Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The State Of Maharashtra And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: 305/1960

Decision Date: 12 January, 1961

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.R. Mudholkar, Subba Rao

In the matter titled Gopal Vinayak Godse versus The State of Maharashtra and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the 12th of January, 1961. The decision was rendered by a bench comprising Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, and J. R. Mudholkar, with Justice Subbarao presiding. The petitioner, Gopal Vinayak Godse, challenged the continued detention imposed upon him by the respondents, the State of Maharashtra and other parties. The case is reported in the 1961 All India Reporter at page 600 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports, volume three, page 440. Subsequent citations of this judgment can be found in various law reports and digests, indicating its continued relevance in discussions of habeas corpus, sentence remission, and the interpretation of transportation for life under the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The central issue before the Court concerned whether the petitioner, having earned remissions amounting to 2,963 days, and thereby accumulating more than twenty years of service in custody, had acquired a legal right to be released from imprisonment. The Court examined the nature of a sentence of transportation for life, the effect of Section 53A of the Indian Penal Code as introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1955, and the statutory framework governing remission under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court also considered the applicability of earlier precedent, specifically the decision in Pandit Kishori Lal v. King‑Emperor, reported in 1944, to determine the legal consequences of remissions on a life sentence.

The Court held that the petitioner had not yet obtained any entitlement to release. It clarified that a sentence of transportation for life, as prescribed before the 1955 amendment, is to be treated as a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life, a position mandated by Section 53A of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is required to remain incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life unless the sentence is expressly commuted or remitted by a competent authority. The Court emphasized that such a sentence cannot be equated with any fixed term of imprisonment. Although the Prisons Act authorises the grant of various remissions, the Court explained that these remissions are to be accounted for only at the termination of the sentence and that the authority to grant remissions resides exclusively with the appropriate Government under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, while the Government had granted certain remissions, it had not remitted the entire life sentence. Consequently, the petitioner remained lawfully detained. The judgment was delivered in the original jurisdiction as Petition No. 305/1960, a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioner had justly served his sentence and should be released. Counsel appearing for the petitioner was the Additional Solicitor‑General of India, while counsel for the respondents represented the State of Maharashtra. Justice Subbarao authored the judgment, concluding that the petitioner’s continued detention was in accordance with the law.

The Court recorded that the petitioner had been duly convicted by the Special Court at Red Fort, Delhi, on 10 February 1949 for offences under section 3 read with section 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, for offences under sections 4(b) and 5 of the same Act, and for murder under section 302 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. For the first two offences the petitioner received sentences of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and five years’ rigorous imprisonment respectively, while for the murder charge he was sentenced to transportation for life. All three sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Following the conviction the petitioner was detained in jails located in the State of Punjab until 19 May 1950, after which he was transferred to the Central Prison at Nasik Road in the State of Bombay, now Maharashtra.

According to the petitioner's own statement, by 30 September 1960 he had accrued several categories of remission: ordinary remission of 836 days, special remission of 206 days, physical‑training remission of 113 days, literary remission of 108 days, annual good‑conduct remission of 250 days, and a state‑grant remission of 1,380 days, making a total of 2,893 days. The State, in its counter‑affidavit, contended that the petitioner had actually earned 2,963 days of remission by that date, and the Court accepted the State’s figure for the purposes of the petition. Adding either total of remission days to the period of actual imprisonment would result in a cumulative term exceeding twenty years, and even if only the State’s remission amount were added, the total would surpass fifteen years. The petitioner asserted that, under the statutory scheme governing his detention, any further confinement would be illegal, and he prayed for immediate release.

The State, while acknowledging the remission total of 2,963 days, argued that the remissions did not confer a right to release because the applicable rules required the petitioner to serve a minimum of fifteen years of actual imprisonment before release could be considered. The petitioner presented his case in person, refusing the assistance of an amicus curiae. His submissions were largely emotional rather than based on legal reasoning. Nevertheless, because the liberty of a citizen was at stake, the Court examined the relevant statutory provisions and anticipated possible arguments that could arise from them. The primary issue before the Court was whether, under the governing statutes, a person sentenced to transportation for life could lawfully be confined in an Indian jail, and if so, what the permissible term of such confinement would be. To address this, the Court briefly reviewed the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code as they stood before amendment by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act XXVI of 1955.

Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code enumerated six distinct punishments that could be imposed upon offenders. The second punishment listed was transportation, while the fourth category was imprisonment, which was further divided into rigorous and simple forms. The statute did not provide a definition for “transportation,” but it was understood to be a sentence of life imprisonment, subject to two specific exceptions. Under section 55 of the Indian Penal Code, the provincial government of the province in which the offender had been sentenced could, without obtaining the offender’s consent, commute a sentence of transportation for life to imprisonment of either description for a period not exceeding fourteen years. Section 58 of the same code stipulated that in every case where a sentence of transportation was imposed, the offender, until such time as he was actually transported, must be treated as if he had been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and must be considered to be serving his transportation sentence during the term of his imprisonment. The State asserted that the petitioner’s sentence had not been altered under section 55 of the Indian Penal Code nor under section 402(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to any form of rigorous imprisonment, and the Court found no reason to reject that assertion. Consequently, the question arose whether a person sentenced to transportation could, in law, be dealt with as though he were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. This issue had previously been presented before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Pandit Kishori Lal v. King Emperor. After examining the historical background of the transportation sentence and the applicable provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prisons Act, the Privy Council concluded that the statutory provisions made it clear that a sentence of transportation was no longer necessarily a sentence involving removal beyond the seas. The Council observed that in contemporary India the term “transportation” merely denoted a life sentence—or, in a few special instances, a lesser term—much as the English terminology distinguishes “imprisonment” for periods not exceeding two years and “penal servitude” for longer durations. Accordingly, a prisoner sentenced to transportation could be sent to the Andaman Islands or could be retained in any Indian jail designated for transportation prisoners, where he would be treated in the same manner as a prisoner sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. In light of this authoritative pronouncement, the Court considered it unnecessary to examine the statutory provisions further, particularly given the amendment introduced by section 53A of the Indian Penal Code through Act XXVI of 1955, which provides that in every case where a sentence of transportation has been imposed, the offender shall be dealt with as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term.

The Court held that the amendment removed any earlier justification that a person sentenced to transportation could not be lawfully subjected to rigorous imprisonment in an Indian jail except temporarily until transportation, and therefore the offender must be treated as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. The term of rigorous imprisonment would be identical to the term originally imposed for transportation. The Court cited the 1944 case reported in L.R. 72 I.A. I. It observed that any earlier argument that a person sentenced to transportation could not be lawfully subjected to rigorous imprisonment in an Indian jail, except temporarily until transportation, was no longer viable after the amendment. Under the amended provision, a person who had been transported for life before the enactment would be deemed to have been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. Similarly, a person transported for any other term before the amendment would be treated as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for that same term. The Court then examined whether any law provided that a sentence of life imprisonment, absent a formal remission by the appropriate Government, could automatically be treated as a sentence for a definite period. It found that neither the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the Prisons Act contained any such provision. The Court noted that the Government of India had earlier, before the Judicial Committee, argued that section 57 of the Indian Penal Code rendered a twenty‑year imprisonment term equivalent to transportation for life. However, the Judicial Committee did not render a final opinion on that question. The Judicial Committee observed at page ten that, assuming the sentence were treated as a twenty‑year term and subject to remission for good conduct, the convict had not earned sufficient remission to merit discharge. Consequently, his application for release was rightly dismissed. The Committee further clarified that its statement should not be read to mean that a life sentence must in every case be treated as not exceeding twenty years. Nor should it be taken to imply that the convicted person is automatically entitled to remission. The Court held that section 57 of the Indian Penal Code did not have any real bearing on the issue before it. For the purpose of calculating fractions of punishment, the section provides that transportation for life shall be regarded as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years. The provision does not state that transportation for life shall be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for all purposes. Nor does the amended wording that replaces ‘transportation for life’ with ‘imprisonment for life’ permit such an all‑embracing construction. A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must, on its face, be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the entire remaining period of the convicted person’s natural life. It was asserted that the Bombay rules governing the remission system substituted a definite period for life imprisonment. Consequently, if the aggregate term actually served exceeded that period, the person would become entitled to release. To assess this contention, the relevant Bombay rules were examined.

In cases where a prisoner was released prematurely, the Court observed that an order under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code had to be issued by the appropriate Government before the prisoner could actually be set free from jail. The Court further explained the effect of Rule 937(c), which required that when a life convict or any prisoner for whom the State Government had issued an order prohibiting release earned a remission that would otherwise entitle him to be released, the Superintendent was obliged to report the matter to the State Government through the Inspector‑General so that the case could be considered under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. The Court then turned to the provisions governing the remission system, noting that Rule 1419(c) stipulated that a sentence of transportation for life was to be taken, ordinarily, as fifteen years of actual imprisonment. The Court also examined Rule 1447(2), which stated that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 1419, no prisoner sentenced to transportation for life, or to imprisonment of more than fourteen years, or to a combination of transportation and imprisonment whose aggregate term exceeded fourteen years, could be released merely on the completion of his term of transportation or imprisonment, including any remissions, unless a report had been made under sub‑rule (1) and the Government had issued orders determining the date of his final release.

The Court noted that these rules were commonly made under the Prisons Act of 1894 and that they possessed statutory force. However, the Court emphasized that the Prisons Act did not confer on any authority the power to commute or remit sentences; its purpose was solely to regulate prisons and to prescribe the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act gave the State Government the authority to make rules, including those providing rewards for good conduct. Accordingly, the Court held that the rules made under that Act must be interpreted within the scope of the Act itself. The rules provided three categories of remission as rewards for good conduct: ordinary remission, special remission, and State remission. In applying these remissions, Rule 1419(c) required that transportation for life be ordinarily treated as fifteen years of actual imprisonment, but the Court clarified that this provision could not be read as a statutory equation equating transportation for life with a fixed term of fifteen years for all purposes. The use of the word “ordinarily” indicated that the conversion applied only for the specific purpose of calculating remissions under the remission system. Moreover, the non obstante clause in sub‑rule (2) of Rule 1447 reinforced that, notwithstanding Rule 1419, a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life could not be released upon the mere expiry of the fifteen‑year period unless a report had been filed and the Government had issued the requisite order. This reinforced the principle that the fifteen‑year figure served solely to determine remission calculations and did not, by itself, create any automatic right of release for the prisoner.

The Court explained that the remission calculated on the basis of a fifteen‑year period for a sentence of transportation for life did not, by itself, confer any automatic right on the prisoner to be released. It held that the order of Government referred to in rule 1447 for a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life could only be an order issued under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the release of such a prisoner could legally be effected only by remitting the entire balance of the sentence. The Court noted that rules 934 and 937(c) contemplated this contingency and that, under those rules, an order of the appropriate Government issued pursuant to section 401 was a prerequisite for any release. No other rule was known to the Court that granted an indefeasible right to a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life to obtain unconditional release upon the expiry of a particular term, even where remissions had been earned. The Court further observed that the rules framed under the Prisons Act did not replace a life‑time sentence with a lesser term. In brief, the legal position was as follows: before the enactment of Act XXVI of 1955, a sentence of transportation for life could be served by the prisoner as rigorous imprisonment for life in a designated prison in India; after that Act, a convict sentenced to transportation for life was to be dealt with in the same manner as one sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term. Unless the sentence was commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment was bound by law to serve the entire life term. The rules under the Prisons Act enabled such a prisoner to earn ordinary, special and State remissions, and those remissions were to be credited against his term of imprisonment. For the purpose of calculating remissions, the sentence of transportation for life was ordinarily equated with a definite period, but this equivalence was limited to that specific calculation and not to any other purpose. Because a sentence of transportation for life, or its equivalent of life imprisonment, was of indefinite duration, the remissions earned could not, in practice, benefit the convict, as the time of his death could not be predicted. Consequently, the rules provided a procedure whereby the appropriate Government could remit the sentence under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, taking into account relevant factors, including the period of remissions earned. The matter of remission lay exclusively within the province of the appropriate Government. In the present case, it was admitted that the appropriate Government had granted certain remissions under section 401, but it had not remitted the entire sentence. Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioner had not yet acquired any right to release and therefore remained in legal detention.

The petitioner argued that he would be left entirely at the mercy of the appropriate Government, and he feared that, acting out of spite, that Government might refuse to remit the remaining portion of his sentence. He contended that such a refusal would deprive him of the benefits that he had earned through sustained good conduct, useful service and even the donation of blood. The Court observed that both the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure vest the authority to remit a sentence in the executive Government, and that this power lies exclusively within the executive’s jurisdiction. The Court further explained that it could not presume that the appropriate Government would act unreasonably or would deliberately withhold its jurisdiction. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the Court held that the petitioner remained in legal detention and that the petition for habeas corpus could not be entertained. The Court therefore dismissed the petition, and the order of dismissal was affirmed.