Krishan Chander Nayar vs The Chairman, Central Tractor Organisation

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 23 August, 1961

Coram: B.P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajgopala Ayyangar, S.K. Das

In the matter styled Krishan Chander Nayar versus The Chairman, Central Tractor Organisation, the case was listed on 23 August 1961 before the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Chief Justice Sinha, with the bench comprising Justices A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajgopala Ayyangar and S.K. Das. The petitioner, Krishan Chander Nayar, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction that would compel the respondents to remove a ban that allegedly prevented his entry into government service. The respondents identified in the petition were the Chairman of the Central Tractor Organisation, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi; the Secretary of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, New Delhi; and the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. The petitioner alleged that he was a trained machineman who, in 1948, obtained employment as a machineman with the Central Tractor Organisation. He remained in government service and, according to his own account, performed his duties satisfactorily until a notice dated 16 September 1954 terminated his services. The termination order, recorded as Office Order No. 375 and annexed to the petition as Annexure ‘A’, stated: “Shri K. C. Nayar s/o Dr. Tara Chand Designation M/Man is informed that his services are no longer required in this Organisation. His services will accordingly stand terminated with immediate effect from the date on which this notice is served on him. In lieu of the notice for one month due to him under rule 5 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, Shri K. C. Nayar will be given pay and allowances, for that period. The payment of allowances will, however, be subject to the conditions under which such allowances are otherwise admissible.” The petitioner appealed the termination order, but his appeal was dismissed on 6 December 1954, as shown in Annexure ‘B’. Following the dismissal, the petitioner obtained a service certificate, reproduced in Annexure ‘C’, which read: “Certified that Shri Krishan Chander Nayar served in this organisation as a Machineman in the scale of Rs. 125‑6‑185 with effect from 13‑5‑1948 to 21‑9‑1954. His services were terminated under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949.”

After receiving the certificate, the petitioner submitted several applications seeking re‑appointment in government posts, but he reported receiving no response. He later discovered, to his dismay, that the respondents had imposed a permanent ban on his future employment with the government. The ban was documented in a memorandum annexed as Annexure ‘D’, which stated: “With reference to his representations dated 9 September 1955 and 21 September 1955, the undersigned is directed to inform Shri K. C. Nayar, Ex‑Machineman that Government of India regret their inability to lift the ban on his employment for the present.” The petitioner contended that this ban constituted discrimination against him in the matter of government employment, and he therefore prayed that the Court issue appropriate relief to remove the ban and restore his eligibility for appointment to government service.

The petitioner had filed a petition before the Circuit Bench of the Delhi High Court under the authority of Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking relief from the alleged ban on his appointment to government service. The Division Bench of that Court dismissed the petition in limine by an order dated 12 September 1956. Subsequently, the petitioner applied for a certificate that was required to enable an appeal to the Supreme Court, but that application was also rejected by the same Bench on 26 April 1957. Thereafter, the petitioner approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution with a petition dated 20 August 1957.

The respondents answered the petition by filing an affidavit sworn by Mr G P Das, who held the position of Acting Chairman of the Central Tractor Organisation, Ministry of Food & Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. The affidavit comprised twenty‑three numbered paragraphs. The drafting of the affidavit was neither brief nor accurate; it contained numerous repetitions and failed to address the principal grievance raised by the petitioner, namely the alleged ban set out in Annexure D. Apart from the customary claim that the petition was “entirely misconceived and untenable in law,” the affidavit asserted that the Central Tractor Organisation was a temporary body operating under the Ministry of Agriculture, that the petitioner had been engaged solely as a temporary hand, and that his services could be terminated at any time by giving one month’s notice or by paying one month’s salary in lieu of such notice, without the necessity of stating any reason. The affidavit repeatedly emphasized that the petitioner’s services had been terminated in accordance with Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949.

When the affidavit turned to the petitioner’s main grievance, identified in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the petition and referring specifically to the memorandum in Annexure D, it stated in the following terms: the respondent did not admit that a ban had been placed on the petitioner’s entry into government service; it maintained that the petitioner had not been deprived of his right to apply for any government post; however, it also observed that the petitioner possessed no entitlement to an appointment in a government service. Nonetheless, the affidavit alleged that the petitioner remained free to apply for any government position and that any such application would be evaluated on its merits. In paragraph 12, after again highlighting the temporary nature of the petitioner’s appointment and its termination under Rule 5, the affidavit reiterated that the alleged ban was merely a departmental instruction intended for future guidance. It contended that this instruction did not, in any manner, prevent the petitioner from applying for any government post, that any application by the petitioner would be considered on its merits, and that the petitioner was not barred from seeking any such appointment.

In the present case the petitioner was governed by Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, and on that basis the Court observed that no show‑cause notice could ever have been issued to him. Regarding the alleged ban, the respondents submitted that after the petitioner had filed a representation to the Chairman of the Central Tractor Organisation seeking reinstatement, the Government examined the representation, considered all the surrounding circumstances and the petitioner’s antecedents, and ultimately concluded that reinstating him would not be advisable. Consequently, the Government decided not to restore the petitioner to his former position.

The Court further noted that the affidavit filed by the respondents was prepared in a careless and irresponsible manner. In paragraph 13 of that affidavit the respondents claimed that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke Article 32 of the Constitution because his application for special leave before this Court had allegedly been dismissed on 26 April 1957, and that the dismissal of that special‑leave petition was final and res judicata. The same contention was reiterated in paragraph 23, where the respondents asserted that the petitioner had no fundamental right to move an application before this Court, that he had exhausted all remedies, and that his present application was wholly misconceived and should be dismissed with costs. The Court explained that these statements were intended to portray a scenario in which this Court had indeed entertained and dismissed a special‑leave application on the cited date. In reality, no such special‑leave petition had ever been filed before this Court; the Punjab High Court had merely refused to grant a certificate that would have permitted an appeal to this Court. The Court therefore concluded that the person who drafted the affidavit was either negligent or ignorant of the facts. Such remissness could not be overlooked, and the Court emphasized that individuals responsible for preparing affidavits for use in this Court must act with great care and must not repeat statements that have no factual basis. The Court also observed that, beyond being unnecessarily wordy, the affidavit was misleading and failed to address the crucial issue of the ban raised by the petitioner.

It was observed that the affidavit suffered not only from the infirmity of being overly verbose, but also from being misleading and disingenuous. The petitioner had expressly drawn the Court’s attention to a prohibition, referred to as a “ban,” that was set out in Annexure D and that formed the core of his grievance against the respondents. However, the affidavit filed in answer to the petition made no reference at all to Annexure D. By ignoring the document, the affidavit appeared to deny that the respondents had ever imposed a ban that would prevent the petitioner from being taken into Government service. In effect, the respondents’ answer asserted that the petitioner had not been deprived of his right to apply for a Government post, even though the existence of the ban would inevitably cause any such application by the petitioner to be disregarded.

The factual situation, as understood by the Court, is that the petitioner remains subject to a ban concerning employment under the Government. Consequently, while the respondents deny the existence of any prohibition, the reality is that, as long as the ban continues, the petitioner cannot be considered by any Government department for any post for which he may apply, even if he meets the required qualifications. Had the respondents’ affidavit clearly explained the nature of the ban and the reasons for its imposition, the Court would have been better placed to determine whether the petitioner had substantial grounds for complaining about the manner in which he was being treated. A person who has previously been employed by the Government and whose services were terminated on account of his antecedents may not necessarily enjoy the same standing as other candidates who are not subject to such a ban. Nonetheless, any ban imposed by the Government must be founded on a reasonable basis and must relate to the person’s suitability for employment or appointment to an office. An arbitrary ban that lacks such justification would constitute a denial of the petitioner’s right to equal opportunity of employment, a right guaranteed under Article 16(1) of the Constitution. In the present case, the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents fails to describe the nature of the ban, and there is no indication that any proceeding was undertaken to give the petitioner an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the reason for the ban, whatever its nature, bore a justifiable relationship to the question of his suitability for employment or appointment under the Government.

Accordingly, the Court found it clear that the petitioner had been deprived of his constitutional right to equality of opportunity in matters of employment and appointment to any office under the State, a right enshrined in Article 16(1) of the Constitution. While the ban remains in force, any application made by the petitioner for employment under the State is destined to be treated as ineffective. The fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution not only includes the right to make an application for a Government post but also the right to be considered on merit for the post applied for. The ban in question effectively deprives the petitioner of that guaranteed right, leading to the inference that he has not been treated fairly.

In the circumstances described, any request submitted by the petitioner to obtain employment with the State would inevitably have been disregarded as if it were mere waste‑paper. The Constitution guarantees not merely the privilege of submitting an application for a governmental position but also the further entitlement that such an application be examined on its substantive merits. This constitutional protection, however, does not extend to an obligation that the petitioner must necessarily be appointed to the vacancy for which he applied. The restriction, referred to in the petition as a ‘ban’, was understood to prevent the petitioner from having his application evaluated on merit. By imposing such a prohibition, the ban effectively removed the petitioner’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a merit‑based consideration. Consequently, the court inferred that the petitioner had not been afforded fair treatment. Accordingly, the court permitted the petition and issued an order directing the respondents to withdraw the ban that had been placed against the petitioner. In addition, the court awarded costs to the petitioner in recognition of the successful challenge. The final order of the court confirmed that the petition was allowed.