M/S. Ramchand Jagadish Chand vs Union Of India And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 1 of 1960

Decision Date: 8 August 1961

Coram: J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal

In the matter of M/s Ramchand Jagadish Chand versus Union of India and others, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 8 August 1961. The opinion was authored by Justice J C Shah and the bench comprised Justices J C Shah, P B Gajendragadkar, M Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was M/s Ramchand Jagadish Chand and the respondents were the Union of India and other relevant parties. The judgment date was recorded as 08 / 08 / 1961 and the case was cited as 1963 AIR 563 and 1962 SCR (3) 72, with subsequent citations including R 1966 SC1044 (8), E 1968 SC 718 (18) and R 1971 SC1283 (11). The issues addressed concerned the Import Licence‑Import Trade Control Policy‑Export Promotion Scheme, the right of the State to impose restrictions on imports, the possibility of infringement of fundamental rights, the powers of the licensing authority under the scheme, and whether those powers were unchannelled or arbitrary. Relevant statutory references included emergency provisions (continuance and Ordinance of 1946), the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1947 (Section 3), the Imports (Control) Order 1955 (Clause 3) and Appendix 42, as well as Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The High Court had dismissed a writ petition filed by an intervener, and the petitioner was permitted to be heard as an intervener before the Supreme Court, invoking the right of appeal under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Government of India had published an “Export Promotion Scheme” whereby the value of an import licence for raw materials depended on the value of specified categories of goods exported by the applicant. Under Clause 2 of Appendix 42 of the Import (Control) Order 1955, the Controller of Imports and Exports was empowered to issue a licence up to two‑thirds of the export value for Indian artsilk sarees and up to the full export value for other Indian artsilk fabrics. The appellant, a firm identified as “R”, engaged in both exporting and importing and applied for an import licence equal to the value of its exported goods, thereby earning foreign exchange. Following allegations of certain malpractices, the Government suspended the Export Promotion Scheme and constituted a verification committee to examine exported values. After reviewing the firm’s claim, the committee concluded that the rates for some items were unreasonable and recommended granting an import licence of approximately forty‑five percent of the exported value. The firm R, after unsuccessfully demanding a licence for the full export value, filed a writ petition alleging that the Controller of Licences had arbitrarily reduced the licence value, thereby infringing its fundamental right. The firm also contended that the Controller was obligated by the Export Promotion Scheme to grant a licence matching the full export value, and that the denial amounted to discrimination because other importers during the same period had received licences for the full export value of their goods. The Court held, that the fundamental right of a citizen to carry on any occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the

The Court explained that the Constitution was not an absolute instrument; it permitted the State to impose reasonable restrictions when such measures served the general public’s interest. Accordingly, the State’s authority to control imports in the larger public interest was not denied. The Court observed that the power to issue the Imports (Control) Order of 1955 derived from the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, which enabled the State to impose restrictions by allowing the import of certain goods only through licences or customs permits issued by the Central Government. The authority to grant or refuse a licence was vested in senior State officials, and the issuance of licences was governed by the Import Trade Control Policy. Detailed provisions in that policy set out the specific grounds on which licences could be refused, suspended, or cancelled, and also provided for a hearing before any such action was taken. Consequently, the Court held that the powers conferred under clause three of the Imports (Control) Order of 1955 were neither unbounded nor arbitrary. The power given to the licensing authority to issue licences only up to the maximum amount specified in clause two of appendix 42 was, by itself, not an unreasonable restriction. Likewise, a notification requiring the scrutiny of all licence applications did not amount to an unreasonable restriction. The clause, the Court clarified, vested authority in the Controller; it did not create an enforceable obligation for the Controller to grant a licence for the full amount claimed by the exporter. The power remained discretionary, and the Controller’s decision to grant a licence for only forty‑five percent of the exported goods did not infringe the petitioner’s fundamental right under article nineteen‑one‑g of the Constitution by imposing an unreasonable restriction.

The Court further held that, in the absence of any evidence showing discriminatory treatment between the aggrieved party and other persons in similar circumstances, there could be no violation of article fourteen of the Constitution, which guarantees protection against arbitrary discrimination among similarly situated individuals. The Court also observed that when a writ of mandamus, direction, or order under article two hundred twenty‑six of the Constitution was dismissed by the High Court, the aggrieved person’s sole remedy was to appeal the decision; the person did not acquire a right to be heard as an intervener. The judgment was recorded under criminal jurisdiction for Writ Petition number one of 1960, filed under article thirty‑two of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners included A V Viswanatha Sastri, K K Jain, and Ganpat Raj, while counsel for the respondents comprised C K Daphtary, Solicitor‑General of India, V A Saiyed Mohamad, and T M Sen. The decision was delivered on August eight, nineteen sixty‑one by Justice Shah, noting that controls on exports and imports imposed as emergency measures during the last war were continued after the lapse of the Defence of India Rules by the Emergency Provisions (Continuance) Ordinance of 1946.

The legislation that had earlier been enacted as emergency controls on exports and imports during the preceding war was subsequently superseded by the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (Act 18 of 1947). Under section 3 of that Act, the Central Government received authority, by means of an order published in the Official Gazette, to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control the import, export or carriage of goods of any specified description, either in all cases or in particular classes of cases, and to make any exceptions that might be prescribed under the same order. Section 3(2) further stipulated that any goods to which an order issued under subsection (1) applied would be treated as goods whose import or export had been prohibited or restricted in accordance with section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. Exercising the powers conferred by section 3, the Central Government periodically issued notifications that prohibited, restricted or otherwise regulated the export and import of a wide range of commodities. A consolidated order dated 7 December 1955, known as the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, imposed restrictions on the import of certain goods pursuant to clause 3 of that order. Clause 3 expressly provided that, unless the order stated otherwise, no person was permitted to import any goods described in Schedule I unless the import was carried out in accordance with a licence or a customs‑clearance permit issued by the Central Government or by an officer named in Schedule II. To give effect to the overall scheme of import control, detailed provisions were laid down in clauses 3 to 11 of the Imports (Control) Order. The Government of India disclosed its import policy at six‑month intervals by publishing, in the Government Gazette, the procedures and conditions governing eligibility for licences and the granting of import licences. This policy was also made available to the public in a handbook titled “Import Trade Control Policy”. The policy was evidently formulated with reference to the domestic requirements for goods to be imported, the prevailing foreign‑exchange situation and the broader economic interests of the country. Paragraph 51 of the Import Trade Control Policy applicable to the licensing period from October 1958 to March 1959 introduced an “Export Promotion” scheme that allowed imports to be authorized based on the value of certain varieties of goods exported by the importer. The paragraph explained that, for specific items, the relationship between imports and exports was direct and intimate, and that the capacity to export certain manufactured products depended largely on the ease with which the exporter or manufacturer could obtain the raw materials necessary for production. Consequently, a scheme was devised to promote the export of such goods by granting special import licences that would replace the imported raw‑material component of the exported product, or by offering incentives for higher export volumes. Under this scheme, artsilk yarn and artsilk fabrics were specifically included in the Export Promotion Scheme, as reflected in Appendix 42, clause 2 of the Import Trade Control Policy for October 1958 to March 1959.

In the Import Trade Control Policy covering the licensing period from October 1958 to March 1959, a specific provision was recorded to promote the export of Indian artsilk products. The provision declared that, in order to stimulate exports of Indian artsilk fabrics, sarees, garments, hosiery and other artsilk manufactures, import licences would be granted at the ports under the Export Promotion Scheme for permissible varieties of artsilk yarn. The licences could be issued to actual exporters up to a certain percentage of the rupee equivalent of foreign exchange earned on the basis of the free‑on‑board value of the exported artsilk goods, or the value assessed by customs, whichever was lower. The policy specified that the percentage would be two‑thirds and one‑third (66 ⅔ per cent) for Indian artsilk sarees, and a full hundred per cent for other Indian artsilk fabrics, including artsilk hosiery.

The petitioners, the firm M/s Ram Chand Jagadish Chand, were engaged in both exporting and importing activities. During the period from October 1958 to March 1959, the petitioners exported to Singapore a variety of goods, namely Bush Shirt Cloth, Glass Nylon, Art silk Piece Goods and Superior Class Nylon, with a total C.I.F. value of Rs 7,10,817. Relying on clause (2) of the Export Promotion Scheme as set out in the Import Trade Control Policy, the petitioners approached the Controller of Imports and requested import licences for artsilk yarn amounting to Rs 4,04,218.62 np for February 1959 and Rs 3,03,490.93 np for March 1959. The petitioners asserted that, having exported artsilk goods to Singapore and having earned net foreign exchange valued at Rs 7,07,709.55 np, they were entitled under the scheme to import artsilk yarn equal to that amount.

In September 1959, the petitioners received communication from the Assistant Controller of Imports and Exports stating that a consolidated licence covering the months of February and March 1959 had been granted for the import of artsilk yarn valued at Rs 3,19,354 only. It subsequently emerged that the Government of India, after becoming aware of certain irregularities in the conduct of some importers of artsilk yarn, had suspended the Export Promotion Scheme effective 9 March 1959. The government further announced that pending applications with the port licensing authorities would be examined by a special Committee. Accordingly, in May 1959, the government appointed a Committee to verify the values of exported goods. The petitioners appeared before this Committee and submitted documentary evidence in support of their claim for a licence equal to one hundred per cent of the rupee equivalent of the cloth exported.

The Committee accepted as reasonable the export rates applied by the petitioners to the “Flock Printed Nylon Dyed” cloth. However, the Committee held that the rates claimed for the “Bush Shirt Cloth” were not reasonable. The Committee directed that, for the purpose of the Export Promotion Scheme, the value of the Bush Shirt Cloth should be calculated at a rate of Rs 1.50 np per yard of thirty‑six‑inch width. The Controller of Licences concurred with the Committee’s recommendation and consequently issued to the petitioners an import licence for the amount of Rs 3,19,354 only.

Thereafter, the petitioners made an unsuccessful demand for a licence reflecting the full value of the goods they had exported. This demand formed the basis of the subsequent petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to grant an import licence for February and March 1959 equivalent to one hundred per cent of the exported goods, or alternatively, a writ of certiorari to set aside the licence issued for Rs 3,19,354 and to order the issuance of a licence for the full amount claimed. The petitioners alleged that the Controller had arbitrarily reduced the value of their import licence under the Export Promotion Scheme, thereby infringing their fundamental right to carry on business, and contended that the Controller was bound to grant an import licence for the full value of their exported goods, with the reduction constituting unlawful discrimination.

The petitioners approached the Supreme Court by filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, requesting a writ of mandamus that would compel the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to grant them an import licence for the months of February and March 1959 in an amount equal to one hundred percent of the value of the goods they had exported in the preceding months. In the alternative, they asked the Court to issue a writ of certiorari directing the authorities to produce the records and proceedings that led to the issuance of a licence valued at Rs 3,19,354, to set aside that licence, and to direct that a licence be granted for the full amount claimed by the petitioners.

The petitioners alleged that the Controller of licences had arbitrarily reduced the value of their import licence under the Export Promotion Scheme, thereby infringing their fundamental right to carry on business. They further contended that the Controller was obligated to grant an import licence for artsilk yarn covering the entire value of the exported goods, and that the refusal to do so amounted to discrimination because other importers of artsilk yarn, who were competitors of the petitioners during the same period, had received licences ranging from eighty‑five to one hundred percent of their exports. In paragraph 22 of their petition, they presented a table naming eight such exporters, the amounts involved, and the percentages of export value that had been granted to each.

The Court observed that the constitutional right of a citizen to pursue any occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) is not absolute; it may be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State in the public interest. Accordingly, the State’s power to regulate imports in the larger public interest has not been denied, and the authority of the State to issue the Imports (Control) Order 1955, exercised under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act and allowing import of certain goods only through licences or customs permits issued by the Central Government, has not been challenged.

Counsel for the petitioners, Mr Viswanatha Sastri, mildly argued that the power conferred by clause 1(3) of the Imports (Control) Order 1955 was unchannelled with respect to fixing percentages, and that, on that basis, the authority had imposed an unreasonable restriction on the freedom to conduct business. The Court noted, however, that the power to grant or refuse licences rests with senior State officials and that the issuance of licences is governed by the Import Trade Control Policy, which is periodically issued. Detailed provisions are set out in the Imports (Control) Order, specifying the grounds on which licences may be refused, amended, suspended or cancelled, particularly in clauses 6 to 9 of the Order. The Order also provides a procedure for allowing a licence holder to be heard before any adverse action is taken under

The Court observed that clauses six to nine of the Import Trade Control Order expressly provide the grounds on which licences may be refused, amended, suspended or cancelled, and therefore it could not be said that the power conferred on the licensing authority was un‑channelled or arbitrary. The petitioners’ counsel argued that, relying on clause two of appendix forty‑two of the Import Trade Control Policy, the petitioners had exported art‑silk fabrics, earned foreign exchange, and consequently should not be deprived of an import licence equal to the full value of those exported fabrics except for a compelling reason. The petitioners maintained that they had purchased the fabrics from various merchants, exported them, and that the foreign exchange earned was duly credited to their bank accounts. They further contended that by reducing the import licence entitlement to roughly forty‑five percent of the export value, the State, by executive order, imposed an unreasonable restriction on their right to carry on business.

The Court explained that under element two of the Export Promotion Scheme, as set out in appendix forty‑two and applicable to licences for the import of art‑silk yarn, the Controller of Imports is authorised to grant licences up to the percentages specified in that clause. The provision does not create a vested right for the exporter to obtain a licence for the full export value. The scheme permits the Controller to grant a licence for any amount up to one hundred percent of the rupee equivalent of the foreign exchange earned, calculated on the basis of the free‑on‑board value of the exported goods. Consequently, the exporter is not entitled to claim an import licence exceeding the foreign‑exchange earnings from the export. The clause confers discretionary authority on the Controller; it does not impose an enforceable obligation on him to issue a licence for the amount claimed by the exporter, subject only to the maximum prescribed. While the Court noted that discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily, it stated that, ordinarily, a licence may be issued for the full export value, but special considerations—such as a strained foreign‑exchange position or other matters affecting the general interest of the State—may justify granting a licence for a smaller percentage. The expression “up to the following percentage of the rupee equivalent” therefore does not empower the authority to fix an arbitrary percentage. In the specific case of granting a licence to the petitioners for a sum of three lakh nineteen thousand three hundred fifty‑four rupees, the Court examined whether this exercise of power was arbitrary or based on a reasonably discernible principle. The affidavit of the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Ram Murth Sharma, was cited, indicating that the Government of India had discovered that some exporters of art‑silk fabrics had taken wrongful advantage of the Export Promotion Scheme by inflating invoice values or fabricating artificial price increases.

Sharma’s affidavit disclosed that exporters of artificial silk fabrics had inflated the declared values of their shipments by more than one hundred per cent. He explained that during the period from January to June 1957, exporters reported the export of three hundred and eighty‑one thousand yards of artificial silk fabrics at an aggregate value of approximately rupees four hundred and fifty‑six thousand, which corresponded to a price of about rupees two and zero annas per yard. The exporters then sought to demonstrate a price increase for the same type of goods during the period from October 1958 to March 1959, alleging a price of rupees two and nine annas per yard. By applying the higher price to nine hundred and eighty‑six thousand yards exported in that later period, the invoice value was shown as twenty‑eight million seven hundred and ninety‑nine thousand rupees, even though the actual wholesale market price of the goods had not risen to that extent. Sharma pointed out that the wholesale price index for silk and rayon fabrics in India was eighty‑five in June 1957 and rose only to ninety‑five point seven in March 1959, indicating an overall price increase of roughly eleven per cent. In contrast, the price claimed by the exporters had risen by more than one hundred and twenty‑five per cent over the same interval. He concluded that the exaggerated price increase was manufactured solely to obtain import licences for higher values of the speculative commodity known as artificial silk yarn.

Relying on this evidence, counsel for the Union argued that the distortion of the Export Promotion Scheme had serious adverse effects on the nation’s foreign‑exchange position. Consequently, the Scheme was suspended by a government notification dated 6 March 195 ?. The government also directed that all pending applications for import licences concerning artificial silk yarn be examined by a specially appointed Committee. That Committee reviewed the applications of one thousand one hundred and six parties, including the petitioners, and ultimately granted the petitioners an import licence for rupees three lakh nineteen thousand three hundred and fifty‑four. The Union counsel maintained that the reduction in the authorised import value did not infringe any fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19 of the Constitution. He asserted that scrutinising licence applications in light of the misuse of the Export Promotion Scheme and issuing licences based on that scrutiny did not amount to an unreasonable restriction. The State, he argued, must protect both foreign‑exchange earnings and the integrity of its export trade. If large quantities of goods were dumped abroad at inflated prices to meet temporary foreign demand, the export trade could ultimately suffer. Moreover, when exporters charge excessive prices that are not justified by reasonable profits on the genuine value of the goods and then invest the excess profit in speculative commodities, the internal economy is endangered. In such circumstances, the State is justified in refusing to provide import facilities to exporters who rely on inflated export values. The affidavit of Sharma supported these contentions.

In the record it was shown that, in several instances, the firm that received the imported goods in the foreign country was merely a sister concern of the exporting house, and the exporters used the device of inflating the export price in order to adjust the excess value that they obtained. Consequently, it appeared that some exporters, operating under the cover of the Export Promotion Scheme, inflated their export prices and were then found to import speculative varieties of goods at values far exceeding the genuine market prices. Moreover, the authorities suspected that these exporters might have repatriated foreign assets without disclosing such repatriation to the State, which was required by law. The Court therefore concluded that the power given to the licensing authorities to issue licences only up to the maximum amount specified in clause 2 of the Scheme could not, by itself, be characterized as an unreasonable restriction, and that the notification directing a scrutiny of all licence applications did not amount to an unreasonable restriction either. Counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that the Controller had placed no evidence on the record showing that the petitioners, for the goods purchased by them in the Indian market, had not paid Rs 7,67,709.55, nor that any portion of that amount represented foreign assets intended to be repatriated contrary to law. The counsel also argued that M/s V. M. S. Abdul Razak & Company, to which the goods were consigned, was not a sister concern of the petitioners, and that the affidavit of the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports did not deny that the petitioners had received the full export value for the goods they shipped. In examining the petitioners’ case, the Committee observed that the party had purchased bush‑shirt cloth from J.C. Vakaria & Sons, Govardhandas Iswardass International Trading Agency, Agwarwla Brothers and Calcutta Silk Manufacturing Co., Ltd., with rates varying from Rs 3.87 to Rs 3.92 per yard. The Committee noted that neither the purchase vouchers nor the export invoices contained any description indicating whether the material was nylon, rayon, nylon‑rayon or any other fibre. Further, the Committee remarked that the petitioners were unable to provide an adequate justification for the prices of the art‑silk bush‑shirt cloth and that the samples could not be linked with the corresponding purchase vouchers or export invoices. The Committee also pointed out that the correspondence with M/s Abdul Razak & Company failed to give any justification or description linking the goods with the materials shipped. In view of these findings, the Committee recommended that, for the purpose of granting an import licence, the value of bush‑shirt cloth should be calculated at the rate of Rs 1.50 per yard. The Committee, however, did not state in its reasons that Rs 1.50 per yard was the prevailing market rate for bush‑shirt cloth at the time of export in the Indian market. Paragraph 22 of the respondents’ affidavit, on the other hand, stated that the petitioner firm had been granted a licence equal to 100 percent of the

In this case, the petitioners asserted that the value of the exports, which the Committee had arrived at as a reasonable value, had been fixed at Rs 1.50 per yard for the bush‑shirt cloth that they had exported. They claimed that the Committee’s decision was arbitrary. The licensing authority, for its part, argued that the decision was taken after ascertaining the reasonable market price in India at the material time when the petitioners exported the goods. The petitioners did not place before the Court any independent evidence showing that the prevailing market rate for the exported bush‑shirt cloth substantially exceeded the rate of Rs 1.50 per yard for a 36‑inch width. In the absence of such evidence, the Court held that it would not be justified in assuming that the Committee had acted arbitrarily in determining the value of the bush‑shirt cloth for the purpose of recommending the grant of an import licence.

The petitioners further contended that the order of the Controller, which granted them a licence for only about 45 % of the total value of the exported goods, infringed their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by imposing an unreasonable restriction. The Court found that this contention could not be sustained. The petitioners also argued that granting a licence for merely 45 % of the total export value amounted to discrimination that would invoke the protection of Article 14. Under the Export Promotion Scheme, the petitioners had exported artsilk goods worth Rs 7,07,709.55, and ordinarily they would have been entitled to an import licence covering 100 % of that value. However, the Scheme allows for a reduction in the licence value in certain circumstances, such as a general deterioration of the foreign‑exchange position, the need to conserve a particular currency, or other justifiable reasons for departing from the maximum set in clause 2 of Appendix 42 of the Scheme. A reduction may also be justified on grounds specific to the petitioners or to a group to which they belong, and any malpractice or dishonest dealing could warrant such a reduction.

The respondents explained that many exporters engaged in malpractices, inflating the declared value of artsilk goods either to speculate in the market or to repatriate foreign assets unlawfully. In the order issued by the Committee appointed by the Government of India, it was observed that the petitioners maintained business relationships with certain firms and that the purchase rates for bush‑shirt cloth varied between Rs 3.87 and Rs 3.92 per yard. The Committee was not satisfied that the documentary evidence produced by the petitioners actually related to the goods they had exported. These findings led the Committee to conclude that there was reason to believe that the petitioners’ claim of having purchased the goods at approximately the same price at which they were exported was not substantiated. Consequently, the Committee recommended that the value of the bush‑shirt cloth should be computed at the rate of Rs 1.50 per yard.

In the present dispute, the Committee that had examined the case of the petitioners had recommended that the value of “bush shirt cloth” be calculated at a rate of rupees 1.50 per yard. Although the record did not contain conclusive proof that this figure represented the prevailing market price at the relevant time, the Court was prepared to accept that the members of the Committee, who were intimately involved in the artsilk trade, were well‑acquainted with current market rates for the cloth exported by the petitioners. During the hearing, counsel for the Union placed before the Court the Committee’s report concerning seven of the eight exporters whom the petitioners alleged had received import licences on the basis of the full export value of their shipments. The report relating to M/s Rajasthan Exporters I and Importers, Calcutta was not produced, the counsel explaining that it was not immediately available. A careful reading of the reports for the other exporters revealed that the petitioners’ assertion that Raghunath Rai Piyarilal had been granted an import licence for the entire export value was inaccurate. The record showed that, for the export identified as application No. 36 involving “Glass, Nylon dved,” only forty percent of the FOB value was to be considered for the purpose of granting the licence. A similar calculation applied to application No. 35, where again forty percent of the FOB value was to be taken when determining the licence entitlement. By contrast, in the cases of other importers – namely Premsukhdass Sitaram, Indian Exporters and Importers Corporation, M/s Universal Watch Emporium, M/s Jawahar Knitting Hosiery, M/s Vastralaya Ltd. and M/s Agarwala Trading Co., Ltd. – the Committee had endorsed the purchase prices submitted by the exporters and had therefore recommended that licences be issued for one hundred percent of the export value of the goods. The Committee’s reasoning in those instances appeared prima facie sound and justified the acceptance of the exporters’ claims. Consequently, if, on the basis of the material before it, the Committee was satisfied that either misconduct or under‑hand dealing had occurred on the part of the petitioners, or that the evidence showed the exported goods were not worth the amounts claimed in the invoices, then a recommendation that an import licence be granted for bush shirt cloth valued at rupees 1.50 per yard could not be characterised as discriminatory. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law and forbids arbitrary discrimination between persons who are similarly situated. The Committee’s findings indicated that the documentation produced by the petitioners was unsatisfactory and that it was not convinced that the prices the petitioners said they had paid were in fact the prices paid. Had there been evidence that other persons, who in the Committee’s view had also inflated prices in the same manner as the petitioners, had nevertheless been granted licences for the full export value or for a substantially higher percentage than that granted to the petitioners, a case of discrimination could have been made out. In the absence of such evidence, the Court concluded that no discrimination was established, and the petition was dismissed with costs.

The Court observed that if the prices had been fixed in the same manner as those adopted by the petitioners and, nevertheless, the Controller had granted import licences to those other persons for the full amount of the export value or for a percentage that was substantially higher than the percentage granted to the petitioners, such circumstances would have allowed a finding of discrimination. But, because the evidence on record did not show any such differential treatment, the Court held that there was no case of discrimination. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed and the respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. The Court also turned down the request made by M/s. M. Shaams and Company for intervention in the matter. The reason for this refusal was that the miscellaneous application numbered 264 of 1960, which the applicants had previously filed in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay seeking a writ of mandamus, a direction or an order under Article 226 of the Constitution, had already been dismissed by that High Court. The Court pointed out that the proper remedy available to the applicants was to file an appeal against that dismissal before this Court. Consequently, the application for intervention was dismissed and the petition was finally dismissed.