Fazal Bhai Dhala vs Custodian-General of Evacuee Property

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 194 of 1956 and 353 of 1958

Decision Date: 21 March, 1961

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

The case titled Fazal Bhai Dhala versus the Custodian‑General of Evacuee Property was decided by the Supreme Court of India on the twenty‑first day of March, 1961. The judgment was written by Justice K. C. Das Gupta and the bench was composed of Justices K. C. Das Gupta, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner in the appeal was Fazal Bhai Dhala and the respondent was the Custodian‑General of Evacuee Property, Delhi. The official citation of the decision appears in the 1961 All India Reporter at page 1397 and also in the 1962 Supreme Court Reports (First Series) at page 456. The matters considered under the relevant statutes included the meaning of “evacuee property”, the concept of a transfer made in bad faith, the effect of a custodian’s interference with questions not before him in an appeal, the requirements of notice before exercising revisional jurisdiction, the consequences of a partnership at will being dissolved, and the point at which assets of a dissolved partnership may vest in the custodian. The statutory provisions relied upon comprised Section 43 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, Section 7(1) of the Government of India Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, and Sections 2(f), 26 and 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.

According to the factual background, Fazal Bhai Dhala (referred to as “F”) and his brother A were partners in a hide and skin trading business. On the tenth of August, 1949, A executed a deed of sale transferring certain immovable properties located in Orissa and Madras to F. Two days later, on the twelfth of August, 1949, the brothers also executed a deed of dissolution of their partnership, which expressly stated that the partnership was to be deemed dissolved as of the second of November, 1948. Subsequent to learning that A had migrated to Pakistan after effecting the transfer of his property interests to his brother, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property served a notice on F under Section 7(1) of the Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949. The notice concerned the immovable properties in Orissa, including those covered by the deed of sale, the hide‑and‑skin business, and other immovable assets held in the name of the partnership. In response, F contended that, effective from the November 2, 1948 dissolution date, he had become the sole proprietor of the business and had assumed all its assets and liabilities. He further argued that the properties mentioned in the notice which had been conveyed to him by A’s deed of sale were properly his, while the remaining properties, being assets of the dissolved firm, had vested in him upon dissolution. The Assistant Custodian, however, held that although the deed of sale involved adequate consideration, the transfer was not made in good faith. Regarding the other properties and the hide‑and‑skin business, the Assistant Custodian concluded that A no longer possessed any interest because the partnership had already been dissolved on November 2, 1948. F appealed this decision to the Custodian, who affirmed that the properties in question were correctly classified as evacuee properties and that the transfer of the additional assets also involved the same degree of bad faith, warranting their inclusion in the evacuee list. The Custodian‑General rejected the appeal, and F consequently filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court. In that petition, the appellant raised four specific contentions challenging the actions of the Custodian‑General and the procedural posture of the case.

Firstly, the appellant argued that the Custodian‑General had acted without jurisdiction when he interfered with the order of the Assistant Custodian that the hides business and the immoveable properties listed in Schedule III of the notice were not evacuee properties and therefore should have been released. Secondly, the appellant contended that, because the Custodian Department had not filed any appeal against the Assistant Custodian’s order concerning the hides business and the immoveable properties in Schedule III, the Custodian could not invoke his appellate jurisdiction to interfere with that order. The appellant further maintained that the Custodian’s order on those properties could not have been issued on the basis of the revisional jurisdiction granted by section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, since no notice had been served on the appellant indicating an intention to examine the records in revision. Thirdly, the appellant submitted that after the partnership had been dissolved, the dissolved partnership could not be declared an evacuee property, relying on section 43 of the Indian Partnership Act. Fourthly, the appellant argued that the transactions evidenced by the two deeds – the sale deed and the deed of dissolution – were merely steps in the winding‑up of the dissolved partnership, and that, in determining the validity of those transactions, the appellant could not oppose the other partner’s claim to wind up the firm.

The Court held that when the Custodian issued an order affecting a part of the Assistant Custodian’s order that was not before him on appeal, that order had to be regarded as made pursuant to the Custodian’s revisional jurisdiction, and the fact that the order did not expressly state that it was revisional could not be taken as a basis for concluding that the Custodian was acting beyond that jurisdiction. The Court further explained that while it was a separate question whether the Custodian had complied with the law while exercising revisional powers, the Custodian was required to give the concerned party a reasonable opportunity to be heard before any prejudicial order was passed in revision. If such an opportunity could not be provided without serving a notice, a notice had to be served; otherwise the omission would be fatal, even though section 26 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act did not expressly require the Custodian to serve notice. However, where the affected party was already before the Custodian, was aware of the proceedings, and had been heard, the absence of a formal notice was considered immaterial and did not invalidate the order. The Court accepted the fact of dissolution and ruled that the declaration concerning the business necessarily meant that the property remaining in the firm at the time of dissolution became evacuee property. Finally, the Court held that where a deed of transfer by an “evacuee” was executed in bad faith, section 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act became applicable, rendering the transfer void.

The Court explained that a transfer executed by an evacuee without good faith would have no legal effect. In the situation of a partnership, the property of the firm, upon its dissolution, would become evacuee property from the date the deed of dissolution of the partnership was executed. Consequently, such property would vest in the Custodian, who would acquire all rights provided under the Partnership Act. The Court further held that the Custodian was not bound by any statements made in the deed of dissolution concerning the settlement of accounts. In the case before it, the Court found that the Custodian had acted within his jurisdiction and had not exercised his powers in an irregular manner.

The matter was brought before the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction on two appeals, identified as Civil Appeal No. 194 of 1956 and Civil Appeal No. 353 of 1958. Both appeals were filed by special leave against earlier judgments and orders dated 26 December 1953 and 30 April 1957, respectively, issued by the Custodian‑General and the Deputy Custodian‑General of Evacuee Property in the revisions numbered 5055R/Judl/1953 and 1161/R/Judl/1954. Counsel for the appellant comprised senior advocates, while the respondents were represented by their own legal counsel. The judgment was pronounced on 21 March 1961 and delivered by Justice Das Gupta. The first appeal challenged the order of the Custodian‑General of India that declined to interfere with the decision of the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Orissa concerning several properties claimed by the appellant as his own. The second appeal similarly contested the order of the Deputy Custodian‑General of India, which refused to intervene in the decision of the Custodian of Evacuee Property in Madras regarding properties situated in Madras, also claimed by the same appellant. Although the factual matrices of the two appeals were largely identical, the Court elected to address them sequentially to avoid any confusion. The appellant, Fazal Bhai Dhala, along with his brother Abdulla Dhala, had been partners in a hides and skins business. They executed a deed of partnership on 1 January 1941, and the firm was duly registered in the Register of Firms, Cuttack, under section 59 of the Indian Partnership Act. On 10 August 1949, Abdulla Bhai Dhala executed a deed of sale transferring certain immovable properties located at Jharsuguda in Orissa, as well as certain properties in Madras, to Fazal Bhai Dhala. The deed recorded a total consideration of Rs 85,000, allocating Rs 50,000 to the Madras properties and Rs 35,000 to the Orissa properties. The full sum was paid in the presence of the Registrar by Fazal Bhai on 11 August 1949. The following day, 12 August 1949, the partners executed a deed of dissolution. This deed declared that the partnership would be deemed dissolved effective 2 November 1948 and further stipulated that the business of Fazalbhoy Dhala & Co would continue under Fazalbhoy Dhala alone. It also acknowledged that the partnership accounts had not yet been settled and that settlement would be difficult and delayed. Accordingly, the parties agreed that Fazal Bhai Dhala would pay Abdulla Dhala a sum of Rs 40,000 as full and final settlement of all claims against the partnership, its assets, goodwill, and related interests. A receipt acknowledging the payment of Rs 40,000 was also incorporated into the dissolution deed.

The deed of dissolution recorded that from the date 2‑11‑1948 the business known as Fazalbhoy Dhanda & Co. would belong to, be continued by, and be carried on by Fazalbhoy Dhanda. The deed further explained that because the accounts of the partnership had neither been taken nor could be settled without considerable delay and difficulty, the parties agreed that Fazal Bhui Dhanda would pay Abdulla Dhanda a sum of rupees 40,000. This payment was to be in full settlement and satisfaction of all claims that Abdulla Bhui Dhanda, as a partner, might have against the partnership, its assets, goodwill and any other interest in the business. A receipt confirming the payment of rupees 40,000 was also incorporated in the same deed. After learning that Abdulla Dhanda had migrated to Pakistan and had transferred his properties to his brother Fazal Bhui Dhanda, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property at Sambalpur, Orissa, issued a notice under section 7(1) of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 to Fazal Bhui Dhanda on 30 December 1949. The notice concerned immovable properties situated at Jharsuguda, including those conveyed by the sale deed dated 10 August 1949, as well as the hides‑and‑skins business carried on under the name Fazalbhoy Dhanda & Co., and certain other immovable properties standing in the name of that firm. In response to the notice, Fazal Bhui Dhanda contended that Abdulla Dhanda was not an evacuee. He further asserted that, irrespective of that point, he had become the sole proprietor of the business, together with all its assets and liabilities, effective from 2 November 1948 when the partnership was dissolved. He explained that some of the immovable properties listed in the notice had been transferred to him by a deed of sale executed by Abdulla Dhanda, while the remaining properties, being assets of the firm, had vested in him automatically upon dissolution. Accordingly, he prayed that his title to the firm’s assets and to the immovable properties mentioned in the notice be confirmed. The Assistant Custodian, after examining the evidence, held that although the transfer of the properties covered by the sale deed was for adequate and valuable consideration, the transaction was not made in good faith. Regarding the other properties and the hides‑and‑skins business, the Assistant Custodian concluded that Abdulla Dhanda had no interest because the partnership had been dissolved on 2 November 1948. Fazal Bhui Dhanda appealed this decision to the Custodian, seeking that the order of the Assistant Custodian concerning the properties listed in Schedule A (parts 1 and II) of the notice issued under subsection 1 of section 7 of the Government of India Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 be set aside. The Custodian affirmed the view of the Assistant Custodian with respect to those properties, holding that they had been correctly declared evacuee properties. He further stated that there was no justification for the Assistant Custodian to adopt a different stance regarding the remaining properties, and he concluded accordingly.

The Custodian stated that, “in fact, with regard to these properties also the same amount of mala fides was present and as such these should also be included in the list of evacuee properties”; he further declared that “it is but proper that the entire 8 annas share of the properties mentioned in Schedules A and B of the evacuee Abdulla should be treated as evacuee properties”. On this basis the Custodian finally ordered: “in consequence of my above decision according to s. 6 of the Evacuee Interest Separation Act, the entire properties in Schedules A and B should now be treated as evacuee properties and revised action should be taken to notify as,such under s. 7(3) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and the appellant be directed to get his 8 annas share in the properties separated in the Court of the Competent Officer”. Following this order, Fazal Bhai filed a petition for revision before the Custodian‑General of India. The Custodian‑General declined to interfere with the Custodian’s decision. It is noteworthy that the record no longer disputes that Abdulla Bhai was an evacuee, although the precise date on which he became an evacuee does not appear clearly. All of the immovable property that is the subject of the present appeal was owned by the firm Fazalbhai Dhala & Co. Four distinct contentions were raised in support of the appeal.

The first contention, which occupied a substantial portion of the argument presented by counsel for the appellant, asserted that the Custodian‑General should have held that the Custodian acted without jurisdiction, and at any rate exercised his jurisdiction irregularly, if he possessed any, by interfering with the order of the Assistant Custodian. The Assistant Custodian’s order had declared that the immovable property, the hides business, and the properties listed in Schedule A III (that is, the properties other than those covered by the sale deed) were not evacuee properties and therefore should be released. Counsel pointed out that, with respect to these two categories of property—the hides business and the immovable properties in Schedule A III—the Custodian’s department had not filed any appeal against the Assistant Custodian’s decision. Consequently, the Custodian could not exercise appellate jurisdiction over those items. The appellant further argued that the Custodian’s order concerning the hides business and the Jharsuguda properties in Schedule A III could not have been issued under the revisional jurisdiction conferred by section 26 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act No. XXXI of 1950), because no notice of an intention to examine the records in revision had been served upon Fazal Bhai. Although the order does not expressly state that it was made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it is clear that the Custodian’s only possible authority, absent an appeal, would have been the revisional jurisdiction under section 26. The argument therefore focused on whether the Custodian, in exercising that jurisdiction, had complied with the procedural requirements prescribed by law.

In this case, the Court observed that an appeal against the portion of the Assistant Custodian’s order concerning the hides business and the immovable properties listed in Schedule A‑III would fall within the revisional jurisdiction conferred by section 26 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The Court held that once it is established that the Custodian issued an order, it is proper and reasonable to conclude that the order was made in the exercise of the only jurisdiction he possessed, namely the revisional jurisdiction, even though the order itself does not expressly state that it was issued under that jurisdiction. The absence of a clear statement in the order, therefore, cannot be taken as proof that the Custodian was not acting under his revisional powers. The Court further noted that a separate enquiry is required to determine whether the Custodian, while exercising that jurisdiction, complied with the law.

Counsel for the appellant argued that the law required the Custodian to serve a notice to the parties before exercising his revisional jurisdiction. The Court accepted that no such notice had been served and that the appellant had emphasised this omission both in his petition for revision before the Custodian‑General and in his application for special leave to appeal to this Court. However, when the Court examined the language of section 26, it found that the statute contains no requirement for the service of any notice. The provision reads:

“26. Powers of review or revision of Custodian etc. (1) The Custodian, Additional Custodian, or Authorised Deputy Custodian may at any time, either on his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, call for the record of any proceeding under this Act which is pending before, or has been disposed of by, an officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any orders passed in the said proceeding, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit: Provided that the Custodian, Additional Custodian or Authorised Deputy Custodian shall not pass an order under this sub‑section revising or modifying any order prejudicial to any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard: Provided further that if one of the officers aforesaid takes action under this sub‑section, it shall not be competent for any other officer to do so …”

The Court explained that the proviso embodies the principles of natural justice by insisting that any order prejudicial to a person must be made only after that person has been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. No rule or statutory provision, however, prescribes a specific method of giving such opportunity, such as the service of a formal notice. The Court observed that in most cases the Custodian, in order to afford the concerned party a reasonable opportunity of being heard, will first issue a notice of his intention to examine the records and will invite the party to show cause why the order should not be revised or modified. If the party appears in response to that notice, the Custodian must then allow the party, either

In this matter the Court explained that the Custodian was required to give a party, either personally or through counsel, a reasonable opportunity to be heard. When the circumstances warranted, the Custodian could also permit the party to present evidence. However, there were situations in which the party was already present before the Custodian. In such cases the Custodian needed only to inform the party of his intention to examine the records to decide whether a particular order should be revised, and then to provide a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Because the party was already before him, the law did not demand a formal notice, and any failure to serve such a notice could not prejudice the proceeding. The essential requirement, according to the Court, was that the person affected by a potentially prejudicial order must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the order was made. If a hearing could be given without a formal notice, the omission of the notice was immaterial; the decisive question was whether, notwithstanding the lack of notice, a reasonable opportunity to be heard had actually been provided.

Upon examining the Custodian’s judgment, the Court found that the Custodian had indeed informed the counsel appearing on behalf of Fazal Bhai Dhala that he intended to reconsider the order relating to the hides business and the properties listed in Schedule A‑III. The Custodian further indicated that he would revise the order, if necessary, after granting Fazal Bhai a reasonable opportunity to be heard on that specific point. The Court also observed that the appellant’s counsel was fully heard on the matter. Consequently, the Court concluded that the statutory requirements embodied in the proviso to section 26(1) of the Act had been completely satisfied. The argument that the Custodian had acted without jurisdiction or had exercised his jurisdiction irregularly therefore could not succeed.

The next issue raised on appeal concerned the contention, quoted from the learned counsel, that under section 43 of the Indian Partnership Act the partnership had dissolved on 2 November 1948, and that the Custodian therefore lacked jurisdiction to declare the “business” an evacuee property. The Court noted that it had not been disputed before either the Assistant Custodian or the Custodian that Fazal Bhai Dhala & Co. was a partnership‑at‑will. The deed of dissolution was dated 1 August 1949, and the Custodian had found that this deed was deliberately executed to provide a common safeguard for the properties to remain in the hands of the brothers. Accordingly, the reference to 2 November 1948 as the date of dissolution could not be accepted. The Court held that the firm must be deemed dissolved on 12 August 1949, the date on which the deed of dissolution was actually executed. The argument that the partnership had ceased to exist earlier and that the subsequent deeds were merely part of a winding‑up process was therefore rejected.

In the case before the Court, the counsel for the appellant argued that once a partnership had been dissolved, the resulting entity could not be declared an evacuee property. The counsel maintained that acceptance of the dissolution fact would require the declaration concerning the business to be understood as a declaration that the property remaining with Abdulla Bhai at the time of dissolution was an evacuee property. The Court observed that this interpretation matched the purpose of the Custodian’s order. The appellant further contended that the two deeds – the sale deed and the deed of dissolution – were merely steps in winding up the dissolved partnership’s affairs, and therefore the validity of those transactions should be examined in that context. The Court noted that Fazal Bhai could not resist the other partners’ claim to wind up the partnership and that the Custodian had not accepted the proposition that the partnership had been dissolved earlier with the deeds executed subsequently. The Court found no reason to disturb the Custodian’s conclusion because the sale deeds were executed before the actual dissolution effected by the deed of dissolution. Consequently, the sale deeds could not be characterized as part of the winding‑up process. Regarding the deed of dissolution, the Court held that whether Abdulla Bhai could have resisted the winding‑up claim was irrelevant; the declaration merely stated that Abdulla Bhai’s share in the dissolved partnership, as it stood on the dissolution date, was an evacuee property. The Court emphasized that the validity of the dissolution itself was not challenged. It was unnecessary to add that dissolution did not automatically transfer Abdulla’s share to Fazal Bhai or vice‑versa. Although a purported transfer of Abdulla’s share appeared in the deed, the Court found it to be without good faith and, under section 40 of the Evacuee Property Act, without legal effect. The Custodian was not bound by the statements in the dissolution deed concerning the firm’s account settlement, and the Custodian, as the holder of evacuee properties, would retain all rights that Abdulla possessed under sections 37, 46, 47, 48 and other relevant provisions of the Partnership Act.

The appellant also maintained that the Custodian had acted illegally by ordering that “the entire properties in Schedules A and B should now be treated as evacuee properties.” The Court observed that the Custodian’s order was indeed framed in those terms, even though his conclusion was that “the entire …” (the fragment of the order as recorded). The Court indicated that this wording required consideration in light of the earlier findings concerning the dissolution, the timing of the deeds, and the statutory provisions governing evacuee property. Accordingly, the Court found that the order’s broader language did not, on the material facts, amount to an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction, given the established status of Abdulla Bhai’s share as an evacuee property and the Custodian’s statutory authority over such properties.

In this case, the Court observed that the Custodian’s order stating that “the entire properties in Schedules A and B should now be treated as evacuee properties” required clarification. The Court explained that the statement was based on the earlier definition of evacuee property found in section 2(f) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act XXXI of 1950), which described evacuee property as “any property in which any evacuee has any right or interest.” After the amendment of that provision, the definition changed to “any property of an evacuee.” Consequently, after the amendment only the eight‑annas share of Abdulla’s interest, as listed in the Schedule attached to the Assistant Custodian’s order dated 28 January 1950, qualified as evacuee property. The Court therefore clarified that, contrary to the original wording, the entire properties in Schedules A and B were not evacuee property; only the eight‑annas portion belonging to the evacuee Abdulla was to be treated as such. With that clarification, the Court dismissed the appeal and granted no order as to costs.

The Court then turned to the second appeal, identified as C. A. No. 353 of 1958, which concerned properties located in Madras. The appellant, Fazal Bhai, had filed an application on 21 July 1950 invoking section 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act XXXI of 1950) in response to a notice issued under section 7 of the same Act. Fazal Bhai’s claim, similar to the earlier matter involving the Orissa properties, was that the partnership had been dissolved in November 1948 and that the final settlement of accounts was effected by a deed of sale dated 11 August 1949 for the Orissa and Madras properties, together with a deed of dissolution dated 12 August 1949. The consideration for the dissolution was Rs. 40,000, making the total amount agreed to be paid to Abdulla Rs. 1,25,000. Fazal Bhai prayed for a declaration that the properties mentioned in the notice had been lawfully transferred to him and that the transfer should be confirmed.

The Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property in Madras accepted Fazal Bhai’s contention that the transfer constituted only a step in the apportionment of the partnership’s assets and not a separate conveyance outside the partnership’s partition. Finding the transfer to be bona fide, the Assistant Custodian issued an order stating: “I therefore accept the dissolution of the firm of Fazalbhai Dhala and Company covered by the dissolution deed dated 12‑8‑49 and confirm the transfer of the immoveable properties covered by the deed dated 10‑8‑49 under section 40(5) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.” When the matter later came to the attention of the Custodian‑General of Evacuee Property during the proceedings concerning the Orissa property, the Custodian‑General noted on 26 December 1953 that the order concerning the Madras properties had not been challenged by the department and, therefore, he was not called upon to express an opinion on it.

The Custodian‑General, while considering the property matter, recorded that regarding the Madras properties he noted that Mr. Rathanam’s order had gone unchallenged by the department and, because the order was not before him, he was not required to give an opinion. He made this observation on 26 December 1953. Subsequently, the Custodian‑General suggested to the Custodian of Madras that the latter examine whether the order issued by the Assistant Custodian, Madras, was proper. In response, the Custodian of Madras reviewed the relevant records and issued a notice to all interested parties, including Fazal Bhai Dhala, requiring them to show cause why the Assistant Custodian’s order should not be set aside on revision. Fazal Bhai Dhala filed a cause‑showing, and after counsel who appeared for him presented arguments, the Custodian of Madras held that the transactions covered by the sale deed dated 10 August 1949 and the dissolution deed dated 12 August 1949 were not bona fide. Consequently, the Custodian set aside the Assistant Custodian’s order that had confirmed the transfer of the properties covered by those two deeds. He then directed the Assistant Custodian, Madras, to take steps under the Evacuee Property Act concerning the evacuee properties, due to the cancellation of the earlier confirmation of transfer. Fazal Bhai’s application for revision of the Custodian’s order was later heard by the Deputy Custodian‑General of Evacuee Property, India, and the application was rejected. The appellant’s counsel raised one further ground, arguing that the notice served on Fazal Bhai to show cause why the Assistant Custodian’s order should not be revised failed to mention the Assistant Custodian’s order relating to the business, and therefore the Custodian lacked jurisdiction to interfere with that portion of the order.

Turning to the Assistant Custodian’s original order, it not only confirmed the transfer of the immovable properties covered by the deed of 10 August 1949, but also stated that the dissolution of the firm of Fazal Bhai Dhala & Company, as reflected in the dissolution deed dated 12 August 1949, was accepted. The Custodian, in his order dated 5 July 1954, subsequently held that the transaction embodied in the dissolution deed was likewise not bona fide. It is important to recognise that the purported dissolution of the firm in November 1948, the settlement of accounts recorded in the August 1949 deed, and the consequent transfer of properties were all integral and indivisible components of a single transaction. Although the notice issued to Fazal Bhai did not expressly refer to the dissolution deed, his own statement filed in response demonstrated that he understood the revising authority would examine the bona fides of the numerous statements concerning the settlement of accounts and the dissolution of the business that were contained in that deed.

The Court considered the deed of dissolution and concluded that the appellant, Fazal Bhai, had been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the question of the bona fides of the transactions set out in that deed. The Court reiterated, in line with observations made in the related appeal, that it could no longer be disputed that the firm was dissolved effective from the date on which the deed of dissolution was executed. According to the Court, the Custodian’s order concerning the deed of dissolution merely declared that the transactions described therein, based purportedly on an earlier dissolution, were not bona fide. Consequently, the order refused to confirm any of the property transfers that had allegedly been effected through the deed, thereby denying legal effect to those alleged transfers. On the basis of these findings, the Court dismissed the present appeal, ordering that the appellant bear the costs of the proceedings. The dismissal of the appeal was therefore final, and no further relief was granted to the appellant in this matter. The Court emphasized that the hearing afforded to Fazal Bhai complied with the principles of natural justice, ensuring that his views on the legitimacy of the transactions were duly considered.