Delhi Administration vs Ram Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 220 of 1960

Decision Date: 3 May, 1961

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In this matter the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment on 3 May 1961 concerning the appeal of the Delhi Administration against Ram Singh. The opinion was authored by Justice Raghubar Dayal, who sat with Justice J. R. Mudholkar. The case is reported as 1962 AIR 63 and 1962 SCR (2) 694, and it has been cited in later authorities such as D 1968 SC 1 (12) R, 1970 SC 1396 (5). The dispute arose under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act 104 of 1956), specifically relating to sections 2(1), 8 and 13(2) of that statute, together with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) – sections 5, 156 and 551. The petitioner, the Delhi Administration, contended that the respondent, Ram Singh, had been lawfully prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 8 of the 1956 Act. A charge‑sheet prepared by a Sub‑Inspector, who was the officer in charge of the relevant police station, had been submitted to a First‑Class Magistrate in Delhi. The respondent objected that only a special police officer appointed under the Act possessed the authority to investigate offences arising under the Act. The Magistrate agreed with the objection and consequently set aside the charge‑sheet.

Justice Mudholkar, however, delivered a dissenting opinion. He asserted that the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, creates a separate code of offences and prescribes its own procedures, thereby prevailing over the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the extent of any conflict. The Act authorises the appointment of a special police officer for the performance of duties concerning offences within his jurisdiction, and that officer and his assistant police officers alone are empowered to investigate such offences. Consequently, police officers who have not been specially appointed cannot investigate offences under the Act, even though those offences are cognizable. Justice Mudholkar further explained that the investigative authority of a special police officer appointed under section 13(1) of the Act is derived not from that section but from section 551 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Even assuming that the wording “deal with offences” in section 13(1) confers investigative powers, the statutory scheme does not exclude the powers of the officer‑in‑charge of the relevant police station. The appeal was filed as Criminal Appeal No. 220 of 1960, arising from the judgment and order dated 4 August 1960 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Revision No. 31‑D of 1960. The Solicitor‑General of India appeared for the petitioner. The Court’s final disposition reflects the divergent views on the scope of investigative powers granted under the 1956 Act and the applicable procedural code.

The appeal was presented by counsel for the appellant, identified as H. Dhebar and D. Gupta. The respondent did not appear before the Court. The appeal was filed on 3 May 1961. The judgment of Judges K. Subba Rao and Raghubar Dayal was delivered by Justice Raghubar Dayal, while Justice R. Mudholkar delivered a separate opinion. The sole question for determination, as certified by the High Court of Judicature at Punjab, concerned whether a police officer who was neither appointed as a special police officer under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) nor subordinate to such a special police officer could lawfully investigate offences punishable under the Act.

In the present case, Ram Singh, the respondent, was alleged to have violated section 8 of the Act. The investigation was undertaken by Jet Ram, a Sub‑Inspector who had not been designated as a special police officer by the State Government. Jet Ram compiled a charge‑sheet and submitted it to the Magistrate. The Magistrate set aside the charge‑sheet, holding that only a special police officer possessed competence to investigate the matter and that Jet Ram’s investigation was therefore invalid. The State Government contested the Magistrate’s order by way of a revision petition, but the High Court affirmed the Magistrate’s decision and dismissed the revision. Nevertheless, the High Court issued a certificate of appeal under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, thereby permitting the Delhi Administration to bring the present appeal.

The learned Solicitor‑General, appearing on behalf of the Delhi Administration, argued that the Act contained no explicit provision barring ordinary police officers from exercising their powers with respect to cognizable offences, and therefore regular police officers were authorized to conduct investigations under the Act. He further contended that the special police officer’s powers were limited to “dealing with offences under the Act” and that this phrase did not encompass the power to investigate. In contrast, counsel for the respondent maintained that only a special police officer could lawfully investigate offences created by the Act, and that any investigation by a regular police officer was ultra vires.

Before addressing the merits, the Court set out the purpose of the legislation and its relevant provisions. The Act was enacted to give effect to the International Convention signed at New York on 9 May 1950 for the suppression of immoral traffic in women and girls. Section 2 provides definitions, and clause (1) of that section defines “special police officer” as a police officer appointed by, or on behalf of, the State Government to be in charge of police duties within a specified area for the purposes of the Act. Sections 3 to 9 create new offences and prescribe punishments, the details of which were not reproduced in the judgment. Section 10 concerns the release of convicted persons on probation of good conduct, as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court’s exposition of these provisions set the stage for its subsequent analysis of whether the investigative powers vested in a special police officer were exclusive, or whether ordinary police officers could also lawfully investigate offences under the Act.

The Court explained that when a person is convicted under the Act, the sentencing court may release the convict on probation in accordance with sub‑section (1) of section 562 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is hereinafter referred to as the Code, or may impose an admonition as provided in sub‑section (1A) of section 562 of the Code. It was noted that certain provisions of sections 562, 563 and 564 of the Code are applicable to such cases. The Court further observed that the provisions of section 11 of the Act correspond to the provisions of section 565 of the Code. Section 12 of the Act, which authorises the court to require security for good behaviour from habitual offenders at the time of passing sentence, was said to correspond, in substance, to the provisions of section 106 of the Code. Moreover, the Court stated that the provisions of sections 112 to 126 of the Code also apply to cases arising under the Act. The Court then set out the substantive provisions of sections 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 13 provides that for each area specified by the State Government for the purposes of the legislation, a special police officer shall be appointed by or on behalf of that Government to deal with offences under the Act in that area. The special police officer must hold a rank not below that of an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the presidency towns of Madras and Calcutta, a Superintendent of Police in the presidency town of Bombay, or a Deputy Superintendent of Police elsewhere. For the efficient discharge of his functions in relation to offences under the Act, the special police officer shall be assisted by such number of subordinate police officers, including women police officers wherever practicable, as the State Government deems appropriate. The State Government may also associate with the special police officer a non‑official advisory body consisting of not more than five leading social‑welfare workers of the area, including women social‑welfare workers wherever practicable, to advise him on matters of general importance concerning the working of the Act. Section 14 declares that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, any offence punishable under the Act shall be deemed a cognizable offence within the meaning of that Code, subject to specific conditions. First, arrest without warrant may be made only by the special police officer, or under his direction or guidance, or subject to his prior approval. Second, when the special police officer requires any subordinate officer to arrest a person without a warrant in his absence, he must give that subordinate a written order specifying the person to be arrested and the offence involved; the subordinate officer, before making the arrest, must inform the person of the substance of the order and, if the person requests, must show the order. Third, any police officer not below the rank of inspector who has been specially authorized by the special police officer may, if he has reason to believe that the delay in obtaining the special police officer’s order would jeopardise valuable evidence relating to an offence under the Act, proceed to make an arrest without a warrant, subject to the conditions later stipulated in the subsequent provisions.

In this case, the Court explained that when there was a likelihood that evidence under the Act might be destroyed or concealed, or that a person who had committed or was suspected of committing an offence might escape, or when the name and address of such a person were unknown or appeared to be false, the special police officer was permitted to arrest the person without obtaining a written order, provided that the officer reported the arrest and the circumstances of it to the special police officer as soon as possible. The Court further stated that, notwithstanding any other law, if the special police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that an offence punishable under the Act was being committed against a woman or girl residing in a premises and that obtaining a warrant would cause undue delay, the officer could record those grounds and enter the premises to conduct a search without a warrant. Before carrying out such a warrant‑less search, the officer was required to summon at least two respectable inhabitants of the locality, one of whom had to be a woman, to attend and witness the search, and the officer could issue a written order directing them to do so. The Court noted that any person who, without reasonable cause, refused or neglected to attend and witness the search after receiving a written order would be deemed to have committed an offence under section 187 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Additionally, the Court observed that the special police officer entering the premises under this power was authorised to remove any girl whom the officer considered to be under twenty‑one years of age and who was engaged in, being forced to engage in, or about to be forced to engage in prostitution. Once such a girl was removed, the officer was required to produce her immediately before the appropriate magistrate. The Court also clarified that the special police officer, together with any other persons who participated in or witnessed the search, would not be liable to any civil or criminal proceedings for any lawful act done in connection with, or for the purpose of, the search. Regarding the removal of girls from brothels, the Court held that where a magistrate, based on information received from the police or other reliable sources, believed that a girl apparently under twenty‑one years of age was living in, or being forced to live in, a brothel for the purpose of prostitution, the magistrate could direct the special police officer to enter the brothel, remove the girl, and produce her before the magistrate. After removing the girl, the special police officer was again obliged to produce her without delay before the magistrate who had issued the order.

Girls who are removed under section 15 or who are rescued under section 16 are dealt with under the provisions of the Act. Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 deal with matters that are not connected with any offence. Section 22 provides that no court that is inferior to a Magistrate, as defined in clause (c) of section 2, shall have jurisdiction to try the offences specified in that section. The Magistrates who are named in this clause include District Magistrates, Sub‑Divisional Magistrates, Presidency Magistrates and a Magistrate of the First Class who has been specially empowered by the State Government through a notification in the official gazette to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. From the various provisions it is evident that the Act constitutes a complete code regarding the steps that must be taken under it. The Act is intended to suppress the immoral traffic in women and girls, a problem that must be approached with due consideration, intelligence and an understanding of the underlying social conditions. This purpose is reflected in clause (b) of sub‑section (3) of section 13, which mandates the creation of a non‑official advisory body composed of not more than five leading social‑welfare workers from the area, including women social‑welfare workers wherever practicable, to work with the special police officer and to advise him on matters of general importance concerning the operation of the Act.

The Act creates new offences, designates the forum in which those offences are to be tried, and specifies the orders that may be passed upon conviction of the offenders. It adopts, either fully or with appropriate modifications, the necessary provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Act provides a specialized machinery to deal with the offences it creates, and the implication is that this machinery must be applied in accordance with the special Act; where the Act is silent, the general procedure applies, and no other machinery is to be employed for those offences. It would be unreasonable to assume that the investigation of the offences is left unprovided for and must be carried out by the regular police under the ordinary procedure of the Code. Moreover, certain provisions are such that the regular police cannot comply with them, leading to the conclusion that the special police officer alone is responsible for taking any action that the police would otherwise be required to take in connection with offences under the Act. Section 14 classifies the offences as cognizable, meaning that persons accused of those offences may be arrested without a warrant, and section 157 of the Code expressly requires the investigating officer, if necessary, to take measures for discovering and arresting the offender; nevertheless, the power to arrest without a warrant is not conferred on the regular police but, under the proviso to section 14, is to be exercised by the special police officer or under his direction, guidance or subject to his prior approval. The provisions of proviso (iii) correspond to the

In this case, the Court observed that the provision of section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits an officer not below the rank of inspector, who has been specially authorised by the special police officer, to make an arrest without a warrant in particular circumstances. The Court then examined section 15 of the Act, which empowers the special police officer to conduct searches without a warrant. Although the section does not expressly state that only the special police officer may perform such a search, the Court found that the language of the provision makes it clear that regular police officers are not entitled to search without a warrant and therefore cannot invoke the power granted under section 165 of the Code. The Court noted that every provision of section 15 mirrors the corresponding provision of section 165 of the Code.

The Court further explained that sub‑section (2) of section 15 obliges the special police officer to ensure that at least one woman is present as a witness to the search. The Court pointed out that there is no comparable requirement in section 103 of the Code, and consequently a regular police officer conducting a search under section 165 of the Code would not be required to have a female witness. Moreover, sub‑sections (4) and (5) of section 15 specifically authorize a special police officer to remove any girl found in the premises being searched, provided she is under twenty‑one years of age and is found to be engaged in prostitution, and to produce her before the appropriate magistrate. The Court emphasized that an ordinary police officer exercising the powers of section 165 of the Code would have no authority to take such action with respect to a girl discovered during the search.

From these observations, the Court concluded that the regular police force is not intended to exercise any of the powers conferred by the Act. All policing functions related to the purposes of the Act within a designated area have been vested in the special police officer. The Court reasoned that there must be a clear purpose for appointing a police officer to be in charge of the police duties within a specific area for the Act, because if the ordinary police could also perform those duties, the legislative provision for a special police officer would be unnecessary. The Court defined “police duties” in this context to include the entire range of functions required by the Act, such as detection, prevention, investigation of offences and any other responsibilities specially imposed by the Act. Finally, the Court referred to section 13 of the Act, which mandates that for each area specified by the State Government, a special police officer shall be appointed by, or on behalf of, that Government to deal with offences under the Act in that area, and interpreted the phrase “dealing with offences” in a broad sense to encompass any action that the police must undertake in relation to those offences.

The Court examined the reference to section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that “All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.” The argument put forward by counsel was that the expression “dealt with” must signify a step beyond investigation, inquiry or trial. The Court observed that this inference does not necessarily follow from the language of the section. The inclusion of the word “otherwise” indicates that “dealt with” is an all‑encompassing term, within which investigation, inquiry and trial are merely components of the overall process of dealing with an offence.

The Court then turned to subsection (3) of section 13, which obliges the special police officer to be assisted by a number of subordinate police officers for the efficient discharge of his functions in relation to offences under the Act, and to be advised by a non‑official advisory body. The phrase “functions in relation to offences” expressly embraces the officer’s investigative responsibilities, and there is no basis for excluding such functions from those contemplated by subsection (3). The contention that the special police officer would be overburdened if required to perform all ordinary police duties of investigation in addition to the duties conferred by the Act was rejected. The Court noted that the officer would be supported by subordinate police officers, who are empowered to investigate both under the implication of section 13 and, if deputed by the special police officer, under section 157 of the Code.

The Court also considered section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 11 of 1947), which declares that, notwithstanding any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no police officer below the ranks mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) shall investigate any of the offences specified in that section. This provision was enacted in a prohibitive form to prevent lower‑rank officers from exercising investigative powers unless a magistrate specifically ordered such investigation. It was not intended to confer special powers on any particular officer, but merely to limit the investigative authority of certain officers in particular circumstances. Consequently, the Court found that the distinction in language between section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 13 of the present Act did not support the State’s contention.

The Court observed that if the special police officer appointed under the Act were not given exclusive authority to investigate offences punishable under that legislation, it would be possible for two separate investigations to be launched on the same matter – one by the special police officer and another by the regular police force. The Court noted that such duplicative proceedings could create serious difficulties and that the Act contains no mechanism to coordinate the activities of the ordinary police with respect to cognizable offences covered by the Act and those of the special police officer. It further pointed out that the special police officer is a police officer who, by rank, is always higher than a Sub‑Inspector. Consequently, under section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the special police officer may exercise, throughout the local area to which he is appointed, the same powers that may be exercised by the officer in charge of a police station within the limits of that station. On that basis the Court held that the special police officer is competent to investigate offences under the Act and that he, together with his assistant police officers, are the only persons authorised to conduct such investigations. Police officers who have not been specially appointed as special police officers are, therefore, barred from investigating offences under the Act even though those offences are cognizable. In view of this reasoning the Court concluded that the appeal filed by the Delhi Administration fails and dismissed it.

The matter before the Court concerned a challenge to a charge‑sheet filed by the officer‑in‑charge of the Kamla Market Police Station, who alleged that the respondent had committed offences punishable under section 8 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956. The respondent was described as a pimp. The investigation that led to the charge‑sheet was carried out by the station‑house officer rather than by a special police officer appointed under the Act. The charge‑sheet was presented before a First Class Magistrate in Delhi, and similar charge‑sheets were filed against other individuals. The defence raised an objection before the Magistrate, contending that the charge‑sheets were invalid because the investigations had not been conducted by a special police officer as required by the statute. The Magistrate upheld the objection and rejected the charge‑sheets. The Delhi Administration then filed an application for revision in the High Court of Punjab, which was likewise dismissed. Subsequently, the Administration sought a certificate of fit‑ness for appeal under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, and the High Court granted the certificate. The appeal therefore reached this Court. The High Court, relying on the decision in Kuppammal (In re) (1), had held that an offence under the Act must be investigated only by one of the officers named in section 13 and that any charge‑sheet based on an investigation by another police officer was bad and ought to be quashed. The present Court was called upon to examine that view.

The Court observed that a charge‑sheet prepared by any police officer other than the special police officer prescribed by the Act is defective and must be set aside. In the Court’s view the position adopted by the Madras High Court and subsequently accepted by the Punjab High Court is not sustainable. The statute in question creates a number of new offences, lays down specific restrictions that may be imposed on persons convicted of those offences, provides for the appointment of a special police officer and for the constitution of an Advisory Board, and grants certain special powers to the special police officer. It also confers on magistrates the authority to order the closure of brothels, to evict offenders from premises occupied by them, and to remove prostitutes from any place. Moreover, the Act makes provision for the establishment of protective homes and empowers magistrates to order the detention of women and girls in such homes under specified circumstances. In addition, the Act authorises the making of rules governing its operation. The Court referred to the judgment reported in I.L.R. [1959] Mad. 345.

According to Justice Raghubar Dayal, the Act constitutes a complete code because it creates new offences and prescribes the procedure for dealing with them. Consequently, he held that, to the extent that the Act contains its own procedural provisions, those provisions must prevail over the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. He further explained that, since the Act provides for the appointment of a special police officer to deal with offences under the Act within the officer’s jurisdiction, only that officer has the authority to investigate an offence under the Act committed in that area. The Court found it useful to examine Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: “(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.” Sub‑section (2) would, at first glance, apply to offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, except to the extent that its provisions are repealed or superseded by the Act itself. While sub‑section (1) limits the Code’s application to offences under the Penal Code, sub‑section (2) extends the Code’s provisions to offences under any other law, subject to any existing enactment that governs the manner or place of investigation, inquiry, trial or other dealing with such offences. The Court therefore needed to determine whether the Act contains any provision that regulates the manner of conducting investigations of offences contemplated by the Act, because the issue at hand was confined to the singular question of the power of a station house officer to investigate an offence under the Act.

The Court examined whether a station house officer possessed the authority to investigate offences under the Act. A simple reading of the statute revealed that it contained no clause granting the specially appointed police officer the power to investigate any conduct made punishable by the Act. The contention that such investigative authority could be inferred from subsection (1) of section 13 was considered. That subsection provides: “There shall be for each area to be specified by the State Government in this behalf a special police officer appointed by or on behalf of that Government for dealing with offences under this Act in that area.” It was argued that the phrase “dealing with offences” was broad enough to encompass investigative functions. While the wording is indeed general and expansive, the Court held that it must be interpreted in conjunction with the remainder of the legislation. The Act delineates particular powers and imposes specific duties on a special police officer, and the expression “dealing with offences” should be limited to those enumerated functions. The Court noted that, had Parliament intended to vest the sole investigative power in the special police officer, it would have enacted a provision analogous to section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which expressly confers such power. Since the Prevention of Corruption Act pre‑existed the present legislation, it would have been reasonable for Parliament to employ the same language if it wished to achieve a similar result. Moreover, offences under the Act are classified as cognizable by virtue of section 14, which plainly brings them within the scope of section 156(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, an officer‑in‑charge of a police station is prima facie empowered to investigate those offences. The Court further observed that subsection (2) of section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subjects the provisions of section 156 to any special statutory scheme that governs investigation. If Parliament had intended to exclude the Code’s investigative provisions for offences under this Act, it would have expressly incorporated such an exclusion in the Act, defining the investigative procedure and naming the officer authorized to conduct it, thereby overriding the general police power. The Court concluded that the mere expression “dealing with offences under this Act” is insufficient to displace the ordinary investigative authority granted under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In discussing the operation of section 166 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court observed that investigation, inquiry and trial constitute distinct stages in the process of bringing a delinquent to book. Each of those stages is separate from the others, and the legislature has expressly recognized their importance by mentioning them specifically in section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To illustrate this point, the Court compared the wording of subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act with the wording of subsections (1) and (2) of section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the former provision Parliament used only the phrase “dealing with offences under the Act,” whereas in the latter provision the language reads “investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.” The Court noted that, according to its ordinary meaning, the expression “dealing with offences” would ordinarily cover the stages of investigation, inquiry and trial. Nonetheless, because the legislature singled out those three stages in section 5, it did so to underscore their significance and to eliminate any doubt about its intention. The Court reasoned that when Parliament was aware of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly sections 5 and 156, it would have employed language in subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act that mirrored the language used in subsection (2) of section 5 if it had intended to bring investigation, inquiry or trial within the scope of that subsection. Consequently, the Court inferred that Parliament’s reference in section 13(1) to a special police officer being empowered to “deal with offences under the Act” was not meant to grant that officer the power to investigate an offence under the Act. It was later pointed out that a special police officer appointed under the Act must be of a rank not below that of an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the towns of Madras and Calcutta, not below a Superintendent of Police in the Presidency Town of Bombay, and not below a Deputy Superintendent of Police elsewhere, and that such rank would ordinarily confer the power to investigate. The Court clarified, however, that this power would not arise from subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act but from section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that police officers superior in rank to an officer‑in‑charge of a police station may exercise throughout their local area the same powers that the officer‑in‑charge may exercise within the limits of his station. Finally, the Court made clear that it does not hold that a special police officer appointed under the Act is incapable of investigating an offence; rather, it holds that such investigative authority does not flow from subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act but only from the provisions of section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court observed that, pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure, a special police officer appointed under the Act might be able to exercise investigative powers concerning an offence defined by the Act. Counsel argued that, based on the definition of “special police officer” in section 2(1) of the Act, such an officer, being placed in charge of “police duties” within a specified area, would inherently possess the authority to investigate an offence. The Court noted that the term “police duties” is not defined anywhere in the Act, and therefore referred to section 23 of the Police Act for guidance. The relevant portion of section 23 provides that every police officer shall promptly obey and execute all lawful orders and warrants issued by a competent authority, collect and communicate intelligence affecting public peace, prevent the commission of offences and public nuisances, and detect and bring offenders to justice. The Court explained that the phrase “to detect and bring offenders to justice” is intended to be comprehensive, but it does not automatically confer upon a special police officer the power to investigate under the Act; rather, the duties imposed by section 23 are distinct from those imposed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court emphasized that investigation is a matter of considerable importance, that statements recorded during investigation carry significant evidential value, and that detailed procedural provisions for investigation are contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Only after completing an investigation may a police officer present a charge‑sheet. Neither the Police Act nor the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act contains any provision regarding the conduct of investigations or the presentation of charge‑sheets. Consequently, the Court held that it would be inappropriate to infer from the words “deal with offences” an authority to investigate and to file a charge‑sheet. The Court also observed that the High Courts of Punjab and Madras have held that section 13(1) of the Act confers on a special police officer an exclusive power to investigate offences under the Act. The Court found it difficult to accept that, even if the words “deal with offences” were read to grant investigative powers to a special police officer, the powers of a police‑station officer in whose jurisdiction the offence occurred would be excluded. No language in section 13(1) suggests the exclusion of a station‑house officer’s powers. It was submitted that, unless the Court ruled otherwise, a conflict would arise because both the special police officer and the station‑house officer might seek to investigate the same offence. The Court, however, was not convinced that such a simultaneous exercise of investigative powers would pose a danger.

In this situation, the Court observed that there would be no danger of two officers exercising investigative power simultaneously. The offence must first be entered in the register of the police station that has jurisdiction over the place where the offence occurred. After the entry is made, the investigation proceeds under the authority of the officer who caused the entry to be made. Where the officer who made the entry happens to be the officer in charge of the police station, the special police officer may either withdraw from the investigation and allow the station officer to continue, or may permit the station officer to proceed without interference. Conversely, when the special police officer himself registers the offence, the officer in charge of the relevant police station becomes aware of the case through the station’s records and is therefore required to refrain from taking any independent investigative steps. On the basis of this reasoning, the Court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, that the judgments of both the High Court and the Magistrate be set aside, and that the matter be remitted to the Magistrate for disposal in accordance with law. Accordingly, the majority opinion of the Court dismissed the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.