Harnam Das vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 74 of 1961

Decision Date: 27 April, 1961

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this case the matter involved a petition filed by Harnam Das against the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petition was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 27 April 1961. The judgment was authored by Justice A.K. Sarkar and the bench was composed of Justices A.K. Sarkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The official citation of the decision is 1961 AIR 1662 and it also appears in the Supreme Court Reports as 1962 SCR (2) 371. The case is referred to in later reports as R 1972 SC 2086 and F 1977 SC 202.

The dispute centred on an order issued by the respondent State under section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898). The order directed the forfeiture of two books authored by the petitioner, alleging that the publications contained material punishable under sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code. The State’s order failed to disclose the specific grounds on which it based its opinion, a requirement expressly prescribed by section 99A. Consequently, the petitioner invoked section 99B of the Code and applied to the High Court for setting aside the forfeiture order.

Section 99D of the Code provides that the High Court must set aside a forfeiture order if it is not satisfied that the impugned books contain seditious or otherwise prohibited matter as defined in sub‑section (1) of section 99A. The High Court, however, held that because the State’s order did not state the grounds for its opinion, the Court could not invoke section 99D. The Court reasoned that its duty was limited to determining whether the books actually fell within the mischief of the offences alleged, not to assess the adequacy of the State’s stated reasons. After examining the books independently, the High Court concluded that their contents were “obnoxious and highly objectionable” and therefore dismissed the petition to set aside the forfeiture.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justices Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, with Justice Das Gupta dissenting, held that the High Court should have set aside the forfeiture order under section 99D. The Court emphasized that when the State fails to articulate the grounds for its opinion as mandated by section 99A, the High Court is obliged to invalidate the order because it cannot be satisfied that the undisclosed grounds justify the forfeiture. In the absence of any expressed grounds, the High Court has no basis to confirm the legality of the order.

The judgment also referred to earlier authorities, including Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal (1955) 59 C.W.N. 495, which was approved, and the decisions in Premi Khem Rai v. Chief Secretary (1951) AIR Raj 213, and N. Veerabrahmam v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1959) AIR A Pr 572. These precedents were considered in forming the Court’s view on the procedural requirements under sections 99A and 99D of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the matter before the Court, the decisions of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. (1959) A. Pr. 572 and Baba Khalil Ahmed v. State of U. P., A.I.R. (1960) All. 715 were indicated as being disapproved. Justice Das Gupta observed that the High Court possessed no authority to set aside the forfeiture order merely because the Government had failed to set out the grounds of its opinion in that order. He explained that the High Court’s duty was not to assess whether the specific grounds articulated by the Government were correct, but rather to determine whether the opinion itself was correct, a task that could be accomplished only by examining the books in question. Section 99B, he noted, restricts the basis on which relief may be sought to a single ground – that the books do not contain any objectionable matter – and it is therefore impermissible for courts to extend that ground. The Court approved the authorities Baijnath v. Emperor A.I.R. (1925) All. 195, Premi Khem Raj v. Chief Secretary, A.I.R. (1951) Raj. 113, N. Veerabrahmam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 A. Pr. 572 and Baba Khalil Ahmed v. State of U. P., A.I.R. (1960) All. 715, while disapproving Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal, (1959) 59 C.W.N. 495. The judgment recorded that this appeal fell within criminal appellate jurisdiction, being Criminal Appeal No. 74 of 1961, and was entertained by special leave from the judgment and order dated 7 May 1957 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2006 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant were Veda Vyas, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, while the respondent was represented by G.C. Mathur and C. P. Lal. The judgment of the Full Bench, comprising Justices Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, was delivered by Justice Sarkar, and Justice Das Gupta delivered a separate opinion. Justice Sarkar identified that the sole issue argued in the appeal concerned the construction of section 99D of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant had authored two Hindi books, titled Sikh Mat Khandan Part 1 and Bhoomika Nazam Sikh Mat Khandan, which were published in April 1953. On 30 July 1953, the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the respondent, issued an order under section 99A of the Code that forfeited the books, leading to their seizure. The material portion of that order stated: “In exercise of its powers conferred by section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure… the Government is pleased to declare the books forfeited to Government on the ground that the said books contain matter, the publication of which is punishable under section 153‑A and 295‑A of the Indian Penal Code.” The validity of this order was the subject of the present challenge. For reference, the relevant wording of section 99A was recalled as follows: “Where any newspaper, or book or any document appears to the State Government to contain any seditious matter or any matter which promotes or is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India or which is deliberately and maliciously intended to…”

The State Government may, by a notification in the Official Gazette, declare every copy of a book forfeited when the book contains any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 124A, section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Two points emerge clearly from the wording of this provision. First, an order under the provision can be issued only after the Government has formed a specific opinion that the document in question contains “any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 124A or section 153A or section 295A of the Penal Code.” Section 124A deals with seditious matters, section 153A addresses matters that promote enmity between different classes of Indian citizens, and section 295A concerns matters that insult the religion or religious beliefs of any such class. Second, the provision obliges the Government to state the grounds of its opinion in the notification. In the present case, the order did state that, in the Government’s opinion, the books contained material punishable under sections 153A and 295A of the Penal Code. However, the order failed to disclose the factual or analytical grounds supporting that opinion. Consequently, it remained unknown which particular communities were regarded as being alienated from one another or whose religious sentiments were considered offended, and why the Government believed that such alienation or offence had occurred.

Section 99B confers on any person who has an interest in a newspaper, book or other document subject to a forfeiture order under section 99A the right to apply to the High Court within two months of the order to have it set aside on the ground that the issue of the newspaper, book or document did not contain any seditious or other matter of the nature referred to in sub‑section (1) of section 99A. Section 99C mandates that every such application be heard and decided by a Special Bench of the High Court consisting of three judges. Section 99D further directs the Special Bench, upon receipt of the application, to examine whether it is satisfied that the issue of the newspaper, book or document in question contained the prohibited matter. If the Bench is not satisfied of such a presence, it is required to set aside the forfeiture order. These procedural provisions, together with section 99C, are particularly relevant to the present dispute and are therefore reproduced for consideration.

It was held that when a document is found to contain seditious or other matter of the nature referred to in sub‑section (1) of section 99A, the order of forfeiture must be set aside. From the provisions, the Court understood that the ground for filing an application under section 99B is exactly the ground which, if proved, would compel the High Court to set aside the forfeiture order under section 99D. The appellant had moved the High Court at Allahabad under section 99B, seeking to set aside the forfeiture of his books. In that proceeding, it was argued before the High Court that the forfeiture order should be annulled because the Government’s reasons for the opinion had not been stated. On this point, the High Court observed that “the requirement to state the ground is mandatory. A mere citation of words of the section will not do.” The Court further noted, quoting a decision of a Special Bench of this Court in Baijnath v. Emperor (AIR 1925 All 195), that “the High Court, in view of the provisions of section 99D of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is pre‑cluded from considering any other point than the question whether in fact the document comes within the mischief of the offence charged.” Relying on this view, the High Court declined to set aside the forfeiture order on the basis of the omission to state the Government’s grounds.

Subsequently, the High Court examined the books itself and described their contents as “obnoxious and highly objectionable.” It dismissed the appellant’s application, observing that the appellant had “entirely failed to show that the books did not contain matters which promoted feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes, or which did not insult or attempt to insult the religion or religious beliefs of the Sikhs.” The present appeal arises from that order of the High Court. The High Court had held that its duty under section 99D was limited to determining “whether in fact the document comes within the mischief of the offence charged.” It interpreted this to mean that a document fell within the mischief if, in the Court’s own assessment, it contained material whose publication would be punishable under section 124A, section 153A or section 295A of the Penal Code, as mentioned in the forfeiture order, regardless of the Government’s opinion on the matter. The Court further opined that, otherwise, it could not uphold the order merely because, in its view, the books offended the Sikhs and Sikh religion, when there was no evidence that the Government had held that view. The same approach appeared to have been adopted in several other decisions, namely Premi Khem Raj v. Chief Secretary, N. Veerabrahmam v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Baba Khalil Ahmed v. State of U.P., as referenced in the judgment.

The Court observed that the decisions reported in (1951) Raj. 113, A.I.R (1959) A.P. 572 and A.I.R (1960) All. 715 had apparently taken the view that the phrase “if it is not satisfied that… the book… contained seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub‑section (1) of section 99A” in section 99D meant a lack of satisfaction for any reason whatsoever, without regard to the reasons on which the Government formed its opinion. The Court stated that it could not accept this construction of section 99D. It then framed the central question as to the meaning of the words “matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub‑section (1) of section 99A” that appear in section 99D. The Court asked whether those words meant any matter of that nature as thought by the High Court, or whether they referred only to those matters on which the order of forfeiture was based, that is, the matters which, for the reasons stated in the order, the Government believed to be punishable under one or more of sections 124A, 153A and 295A of the Penal Code. The Court concluded that the latter interpretation was the correct one, because it followed inevitably when sections 99A, 99B and 99D were read together, as they necessarily must be.

The Court explained that section 99D dealt with setting aside an order made under section 99A. Such an order could be issued only after certain facts had been brought to the Government’s notice and the Government had formed an opinion based on those facts. The statute further required the Government to record the grounds for its opinion. It was this government‑based order, together with the recorded grounds, that section 99B authorised an aggrieved person to approach the High Court for its set‑aside. Consequently, the only requirement that section 99B imposed on the petitioner was to demonstrate that the original order was improper. The propriety of the order depended solely on the merits of the grounds on which it was founded; the existence of another possible order on different grounds was irrelevant, because it would not affect the validity of the order that had actually been made. An order could be invalid if the reasons on which it rested did not support it, even if another order addressing the same penal provision could have been justified on alternative reasons. The Court further noted that two orders, although both stating that a publication contained matter offending the same penal provision, could not be regarded as identical when the reasons for classifying the matter differed. Accordingly, when section 99B permitted a person affected by the order to move the High Court to set it aside on the ground that the book “did not contain any seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub‑section (1) of section 99A”, the phrase “matter of such a nature” must, for the reasons explained, refer only to the matter on which the Government’s opinion, as stated in the order, was based.

In addressing section 99D, the Court explained that this provision dealt with the same forfeiture order that was considered under section 99B. Because an order under section 99D was made only after an application filed under section 99B, the Court held that the order had to either accept or reject the grounds raised in that application. Those grounds, as previously examined, were limited to questioning the propriety of the reasons on which the Government’s opinion, which resulted in the forfeiture order, was based. The Court noted that the language quoted from section 99B appeared in essentially the same wording in section 99D, and therefore the two sections shared an identical scope. Consequently, the words in section 99D must be given the same meaning as in section 99B, that is, they refer only to matters on which the Government’s opinion was founded. The Court rejected the High Court’s broader interpretation that the words could refer to any matter whatsoever, regardless of the Government’s reasons for making the order, a view the Court found untenable. This interpretation, the Court said, also clarified why section 99A required the Government to state the grounds of its opinion: the purpose was to enable the High Court to set aside the forfeiture order if it was not satisfied with the propriety of those grounds. Without that requirement, the Government’s stated grounds would be meaningless, especially since section 99G limited challenges to forfeiture orders to the procedure laid down in section 99B. If the order could be upheld on grounds other than those on which the Government formed its opinion, the requirement to state the Government’s grounds would be irrelevant, leading to an anomalous result. The Court emphasized that a forfeiture order under section 99D was indisputably an order made under section 99A, and therefore it was essentially an order of the Government alone. To illustrate, the Court described a hypothetical where the Government, in its order, stated that expression A in a book offended the religious beliefs of community X. If the High Court, in reviewing the application to set aside the order, found that expression A did not offend community X but that another expression B in the same book offended community Y, and then upheld the order on that basis, the resulting forfeiture would effectively be an order made by the High Court rather than by the Government. The Court found such a possibility impossible, noting that the statutory scheme did not envisage a forfeiture order being issued by the High Court. Accordingly, the Court concluded that under section 99D it was the duty of the High Court to set aside a forfeiture order whenever it was not satisfied that the Government’s stated grounds justified the opinion that the book contained matter punishable under sections 124A, 153A or 295A of the Penal Code. The High Court’s role was not to independently determine whether the book contained such prohibited matter, but solely to assess whether the Government’s grounds, as articulated, were sufficient.

The Court explained that an order of forfeiture could not be issued by a High Court on its own because the statutory provisions did not empower the Court to do so. The relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure required that the forfeiture order be made by the Government, and the Government had to set out the specific grounds for its opinion that the books in question contained material punishable under sections 124A, 153A or 295A of the Penal Code. Accordingly, under section 99D, the High Court’s function was limited to examining whether it was satisfied with the grounds that the Government had actually stated. If the High Court was not convinced that the Government’s stated grounds justified the forfeiture, the Court was required to set aside the forfeiture order. The Court stressed that it was not the role of the High Court to make its own independent finding as to whether the books contained any punishable matter. In a situation where the Government failed to state any grounds, the Court could not uphold the forfeiture because doing so would amount to the Court itself issuing an order of forfeiture, an act beyond its statutory authority. The Court observed that this view was consistent with the decision in Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal, and affirmed that the present case fell within the same category.

Consequently, the Court held that the High Court was obligated under section 99D to set aside the forfeiture order dated 30 July 1953. The appeal was allowed, and the Government’s forfeiture order was vacated. The appellant, Harnam Das, was ordered to receive back all books, documents and other items that had been seized pursuant to that order. The Court noted that the Uttar Pradesh Government, by a notification dated 30 July 1953 and acting under section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had declared the books titled “Sikh Mat Khandan, Part 1” and “Bhoomika Nazam Sikh Mat Khandan”—published by the appellant in April 1953—to be forfeited on the ground that they contained matters punishable under sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court had examined the books and concluded that they fell clearly within the mischief of those offences, and had therefore upheld the forfeiture. In light of the statutory requirements and the lack of expressed grounds by the Government, the Supreme Court set aside that earlier decision and directed the return of the seized material to the appellant.

The Court observed that the State Government’s order forfeiting the two books had been held by the High Court to be eminently just and proper, and that the High Court had consequently dismissed the application seeking relief. One argument was advanced that the forfeiture order should be set aside because the government’s notification, which effected the declaration of forfeiture, failed to state the grounds of the government’s opinion as required by section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court rejected this argument, expressing the view that, in accordance with the provisions of section 99D, the High Court was limited to considering only the question of whether the document actually fell within the mischief of the offence charged and could not entertain any other point. The Court noted that it was quite clear that the government’s notification did not specify the grounds on which the government formed the opinion that the two documents contained matters whose publication was punishable under sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code. The matter that now came before this Court was whether the High Court had been correct in rejecting the contention that the forfeiture order should be set aside on the ground that the notification had omitted the required statement of the government’s opinion under section 99A. The learned judges explained that their view was consistent with the earlier decision of the same High Court in Baijnath v. Emperor, as well as with the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Premi Khem Raj v. Chief Secretary. The same approach had later been adopted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in N. Veerabrahmam v. State Of Andhra Pradesh and by the Allahabad High Court in Baba Khalil Ahmad v. State of U. P. A contrary position had been expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Arun Ranjan Ghose v. State of West Bengal. The Court then reproduced the material portion of section 99A, which reads: “Where any newspaper, or book… or any document… appears to the Government to contain any seditious matter or any matter which promotes or is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India or which is deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or the religious belief of that class, that is to say, any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 124A or section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette stating the grounds of its opinion, declare… every copy of such book… to be forfeited to the government.” From this provision it was clear that before any government could make a declaration forfeiting a book, it first had to form the opinion that the book contained material punishable under the cited sections, and then it was required to issue a notification in the Official Gazette that set out the grounds of that opinion.

Before the government can forfeit a book, it must first be of the opinion that the book contains material whose publication is punishable under section 124A, section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Once the government forms that opinion, it acquires the authority to declare the book forfeited. The statute obliges the government to effect this declaration by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette, and the notification must set out the reasons on which the government based its opinion.

The legislature, however, did not render such a governmental order immune from judicial scrutiny. Section 99B provides a procedure by which a person who believes the order to be erroneous may obtain relief. Specifically, relief is available if the government’s opinion is wrong and the book does not actually contain material punishable under section 124A, section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Section 99B reads as follows: “Any person having any interest in any newspaper, book or other document, in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under section 99A, may, within two months from the date of such order, apply to the High Court to set aside such order on the ground that the issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect of which the order was made, did not contain any seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub‑section (1) of section 99A.”

Section 99D governs the High Court’s response to such an application. If, after hearing the application, the High Court is not satisfied that the questioned document contains any seditious matter or any other matter referred to in section 99A—that is, any matter whose publication is punishable under section 124A, section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code—the Court shall set aside the forfeiture order. Conversely, if the High Court finds that the book does contain material punishable under those penal provisions, it will decline to set aside the order.

It is important to note that section 99B limits the grounds for relief to a single ground: the assertion that the newspaper, book or other document in question does not contain any seditious or other matter specified in sub‑section (1) of section 99A. The appellant argued that the High Court should also scrutinise the government’s notification to determine whether the required statement of grounds, as mandated by section 99A, had been made, and that the Court should set aside the forfeiture order if that requirement had not been fulfilled.

The appellant contended that the High Court should be allowed to set aside a forfeiture order when it determines that the statutory requirement of stating the government’s reasons has not been satisfied, thereby creating an additional ground for an application under section 99B and for relief under section 99D. The Court was asked whether such an expansion of the statutory scheme was permissible. It was observed that both the right of appeal and the right to move an application for setting aside an order are creations of statute; consequently, the legislature may either leave the right unrestricted or may impose specific limitations upon it. Established jurisprudence holds that a court may not enlarge the grounds for appeal beyond those enumerated in the enabling provision. The same principle applies when a statute confers a right to obtain relief by way of an application: a court cannot add further grounds for relief if the statute confines the right to one or more expressly listed grounds. The Court recalled the analogous situation concerning the right to seek a review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the legislature, after enumerating certain grounds for review, introduced the phrase “for any other sufficient reason.” The Privy Council, in 1922, after extensive analysis of case law, clarified that this phrase is to be interpreted as requiring a reason that is at least analogous to the expressly listed grounds, not as a carte blanche authority for the court to create new grounds. Had the court been free to add grounds at its discretion, the extensive discussion on the meaning of “for any other sufficient reason” would have been superfluous. The Court therefore reiterated that the law is unequivocal: courts cannot augment the grounds of relief that the legislature has deliberately limited. This doctrinal certainty was recognized by counsel for the appellant, who refrained from asserting that an additional ground could be introduced. To circumvent the limitation imposed by sections 99B and 99D, the appellant advanced an innovative argument asserting that, for the High Court to dispense appropriate relief under those sections, the government’s order must disclose the reasons behind its opinion. The argument proceeds as follows: first, the government has formed an opinion; second, the High Court must verify the correctness of that opinion; third, to perform this verification, the High Court must be apprised of the factors that influenced the government’s conclusion. Consequently, without a statement of the government’s reasoning, the High Court would be unable to assess whether the statutory requirement has been fulfilled.

The Court explained that, without the Government’s opinion, the High Court could not be satisfied, within the meaning of section 99D, that the newspaper issue actually contained the matter complained of. The Court held that the flaw in the proposed reasoning lay in the unsound premise that, in order to determine whether the Government’s opinion was correct, the High Court must know the material that weighed with the Government. When the High Court hears the application and must decide whether it is satisfied that the newspaper, book, or other document contains a matter referred to in section 99A, the Court observed that the sole proper method of reaching that conclusion is to read the newspaper, book, or document itself. While counsel’s arguments may be helpful and the Government’s stated grounds for its opinion would also assist, the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether the issue contains the matters mentioned in section 99A rests solely on the High Court’s examination of the document in question. The Court rejected the suggestion that the phrase “any seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub‑section (1) of section 99A” in sections 99B and 99D limits the matters to only those on which the Government based its forfeiture order, and that without the Government stating its grounds the Court would be unable to decide the question under section 99D. The Court expressed that it could not conceive of a case where an order under section 99A would fail to mention the particular matter referred to in subsection (1). The mention of the specific matter among the several matters listed in section 99A does not, however, require the statement of reasons for forming the opinion. For example, if the Government states that, in its opinion, the document contains seditious matters, that statement remains complete even if the reasons for that opinion are not provided. The formation of the opinion that one or more of the matters listed in the section are contained in a document and the declaration that such an opinion has been formed are distinct from providing the reasons for forming the opinion. In the present case, the Government’s order identified the particular matter or matters among those listed in section 99A, namely any seditious matter or any matter intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India or to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting religion or religious beliefs, and the Court found no difficulty arising from the absence of the Government’s grounds for forming that opinion.

The Court observed that when the Government states that a document contains any matter punishable under section 124A, section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, it is not necessary for the Court to have before it the Government’s reasons for forming that opinion. The appellant questioned why the legislature, in section 99A, required the Government to set out the grounds of its opinion when issuing a forfeiture order. He argued that the true purpose of this requirement was to enable the High Court to overturn a forfeiture order if it was not convinced of the propriety of those grounds, or if no grounds were supplied at all. According to that line of reasoning, the legislature ought also to have provided in section 99B a provision allowing a challenge on the basis that the grounds were omitted, together with the consequential provisions in section 99D. The Court found no justification for reading into sections 99A and 99D words that are not present, merely to explain why section 99A demands a statement of the grounds. It held that the requirement for the Government to record its grounds is a salutary measure that reduces the risk of arbitrary forfeiture orders and reflects a legislative policy decision, not a hidden intention to invite High Court interference solely on the ground of omitted reasons. The Court further explained that the duty imposed by section 99D on High Court judges is not to assess the correctness of the specific grounds articulated by the Government, but to determine whether the opinion itself was correct. To fulfill this duty, the judges must examine the document that the Government alleges contains the offending matter. The Court rejected the contention that the High Court could not discharge its duty under section 99D without a stated set of grounds, describing that view as wholly unsound. It noted that in the present case the Allahabad High Court judges were able to reach a conclusion on the matter despite the absence of a stated ground, and therefore found no justification for imagining any difficulty where none existed. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in rejecting the argument that the forfeiture order should be set aside on the basis that the Government had not disclosed its grounds.

The Court observed that the petitioner had argued that the notification on which the forfeiture order was based failed to disclose the government’s reasons for forming its opinion, and therefore the petitioner's submission was that the appeal ought to be dismissed on that ground. In response, the Court considered the view expressed by the majority of the judges hearing the matter and concluded that the appeal could not be dismissed merely because the notification omitted a statement of the government’s grounds. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and expressly set aside the order that had been passed by the High Court. As a result of setting aside that order, the Court directed that the appellant be returned all books, documents and any other items that had been seized from him under the operation of the now‑set‑aside order. Moreover, the Court ordered that the appellant be reimbursed for all expenses and costs that he had been compelled to incur in complying with the High Court’s order, thereby restoring to him both the seized property and the monetary outlays he had made as a consequence of the earlier decree.