Inder Singh vs Gurdial Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 141 of 1956

Decision Date: 10 April, 1961

Coram: S.K. Das, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah

In this case, the Court noted that the dispute was between Inder Singh and Gurdial Singh and that the judgment was delivered on 10 April 1961 by a Bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justice S K Das, Justice M Hidayatullah and Justice J C Shah. The parties were identified as petitioner Inder Singh and respondent Gurdial Singh, and the citation of the decision was recorded as 1967 AIR 119 and 1962 SCR (1) 845. The matter concerned the statutory provision on adoption custom among the Jats of Ludhiana, specifically the requirement that the adopted child be treated generally as a son.

The Court explained the factual background as follows: N, a Jat of Ludhiana district, was the last male holder of the property that was the subject of the litigation. He performed an adoption of the appellant before the village panchayat by distributing gur (jaggery) and subsequently executed a deed of adoption in the appellant’s favour. For a short period after the ceremony, N lived with the appellant. Within a few weeks, however, N left the appellant, cancelled the deed of adoption within five months, and repudiated any relationship with the appellant as his son. N died three years later. The appellant thereafter claimed that he had been validly adopted by N and argued that a valid adoption could not be revoked. The Court held that the appellant had not been validly adopted, because the customary law required two essential formalities: first, a declaration of adoption, and second, the general treatment of the adopted person as a son. The Court emphasized that a mere declaration, or even the execution of a deed of adoption, is insufficient if it is not accompanied by precedent or subsequent treatment of the adopted person as a son. In the present case, the second requirement was missing, and there was no evidence that N ever treated the appellant as his son; on the contrary, evidence showed that N repudiated the earlier declaration. The Court referred to prior authorities, including Gurbachna v Bujha (1911) 46 Punj Record 151, Baj Singh v Pratap Singh (1923) 77 I C 473, Chhajju v Mehr Singh (1930) 31 P L R 997, Chanan Singh v Buta Singh (1935) A I R Lah 83 and Kishen Singh v Taru (1949) A I R East Punjab 342.

The judgment proceeded under the civil appellate jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No 141 of 1956, which was an appeal from the decree dated 2 September 1954 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Regular Second Appeal No 337 of 1952. Counsel for the appellant were identified, and counsel for the respondents were listed. The judgment was delivered on 10 April 1961 by Justice S K Das. The Court framed the sole issue for decision as whether Inder Singh, who had been the plaintiff in the first instance, had been validly adopted by a person named Nathu in accordance with the customary rules of adoption among the Jats of Ludhiana district, State of Punjab. The Court then recounted the relevant facts about Nathu: he was the last male holder of the disputed property, a Jat of Ludhiana district, blind, unmarried, childless, and a resident of the village of Mohanpur.

Inder Singh, who also lived in the same village, was related to Nathu as a nephew by a collateral relationship of the fifth degree. Inder Singh asserted that he had looked after Nathu from his childhood. He claimed that on 24 March 1946 Nathu adopted him in accordance with the customary practice of their community. The adoption was performed before the village Panchayat by the customary distribution of “gur” (jaggery). The following day, 25 March 1946, Nathu executed a deed of adoption in favour of Inder Singh, and that deed was registered on the same day. After the registration, Nathu resided with Inder Singh for a short period.

Subsequently, Gujar Singh, who was a closer collateral relative of Nathu and the defendant in the suit, gained influence over Nathu. Under this influence, Nathu left Inder Singh and, on 6 September 1946, cancelled the deed of adoption. Nathu died three years later, on 27 October 1949. After Nathu’s death, Gujar Singh succeeded in having Nathu’s property recorded in the revenue records in his own name. Inder Singh then instituted a suit, which is the subject of the present appeal, seeking possession of Nathu’s estate consisting of approximately sixteen bighas of land and a house, on the basis that he was the lawfully adopted son of Nathu. The suit was contested by Gujar Singh, who alleged, among other points, that Inder Singh’s adoption was not valid according to the customary law of the Jats of Ludhiana.

The trial judge held that the alleged adoption before the village Panchayat was not substantiated and that the statements in the deed of adoption were inaccurate. He further observed that, under the customary rules of adoption, a deed of adoption would have no legal effect unless, after its execution, there was a continuous course of conduct showing that the adoptor treated the adoptee as his son. Because no evidence of such a continuous association was presented, the judge concluded that Inder Singh had failed to establish his case and dismissed the suit.

Inder Singh appealed the decision, and the appeal was heard by the District Judge of Ludhiana. After examining the evidence, the District Judge concluded that it was established that Nathu had declared Inder Singh to be his heir before the village Panchayat on or about 24 March 1946 and that Nathu had lived with Inder Singh for a very short time thereafter. In the District Judge’s view, this declaration was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a valid adoption under the customary law, and no additional proof of a father‑son type association was necessary. Accordingly, he held that the cancellation of the deed of adoption on 6 September 1946 had no effect, because once a valid adoption is made it cannot be revoked. The District Judge therefore allowed the appeal.

After the appellate decision, Gujar Singh died. The present respondents, claiming to be the heirs and legal representatives of Gujar Singh, filed a second appeal before the Punjab High Court.

The Court observed that the customary law of adoption followed by the parties required two indispensable elements: first, a clear intention to designate an heir, and second, an act of association that treated the designated person as a father‑son relationship. The Court further held that the brief interval of roughly six weeks during which Nathu resided with the appellant after the deed of adoption was inadequate to demonstrate that Nathu regarded Inder Singh as his prospective heir. Consequently, there was no act of association that would satisfy the customary requirements for a valid adoption among the Jats of Ludhiana district. On this basis, the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge and restored the decision of the court of first instance. Because the judgment was a reversal and the property in dispute was valued at more than Rs 20,000, the High Court issued a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution read with sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present appeal was filed on that certificate. The Court noted that the finding of the learned District Judge—that the evidence on record established that Nathu had declared Inder Singh his heir before the village Panchayat on or about 26 March 1946—constituted a factual determination and was binding in this second appeal; that finding therefore could not be reopened for further consideration. The controversy before the High Court and now before this Court centered on whether, under the customary rules of adoption prevailing among the Jats of Ludhiana, the second element—namely, an act of association or a general treatment of the appointed heir as a son—is essential for a valid adoption. Counsel appearing for the appellant, identified as Mr Achhru Ram, argued that the view expressed by the learned District Judge was correct. He referred the Court to the general statement of the customary rule concerning the appointment of an heir found in paragraph 35 on page 50 of the seventh edition of Rattigan’s Digest of Customary Law. That paragraph, together with its first explanation, reads: “A sonless proprietor of land in the central and eastern parts of the Punjab may appoint one of his kinsmen to succeed him as his heir. Such an appointment may be manifested, in the absence of any special custom prescribing a different mode, in any of the following ways: (a) a formal declaration before the brotherhood; (b) a written declaration, either preceded or followed by some treatment consistent with a deliberate appointment; or (c) a long course of treatment evidencing an unequivocal intention to appoint the specified person as heir.” The counsel contended that, according to this general rule, the appointment of an heir by adoption may be manifested by any of the methods enumerated above, namely a formal declaration before the brotherhood or a written declaration accompanied by appropriate treatment.

In the passage quoted, the third mode of manifesting an appointment was described as “a long course of treatment evidencing an unequivocal intention to appoint the specified person as heir.” Counsel for the petitioner argued that the district judge had found a formal declaration of adoption made by Nathu before the village panchayat, and that this declaration satisfied the requirement of sufficient manifestation of the appointment. Counsel further asserted that a later edition of Rattigan’s Digest, revised by O P Aggarwala, misstates the law by claiming that adoption is established solely by (i) an intention to appoint an heir and (ii) an act of association, as stated on page 497. The Court considered it unnecessary to explore the broader question of the rule’s exact reach in other parts of the Punjab because there existed clear and reliable evidence of the rule’s scope within Ludhiana district. To illustrate this, the Court referred to the Customary Law of the Ludhiana District (rewaj‑i‑am), compiled and attested by J M Dunnett, Settlement Officer, which set out the formalities of customary adoption among Ludhiana Jats in a question‑and‑answer format on page 102. The answer indicated that adoption was not a religious ceremony and required no special formalities; typically the adopter would summon neighbours and relatives, distribute gur, and announce the adoption, sometimes executing a deed, but that a declaration of adoption together with general treatment of the adopted person as a son was regarded as sufficient.

The compiler of that volume added that case law uniformly agreed that customary adoption demanded no formalities and that the only evidence needed to establish the fact of adoption was a clearly expressed intention and corresponding treatment. The Court cited two entries from the Punjab Record: in the 1882 record (entry 79) concerning Jats of Mauza Baga Kalan, the execution of a deed and general conduct were held sufficient, whereas in the 1893 record (entry 94) involving Dhaliwal Jats, a deed alone without antecedent or subsequent treatment was deemed insufficient. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Achhru Ram, acknowledged that the statement of Ludhiana custom in the rewaj‑i‑am was authoritative, though he noted that the detailed answers were not necessarily mandatory. The Court concluded that, for the Jats of Ludhiana, the essential formalities were a declaration of adoption and the general treatment of the appointed heir as a son; a mere declaration or a deed without accompanying treatment was inadequate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the High Court’s decision was correct, a view supported by earlier authorities, the earliest of which was Gurbachna v. Bujha, which held that the essential requirement was a clear expression of intent to adopt together with sufficient manifestation of that intent.

In the matter before the Court, the power of customary adoption by a proprietor who had no sons was not in dispute. The Court explained that, according to customary law, an adoption was only complete when the adoptive father expressed a clear intention to adopt the boy as his son and when that intention was demonstrated sufficiently. Such manifestation required the execution and registration of a deed of adoption, a clear declaration made in a court of law, and a subsequent treatment of the boy as an adopted son. The Court further noted that if a suit was filed by the reversioners of the adoptive father soon after the deed was executed, those parties could not be compelled to produce evidence of the subsequent treatment. In the present case, the deceased Nathu died three years after the deed of adoption was executed. He left Inder Singh only a few weeks after the deed, cancelled the deed within about five months, and, instead of treating Inder Singh as his son, repudiated any such relationship. The Court observed that under these facts the High Court correctly held that there was no sufficient manifestation of Nathu’s intention to adopt Inder Singh as his son.

The Court then referred to several authorities to support its view. In Baj Singh v. Partap Singh, it was observed that “there is ample authority for holding that the appointment in order to be valid must be made in some unequivocal and customary manner and the execution of a deed coupled with a long course of treatment has always been recognised as one of the modes of manifesting such an appointment.” In Chhajju v. Mehr Singh, it was held that the execution of a deed alone was not enough and that, where continuous subsequent treatment could not be proved, the adoption could not be established. The decision in Chanan Singh v. Buta Singh was based on the customary law of the district of Jullundur and affirmed that the appointment must be manifested by a declaration or a course of treatment that showed an unequivocal intention to appoint a specified person as heir; the recorded question and answer in the rewaj‑i‑am demonstrated that the essence of the customary rule required a clear declaration. Those Lordships dealt with a case where there was not only a public declaration in court but also subsequent treatment of the appointed heir as a son by the adoptive father. Finally, in Kishan Singh v. Taru it was observed that, to constitute an adoption under customary law, it was necessary to have a clear expression of intention by the adoptive father, the execution of a deed of adoption, a clear declaration before a registering officer, and continuous subsequent treatment as an adopted son. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the High Court was correct in holding that, in the circumstances of this case, the declaration made by Nathu before the village Panchayat was not a sufficient manifestation of his intention to adopt Inder Singh as his son.

In reaching its decision, the Court referred to several authorities, namely I.C. 473, the 1930 volume of the Punjab Law Reports at page 997, the 1935 Lahore report of the All‑India Reporter at page 83, and the 1949 East Punjab report of the All‑India Reporter at page 342. The Court observed that the declaration made by Nathu before the village Panchayat on 24 March 1946, together with the execution of a deed of adoption that Nathu subsequently cancelled within a short period, did not demonstrate a clear intention on Nathu’s part to adopt Inder Singh as his son. The Court emphasized that the evidence presented failed to show any conduct by Nathu Singh that treated Inder Singh as a son. In fact, the material on record indicated that Nathu had repudiated the earlier declaration he had made, thereby undermining any claim that a valid adoption had occurred. Having considered these points, the Court concluded that the appeal lacked any merit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the costs of the proceeding were awarded against the appellant. The final order of the Court therefore read that the appeal was dismissed with costs.