In Re: vs Unknown
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Not extracted
Decision Date: 25 September, 1961
Coram: B.P. Sinha, J.C. Shah, J.R. Mudholkar, K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal
In this case, the Court noted that the advocate who had been the subject of the misconduct proceedings had first been enrolled as an advocate of the Allahabad High Court in December 1958 and subsequently, in January 1961, had been enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court. The proceedings against him were instituted pursuant to the procedure specified in Order IV‑A of the Supreme Court Rules. In March of that year, the Registrar of the Supreme Court received a confidential letter from the Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Department of Law and Judiciary, stating that the advocate’s “Advocate on Record” had sent a post‑card dated 1 January 1961 to the Minister of Law of the State of Maharashtra, which the letter described as a “gross case of advertisement and solicitation for work.” The original post‑card, marked as Exhibit A in the subsequent proceedings, read as follows: “Mr. ‘A’. Advocate on Record. Supreme Court, Office and Residence B‑9, Model Town, Delhi‑9. Dated 19‑1‑61. Dear Sir, Jai Hind. Your attention is drawn to rule 20 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules 1950 (as amended) which provides that no advocate other than an Advocate on Record shall appear and plead in any matter unless instructed by an Advocate on Record. You might have obtained an Advocate on Record in this Court but I would like to place my services at your disposal if you so wish and agree. Hoping to be favoured. Thanks, yours sincerely, Sd : ‘A’ To The Minister of Law, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay.” When the matter was referred to the Chief Justice, he informally directed the Registrar to ascertain from the advocate whether the post‑card had indeed been written by him and whether it bore his rubric and signature. The Registrar telephoned the advocate, who conceded that the post‑card did contain his rubber stamp and signature and that he had dispatched it himself. He further disclosed that he had sent similar post‑cards to other parties and claimed that he had not realized that such correspondence amounted to any breach of professional etiquette or rule. Upon receiving this information, the Chief Justice placed the issue before a three‑judge Committee of the Supreme Court, acting under rule 2 of Order IV‑A, and the Committee proceeded to consider the matter referred to it.
After receiving the opinion of the Committee, the Chief Justice formed a Tribunal consisting of three members of the Bar: Shri Bishan Narain, Shri A. Ranganadham Chetty, both Senior Advocates, and Shri I. N. Shroff, an Advocate. Shri Bishan Narain was appointed as President of the Tribunal, which was tasked with conducting an enquiry into the alleged misconduct of the Advocate who was the subject of the proceedings. The Advocate was served with a notice and responded in a manner that the Tribunal described as highly irresponsible. In his response, he asserted that the complaint filed by the Government of Maharashtra was “false, mala fide and misconceived.” He denied authorship of the letter in question, describing it as “the work of any miscreant.” Moreover, he maintained that even if it were established that he had written the letter, a simple examination of its contents would reveal nothing unprofessional or objectionable. He further argued that “certainly it is not solicitation of work if one inquires from any person whether it requires or wishes and agrees to have the services of another advocate.” The Advocate was then examined as a witness on his own behalf, and the Tribunal presented the post‑card to him for identification. The sequence of questions and answers recorded by the Tribunal showed his persistent denial of facts that he had previously admitted to the Registrar. The Tribunal asked whether the post‑card was written by him; he replied “No.” When asked if the card had been sent from his office, he again answered “No,” acknowledging only that the card bore the seal of his office but that the seal had not been affixed by him. He confirmed that the rubber‑stamp and his name appeared on the card, yet he insisted that he had not applied them. In response to the query about the handwriting on the card, he denied that it was his own, and he also denied that the signature at the foot of the letter was his. To investigate further, the Tribunal examined additional documents labeled Exs. B to E, comparing his admitted handwriting in those exhibits with the handwriting on the post‑card. The Tribunal also required him to compose a letter using the same wording as the post‑card, so that a direct comparison could be made between the newly written text and the questioned post‑card. After these exercises, the Tribunal confronted him with the admissions he had previously made to the Registrar. The Tribunal then asked him to point out any differences between his normal signature and the signature that appeared on the post‑card, seeking to clarify the inconsistency in his statements.
When the Tribunal presented the signature that appeared on the post‑card to the Advocate, he responded that the signature resembled his own but asserted that it was not his signature; he also stated that the signature shown on Exhibit A was not his signature. The Tribunal then asked whether the Advocate had seen the Registrar of the Supreme Court in connection with this post‑card; the Advocate replied that the Registrar had indeed called him, but he could not recall the exact date of that meeting. When questioned if he had said anything to the Registrar, the Advocate answered that he had made no statement, adding that he had simply informed the Registrar that he had not written the post‑card and that someone else might have written it. The Tribunal further inquired whether the Advocate had admitted before the Registrar that he was the author of the letter; the Advocate denied that he had made such an admission, explaining that the Registrar had told him that admitting authorship could cause the matter to be quietly resolved. The Tribunal then asked if the Advocate had told the Registrar that he did not realize his actions were wrongful; the Advocate responded negatively, stating that he had said nothing of the sort. Finally, the Tribunal asked whether the Advocate wished to produce any evidence; the Advocate declined, stating that he had done nothing and therefore saw no reason to produce evidence, and he added that even if it were found that he had written the post‑card, there was nothing substantive in the case on its merits.
Observing the Advocate’s steadfast denial that he had written the post‑card or made any statement before the Registrar, the Tribunal called the Registrar as a witness and examined him on solemn affirmation. The Registrar testified and fully corroborated his earlier report that the Advocate had indeed made the admissions before him. After taking into account all oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal reported that, despite the Advocate’s emphatic denial, it was satisfied that the post‑card in question had been written by the Advocate. The Tribunal further concluded that the Advocate did not appreciate that drafting the post‑card constituted a breach of professional etiquette and ethics, and it expressed that it was regrettable that the Advocate chose to deny authorship. The Tribunal’s findings, together with the complete record of evidence, were placed before this Court. The Advocate, having received notice, appeared before this Court and was heard. Initially, he repeated the same position he had taken before the Tribunal; however, when this Court pressed him to make a truthful statement regarding whether he had written the post‑card and whether he had admitted this to the Registrar, he answered affirmatively. Consequently, it was clear beyond any doubt that the Advocate had addressed the letter to the Government of Maharashtra to solicit briefs, that he had admitted to the Registrar that he had written the post‑card and other similar post‑cards to other parties, and that he had done so in complete disregard of his duties as an Advocate of this Court.
The Court noted that the advocate had dispatched post‑cards to other parties and that he had done so in complete disregard of his position as an advocate of this Court. It was equally clear, the Court said, that his denial of having written the post‑card and his denial of the subsequent admission to the Registrar were again in total disregard of the truth. By making such false statements before the Court, the advocate condemned himself as a liar and as a person either ignorant of the basic rules of professional ethics or indifferent to them. The Court held that the advocate had chosen the wrong profession and appeared to possess very weak moral fibre. If the advocate was ignorant of the elementary rules of professional ethics, the Court observed that this ignorance demonstrated a deficiency in the training and education required of a member of the legal profession. Conversely, if the advocate was aware that soliciting a brief through a post‑card was highly improper and nevertheless proceeded to write it, the Court considered him an unworthy member of the learned profession. In either circumstance, the Court found that the advocate did not possess the high moral calibre essential for a member of the legal profession. By maintaining a false denial that was proven untrue during the Tribunal proceedings, the advocate did not merit leniency from the Court with respect to the quantum of punishment for his proven misconduct. The Court concluded that the advocate fully deserved a suspension from practice for a period of five years. The Court explained that such a suspension would provide the advocate with sufficient time and opportunity to reflect deeply and decide, after introspection, whether he is fit to continue as a member of the legal profession. The Court expressed the view that the advocate is not fit to continue and ordered that he be taught that a lawyer must never be a liar.