, among other persons, a taluqdar, and defines “tenure‑land” to include, inter alia, taluqdar land. Sections 3 and 4 are especially important for the matters before the Court and must be read in full. Section 3 provides that a person shall, within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed to be an inferior holder, a permanent holder or, as the case may be, a permanent tenant on the date of abolition of the relevant land tenure if his name is recorded in the record of rights or any other public or revenue record as an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant with respect to any tenure‑land. This deeming occurs if the name appears (a) on the date of abolition, or (b) pursuant to orders issued during any proceedings under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the case may be, the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879—whether such orders were made (i) before the commencement of this Act, or (ii) after the commencement of this Act where inquiries were already pending at that time, or (c) pursuant to an order of the Mamlatdar concerning an entry under section 6 of this Act. Section 4 states that, for the purposes of the relevant Act specified in Part I of the Schedule, a person who (a) on the date of commencement of that Act was holding any tenure‑land and (b) whose predecessors in title, if any, had, immediately before that date, for an uninterrupted period of twelve years or more, held the same tenure‑land—or any other tenure‑land—as a tenant or inferior holder under the then‑existing tenure‑holder, and who paid an amount exceeding the assessment of the land, shall be deemed a permanent tenant unless the tenure‑holder can prove that the person would not have been a permanent tenant.

The Court explained that a person who, under clause (b), continues to possess the land as a permanent tenant shall be treated as a permanent tenant under clause (a), and consequently every provision of the Act that applies to a permanent tenant shall also apply to him. The Court further clarified that the assessment required for this section must be calculated in accordance with the method set out in clauses (a) and (b) of section 5. Regarding the recording of rights, the Court stated that the rights of an inferior holder, a permanent holder, or a permanent tenant, as prescribed in sections 4 and 5, shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure‑holder files a written application to the Mamlatdar within six months from the commencement date of this Act. Such an application must seek a declaration that any holder or any tenant under that holder does not qualify as an inferior holder, a permanent holder, or, as the circumstance may require, a permanent tenant. The Court indicated that any application of this nature shall be dealt with in the same manner as an application concerning a disputed case under section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. The Court then turned to the constitutional challenge raised by the petitioners against the provisions mentioned above. The petitioners contended, first, that the Bombay State Legislature lacked the authority to enact the impugned Act because it was, in effect, colourable legislation: although it was presented as a definition of a permanent tenant or as a modification of a rule of evidence, it in reality confiscated a substantial portion of the purchase price that the petitioners were entitled to receive under section 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948 from certain tenants. Secondly, the petitioners argued that the impugned Act violated constitutional rights guaranteed to them under Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31. Thirdly, they maintained that Article 31A did not provide any protection to the Act. On the opposite side, the respondents maintained that the impugned Act of 1958 merely altered the evidentiary rule used to determine who qualified as a permanent tenant in possession of taluqdari lands and did not go beyond that purpose, and therefore did not offend any of the grounds raised by the petitioners. The Court observed that if the Act indeed only changes the evidentiary rule for identifying permanent tenants, the petitioners’ alleged infringements of the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 would not arise. Conversely, if the Act is found to be more than a change of evidentiary rule and instead operates as a device that deprives the petitioners of their property without providing compensation, then it would constitute colourable legislation beyond the competence of the State Legislature. In that event, the legislation would fall under the category of colourable legislation whose subject matter is not enumerated in any entry of List II or List III of the Constitution. Thus, the essential question for the Court was to determine the true scope and effect of the provisions of the impugned Act of 1958.

The Court first observed that the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949 and the Tenancy Act of 1948, as amended by the Bombay Act XIII of 1956, had not been challenged before it. Earlier decisions in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. State of Bombay and Sri Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay had upheld those provisions as constitutionally valid. The present challenge concerned only the provisions of the impugned Act of 1958, specifically sections three, four and six, whose scope and effect required determination.

Section three declared that a person would be deemed a permanent tenant on the date of abolition of the relevant land tenure if his name appeared in the record of rights or any other public or revenue record as a permanent tenant under any of three circumstances. The first circumstance required the name to be recorded on the date of abolition; the second circumstance covered entries made pursuant to orders issued in any proceeding under the land‑tenure abolition law or the Revenue Code, whether such orders were issued before or after the commencement of the 1958 Act; the third circumstance involved an order issued by the Mamlatdar under section six of the 1958 Act. The Court emphasized that section three did not create a mere presumption as provided in section 135J of the Revenue Code, which holds that an entry in the record of rights is presumed true until disproved. Instead, section three operated by a legal fiction: if any one of the three stated circumstances existed, the person satisfying that circumstance was to be deemed a permanent tenant.

Section four dealt with the status of tenants who, on the commencement date of the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949, were holding any tenure land and whose predecessors in title, if any, had held the same or another tenure land for continuous periods that, when aggregated, amounted to twelve years or more. Subject to a rebuttal by the tenant that he would not qualify as a permanent tenant based on continued possession, such a tenant was to be deemed a permanent tenant, and all provisions of the 1949 Act would apply to him as they did to any permanent tenant. The provision also mentioned a third condition that the amount paid by the tenant must exceed the land’s assessment; the Court noted that this condition was not material to the present discussion and required no further reference. While clause (a) of section four was straightforward, clause (b) presented an interpretative difficulty. The Court observed that the phrase “continuous periods as aggregate to a total continuous period of twelve years or more” was neither elegant nor clear, and suggested that it might mean that several individual continuous periods, each possibly less than twelve years, could be added together to meet the twelve‑year requirement.

The provision states that if the tenure‑holder fails to prove that the person would not have become a permanent tenant by reason of continued possession of the land under clause (b), the person shall be deemed a permanent tenant under clause (a), and every provision of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 shall apply to him in the same manner as to any other permanent tenant. Section 4 also mentions a third condition, namely that the rent paid by the tenant must be higher than the assessed value of the land. The Court observed that this condition does not affect the present discussion and therefore it required no further reference. While clause (a) of section 4 is clear, clause (b) is not. The phrase “continuous periods as aggregate to a total continuous period of twelve years or more” is described as neither elegant nor clear. The Court interpreted the phrase to mean that a single continuous period may be shorter than twelve years, but several such periods may be combined, and the total of those periods must add up to at least twelve years. If a single continuous period already exceeds twelve years, the issue of aggregation does not arise. The question of aggregation becomes relevant only when there are multiple continuous periods, each lasting less than twelve years. Those periods of possession may relate to the same tenure‑land or to different tenure‑lands. When the combined duration of possession of either the same tenure‑land or any other tenure‑land reaches twelve years or more, clause (b) is satisfied.

The Court further concluded that the conditions in clauses (a) and (b) operate cumulatively. Consequently, for section 4 to apply, a tenant must have been in possession of a tenure‑land on the commencement date of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 (15 August 1950) and must also have possessed the same tenure‑land or any other tenure‑land for continuous periods that together amount to at least twelve years immediately before that date. A person who satisfies both requirements shall be deemed a permanent tenant unless the tenure‑holder can prove that the person would not have become a permanent tenant on the basis of the possession described in clause (b). The expression “unless it is proved by the tenure‑holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b)” raised another difficulty. Two interpretations were advanced before the Court. The first view holds that the wording permits the tenure‑holder merely to challenge the assertion of twelve years’ possession, to show that the tenant was not in possession of the land or lands concerned, or that the continuous periods of possession did not sum to twelve years.

In this matter, the Court identified two alternative interpretations of the phrase “unless it is proved by the tenure‑holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b).” The first interpretation limits the tenure‑holder’s burden to contesting the factual claim that the tenant possessed the land for a continuous aggregate period of twelve years. Under that view, the tenure‑holder may only show that the tenant was not in possession for the required twelve‑year period or that the periods of possession do not add up to twelve years. The second interpretation permits the tenure‑holder to demonstrate that the tenancy began on a specific date or that there is satisfactory evidence regarding the duration of the tenancy, and therefore, under section 83 of the Revenue Code, the tenant would not acquire permanent status merely by virtue of twelve years’ possession. Section 4 of the impugned Act of 1958 is expressed in an obscure manner, and a literal reading appears to favour the first interpretation. If that interpretation were adopted, section 4 would go beyond merely establishing an evidentiary rule; it would effectively create a new category of permanent tenants that section 83 does not contemplate. Section 83 itself determines a tenant’s status based on two circumstances: the commencement of the tenancy and the intended duration. Under section 83, the burden of proving either an unknown commencement date or the absence of an agreed duration, or that no local usage governs the tenancy, lies on the person asserting permanent status. Section 4 of the challenged Act bypasses these two circumstances and introduces a different criterion altogether, namely, whether the tenant has continuously possessed the land for an aggregate period of twelve years.

According to the Court’s analysis, section 4 declares that any person who was in possession of any tenure‑land on 15 August 1950—the date on which the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, commenced—and who subsequently remained in possession of the same tenure‑land or any other tenure‑land for a continuous aggregate period of twelve years, shall be deemed a permanent tenant unless the tenure‑holder proves that the tenant was not in possession for such a period as required by clause (b). This provision therefore replaces the two original circumstances concerning commencement and duration with a single consideration of twelve‑year continuous possession. If the tenant satisfies this possession requirement, he becomes a permanent tenant; if he does not, he remains a non‑permanent tenant. Consequently, section 4 of the impugned Act of 1958 fundamentally alters the definition of a permanent tenant and creates a new class of permanent tenants who were not regarded as permanent on 1 April 1957. The Court noted that, should this construction be accepted, section 4, even though it affords the tenure‑holder an opportunity to rebut the twelve‑year possession claim under section 6, nevertheless changes the definition of permanent tenancy and thereby extinguishes a substantial portion of the purchase price that the petitioners were entitled to receive on 1 April 1957 from certain tenants.

The Court observed that it was not contested that, if section 4 were interpreted in the first manner, the impugned legislation would be unconstitutional because it would place within the class of permanent tenants persons who had not been permanent tenants under the earlier law, thereby depriving the tenure‑holder of a portion of the purchase money that he was entitled to receive from those tenants. It was further contended that the alternative interpretation of the phrase “unless it is proved by the tenure‑holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b)” was preferable. The argument for this view was that clause (b) constituted one of the conditions a tenant must satisfy before obtaining the benefit of section 4, and it would make little sense to allow the tenure‑holder to disprove a condition that the tenant himself must fulfil in order to claim the benefit. The Court found this reasoning difficult to accept. On a pure construction of the words of section 4, the Court saw no difficulty in permitting the tenure‑holder to prove that the tenant had not been in possession for continuous periods adding up to twelve years. However, the Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the second interpretation of section 4 might be preferable to the first. Under that assumption, a tenant who satisfied both conditions listed in clauses (a) and (b) would be deemed a permanent tenant unless the tenure‑holder could establish the commencement and/or duration of the tenancy. From this perspective, it could be argued that section 4 merely altered the evidential rule, shifting the onus onto the tenure‑holder to demonstrate that, despite the twelve‑year continuous possession required by clause (b), the tenant was not a permanent tenant because the tenancy’s commencement or intended duration was known.

Section 6 provides that the rights of a permanent tenant identified under section 4 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure‑holder files, in writing, an application to the Mamlatdar within six months from the date the impugned Act, 1858, took effect, seeking a declaration that the tenant under him is not a permanent tenant. The Court noted that any such application would be disposed of as if it were an application in a disputed case under section 135D of the Revenue Code. The effect of section 6 was conceded by counsel for the State and also by counsel for the respondents who were tenants: the tenure‑holder has only a single opportunity to assert that a tenant is not a permanent tenant, and this opportunity must be exercised within six months of 10 June 1958, the date on which the impugned Act, 1858, came into force. Consequently, the combined operation of sections 3, 4 and 6 appears to the Court to mean that if the tenure‑holder fails to file an application within the prescribed six‑month period, every tenant who satisfies the conditions in clauses (a) and (b) of section 4 is automatically entered as a permanent tenant in the record of rights. Once entered, the tenant is deemed, by operation of section 3, to be a permanent tenant by a legal fiction, and all provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, then apply to him as they do to a permanent tenant. This combined effect, in the Court’s view, deprives the tenure‑holder of any genuine opportunity to contest the tenants’ claims and effectively converts the tenants into permanent tenants, thereby denying the tenure‑holder the purchase price he would have been entitled to receive under section 32H of the Tenancy Act.

In the present case the Court observed that if the tenure‑holder failed to file an application within six months from 10 June 1958 requesting a declaration that a tenant under him was not a permanent tenant, then every tenant who satisfied the conditions laid down in clauses (a) and (b) of section 4 would automatically be entered in the Record of Rights as a permanent tenant. The moment such an entry was made, the tenant would be deemed, by operation of section 3, to be a permanent tenant through a legal fiction. Consequently, under section 4, all the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, would apply to that tenant in the same manner as they applied to an existing permanent tenant. The Court held that the combined operation of sections 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, effectively removed any genuine opportunity for the tenure‑holder to contest the claims of his tenants. Once recorded, the tenants became permanent tenants, which in turn denied the tenure‑holder the purchase price he was entitled to obtain from them under section 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948.

The Court noted that counsel for the respondents had asserted at the Bar that the petitioners had filed applications for a declaration under section 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, and that those applications remained pending. The Court found no documentary evidence to support this allegation. No affidavit was presented on behalf of the respondents to confirm the existence of such applications, and the Court was unable to determine whether the alleged applications concerned all of the petitioners’ non‑permanent tenants. The only factual material before the Court was that, in a stay application filed by the petitioner in Petition No. 120 of 1958, it was averred that the petitioner had instituted several declaratory suits before the Mamlatdar under section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act, 1948, seeking a declaration that the tenants in question were not permanent tenants. Those suits, however, were instituted before the impugned Act, 1958, came into force.

The petitioner’s stay application was based on two grounds. First, the petitioner contended that after the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, the suits would become futile. Second, the petitioner argued that the Mamlatdar would lack jurisdiction to consider the constitutional validity of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958, and that, in view of those provisions, the Mamlatdar would be compelled to hold the tenants to be permanent tenants. The Court did not pass any order on the stay application. Nevertheless, the petitioner appears to have approached the Mamlatdar requesting a stay of the hearing of the suits pending the disposal of the writ petition before this Court, and the Mamlatdar granted that stay.

In a subsequent petition filed on behalf of the petitioner, it was stated that after the impugned Act, 1958, became operative, the petitioner received a notice to show cause why the non‑permanent tenants under him should not be declared permanent tenants and why the Record of Rights should be amended accordingly. In response, the petitioner applied to the concerned Revenue Officer for a stay of those proceedings, invoking the pending writ petition before this Court.

In response to the pending writ petition, the petitioner sought a stay of the revenue proceedings, but the revenue officer rejected that request. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court, where an order was issued indicating that any investigative work necessary for the revenue proceedings could continue, yet no final order or entry should be recorded until the writ petition was finally decided. This directive was applied to several villages, and the petitioner disclosed that he held tenancy over thousands of tenants across twenty‑four villages, comprising permanent, protected, and ordinary tenants. The petitions and the accompanying replies did not mention whether any of the tenancy holders had submitted an application for a declaration as defined in section 6 of the impugned Act of 1958. The only matter asserted in the application was that, after receiving a notice from the revenue officer, the petitioner, acting as a tenure‑holder, asked the Court to stay the proceedings. If a tenancy holder had failed to file a declaration application within the period prescribed by section 6 of the impugned Act, then it was evident that the revenue officer handling suits under section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act of 1948, or any other proceedings before him, was obligated to enforce the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act. Consequently, it was difficult to perceive how the existence of pending suits or other proceedings before the revenue officers could provide any benefit to the petitioners. The essential issue therefore reduced to whether section 6 of the impugned Act offered the petitioners a single opportunity to apply for a declaration that a tenant was not permanent, an opportunity that had to be exercised within six months of June 10, 1958. Once that six‑month period expired, a tenure‑holder could no longer contend that a tenant satisfying clauses (a) and (b) of section 4 was not a permanent tenant. The Court’s attention was drawn to sub‑sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949, which provide that if a question arises concerning the status of a permanent tenant, the State Government or an officer authorized by it must determine the matter; any aggrieved person may appeal that decision to the State Government within sixty days, and the State Government’s decision is final. No submission was made before the Court suggesting that these sub‑sections afforded the tenure‑holder a second chance to dispute the tenant’s claim, and it was clear that a tenure‑holder who had missed the deadline prescribed in section 6 could not invoke the provisions of sub‑sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 5A.

In this case the Court observed that a person who sought to rely on section 6 of the impugned Act of 1958 could not also invoke sub‑sections 3, 4 and 5 of section 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949. The Court explained that if sections 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act are upheld as valid, then any authority that is required to determine the claim of a tenant must do so in accordance with those provisions. The Court then examined whether the opportunity created by section 6 constituted a genuine chance for the tenure‑holder or whether it merely altered a rule of evidence. The Court answered this question in the negative, holding that the opportunity was not a real one. The Court further noted that on 1 April 1957 the petitioners ceased to be tenure‑holders of the lands that were occupied by non‑permanent tenants. It pointed out that sections 32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act of 1948 clearly provided for the vesting of title in the tenants on the tiller’s day, subject only to certain specified contingencies. The Court recalled its earlier decision that those sections were intended to bring about the extinguishment, or at the very least the modification, of the landlord’s rights in the estate within the meaning of article 31A(1)(a) of the Constitution. Consequently, on 1 April 1957 the petitioners were left with only the right to receive the purchase price under section 32H. The Court held that this right to the purchase price was undeniably a right to property.

The Court then referred to the decision in Bombay Dying and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, where it had observed that when an employee performed his work, the wages earned by him became a debt due from the employer and that such a debt constituted property that could be assigned under the law. In that case the provisions of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1953, were under consideration. The Court had held that section 3(1) of that Act, to the extent that it dealt with the unpaid accumulation of wages in section 3(2)(b), was unconstitutional and void because it violated the right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and was not saved by clause 5 of the same provision. The Court stated that the same principle must be applied in the present matter. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the petitioners’ right to the purchase price under section 32H of the Tenancy Act of 1948, arising from their tenants who were non‑permanent on 1 April 1957, was a property right protected by article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Court further observed that the provisions contained in sections 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act of 1958, insofar as they stipulated that in certain circumstances a tenant shall be deemed to be a …

In this case the Court observed that the provision of the impugned Act of 1958 which deemed a tenant to be a permanent tenant from the date of the Taluqdari Abolition Act of 1949 adversely affected the petitioners’ right with retrospective effect and effectively erased a substantial portion of the purchase price to which the petitioners were entitled. The Court examined section 6 of the impugned Act against the test of reasonable restrictions in the public interest prescribed by clause (5) of Article 19 of the Constitution and concluded that the provision did not constitute a reasonable restriction. The Court found it difficult to understand why the tenure‑holder was required to make an application within six months from the commencement of the 1958 Act in order to obtain a declaration that his tenants were not permanent tenants. The petitioners dealt with three categories of tenants – permanent tenants, protected tenants and ordinary tenants – and on 1 April 1957 the petitioners ceased to be tenure‑holders with respect to all tenants except the permanent ones, thereby becoming entitled only to the purchase price prescribed in section 32H of the Tenancy Act of 1948. If on that date any tenant claimed permanent status, the tenant had to establish his claim under section 83 of the Revenue Code, and the tenure‑holder could contest the claim whenever it was made. The impugned Act altered this scheme by stipulating that unless the tenure‑holder filed an application within six months of the Act’s commencement, he could not assert that a tenant who had possessed the land continuously for a period aggregating twelve years on or before 15 August 1950 was not a permanent tenant. The Court held that the six‑month limitation imposed by section 6 of the 1958 Act was not a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(5). It was difficult to see how the tenure‑holder could know which of his non‑permanent tenants would claim permanent status when the Act came into force, and consequently the tenure‑holder would have to anticipate that all his non‑permanent tenants might make such a claim and therefore would be compelled to apply for a determination that none of them were permanent, lest he lose his right to the purchase price under section 32H. The Court plainly expressed the view that the time limit imposed by section 16 of the impugned Act, in the circumstances, was an unreasonable restriction and could not be justified under Article 19(5). Because of this conclusion, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the operation of Article 31 of the Constitution. The State, for its part, sought to rely on Article 31A, but the Court opined that Article 31A did not apply to the present matter since there was no acquisition of any estate or any rights therein, nor any extinguishment or modification of such rights, and therefore Article 31A could not save the impugned Act of 1958.

The Court observed that the impugned legislation did not involve the State acquiring any estate or any rights therein, nor did it entail the extinguishment or alteration of such rights. On the first day of April 1957, the individuals who had previously been tenure‑holders ceased to occupy that status with respect to lands that were then held by non‑permanent tenants. Consequently, the legal relationship that had existed between the former tenure‑holders and the tenants transformed from the traditional landlord‑tenant dynamic to one of creditor and debtor. Because the 1958 Act affected the petitioners in their capacity as creditors who were entitled to recover a specific monetary sum from the debtors, the Act did not create any situation in which the State would acquire an estate or any associated rights, and it likewise did not provide for the removal or modification of those rights. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Article 31A of the Constitution could not be invoked to protect the 1958 Act, and that provision offered no shield for the legislation in question. The petitioners had argued that, during the implementation of Section 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, a practical difficulty arose: former Taluqdars often could not produce old tenancy records, which impeded tenants from benefiting from the statutory protection. They asserted that this difficulty necessitated a legislative definition of “permanent tenant” designed to prevent the tenure‑holder from defeating the operation of Section 5A, and that this rationale was the reason for enacting Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the 1958 Act. The Court rejected this contention as unsatisfactory. If the legislative motive truly had been to enable tenure‑holders to contest tenants’ claims whenever a tenant asserted permanent status, then the statute should have provided a mechanism for such contestation. Instead, the Court found that the real effect of Sections 3, 4 and 6 was to markedly diminish the purchase price that the petitioners could claim under the Tenancy Act, 1948. This reduction was achieved by defining “permanent tenant” in a manner that left the tenure‑holder with virtually no opportunity to challenge the tenants’ assertions of permanence. In the Court’s view, because the Act’s provisions aimed chiefly at curtailing the purchase price payable to the former tenure‑holders on April 1, 1957, the legislation did not fall within any subject matter listed in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Court characterized the Act as “colourable legislation,” a term explained in the precedent K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, wherein the Court described such legislation as one that appears, on its face, to be within legislative competence, but in substance exceeds the legislature’s authority, the excess being disguised by a pretence. Applying that principle, the Court held that the 1958 Act, by ostensibly redefining permanent tenancy or altering evidentiary rules, in reality sought to reduce the compensation owed to the tenure‑holders, thereby rendering the statute unconstitutional.

For the reasons already explained, the Court concluded that sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Act of 1958, insofar as those provisions classify certain occupants as permanent tenants of taluqdari land, are unconstitutional and therefore void. By pretending to merely revise the definition of a permanent tenant, the provisions in fact deprive the petitioners of a substantial portion of their entitlement to receive the purchase price guaranteed under section 32H of the Tenancy Act 1948 from a number of their tenants. Consequently, the petitions were allowed and the petitioners were awarded costs. Because all of the petitions were heard together, only a single hearing fee was to be levied. Writ petition number 120 of 1958 was heard together with writ petitions numbers 147 to 158 of 1958. In each of those matters a common argument was presented on behalf of the petitioner by counsel, and the State of Gujarat was represented by the Solicitor General, while the tenants were represented by another counsel. The petitioners in all of the cases were talukdars who possessed certain villages in the portion of the former Bombay State that presently forms part of Gujarat. Their rights over the taluqdari villages in the various districts of Gujarat had previously been governed by the Ahmedabad Taluqdars Act 1862 (Bombay Act 6 of 1862), the Broach and Kaira Incumbered Estates Act 1881 (Act XXI of 1881) and the Gujarat Taluqdars Act 1888. The Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act, repealed those earlier Taluqdari statutes and, by its section 3, abolished the taluqdari tenure wherever it existed. That same section also eliminated all ancillary incidents of the tenure that were attached to any land forming part of a taluqdari estate. Section 5 of the Abolition Act then deemed all the taluqdars to be “occupants” of the lands they possessed, giving the term “occupant” the meaning employed in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which is subsequently referred to as the Code. In the same manner as occupants elsewhere in Bombay State, these former taluqdars became liable to pay land revenue to the Government, subject to clause (b) of sub‑section 2 of section 5. The Court noted, however, that the present decision does not turn on those revenue provisions. Section 16 of the Abolition Act made the provisions of the Code applicable to taluqdari villages, subject to certain modifications that the Court did not need to examine in this judgment. The validity of the Abolition Act had earlier been challenged before this Court, but that challenge was rejected in the case of Dhisubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay. Large tracts of land in the villages in question were then occupied by inferior holders, permanent tenants, protected tenants and ordinary tenants. It is not denied that Chapter VII of the Code, which deals with “superior holders and inferior holders,” governs the relationship between the tenure‑holders and the permanent tenants. In addition to the Code, the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948, hereinafter called the Tenancy Act, regulates the landlord‑tenant relationship, and up to 1 April 1957 those provisions were the exclusive source of law governing the relationship between the tenure‑holder and all tenants other than permanent tenants and inferior holders.

The judgment explained that, prior to the amendment, the relationship between a tenure‑holder and any tenants other than permanent tenants and inferior holders was governed exclusively by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. In order to address the arguments presented, it was necessary to refer to certain provisions of that Act. By means of the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition (Amendment) Act 1 of 1955, which became operative on 1 March 1955, the earlier Abolition Act was amended and a new clause, namely section 5A, was inserted. The relevant portion of section 5A read as follows: “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 5, a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari land, and also an inferior holder holding such land on payment of annual assessment only, shall be deemed to be occupants within the meaning of the Code, in respect of such land in their possession and shall be primarily liable to the State Government for the payment of land revenue due in respect of such land, and shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to all the obligations in respect of such land as occupants under the Code or any other law for time being in force: Provided that—(a) such permanent tenant shall be entitled to the rights of an occupant in respect of such land on payment to the taluqdar or the cadet as the case may be (i) of the occupancy price equivalent to four multiples of the assessment fixed for such land, and (ii) for the extinguishment or modification of any rights of the taluqdar or cadet, as the case may be, including the right of reversion in the lands, of a further sum equivalent to two multiples of such assessment; … (2) The right conferred under sub‑section (1) shall not be exercisable after a period of five years from the date on which the Bombay Taluqdari Tenures Abolition (Amendment) Act 1954 comes into force.”

The judgment noted that this provision, for the first time, granted a permanent tenant the right to acquire the status of an occupant in respect of the land he held as a permanent tenant, provided that he paid the prescribed occupancy price to the tenure‑holder within five years of the commencement of the 1955 amendment. It was accepted that the period fixed by section 5A had been extended up to the year 1962. Section 5A of the Act had never been subject to a challenge, and the argument before the Court proceeded on the basis that it was a perfectly valid piece of legislation. Although section 5A conferred upon permanent tenants in the taluqdari villages the right to become occupants, the provision did not define the term “permanent tenant.” An amendment made by Bombay Act XVIII of 1958 identified certain persons as permanent tenants, but it did not provide a definition of the category. The judgment observed that this absence of a definition did not create any difficulty, because in Bombay the term had been understood to refer to the tenant described in paragraph 2 of section 83 of the Code, a view that was reflected in the petitions themselves, which expressly stated that section 83 of the Code defined a permanent tenant.

In this matter the term “permanent tenant” was interpreted to refer to the tenant described in paragraph 2 of section 83 of the Code. The petitions submitted in the proceedings expressly stated that section 83 of the Code provides a definition of a permanent tenant. The language of the second paragraph of that provision reads as follows: “And where by reason of the antiquity of a tenancy no satisfactory evidence of its commencement is forthcoming, and there is not any such evidence of the period of its intended duration, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and tenant, or those under whom they respectively claim title or any usage of the locality as to duration of such tenancy, it shall, as against the immediate landlord of the tenant, be presumed to be co‑extensive with the duration of the tenure of such landlord and of those who derive title under him.” Consequently, under this section a permanent tenant is deemed to be a tenant whose tenancy runs for the same length as that of his immediate landlord, and the law presumes a tenant to be permanent where, because of the great antiquity of the tenancy, the beginning of the tenancy cannot be proved and there is no satisfactory evidence of any agreed period of tenancy or of any local custom establishing such a period.

The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1956 (Act 13 of 1956) amended section 2 of the Tenancy Act and introduced a definition of the expression in the new subsection 10A, although that definition is not reproduced here because no argument was advanced relying upon it and none could be made. The 1956 Act effected extensive and far‑reaching amendments to the Bombay Tenancy Act, recasting several sections, including section 32. New provisions numbered sections 32A to 32R were inserted in the second part of Chapter 3 of that Act and deal with the purchase of land by tenants; these provisions will be referenced subsequently. By operation of section 32, subsection 1, the date 1 April 1957 was declared the “tillers’ day”, on which every tenant, including a permanent tenant, was deemed—subject to the other provisions of that section and the succeeding sections—to have purchased the tenancy land in his possession from the landlord, free of all encumbrances then existing on the land. Section 87A, also inserted into the Tenancy Act by the Amending Act of 1956, expressly provided that nothing contained in the Tenancy Act was to affect the provisions of any of the Land Tenancy Abolition Acts listed in Schedule II (which includes the Abolition Act under consideration) insofar as those provisions relate to the confinement of the right of an occupant upon a permanent tenant with respect to land held by him. As a result, the provisions of section 32‑H of the Tenancy Act, which prescribe the purchase price payable by permanent tenants, do not apply to such a permanent tenant. Accordingly, the permanent tenant is entitled only to the right conferred upon him by section 5‑A of the Abolition Act, and the net effect of this statutory scheme is that

According to the Court’s observation, a person who falls within the category described would not be required to discharge the purchase price immediately under section 32‑H of the Tenancy Act. Instead, he could elect, within the time frame prescribed by section 5‑A – a period that may be extended from time to time – whether to acquire the right of an occupant or to decline it. Historically, the records that documented tenancies in taluqdar villages were kept by the tenure‑holders themselves, and those registers served as the source for determining the exact nature of each tenant’s holding. When the authorities attempted to give effect to the provisions of section 5‑A of the Abolition Act, they discovered that many taluqdars either refused, failed, or were simply unable to produce these older tenancy records. This lack of documentary evidence made it practically impossible for tenants to enjoy the benefits that section 5‑A intended to provide. In response to this difficulty, the legislature enacted Bombay Act No. 57 of 1958, known as the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958. The long title of that legislation reads: “An Act further to define permanent tenants, inferior holders and permanent holders for the purposes of certain Land Tenure Abolition laws and to provide for certain other matters.” Section 4 of the Amendment Act specifies the persons who are to be deemed permanent tenants for the purposes of the Land Tenure Abolition laws listed in Part II of the Schedule to the Act. The validity of this Amendment Act, hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, and in particular the constitution of section 4, is presently before the Court for determination. The Court notes that it will set out the wording of section 4 and other relevant provisions of the Act in order to illuminate the arguments that have been presented.

The learned counsel, Mr Pathak, submits that section 4 of the Amendment Act effectively widens the definition of permanent tenant by including persons who, before the amendment, were merely ordinary tenants. He contends that, for an ordinary tenant, the “tillers’ day” – that is, the first day of April 1957 – converted the tenant into an occupant of the land, or at the very least caused the landlord or tenure‑holder to lose his interest in the land. Consequently, the landlord would thereafter become entitled to receive a purchase price from the tenant, the amount of which would be determined by the combined operation of sections 32(1) and 32‑H(1)(i) of the Tenancy Act. Section 32(1), as relevant, provides: “On the first day of April, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the tillers’ day’), every tenant shall, subject to the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if (a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates the land leased personally; (b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of this tenancy under section 31, or (ii) notice has been given …”. The Court therefore notes the precise language of section 32(1) and the manner in which Mr Pathak relies upon it to argue that ordinary tenants, by virtue of the amendment, acquire rights and obligations akin to those of permanent tenants.

Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, as it applies to the “tillers’ day” of 1 April 1957, provides that every tenant who, on that day, satisfies certain conditions shall be deemed to have purchased the land he holds as a tenant. The tenant must either be a permanent tenant who cultivates the land personally, a non‑permanent tenant who cultivates the land personally, or a tenant for whom the landlord has not issued a notice of termination under section 31, or where such notice has been issued, the landlord must not have applied to the Mamlatdar for possession under section 29 on or before 31 March 1957. The provision further states that the landlord must not have terminated the tenancy on any ground specified in section 15, or, if the tenancy was terminated, the landlord must not have applied to the Mamlatdar for possession under section 29 by the same deadline. Section 32‑H, subject to the additions and deductions in sub‑sections 1A and 1B, prescribes the manner in which the purchase price is to be calculated. For a permanent tenant who cultivates the land personally, the purchase price is the aggregate of certain specified amounts. For other tenants, the purchase price is the aggregate of amounts that include, at a minimum, a sum determined by the Tribunal that shall not be less than twenty times the assessment and not more than two hundred times the assessment.

The petitioner, in his writ petition numbered 120 of 1958, stated that his total landholdings across his villages amount to 62,588 acres, of which only 703 acres are cultivated by him personally; the remainder is cultivated by tenants who are classified as non‑permanent tenants. He argued that, by the operation of section 4 of the impugned Act, many of those tenants would be re‑characterised as permanent tenants. Consequently, the petitioner would be compelled to accept a purchase price calculated at only six times the assessment instead of the range of twenty to two hundred times the assessment that the Tribunal could determine for ordinary tenants. He estimated that this re‑characterisation would cause him a loss exceeding Rs 14,00,000. The State denied that the petitioner would suffer any such loss. Counsel for the petitioner, identified as Mr. Pathak in the original submission, contended that the right to claim compensation under section 32H(1)(ii) for ordinary tenants, a right that had vested in the petitioner, could not be withdrawn by the Bombay legislature through an expanded definition of “permanent tenant” that would encompass those who were ordinary tenants on the “tillers’ day”. He presented several grounds of attack on the legislation: first, that the Bombay legislature lacked the competence to enact the impugned Act because its subject matter did not fall within any entry in List II of the Constitution; second, that the Act was colourable legislation designed to confiscate money that had vested in the landlord as a purchaser on 1 April 1957, a power beyond the State legislature’s authority; third, that because the Act was beyond the legislative competence of the Bombay legislature, its taking away of the petitioner’s money contravened article 31(1) of the Constitution; fourth, that the acquisition of money was not for a public purpose, as merely transferring money from one party to another does not qualify as such; fifth, that even assuming a public purpose, the Act provided no compensation, thereby violating article 31(2); sixth, that the Act authorised the confiscation of money, infringing article 19(1)(f); and seventh, that the Act violated article 14 because it discriminated against other classes of tenure‑holders in similar situations who were not affected by the Act. All of these grounds, except the last, rest on the assumption that section 4 of the impugned Act expands the definition of permanent tenants to include ordinary tenants as of the “tillers’ day”. If that assumption is found to be incorrect, the entire argument constructed on its basis would collapse.

The Court noted that the taking of money under the impugned legislation amounted to a violation of Article 31(1) of the Constitution. It further observed that such acquisition could not be said to serve a public purpose, because merely transferring money from one party to another does not constitute a public purpose. The Court added that even if the acquisition were imagined to be for a public purpose, the Act neither provided any compensation nor contained any mechanism by which compensation could be supplied; consequently Article 31(2) was also contravened. Moreover, the Court held that the impugned Act infringed Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution since it authorised the confiscation of money. The Court also found that the Act breached Article 14 because it created a class of tenure‑holders to whom the provisions of the Act applied while leaving other similarly situated tenure‑holders outside its reach. All of these grounds of attack, except the last one concerning Article 14, were predicated on a single assumption: that Section 4 of the impugned Act expands the definition of “permanent tenant” to include persons who, on the “tillers’ day” of 1 April 1957, were merely ordinary tenants. The Court stated that if this assumption were erroneous, the entire argument constructed by counsel would collapse. To examine the validity of the assumption, the Court turned to the wording of Section 4 and, for a fuller understanding, reproduced Sections 3 and 6 of the Act. Section 3 provides that a person shall, for purposes of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed an inferior holder, a permanent holder or, as the case may be, a permanent tenant on the date of abolition of the relevant land tenure if his name appears in the record of rights or other public or revenue records as such an holder in respect of any tenure‑land. This deeming applies in three circumstances: (a) on the date of abolition; (b) pursuant to orders issued during any proceeding under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as may be, the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, either before the commencement of this Act or after its commencement where inquiries were pending at that time; and (c) pursuant to an order issued by the Mamlatdar concerning an entry under Section 6 of this Act. The Court clarified that for the purposes of this discussion, the “relevant Land Tenure Abolition law” is the Bombay Tenancy Abolition Act and that “tenure‑land” refers to taluqdari land. Section 4 states that, for the purposes of the relevant Act specified in Part I of the Schedule, a person who on the commencement date of that Act was holding any tenure‑land and whose predecessors in title, if any, had immediately before that date held the same or any other tenure‑land continuously for a total period of twelve years or more as a tenant or inferior holder under the then incumbent tenure‑holder, shall, unless it is proved by the tenure‑holder that the person would not have qualified as a permanent tenant based on continuous possession, be deemed a permanent tenant and be subject to all the provisions applicable to permanent tenants. Finally, Section 6 provides that the rights of an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant under Sections 4 and 5 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure‑holder submits in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months of the commencement of this Act a declaration that any holder or tenant under him is not an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant; such an application shall be disposed of as if it were a disputed case under Section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879.

In the provision under discussion, the court explained that when a payment exceeding the assessment of the land was made, the person making such payment would be treated as a permanent tenant under clause (a) unless the tenure‑holder could prove that the person would not have become a permanent tenant based on continued possession of the land under clause (b). Once deemed a permanent tenant under clause (a), all the provisions of the Abolition Act were to apply to that person in the same way they applied to any other permanent tenant.

Section 6 of the Act was then set out. Sub‑section (1) provided that the rights of an inferior holder, a permanent holder or a permanent tenant, as defined in sections 4 and 5, would be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure‑holder made a written application to the Mamlatdar within six months from the date of the commencement of the Act, seeking a declaration that any holder or tenant under him was not an inferior holder, not a permanent holder or, as the case might be, not a permanent tenant. Sub‑section (2) stated that any such application would be disposed of as if it were an application in respect of a disputed case under section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879.

The court then observed that, according to section 3, a person whose name appeared in the record of rights or any other public revenue record as a permanent tenant in respect of tenure land would be deemed to be a permanent tenant within the meaning of the expression used in the Abolition Act. To determine the meaning of that expression, the court referred to paragraph 2 of section 83 of the Code, noting that the provision raised a presumption of permanent tenancy but also allowed the essential feature of permanent tenancy to be deduced from that paragraph.

Addressing the argument that section 3, being a deeming provision, created a new definition of permanent tenant, the court examined who could fall within the class created by the section. It concluded that a simple reading of clauses (a) to (c) of section 3 showed that only those tenants who had been found, at least presumptively, to be permanent tenants on enquiry could be regarded as permanent tenants for the purposes of the Abolition Act, and that their status could no longer be questioned. Regarding persons covered by clauses (a) and (b), the section merely removed the tenure‑holder’s right to challenge their status in any collateral proceeding. For tenants falling under clause (c), the provision required the tenure‑holder to object to the recording of such a person as a permanent tenant before the Mamlatdar within the prescribed time; failure to do so closed the door on any later claim by the tenure‑holder that the person was not a permanent tenant.

The Court explained that a person can be treated as a permanent tenant for the purposes of the Abolition Act only when a revenue court, after conducting an enquiry, has formally identified him as such; such identification cannot be based on an arbitrary selection or on a person who could not reasonably be regarded as a permanent tenant. It further noted that the entry of a person as a permanent tenant in the register of rights may have been made either before the commencement of the Abolition Act or after that commencement, and that the proceedings that led to that entry may likewise have been instituted before the Act came into force or may have been instituted under the impugned legislation. Whenever those proceedings conclude in favour of the tenant, the tenant becomes deemed to be a permanent tenant, and the landlord is thereafter prohibited from asserting that the person is not a permanent tenant. The Court found it difficult to accept that this restriction on the landlord’s ability to dispute the status of a permanent tenant represents an expansion of the definition of permanent tenant. It observed that Section 135 J of the Code had previously given a landlord the unconditional right to challenge the correctness of an entry in the record of rights through collateral proceedings, without any time limitation, and that the impugned Act has removed that procedural right. Nonetheless, the removal of that procedural remedy does not amount to the loss of any vested right, because the time, circumstances and manner in which a particular fact may be challenged are matters of procedure, and procedural rights are not vested. Consequently, the effect of the provision is that, in proceedings under the Abolition Act seeking to confer a right of occupancy, the claimant’s status as a permanent tenant—provided he satisfies any one of the three clauses of Section 3 of the impugned Act—cannot be questioned by the tenure‑holder. The Court then asked whether the situation would have been different if the impugned Act had not been enacted and turned to consider Section 5A of the Abolition Act on its own. It imagined a scenario in which a person whose name appears in the record of rights as a permanent tenant seeks to enforce the right created by Section 5A to obtain occupancy. Such proceedings would be conducted before a revenue officer, who would be bound to act upon the entry in the record of rights until, and unless, that entry is lawfully replaced by another. The Court pointed out that no suit lies for correcting an entry in the record of rights; the only avenue for challenging the entry is a collateral proceeding that would invoke the jurisdiction of a civil court. Where no such suit or collateral proceeding is pending at the time the Section 5A proceedings are underway, the tenure‑holder cannot be allowed to disregard the entry. However, the Court emphasized that Section 5A itself provides an additional safeguard: the aggrieved party may approach the State Government or any authority empowered by it for a decision on the matter.

Clause (b) of section 3 of the impugned Act, together with clause (c), expressly provides for situations in which the status of a person is in dispute. If a decision is rendered in favour of the person who claims to be a permanent tenant, that person is to be deemed a permanent tenant for all purposes of the Abolition Act. The Court noticed that, once such a determination is made, the holder of the tenure is barred from challenging the fact even in a collateral proceeding. This restriction arises not from any new limitation but from the terms of section 5A itself, which have not been contested. The Court further observed that after the commencement of the impugned Act, no fresh proceedings may be instituted under section 5A of the Abolition Act because an alternative remedy is made available under section 6 of the impugned Act.

Turning to section 4, the Court examined its wording in detail. Section 4 states that a person who, on the date on which the Abolition Act came into force, was in possession of any tenanted land, and whose predecessors in title, if any, were immediately before that date holding the same tenanted land or any other land as a tenant for continuous periods that together add up to at least twelve years, shall be deemed a permanent tenant unless the tenure‑holder proves that he would not qualify as a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b). The Court found it difficult to see how this provision widens the definition of “permanent tenant.” While the provision does declare such a tenant to be permanent, it immediately adds a condition that the tenure‑holder may escape that deeming if he can demonstrate that he should not be considered permanent.

The Court considered the meaning of the phrase “a tenant shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant.” It observed that the legislature was clearly referring to the provisions of section 83 of the Code, which, by virtue of section 16 of the Abolition Act, apply to all former taluqdari villages. The Court reiterated that the impugned Act itself does not contain a definition of “permanent tenant.” Consequently, the meaning must be inferred from paragraph 2 of section 83 of the Code, which indicates that a person whose tenancy is co‑extensive with that of the landlord is to be treated as a permanent tenant. A tenure‑holder can overcome the presumption created by that provision by establishing the exact date on which his tenancy began, or by showing that the tenancy is terminable under specific circumstances or on a specific date.

The Court concluded that section 4 does not directly or indirectly alter the criteria that define a permanent tenant. Although paragraph 2 of section 83 of the Code sets out certain conditions for raising a presumption of permanent tenancy, and section 4 of the impugned Act modifies those conditions, the modification does not reshape the fundamental requirements that constitute a permanent tenancy as derived from the Code.

In interpreting paragraph 2 of section 83 of the Code, the Court observed that section 4 merely modifies the conditions that trigger the presumption of permanent tenancy; it does not rewrite the definition of “permanent tenant.” Counsel for the landlord, Mr Pathak, argued that the provision allows a landlord to establish only that the tenant and the tenant’s predecessors were not in continuous possession for at least twelve years on the date the Abolition Act came into force, and that if the landlord fails to meet this burden, the presumption created by the section becomes irrebuttable. According to that view, section 4 would effectively convert any occupant who has held land for more than twelve years into a permanent tenant, even when the exact commencement date of the tenancy is known or the tenancy was established for a fixed term. The Court found that reading the statute in this manner would produce an absurd result. Both parties agreed that section 4 is intended to operate only in proceedings under section 6, where a landlord is a party. Clause (b) of section 4 sets out a second prerequisite that a person must satisfy before invoking the presumption; this clause specifies a minimum “duration” of tenancy and does not address the question of when the tenancy began or the terms that governed it. Consequently, a tenant either meets the duration requirement or does not; if the requirement is not met, no further inquiry is necessary and the tenant remains an ordinary tenant. If the tenant does satisfy the duration requirement, it would be pointless to allow the landlord to challenge the very fact that has already been established and upon which the presumption rests. Such an interpretation would render the provision meaningless or, at best, useless. The Court illustrated the absurdity by rendering the hypothetical language that Mr Pathak proposes: “A person who has been in possession of tenure land at the commencement of the Abolition Act and who continued to hold that land or any other land under the same tenure holder for a continuous period of twelve years shall, unless the tenure holder proves that he was not holding the land for the continuous period of twelve years, be deemed to be a permanent tenant.” The Court concluded that this construction makes no sense and cannot be accepted. Instead, the Court held that the tenure‑holder may rely on section 4 to show that, despite twelve years of continuous possession, the tenant is not a permanent tenant for other reasons. Those other reasons must be factors that, even in the face of long possession, demonstrate that the tenancy began at a specific point in time or was limited by an agreed term or by usage.

In this case, the Court noted that the language of the statute, although perhaps not perfectly expressed, could be interpreted to mean that the tenure‑holder possessed the right to prove that a tenancy had begun at a specific point in time or had a limited duration. The Court held that such a construction was the only sensible interpretation of the legislative wording. The petitioners argued that even if section 4 were read as granting the tenure‑holder an opportunity to demonstrate a contrary fact to the presumption of permanent tenancy based on twelve years of continuous possession, that opportunity was merely illusory and effectively nonexistent, thereby extending the definition of a permanent tenant. This argument relied on section 6 of the Act, which provides the tenure‑holder with a six‑month period, starting from the commencement of the impugned Act, to submit a written application to the Mamlatdar seeking a declaration that the tenant was not a permanent tenant within the meaning of section 4. While the respondents conceded that section 6 had this effect, the Court rejected the view that section 6 rendered the opportunity to rebut the presumption illusory. The Court observed that the petitioners had not raised this point in their filings. Moreover, the Court found no reason to treat the six‑month period as if no time had been allotted; six months is not a brief interval, and it is reasonably feasible for a tenure‑holder to lodge the required application within that timeframe. Although the petitioners contended that the tenure‑holder might face a large number of tenants and therefore many applications, the Court saw no practical barrier to submitting such applications in the prescribed period. The required procedure merely involved naming the tenant and stating the desire for a declaration of non‑permanent status. The petitioners also suggested that the application must be made in anticipation of the tenant’s claim for permanent tenancy, but the Court did not find this requirement to invalidate the opportunity, noting that there was no practical difficulty in filing in anticipation. Finally, the Court considered the factual context, noting that the petitioners’ affidavit acknowledged that the preparation of the record of rights for tenants in the taluqdari villages had begun shortly after the Abolition Act became effective.

The Court noted that the preparation of the record of rights in the taluqdari villages began shortly after the Abolition Act became effective on 15 August 1950. It further observed that many tenants had already been entered as permanent tenants, and such entries could only have been made relying on section 83 of the Code. Consequently, the petitioners could not claim any grievance against those entries because they were made under the authority provided by that statutory provision. Section 3(b)(ii) of the impugned Act was highlighted as taking into account that the proceedings for preparing the record of rights were still pending at the time the Act commenced. During those pending proceedings, the tenure‑holder was required, whenever he deemed it appropriate, to object to a tenant being recorded as a permanent tenant. Such objections would have applied to a considerable number of cases, thereby limiting the pool of tenants for whom further action might be necessary. Only the remaining cases, in which no objection was raised, would require the tenant to make an application under section 6 of the impugned Act. The Court also pointed out that a tenant who pays an amount exceeding the land assessment may claim rights under section 4 of the impugned Act, which further reduces the number of tenants likely to invoke section 6.

The petitioners offered no material evidence to demonstrate that the number of tenants who might need to file applications under section 6 was large or unmanageable. Because they had not raised this issue previously, they also failed to provide any data indicating how many tenants remained outstanding for such applications. Accordingly, on the facts of the present case, the petitioners could not convincingly assert any practical difficulty in filing the required applications under section 6. The Court further observed that many tenants would already have asserted their claim to permanent tenancy long ago under the law. Section 5A of the Abolition Act, as originally framed, allowed a tenant five years from the Act’s commencement on 15 August 1950 to exercise that right. The deadline for exercising the right was later extended to 28 February 1960, but the impugned Act became operative on 10 June 1958. Consequently, at the time the impugned Act came into force, each tenant still had about one year and nine months remaining to invoke the provision of section 5A. This remaining period explains why section 6 of the impugned Act fixed a six‑month window for filing applications by the legislature. Although the period prescribed in section 5A was later extended by Act XVIII of 1960, that amendment took effect on 8 April 1960 and therefore did not influence the legislature’s choice of a six‑month period in section 6. One counsel for the petitioners argued that the definition of “permanent tenant” was expanded to include persons whose tenancies began earlier, based on clause (b) of section 4 of the impugned Act. The Court noted that this argument had not been raised at trial, and therefore the definition as used in the impugned Act remained unaffected by that contention. Finally, the Court concluded that the provisions of section 4 merely acknowledged the customary practice in tenure villages of periodically changing tenant holdings, and no challenge to that clause was made.

In this matter an argument was raised at trial, and the respondents were not afforded a chance to meet that argument. Putting that procedural deficiency aside, the Court observed that the clause under discussion must be read in conjunction with Explanation II to section 5‑A of the Abolition Act. As has already been mentioned, section 5‑A itself was not attacked on the ground of unconstitutionality. Explanation II to that section provides the following definition: “For the purpose of this section, a permanent tenant includes a tenant who holds a taluqdarī land in exchange of another taluqdarī land of which he was, and but for the exchange would have been a permanent tenant and who has been in continuous possession thereof since the date of exchange.” The Court may therefore assume that this Explanation widens the meaning of “permanent tenant,” although the plaintiffs have not challenged the validity of the Explanation. Clause (b) of section 4 of the impugned Act, the Court noted, merely records the customary practice in tenure villages of periodically altering the holdings of tenants, and it appears that no challenge was raised to section 4 of the impugned Act on that basis. Accordingly, only those persons whose predecessors in title were tenants in tenure villages from time immemorial will be entitled to the benefits of the impugned Act; no other persons will be brought within its ambit. Consequently, it is idle to contend that section 4(b) expands the definition of “permanent tenant.” It has been asserted that section 4 broadens the definition by including tenants whose tenancy commencement dates are positively known. The Court examined whether this proposal is correct. A tenant in a tenure village is simply a holder of tenure land; it is not essential that he and his ancestors in title have possessed the same parcel of land since the inception of their tenancy. The practice of exchanging parcels of land has long been prevalent in tenure villages, and Explanation II to section 5‑A is founded upon that practice. Section 83 of the Code deals with the permanence of the landlord‑tenant relationship, not with the existence of a permanent tenancy in respect of a particular parcel of land. These provisions must be read together with section 4 of the impugned Act because the Act does not stand alone; it supplements the Abolition Act and the Code, and its provisions must therefore be assimilated with those of the principal statutes. Viewed in this light, the Court concluded that section 4 contemplates a person whose predecessors’ tenancy commencement is unknown but who has been in possession of the same or different parcels of tenure land for a period of at least twelve years prior to the commencement of the Abolition Act. It may be possible to determine when the person entered into possession of a specific parcel ‘X,’ if that entry occurred within or beyond twelve years after the commencement of the Abolition Act, but that is not the same as saying that the relationship between the person and the tenure‑holder originated for the first time on that date. If, in fact, the relationship began more than twelve years before the Abolition Act came into force, perhaps with respect to different parcels over time, the person is entitled to be regarded as a permanent tenant, unless the landlord can demonstrate that the tenant or his predecessor was first inducted into tenancy at a definite point or that the tenancy was for a finite term. Thus, the Court held that section 4 of the impugned Act does not expand the definition of a permanent tenant, and consequently it does not deprive the landlord of any property that vested in him on the tillers’ day.

In this matter the Court explained that the fact a tenancy began at the time the Abolition Act came into force does not mean that the legal relationship between the tenant and the tenure‑holder was created for the first time on that date. The Court noted that if, in reality, the tenancy originated more than twelve years before the Act became operative—perhaps on different parcels of land at different moments—the occupier must be treated as a permanent tenant, unless the landlord is able to demonstrate that the tenant or his predecessor first entered the tenancy at a specific point in time or that the tenancy was intended to last only for a limited period. Consequently, the Court held that section 4 of the impugned Act does not expand the statutory definition of a permanent tenant and therefore cannot be said to deprive the landlord of any property rights that vested in him on the tillers’ day. It may happen that a person who, before the enactment of section 4, was recorded only as an ordinary tenant because he could not establish that the origin of his tenancy lay far back in antiquity, may now, by relying on the provision, seek to be recorded as a permanent tenant by showing continuous possession for twelve years. However, the Court emphasized that section 4 does not automatically convert such a person into a permanent tenant in every case; the landlord may still succeed in showing that the tenancy began at a particular date beyond the twelve‑year period or that it was of a fixed duration, thereby preventing the conversion. The Court further observed that section 32H(1) gives the landlord no right to demand the price of occupancy at the rates prescribed in sub‑section (1)(ii) from a person merely because he is recorded as an ordinary tenant; the right to claim such price arises only against a person who is not a permanent tenant. If, in fact, the occupier is a permanent tenant, or can be presumed to be one even though he had not been recorded as such before the impugned Act took effect, the landlord has no authority to demand the price of occupancy on the basis that the tenant is not a permanent tenant of tenure land vested in the tenure‑holder by virtue of that provision. Moreover, section 87‑A of the Tenancy Act makes section 32H(1)(i) inapplicable to such a tenant, and therefore no violation of the right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution arises in these circumstances. The Court also addressed the contention that section 6 of the impugned Act is void because it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the tenure‑holder’s right to hold property and thus offends article 19(1)(f). The Court noted that this issue had not been raised in the petitions. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that if its interpretation of section 4 is accepted, the impugned Act would be saved by article 31‑A of the Constitution and its validity would not be susceptible to attack on the ground that it infringes article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

The Court observed that it is difficult to see how the tenure‑holder’s right to hold property is impaired by section 6 of the impugned Act. The property right in question is the tenure‑holder’s right as occupier of land on which permanent or other tenants may exist. Section 5‑A of the Abolition Act permits permanent tenants to convert themselves into occupants, thereby ceasing to be tenants of the tenure‑holder, and the validity of that provision has not been challenged. A tenant may invoke the benefit of section 5‑A only after establishing that he is a permanent tenant. The Court recognised that it is readily conceivable that, in many cases, the tenure‑holder may dispute a tenant’s claim of permanency. When such a dispute is raised, the burden falls on the tenant to prove his status as a permanent tenant. Section 6 merely sets a time limit within which the tenure‑holder may contest the claim that a particular tenant is permanent. The provision does not transform non‑permanent tenants into permanent ones; consequently, section 6 cannot be said to affect the tenure‑holder’s property right. The Court further noted that, in most cases, the tenure‑holders, including the petitioners, have actually applied to the mamlatdars for declarations in their favour under the provision, and those applications remain pending. According to the Solicitor‑General, records supplied by the tenure‑holders show that tentative entries were made in the record of rights immediately after the impugned Act came into force, and that the tenure‑holders applied to the mamlatdar within six months for a declaration under the provision. The Solicitor‑General therefore submitted that the section provides a genuine opportunity for tenure‑holders to rebut the presumption created by section 4, an observation with which the Court agreed. In summary, the Court held that section 4, by merely creating a presumption, does not deprive the tenure‑holder of any property; his property, such as it exists, remains intact. Section 4 does not create new property rights for a tenant; it merely assists a permanent tenant who must prove the nature of his tenancy by raising a presumption of permanency in his favour. If, in fact, his tenancy is not permanent and has been extinguished by law but he is tentatively recorded as permanent, the landlord may, under section 6(1), rebut the presumption by producing documentary evidence that the tenancy is not permanent and has been terminated under section 32(1) of the Tenancy Act. Upon such proof, the landlord is entitled to claim compensation or purchase money at the rates allowed by section 32H(1)(ii) of that Act, a right that is unaffected by the impugned Act.

In this case, the Court explained that if a landlord is unable to prove that the tenancy has been permanently extinguished, the landlord is entitled only to the purchase price fixed under section 5A of the Abolition Act. This entitlement arises solely because section 5A of the Abolition Act remains in force, and not because any provision of the impugned Act removes the landlord’s right to claim a higher purchase price. The Court further observed that the impugned Act deals exclusively with matters that arise from a landlord‑tenant relationship, and its provisions are not intended to apply where such a relationship does not exist. Consequently, the Court held that the Act falls within the legislative competence of the State of Bombay under entry 18 of List II of the Constitution, which covers land rights, tenures, the landlord‑tenant relation, rent collection, and related agricultural matters. The Court rejected any suggestion that the impugned Act is colourable, noting that it directly addresses issues concerning landlord‑tenant relations and therefore lies squarely within the field assigned to the State legislature. As a result, the Court concluded that Article 31(1) of the Constitution has not been violated.

The Court then turned to the specific submissions made by Mr Pathak. It dismissed the first three points raised by him as untenable. The fourth, fifth and sixth points were based on the premise that the impugned Act confers permanent tenancy rights on persons whose tenancy rights were terminated on 1 April 1957. The Court clarified that, on a proper construction of section 4, the Act does not create any new rights for those persons; it applies only to existing permanent tenants. Accordingly, those three contentions were not open for consideration. Regarding the seventh point, Mr Pathak argued that sections 4 and 5 of the impugned Act do not extend to other occupants under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and that this omission would allow those occupants to claim a purchase price higher than that permitted by section 5A of the Abolition Act, constituting an unreasonable classification. The Court held that if its construction of section 4 is correct, Article 31‑A of the Constitution protects the law, and the petitioners cannot invoke Article 14 to challenge it. The Court also noted a real distinction between tenure villages, where relevant records were held by tenure‑holders, and non‑tenure villages, where the government maintained the records. This distinction provides a reasonable basis for the classification made by the impugned Act, linking it to the purpose of the statute.

It was observed that, for villages where the statements of “objects and reasons” had not been produced by the occupants, the authorities faced difficulty in completing the record of rights. In contrast, for villages where the records had been kept by the Government, the material was readily available and no difficulty arose in completing the record of rights. The Court therefore concluded that the classification made by the impugned Act was based on the degree of availability of material that could be used to draw an inference or a presumption. Because the classification hinged on whether the relevant documents existed, the Court found that it bore a reasonable connection to the purpose that the Act sought to achieve. On this basis, the Court held that it was unnecessary to examine the additional points raised by Mr. Pathak, which invoked authority from various decisions, since the foundation of those arguments was, in the Court’s view, unsound. Accordingly, the petitions were dismissed with costs. Since the parties had raised only one common issue, the Court directed that a single set of costs would be awarded.

Justice Ayyangar expressed complete agreement with the order that was proposed to be passed by the Chief Justice and by Justice S.K. Das. The sole reason for delivering a separate judgment was the need to articulate his own views on the meaning of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act 1958, hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, particularly with respect to section 4. He noted that the facts of the case and the statutory provisions relevant to the dispute had already been set out in detail in the judgments of his fellow judges, and therefore needed no repetition. Before analysing the proper construction of the impugned Act, Justice Ayyangar explained that he did not understand the learned Solicitor‑General to be challenging the proposition that, if the Act extended the definition of “permanent tenant” beyond what was prescribed in section 83 of the Land Revenue Code and brought into that category tenants who had previously been classified as “other tenants”, the constitutional validity of the Act could still be sustained. He referred to the decision in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, which held that the 1956 legislation transformed the landlord‑tenant relationship into a vendor‑purchaser relationship between the tenure‑holder and his tenants. The Solicitor‑General’s submission, as interpreted by the Court, was that the impugned Act did not alter the essential requirements for a person to be deemed a “permanent tenant” under section 83 of the Code; rather, it merely shifted the burden of proof onto the tenure‑holder when certain facts were established. Justice Ayyangar observed that this view had been accepted by Justice Mudholkar, who held that the status or character of a permanent tenant, and the definition of that term, had not been changed by the Act, and that prior to the enactment the onus was on the tenant to prove all the necessary elements.

In this case, the Court observed that before the enactment of the 1958 Act a tenant who wished to prove that he was a permanent tenant had to bear the full burden of establishing all the elements of that status. The statutory change introduced by the 1958 Act transferred the onus to the landlord, requiring the landlord to demonstrate the origin of the tenancy and to show that the tenancy could be terminated, but only in the circumstance where it was shown that the tenant had possessed the holding for twelve years before 15 August 1950. The Court noted that if that construction of the effect of the impugned Act were accepted, it would considerably advance the argument that the provision was constitutionally valid. However, the Court expressed its inability to accept the interpretation of section 4 put forward by the learned Solicitor‑General for the State and by counsel for the tenants. The Court began by noting that the long title of the Act declares that the legislation is intended to “define” permanent tenants. While the Court recognized that when the operative language of a provision plainly indicates only a shift of the burden of proof, the long title cannot be used to alter that meaning, it held that this was not the situation before it. The Court further explained that, on examination of the operative clauses, the statute appears designed to fulfil the purpose stated in its long title, namely to define or to redefine the category of persons who shall be treated as permanent tenants for the purpose of obtaining the benefits previously accorded to permanent tenants under the law in force before the Act’s commencement.

The Court then set out the operative provisions of the impugned Act that are relevant to the present enquiry, namely sections 3, 4 and 6. Section 3 provides that a person shall, within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition Law – in this context the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 – be deemed to be a permanent tenant on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure if his name is recorded in the record of rights or any other public or revenue record as a permanent tenant in respect of any tenure‑land. This deemed status may arise (a) on the date of the abolition, or (b) pursuant to orders issued during any proceedings under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the case may be, the Land Revenue Code, 1879, whether such orders were made (i) before the commencement of this Act, (ii) after the commencement of this Act in cases where inquiries were pending at that time, or (iii) by order of the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under section 6 of this Act. Section 4, for the purposes of the relevant Act specified in Part I of the Schedule, defines a person as one who (a) on the date of commencement of that Act was holding any tenure‑land, and (b) whose predecessors in title, if any, immediately before that date held the same or other tenure‑land for continuous periods that, in aggregate, amounted to a total continuous period of twelve years or more. Section 6 deals with the entry of the rights of a permanent tenant in the record of rights, subject to a written application by the tenure‑holder within six months of the commencement of this Act for a declaration that any holder or tenant under him is not a permanent tenant, and sets out the procedure for such applications.

In this case, the Court explained that a person who, on the date of commencement of the relevant Act, had held tenure‑land for a continuous period of twelve years or more, and who paid rent exceeding the assessment of the land, would be deemed a permanent tenant unless the tenure‑holder proved that the person would not have qualified as a permanent tenant based on continued possession under clause (b). Accordingly, such a person would be treated as a permanent tenant under clause (a), and all provisions of the Act applicable to permanent tenants would apply to him. The Court also noted the Explanation to that provision, which states that “the assessment for the purpose of this section shall be reckoned as provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section 5.” Further, the Court quoted section 6(1), which provides that the rights of a permanent tenant under sections 4 and 5 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure‑holder makes a written application to the Mamlatdar within six months from the date of commencement of the Act for a declaration that any holder or tenant under him is not a permanent tenant. Section 6(2) adds that any such application shall be disposed of as if it were an application in a disputed case under section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. The Court then turned to the specific controversy before it and observed that, by virtue of section 3, persons are deemed permanent tenants under the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, if their names appear in the record of rights or other public records as “a permanent tenant” in any of the three situations described in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that section. For individuals whose names were recorded in the record of rights before the Act was passed, the criteria for determining permanent tenancy would have been based on the pre‑existing law, and they would already have been permanent tenants apart from the deeming provision. The Court considered that the situation of those recorded under clause (b) was similar and that it was unnecessary to discuss whether, in cases where an enquiry began before the Act’s commencement but concluded afterwards, the tests introduced by section 4 could be used to determine tenant status. Assuming that the provisions of the impugned Act were not to be applied to an enquiry already underway, there would be no distinction between clauses (a) and (b) of section 3, and in both instances the tenants would be actual, not merely statutorily deemed, permanent tenants. However, the Court held that clause (c) was different. If the Court’s construction of section 4(b) is correct, clause (c) creates a new class of permanent tenants – persons who, before the enactment, were not permanent tenants but whose landlord’s interest was transferred to them under the Bombay Act 13 of 1956, thereby bringing them within the category of permanent tenants.

In this case the Court observed that a person who was liable to pay the purchase‑price prescribed in section 32H(1)(ii) was placed within the class of “permanent tenants.” Section 3(c) spoke of an entry made by a Mamlatdar pursuant to section 6, and a reference to section 6 showed that it in turn pointed to section 4 as containing the definition of the class of tenants that the Mamlatdar was required to record in the revenue books as “permanent tenants.” Turning to section 4, the Court noted that a person was deemed to be a permanent tenant only when he satisfied three cumulative conditions. The first condition required that the person must be in possession of tenure‑land on the date of the commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, namely 15 August 1950. The second condition required that the person, or the person from whom he claimed title, must have been in continuous possession of that land or of any other tenure‑land immediately before 15 August 1950 for a period of twelve years. The third condition required that the rent payable by the person must exceed the amount of assessment leviable on the land as calculated under section 5. The effect of the first condition was to exclude from the permanent‑tenant category any person who entered into possession of the land after 15 August 1950. However, any tenant who was already in possession of tenure‑land on that date could be deemed a permanent tenant, provided that he also met the second and third conditions. The Court then examined the second condition and found an ambiguity in the phrase “continuous periods aggregating to a total continuous period of twelve years.” The Court explained that “aggregation” ordinarily means the arithmetic addition of whole numbers, and when the unit of measurement is years it suggests that broken periods may be added together. To preserve the idea of continuity, the Court suggested that the provision could be interpreted to cover a situation where a tenant occupied different parcels of tenure‑land at various times during the twelve‑year span, without being in possession of any single parcel for the whole twelve years, yet remaining in possession of some parcel at every point in time. Under such an interpretation the tenant would be regarded as having “continuous possession” of the land that he held on the commencement date of the Act, for the purpose of qualifying as a permanent tenant of that particular parcel. To illustrate the circumstance, the Court considered a hypothetical in which, during the twelve years preceding 15 August 1950, a tenant possessed three distinct parcels of tenure‑land, designated A, B and C, in successive but unbroken intervals, so that there was never a moment when the tenant was without possession of at least one of the parcels, and that on the commencement date the tenant was in possession of parcel C. The Court observed that such a situation could arise from an exchange of holdings with the consent of the tenure‑holder.

The provision was not limited to exchanges made by a person who was already a permanent tenant under the existing law; rather, its language applied more broadly. If the provision is properly construed as described, any tenant who satisfied the other conditions of the section would be deemed to be a permanent tenant with respect to parcel “C.” It follows immediately that the origin of the tenancy of parcel “C” is known. Such a tenant, however, would not qualify as a permanent tenant under section 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, nor would he fall within the definition of a permanent tenant in section 2(10 A) of the Tenancy Act inserted by Bombay Act 13 of 1956. Consequently, the argument that section 4 was intended merely to provide a rule of evidence for determining who a permanent tenant was under section 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, without creating a new category of persons, is contradicted even by the first paragraph of section 4(b). This view is further reinforced by the clause at the end of section 4(b) that specifies the grounds on which a landlord or tenure‑holder could challenge a tenant’s right to permanent tenancy. The clause reads: “Unless it is proved by the tenure‑holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of land under clause (b)….”

The learned Solicitor‑General argued that interpreting this part of section 4(b) to mean that the landlord must disprove what the tenant has already established would render the provision meaningless, and therefore the words should be read as requiring the tenure‑holder to prove that the tenant was not a permanent tenant under section 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In other words, once the conditions of section 4(b) – continuous possession of tenure‑land for twelve years as described – are satisfied, the onus would shift to the tenure‑holder to demonstrate that the tenant does not fall within the category described in section 83. The Court is unable to accept this interpretation of the section. Even if one assumes that the impugned Act was not meant to define a permanent tenant but merely to shift the burden of proof, there is no language in section 4 that supports the Solicitor‑General’s construction. The Act contains no reference to section 83, and it expressly states that the class of persons termed “permanent tenants” are those deemed to be such, indicating that the category is an artificial creation brought about by the Act. Moreover, the opening words of the first paragraph of section 4(b) contemplate situations where the origin of the tenancy of the parcel in question is known. Finally, the wording concerning the tenure‑holder’s right to dispute the “deemed” permanent tenancy is wholly inconsistent with a right to establish that the tenant does not satisfy the requirements of section 83. The words used are “that the tenant would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of land under clause (b).” The conditions on which a person is deemed to be a permanent tenant are, as already noted, three, and of these two are… There is no reference to s. 83 in

The Court observed that the impugned Act expressly states that the class of persons described as “permanent tenants” consists of those who are deemed to be such. This wording indicates that the category is a creation of the Act rather than a pre‑existing legal class. The Court also noted that the opening words of the first paragraph of section 4(b) refer to situations where the origin of the tenancy of the land for which permanent tenancy is claimed is known. Furthermore, the language used to describe the tenure‑holder’s right to contest the “deemed” permanent tenancy is wholly incompatible with a right to prove that the tenant fails to satisfy the requirements of section 83 of the Code. The provision states that the tenant “would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of land under clause (b).” The conditions that make a person deemed a permanent tenant are, as previously explained, three in number; two of those conditions are set out in sub‑clause (b), namely the continuous possession of tenure‑land and the rent of the land being higher than the revenue assessment. These observations form the basis for the Court’s analysis of the statutory language.

Turning to the argument that the literal construction of the quoted words of section 4(b) is irrational, the Court held that this argument rests on the assumption that section 4 contemplates an enquiry or proceeding initiated by tenants who, by evidence, establish the matters listed in section 4. On that basis, it was submitted that the legislature could not have allowed the tenure‑holder to disprove the same matters. Even if that assumption were accepted, the Court found no absurdity in the provision. In its judgment, the Court concluded that section 4(b) does not provide for any application by the tenant, and therefore there is no question of the tenant having established that the conditions of section 4(b) have been satisfied. Section 4(b) creates a positive rule of law whereby a person in possession of a holding of tenure‑land on 15 August 1950 is “deemed” to be a permanent tenant upon fulfillment of three conditions. The tenure‑holder is entitled to show that those conditions have not been satisfied when he initiates proceedings for that purpose. The right of the tenure‑holder to commence such proceedings is found in section 6, which provides that the rights of a permanent tenant under section 4 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure‑holder applies in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months from the commencement of the Act, declaring that the tenant under him is not a permanent tenant.

The Court observed that the concept of a permanent tenant described in section 4 is incorporated into the framework of section 6, making the two provisions interdependent. Consequently any person who satisfies the definition of a permanent tenant under section 4 becomes automatically eligible to be entered in the revenue records as a permanent tenant by the Mamlatdar without filing a separate application. This entry, however, may be barred if the tenure‑holder submits a written objection to the proposed registration in accordance with the statutory procedure. The Court noted that the objections which the tenure‑holder may raise, and which would be adjudicated under section 6, are precisely those grounds provided to him by section 4. It was further observed that section 6 itself does not enumerate the specific grounds on which a tenure‑holder may object to a tenant being treated as a permanent tenant. Relying on this apparent omission, the learned Solicitor‑General argued that the tenure‑holder’s objections could extend to disproving the tenant’s status as a permanent tenant under section 83 of the Code. The Court rejected that submission as untenable, noting that both parties agreed that section 4(b) does not contemplate a separate enquiry and that the tenure‑holder’s right to object is exercised through the mechanism provided in section 6. Accordingly the Court held that sections 4(b) and 6 function as integrated provisions, the former laying down the permissible grounds of objection and the latter providing the forum and procedure for raising those objections. In other words, section 4(b) identifies the reasons a tenure‑holder may object but does not specify the procedural venue. Section 6, on the other hand, designates the Mamlatdar as the authority to decide and requires the tenure‑holder to commence the proceeding by filing an objection petition. The Court emphasized that reading either provision in isolation would render them ineffective, and that they must be read together as a cohesive scheme for determining. After inquiry, the scheme identifies which persons are entitled to claim the rights of a permanent tenant under the statutory framework. Section 4 positively defines the class of permanent tenants, and section 6 creates the procedural mechanism and forum in which that definition can be tested and, if not displaced, given effect. Finally the Court expressed the view that referring the enquiry to section 135D of the Code would not alter the outcome. Officials, tribunals or courts empowered under that section would still have to apply the criteria laid down in section 6 to decide whether the tenant qualifies as a permanent tenant. Thus the observations above establish that the statutory scheme functions as a unified mechanism for recognizing permanent tenancy, and the intended purpose of the legislation is achieved. I am therefore of the view that the proper legal consequences should follow from the foregoing analysis as articulated by the Court.

The judge was clearly of the opinion that the whole object and purpose of the impugned enactment, as given effect to by its operative provisions, was not to create a rule of evidence for determining who permanent tenants were under the earlier law. Instead, the judge held that the enactment was intended to define, to create, and in effect to add a new class of “permanent tenants”, namely those persons who satisfied the requirements laid down in section 4 of the statute. The judge further observed that, if this construction of the impugned enactment were accepted, it was not seriously contested that the enactment would be void, unconstitutional, and therefore liable to be struck down. On the basis of this reasoning, the judge agreed that the petitions filed against the enactment should be allowed.

Accordingly, the Court, following the view expressed by the majority of the judges, allowed the petitions and ordered that the costs be awarded to the petitioners. Because the petitions had been heard together, the Court directed that only a single hearing fee would be payable, rather than separate fees for each petition.