Harbans Singh and Another vs State of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1959

Decision Date: 16 October 1961

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo

In the matter of Harbans Singh and another versus the State of Punjab, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 16 October 1961. The bench that heard the appeal consisted of Justice K. C. Das Gupta, Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice A. K. Sarkar and Justice K. N. Wanchoo. The petitioners, Harbans Singh and another individual, appealed against the order of the State of Punjab. The case is reported in the 1962 volume of the All India Reporter at page 439 and in the 1962 supplement to the Supreme Court Reports at page 104. Subsequent citator references include numerous reports such as RF 1963 SC 200, R 1965 SC 26, R 1965 SC 257, and several others up to R 1985 SC 416. The appeal concerned an order of acquittal that had been set aside by the High Court, which then convicted the appellants under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Supreme Court examined the principles governing an appellate court’s interference with a trial‑court acquittal. The Court reiterated that interference must be based on “compelling and substantial reasons” and that, in the absence of such reasons, an appellate court should not disturb an acquittal. While the Court declined to limit the powers granted by section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it emphasized that the prevailing principle remains that an appellate court must scrutinise the evidence with particular care and must review the reasons on which the acquittal was founded. Interference is warranted only when the appellate court is satisfied that the trial judge’s view was clearly unreasonable. The Court observed that finding the lower‑court view unreasonable itself constitutes a compelling reason for setting aside the acquittal. If the High Court correctly applied the required principles in overturning the acquittal, the Supreme Court would ordinarily not interfere with the High Court’s conviction order nor re‑examine the evidence to determine whether the High Court’s assessment of the facts was accurate. The Supreme Court would limit its own examination to ensuring that the High Court had undertaken a careful analysis of the evidence, applied the correct legal standards, and had not erred in its interpretation of law or in reading the trial‑court record. If the High Court’s judgment failed to demonstrate such careful scrutiny, or if it appeared to contain legal error or misapprehension of the evidence, the Supreme Court indicated that it would intervene accordingly.

In accordance with the established principle, the Supreme Court must, unless the case is remanded to the High Court for a fresh hearing, examine the evidence independently in order to determine the reasons upon which the lower court based its order of acquittal. After this independent appraisal, the Court must decide whether the High Court’s view that the lower court’s conclusions were unreasonable is justified. Should the Court, after such examination, find that the view of the acquitting court was indeed unreasonable, the order of acquittal will be set aside. Conversely, if the Court concludes that the acquitting court’s view was not unreasonable, the order of acquittal will be restored. In reaching this determination, the Court referred to the authorities in Suraj Pal Singh v. State [1952] S.C.R. 194, Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab [1953] S.C.R. 418, Puran v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 459, Chinta v. State of M.P. (Cr. A. No. 178 of 59) and Ashrafkha Haibatkha Pathan v. State of Bombay (Cr. A. No. 38 of 1960). The Court emphasized that there is no rule of law or prudence demanding that a dying declaration be corroborated by other evidence before a conviction may be based upon it, a principle affirmed in Ram Nath v. State of M.P. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 420. The precedent set in Khushal Ram v. State of Bombay [1958] S.C.R. 552 was followed, and the Court noted that a dying declaration does not lose credibility merely because several persons are named as culprits, rejecting the erroneous view expressed in Khurshaid Hussain v. Emperor (1941) 43 Cr.L.J. 59.

The judgment in this criminal appellate matter concerned Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1959, which was filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 23 May 1958 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 414 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant were N.C. Chatterjee, I.M. Lal, C.L. Sareen and Mohan L. Agarwal, while N.S. Bindra and P.D. Menon appeared for the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 16 October 1961 by Justice Das Gupta. The factual backdrop involved six persons, including the present appellants, who were tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozpur, on several charges relating to the homicidal deaths of two brothers, Munshi Singh and Hazura Singh. Among the six, Bhag Singh was the father of the other five accused. The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted all six accused. On the State’s appeal, the Punjab High Court set aside the acquittals of Harbans Singh and Major Singh and convicted them under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, while the acquittals of Bhag Singh, Gursi, Bant Singh and Gian Singh were upheld. Harbans Singh and Major Singh subsequently obtained special leave and filed the present appeal against their convictions. The prosecution’s case stated that at about 8 or 9 p.m. on 23 July 1956, shortly after Munshi Singh had returned home and complained to his father Hira Singh about the abusive conduct of Harbans Singh and Bant Singh, Munshi Singh ran out of his house upon hearing cries. When he reached a nearby Dharamshala, he encountered Harbans Singh and Bant Singh, who allegedly attacked him, an incident that formed the core of the prosecution’s evidence.

According to the evidence, the appellants together with their father Bhag Singh and their brothers Bant Singh, Gian Singh and Gursi attacked Munshi Singh and inflicted numerous injuries using the weapons they carried. It was alleged that Harbans Singh struck Munshi Singh on the abdomen with a handgun. Munshi Singh’s brother Hazura Singh and his father Hira Singh had followed Munshi Singh when he ran out of the house. When Hazura Singh saw the assault on his brother, he attempted to intervene, but he too was attacked and received several injuries, a thrust to his abdomen being attributed to Harbans Singh. Munshi Singh died at the scene. Hazura Singh was taken to the hospital at Gidder Bha the following morning, received some treatment, and died of his injuries on the next day, 24 July. All of the accused pleaded not guilty, contending that they had been falsely implicated out of personal enmity. To prove its case, the prosecution relied on the testimony of two relatives of the deceased—his father Hira Singh and his uncle Bhag Singh—and on the dying declaration allegedly made by Hazura Singh, first in the village before Sub‑Inspector Devendra Singh, who had arrived that night on a separate investigation, and later at Gidder Bha hospital before a Magistrate.

After examining the evidence, the trial judge concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the case against any of the accused. He observed that the First Information Report had been recorded at 4:30 p.m. on 24 July, and he expressed doubt that the complainant party could identify the assailants at that time, suggesting that the police had delayed the report while investigating. The judge also doubted the Sub‑Inspector’s claim that he had reached the village on the night of the incident and therefore questioned whether Hazura Singh could have made a statement to him that night. He further held that Hazura Singh’s dying declaration carried little probative value because it named six persons and lacked corroboration. The judge was not satisfied that the prosecution witness Bhag Singh had been present in the village or at his house at the time of the occurrence, noting that Bhag Singh’s statement was absent from the police‑prepared Inquest Report recorded at midnight. Moreover, the judge found it unsatisfactory that no one other than the two close relatives—the father and uncle of the deceased—had been examined as witnesses to the incident. These considerations led him to conclude that the prosecution had not established guilt beyond reasonable doubt against any of the accused, resulting in their acquittal. The High Court, however, disagreed with this assessment.

The High Court observed that the learned Judge had been completely wrong in holding that Bhag Singh was not mentioned in the Inquest Report. It further held that the judge had misread the time of the first Information Report, recording 4‑30 P.M. instead of 4‑30 A.M. The High Court also found that the judge erred in concluding that the statement given by Hazura Singh to the police upon their arrival at 1‑15 A.M. was inadmissible. After identifying these mistakes, the High Court declared that it had no hesitation in concluding that, for those reasons, the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wholly erroneous. It further stated that the erroneous judgment had caused a complete miscarriage of justice. The High Court then indicated that after carefully reviewing the testimony of both eye‑witnesses and examining other material, particularly the two dying declarations, it was satisfied that the prosecution case was substantially true. It further concluded that the case had been proved. Regarding the alleged complicity of Harbans Singh and Major Singh, the High Court found no doubt that both had participated and were responsible for delivering the fatal blow to each of the deceased. In this respect, the testimony of the witnesses and the dying declarations were consistent, leading the court to hold both accused guilty under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The principal argument advanced on behalf of the appellants was that the High Court had not provided sufficient reasons for interfering with the acquittal order of the Additional Sessions Judge. They also contended that the High Court had itself committed errors, particularly by misreading the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and attributing to him statements that were not present in his judgment. The Court noted that the appropriate principles to be applied by a court hearing an appeal against an acquittal have attracted its attention since the earliest stage of its jurisprudence. In many earlier decisions, the Court laid down that interference with an acquittal order must be based only on compelling and substantial reasons. It also expressed the view that without such reasons an appellate court should not disturb the acquittal. The Court cited Suraj Pal Singh v. The State, Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab and Puran v. State of Punjab as authorities that articulated this principle. The Court observed that the phrase “compelling reasons” sometimes created difficulty for High Courts when exercising jurisdiction in appeals against acquittals, leading to uncertainty about its precise meaning. The cited authorities were reported in [1952] S. C. R. 194, [1953] S. C. R. 418 and A.I.R. (1953) S. C. 459. In later judgments, the Court has often refrained from emphasizing “compelling reasons”. Nevertheless, it has maintained the earlier view that before interfering with an acquittal, a court must scrutinize both questions of law and fact in all aspects. Moreover, the Court stated that the appellate court must also examine closely the reasons that prompted the lower court to grant an acquittal.

The Court explained that an appellate court should disturb a lower court’s acquittal only after it has examined the record with great care and is convinced that the lower court’s finding that the accused’s guilt had not been proved is unreasonable. The Court cited the decisions in Chinta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ashrafkha Haibatkha Pathan v. The State of Bombay to illustrate this principle.

It was further clarified that stressing the need for “compelling reasons” to justify interference does not diminish the power granted to appellate courts by section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when hearing appeals against acquittals. The Court recognised the strong aversion in Indian jurisprudence to convicting innocent persons and noted that many legal systems do not permit any appeal against an acquittal at all. Consequently, the appellate courts must give special, meticulous attention to the evidence when dealing with such appeals.

Although later judgments have placed less overt emphasis on the phrase “compelling reasons,” the Court observed that a close reading shows the underlying principles have remained unchanged. The consistent theme, described as the “golden thread” of the case law, requires that an appellate court examines the evidence with particular care, reviews the reasons upon which the acquittal was based, and intervenes only when it is satisfied that the acquitting judge’s view is clearly unreasonable. Once the appellate court reaches the conclusion that the lower court’s view is unreasonable, that conclusion itself constitutes a compelling reason for interference.

The Court stressed that a court has a duty to convict a person when guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, just as it has a duty to acquit when such guilt is not established. When a High Court judgment demonstrates that the matter was approached properly and the correct principles were applied, there is little scope for this Court to interfere with a conviction made on appeal against an acquittal. If the Supreme Court finds that the principles laid down by it have been correctly applied, it will not normally re‑appraise the evidence to determine whether the High Court’s view of the evidence was right. The only examination of the evidence that this Court would ordinarily undertake is the limited review necessary to ensure that the High Court properly addressed the questions and applied the established principles.

References were made to earlier appellate decisions, namely Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 1959 decided on 18‑11‑60 and Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1960 decided on 14‑12‑60, to illustrate the application of these principles.

In circumstances where the High Court’s judgment merely indicates that, in its view, the lower court’s conclusion is unreasonable without providing a thorough examination of the evidence on which that conclusion is based, the situation changes. Likewise, where the High Court’s reasoning reveals an error of law, a clear misreading of the trial record, or an obvious misunderstanding of the evidence, the appropriate response of this Court becomes a matter of consideration. The submission of counsel that the only proper step would be to set aside the High Court’s order and to reinstate the original acquittal is not accepted. Even when a High Court judgment displays the defects mentioned, it may nevertheless reach a correct conclusion that the lower court’s view was unreasonable. Consequently, unless this Court decides to remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh hearing and disposal in accordance with law, it must, in the relatively few cases that present such difficulties, examine the evidence itself. The Court must scrutinise the reasons that the lower court relied upon to grant acquittal and then determine whether the High Court’s finding that the lower court’s view on the accused’s guilt was manifestly unreasonable is justified. If the Court is convinced that the lower court’s view was indeed unreasonable, it must dismiss the appeal and uphold the conviction affirmed by the High Court; conversely, if the Court, after its own appraisal, is not satisfied that the lower court’s conclusion that guilt was not proved was unreasonable, the order of acquittal must be restored.

The judgment of the High Court in the present matter contains only a brief discussion of the evidence, limited to the few sentences quoted earlier in this opinion. It also appears that the High Court judges were under a mistaken impression that the Additional Sessions Judge had held that Bhag Singh was omitted as a witness in the inquest report. In fact, the Additional Sessions Judge merely observed that Bhag Singh’s statement had not been recorded in the inquest report, a point on which the judge was correct. While the High Court might have reasonably concluded that the lack of recording could affect Bhag Singh’s credibility, it was not justified in attributing to the trial judge a statement that he never made. Moreover, the record does not clearly indicate how the learned judge described the appellant Major Singh’s participation in the incident.

The Court observed that the prosecution had assigned to Major Singh the role of delivering the fatal blow to each of the deceased victims. However, the two persons who asserted that they were eyewitnesses of the incident did not state that Major Singh inflicted a fatal wound on either Hazura Singh or Munshi Singh. Both witnesses did make a general statement that all six accused had attacked both Munshi Singh and Hazura Singh, but they never identified any specific injury as having been caused by Major Singh. Hazura Singh, in his dying declaration, did acknowledge that Major Singh struck his left wrist with a Sela blow, yet he did not mention any further injury caused by Major Singh to himself or to Munshi Singh. Apart from this specific reference, Hazura Singh also remarked in general terms that all the accused had struck Munshi Singh. Considering these facts, the Court concluded that the High Court had improperly inferred that Major Singh was responsible for any of the fatal injuries. Consequently, the Court found it necessary to review the Trial Court’s judgment and the evidence on record in order to reach a proper decision on the appeal. This review was prompted by the view that the High Court’s direction concerning Major Singh’s alleged participation was unfounded and required a fresh examination of the trial proceedings and the material evidence presented.

Turning to the Trial Court’s judgment, the Court noted that the primary factor influencing the trial judge’s doubt about the prosecution’s case was the perceived substantial delay in recording the First Information Report. The printed record showed that Head Constable Narendar Nath Moharrir, who actually entered the formal report, testified that he made the entry at “4.30 P.M.” on 24 July 1956. The trial judge, seeing this time together with the fact that the report reached Magistrate Shri Pasricha only at 8.45 P.M. on the same day, concluded that the First Information Report had been made at the police station at 4.30 P.M. The Court pointed out that the judge failed to notice that Exhibit PP1, the record of the First Information Report, indicated the time of entry as 4.30 A.M. Furthermore, the judge overlooked a statement made by Narendar Nath during cross‑examination, in which he said, “I have perused the Roznamcha entries and find that this special report was despatched by me through Constable Chanan Singh at 5.15 A.M. I cannot say why he did not deliver it to the Magistrate till 8.45 P.M.” The Court found that this 5.15 A.M. timing could not be a misprint for 5.15 P.M., because the constable’s failure to deliver the report until the evening would be inexplicable if the dispatch had occurred in the afternoon. Considering the cross‑examination statement together with the time shown in Exhibit PP1, the Court concluded that the trial judge’s reliance on the 4.30 P.M. entry was a slip of the tongue, and that the correct time of recording was in fact 4.30 A.M.

The Court observed that the correct time of recording the formal First Information Report was four thirty in the morning and that the fact that the report reached the Magistrate at eight forty‑five in the evening could be explained by the constable’s negligence or by some other reason that was not clear from the record. Consequently, the Trial Judge’s reasoning, which was based on an incorrect view of the time of recording of the First Information Report, was rejected. The Trial Judge had concluded that because the complainant could not identify the assailants, a delay was introduced, and that conclusion was therefore unsupported. The Court also held that the Trial Judge had misdirected himself by asserting that the dying declaration possessed little probative value simply because it named six accused persons and that, in law, a conviction could not be based on such a dying declaration without corroboration. The Court clarified that the law makes no distinction between a dying declaration that names one person and one that names several persons as culprits. A dying declaration naming a single individual may be false, while one naming several persons may be true. Just as a witness who identifies multiple persons in court must be examined to determine whether any mistake or falsehood exists, a dying declaration that implicates several persons must be scrutinised with respect to each accused. It is therefore erroneous to think that a dying declaration becomes less credible when it names multiple persons. The Court rejected the view expressed in the Lahore High Court decision in Khurshaid Hussain v. Emperor, which the Trial Judge had relied upon, describing that view as plainly erroneous. The Trial Judge also appeared to rely on the observations of this Court in Ram Nath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where the Court had emphasized the need for corroboration of a dying declaration because such a statement is not made on oath, is not subject to cross‑examination, and may be given while the declarant is in a confused mental or physical state. However, the Court noted that the issue was reconsidered later in Khushl Rao v. State of Bombay, where, after observing that the earlier decision in Ram Nath had found the dying declaration unreliable on the facts, this Court held that the observations in Ram Nath were obiter dicta. The later judgment affirmed that no absolute rule exists that a dying declaration must always be corroborated, that each case must be assessed on its own facts, and that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as any other piece of evidence, to be weighed according to the surrounding circumstances and the principles of evidence law.

The Court observed that the earlier pronouncements in Ram Nath’s case were merely obiter dicta. It then undertook a detailed review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act together with the decisions of various High Courts and of this Court, and articulated the law in the following terms. First, the Court held that it could not be declared an absolute rule that a dying declaration may never form the sole basis of a conviction unless it is corroborated. Second, each matter must be decided on its own factual matrix, taking into account the particular circumstances in which the dying declaration was made. Third, the Court rejected the notion that a dying declaration is inherently weaker than other evidence. Fourth, the Court stated that a dying declaration occupies the same evidential standing as any other piece of evidence and must be evaluated in light of the surrounding circumstances and the general principles of weighing evidence. Fifth, the Court emphasized that a dying declaration recorded by a competent magistrate in a proper manner—namely, in a question‑and‑answer format and, as far as possible, in the exact words of the declarant—commands a substantially higher level of reliability than a declaration that relies solely on oral testimony, which is susceptible to the ordinary infirmities of human memory and character. Sixth, the Court explained that to test the reliability of a dying declaration the tribunal must consider factors such as the opportunity the dying person had to observe the incident, for example whether sufficient illumination was present if the crime occurred at night; whether the declarant’s capacity to recall facts was not impaired by any external circumstances; whether the statement remained consistent across multiple occasions of recording; whether it was made at the earliest possible moment; and whether it was free from any tutoring by interested parties.

Consequently, the Court required that a dying declaration be subjected to very close scrutiny because it is given in the absence of the accused, who therefore cannot cross‑examine the declarant. However, if after this careful examination the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration represents the truthful account of the death and correctly identifies the assailants, no additional corroboration is necessary. Conversely, if the Court, after evaluating all aspects of the declaration and testing its veracity, finds that the statement is unreliable or suffers from any infirmity, then it cannot, on its own, support a conviction without corroboration. The need for corroboration therefore does not arise from any intrinsic weakness of a dying declaration as a category of evidence, but rather from the particular conclusion that the declaration in a given case is not free from the infirmities described, or from other defects that may emerge from the evidence presented in that case.

In this case the Court observed that the requirement for corroboration of a dying declaration did not stem from an inherent weakness of such evidence, as some earlier reports had suggested, but arose only when a particular court concluded that the declaration was affected by the infirmities previously described or by other defects that might be revealed by the evidence in that specific case. The Court noted that the recent pronouncement on this point had been issued after the Trial Judge had already delivered his judgment, and therefore it could not be said that any rule of law or of prudence mandated that a dying declaration must be supported by additional evidence before a conviction could be based upon it. The statement made by the deceased was to be assessed by the Judge in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness, although the Court recognised that certain special considerations applied to dying declarations and did not arise when a person testified in Court and identified the accused before the Court. First, the Court must ascertain precisely what the deceased actually said, a task that is often difficult especially when the declaration has not been recorded in writing. Second, the Court must be certain of the identity of the persons named in the declaration, a difficulty that does not occur when a witness makes his deposition in Court and points out the accused present. The Court recalled the special considerations enumerated in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay and stated that they need not be repeated. Consequently, the Court held that the Trial Judge was incorrect in believing that he could not act on the dying declaration of Hazura Singh unless it was corroborated by other evidence. Because of several defects in the Trial Judge’s reasoning, the Court found it necessary to examine the evidence on record to determine whether the High Court was right in deeming the Trial Judge’s view unreasonable. The most important evidence consisted of the dying declaration of Hazura Singh. The investigating officer, Devender Singh, testified that on 22 July 1956 he had gone to the village of Rikala on an excise raid and, on the following day, proceeded to Mallan at about two p.m. to investigate a case under section 392 of the Indian Penal Code. He further stated that on the same night, at around midnight, he left Mallan for Dhurkot and reached Dhurkot shortly after midnight on 23 July. The Court saw no reason to doubt the truth of this statement.

The Court observed that the investigating officer, Devender Singh, testified that after conducting an excise raid at the village of Rikala on 22 July 1956, he proceeded to Mallan at approximately two in the afternoon on 23 July to investigate a case under section 392 of the Indian Penal Code. He further stated that on the night of 23 July, at around midnight, he departed Mallan for Dhurkot and arrived there shortly after midnight on 23 July. Upon learning of a murder near the Dharamshala, he went to that location, where he found Hazura Singh lying injured on a cot. Hazura Singh gave a statement to the officer, which the officer recorded accurately; this statement has been marked as Exhibit PP. The substance of the recorded statement is that at about nine in the evening on the night of the occurrence, Hazura Singh’s brother, Munshi Singh, arrived and complained about the conduct of Bant Singh, Harbans Singh and the other sons of Bhag Singh. Shortly thereafter, upon hearing shouts from Bant Singh and others near the Lharamshala, Munshi Singh moved toward that place, followed by Hazura Singh and their father, Hira Singh. When they reached the spot, they encountered Harbans Singh and the other accused persons, all armed and creating a disturbance. As Munshi Singh arrived and returned the abuse, Harbans Singh delivered the first blow to Munshi Singh with a Sela in his hand, striking him on the front of the chest. Subsequently, other members of the party also struck Munshi Singh. When Hazura Singh stepped forward to protect his brother, Harbans Singh struck him with a Sela, hitting his abdomen, and the other accused also delivered blows. A further blow by Major Singh struck Hazura Singh on his left wrist. The Court noted that this statement was made by Hazura Singh shortly after midnight, that is, within roughly four hours of the incident. It was also noted that Hazura Singh sustained a single serious injury, namely a penetrating wound to his abdomen. From the testimonies of other witnesses, the Court was satisfied that sufficient moonlight was present to enable Hazura Singh to clearly recognize the assailant who delivered the blow that caused his abdominal injury, making it unlikely that he could have mistaken the identity of that assailant. Moreover, the Court found it implausible that Hazura Singh, within a few hours of the occurrence, would attribute the fatal blow to anyone other than the true perpetrator. The multiple injuries sustained by Hazura Singh and the numerous injuries on Munshi Singh supported the conclusion that more than one assailant participated in the attack. Even if there was a possibility that Hazura Singh might have erred concerning the identity of some of the other assailants, the Court held it unreasonable to think that he would substitute another individual for the one who delivered the lethal blow to his abdomen. Considering all these circumstances, the Court concluded that it would be unreasonable to doubt or disbelieve Hazura Singh’s declaration that Harbans Singh struck him with a Sela in his hand, causing the abdominal wound. The Court further stated that even in the absence of any other corroborating evidence regarding the role of the appellant, Harbans Singh, this dying declaration was so clearly reliable that the only logical conclusion for a fact‑finder was that Harbans Singh caused the death of Hazura Singh by striking him with a Sela.

In this case the Court concluded that the only reasonable finding for a fact‑finder was that Harbans Singh had caused the death of Hazura Singh by striking him with a Sela. The Court observed that, in the dying declaration made to the police sub‑Inspector, Hazura Singh had identified Harbans Singh as the person who delivered the first blow to Munshi Singh, a blow which produced an injury on Munshi’s chest. The Court found no justification for attributing this principal part of the declaration falsely to Harbans Singh and, after considering the circumstances surrounding the statement, held that this portion of Hazura Singh’s testimony was clearly truthful and could be accepted even in the absence of any corroborating evidence. A second statement of Hazura Singh had been recorded at the hospital to which he had been taken; this later statement appeared to have been taken at about midnight on 24 July. In that statement Hazura Singh again mentioned Harbans Singh and the other accused persons as participants in the attack. The Court noted that at the time the second statement was made Hazura Singh’s condition was extremely poor. Indeed, after he had given part of the statement the Magistrate recorded that he began to give indifferent answers and directed the Doctor to provide the necessary treatment; the statement was concluded only after the medical assistance was rendered. Accordingly, the Court would not assign great weight to the later hospital statement. However, the Court also observed that nothing in the later statement contradicted the truth of the earlier declaration that had been given shortly after the incident to the police sub‑Inspector. Apart from these declarations, the Court considered the testimony of Hira Singh, the father of the two deceased, and his uncle Bhag Singh. Regarding Bhag Singh, the learned Trial Judge had pointed out that his statement had not been recorded by the sub‑Inspector in the Inquest Report. Although the law did not require witnesses’ statements to be entered in the Inquest Report, it was a common practice in Punjab for police officers to record such statements therein. In the present matter the sub‑Inspector had recorded a fairly full statement of Hira Singh as well as brief statements of Arjan Singh, Matha Singh and Lakal Singh in the Inquest Report. It was therefore somewhat curious that Bhag Singh’s statement had been omitted, even though the dying declaration of Hazura Singh identified Bhag Singh as a witness to the occurrence. The Court also found Bhag Singh’s explanation—that he left the scene as soon as some neighbours arrived and did not return until called by the police—unsatisfactory and unusual. In view of these considerations, the Court did not consider the Trial Judge’s doubt about Bhag Singh’s testimony unreasonable, but it could not discover any valid basis for doubting the other statements presented.

The Court observed that the issue of Hira Singh’s presence at the scene of the occurrence was central to the trial. It held that the principal reason the Trial Judge had questioned the veracity of Hira Singh’s testimony was the perceived long delay in filing the formal First Information Report. The Court noted that, as earlier indicated, no such delay existed and therefore the Trial Judge’s reliance on it was misplaced. Upon examination, the Court found it highly probable that Hira Singh had accompanied Hazura Singh when the latter pursued Munshi Singh toward the Dharmashala. The Court further considered it unlikely that Hira Singh would falsely assign the principal part of the assault to Harbans Singh if another person had actually delivered the blow that caused Hazura Singh’s death. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Trial Judge acted unreasonably in casting doubt on Hira Singh’s evidence against Harbans Singh. After a full consideration of the material, the Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that the Trial Court’s view of Harbans Singh’s guilt was manifestly unreasonable. The Court articulated that the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that Harbans Singh had committed murder by causing the death of Hazura Singh and had also committed murder by causing the death of Munshi Singh.

Regarding Major Singh, the Court distinguished the position. It held that the High Court was incorrect in finding that the evidence demonstrated that Major Singh delivered any fatal blows. The Court pointed out that Hazura Singh’s first dying declaration recorded that Major Singh had struck him on the left wrist, and that, apart from Bhag Singh, only Hira Singh attributed any specific role to Major Singh, while generally stating that Major Singh had taken part in the attack. The Court explained that the evidence left open the possibility that Hazura Singh either erred in his identification of Major Singh or had inadvertently implicated him. Accordingly, the Court was not prepared to deem the Trial Judge’s view on Major Singh’s alleged involvement as clearly unreasonable. As a result, the Court allowed Major Singh’s appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court, and restored the acquittal originally granted by the Trial Court. The appeal of Harbans Singh was dismissed, and Major Singh was ordered to be released at once. The Court recorded that the appeal of the second appellant was allowed, while the appeal of the first appellant was dismissed.