Balaji vs Income-Tax Officer, Special

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 240 of 1960

Decision Date: 04 August 1961

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, Raghubar Dayal, K. Subbarao

In the matter titled Balaji versus Income‑Tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 4 August 1961. The bench that heard the case comprised Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J. C. Shah and Justice Raghubar Dayal, with Justice K. Subbarao also noted. The case is reported in 1962 AIR 123 and 1962 SCR (2) 983, and has been cited in numerous subsequent authorities. The issue concerned the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Indian Income‑Tax Act, 1922 (section 16(3)(a)(i) and (ii)), which required the inclusion of income earned by a taxpayer’s wife and minor children in the computation of the taxpayer’s total income. The petitioner, Balaji, together with his wife, had carried on a partnership business and had admitted their three minor sons as partners. When the Income‑Tax Officer assessed Balaji’s total income, he included the shares attributable to the wife and the three minor sons under the aforementioned sections of the Act. Balaji challenged this assessment before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, contending that the provisions were ultra vires the legislature because they fell outside Entry 54 of the Federal Legislative List in the Government of India Act, 1935, and that they violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. The Court held that the entries in the legislative lists are not powers but fields of legislation, and that the widest import should be attached to them. Accordingly, Entry 54 was interpreted to cover legislation intended to prevent tax evasion, and the impugned provision fell within this field. Referring to Sardar Baldev Singh v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax, Delhi and Ajmer (1961) 1 SCR 482, the Court explained that the tests for permissible classification under Article 14 require an intelligible differentiation and a rational connection of that differentiation to the legislative objective. The Court found that the classification based on the income of spouses and minor children was founded on an intelligent differentia and was reasonably linked to the purpose of preventing tax evasion. Consequently, the provision did not infringe Article 14. The Court further observed that it was inappropriate to apply American precedents on tax evasion to the Indian context, as the conditions were entirely different. Recognising the widespread evasion of taxes in the country, the legislature had enacted the law to curb such practices, and therefore the provision was constitutionally valid.

In the present case, the Court considered whether, in the absence of any counter‑balancing circumstances, it would be proper to follow the analogy of certain American decisions and conclude that the legislation under challenge was unnecessary. The Court distinguished the American case of Albert A. Hoeper v. Tax Commissioner of Wisconsin (1931) 76 L. Ed. 248 and held that it was inapplicable to the facts before it. By contrast, the Court approved the decision in B. M. Amina Umma v. Income‑tax Officer, Kozhikode (1954) 26 I.T.R. 137, finding its reasoning relevant to the matters before this Court.

The Court further examined whether the impugned provision infringed the guarantee of freedom of trade and commerce under Article 19(1)(f) and the right to practise any profession, calling or occupation under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. While acknowledging that a tax authorised by statute may be challenged on the ground that it violates the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, the Court reiterated the well‑settled principle that any tax law, like any other statute, must satisfy two conditions: first, that the legislature competent to enact the law possessed the constitutional authority to do so; and second, that the law does not encroach upon any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. To illustrate this principle, the Court referred to the authorities in Md. Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, Jalalabad (1952) S.C.R. 572; Himmattai Harilal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1934) S.C.R. 1122; K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras (1960) 3 S.C.R. 887; and K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala (1961) 3 S.C.R. 77.

Even after satisfying the foregoing conditions, the Court held that the restriction imposed by the impugned provision must also be reasonable. It observed that, although the mode of taxation prescribed by the provision might impose a somewhat heavier burden on a husband or a father who is a partner in a genuine partnership, this burden was justified by the overall benefit to the public. Moreover, the Court noted that any additional tax payable by the husband or father on the income attributable to his wife or minor children would ultimately be absorbed by them in the final settlement of accounts within the family. The Court cited the decision in State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1952) S.C.R. 597 to support this analysis of reasonableness.

Having set out the legal principles, the Court then turned to the specific proceedings before it. The case was an original jurisdiction matter, identified as Petition No. 240 of 1960, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The petition was presented on behalf of the petitioner by counsel comprising T. M. Thakar, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath. The respondents were represented by counsel including H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor‑General of India, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and P. D. Menon. The judgment dated 4 August 1961 was delivered by Justice Subba Rao.

The writ petition sought to examine the constitutional validity of Section 16(3)(a)(i) of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922 (Act XI of 1922), hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” The Court noted that the material facts were not in dispute and could be succinctly summarised. The petitioner, Balaji, together with his six soils and his wife, identified as Godawaribai, formed a Joint Hindu family. The family was engaged in trading activities, money‑lending, and owned substantial agricultural lands. On 23 November 1946, two of Balaji’s sons separated from the family. In 1951, with the assistance of mediators, the remaining members also divided, and another prominent member commenced a separate business. Subsequently, Balaji and his wife entered into a partnership to conduct their business and admitted their three minor sons to the benefits of that partnership. On 22 September 1952, a partnership deed was executed, allocating an equal share to each partner.

In this matter the petitioner had executed a partnership deed on 22 September 1952 that gave each partner an equal share in the business. Relying on that deed, the petitioner submitted two separate applications to the Income‑tax Officer at Wardha for the assessment year 1952‑53: one application was made under section 25‑A of the Act seeking recognition of the family partition, and the other was made under section 26‑A for registration of the partnership firm. Both applications were ultimately approved by the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal in Bombay by its order dated 3 September 1958, which confirmed that the partition was recognized and that the firm received registration. For the subsequent assessment years 1953‑54 and 1954‑55 the Income‑tax Department also registered the firm under section 26‑A, and the assessment proceedings for those three years remained pending before the appropriate tax authorities. For the assessment year 1955‑56 the Income‑tax Officer again permitted registration of the firm, but he assessed the petitioner’s total income at Rs 2,44,625, a figure considerably higher than the total income of Rs 58,232 that the petitioner had declared. The discrepancy arose because the petitioner had excluded from his total income the share of partnership profit attributable to his wife and his three minor sons, whereas the Officer had included the income share of the wife and the minor children as part of the petitioner’s business income. By way of the present petition the petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of sections 16(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act, seeking a declaration that those provisions are ultra vires the Constitution, a writ of certiorari to set aside the assessment order dated 15 March 1960, and a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondents from adding the share income of the petitioner’s wife and minor children from the partnership firm to his total income for taxation. The first issue presented for determination is whether the legislature possessed the competence to enact sections 16(3)(a)(i) and (ii). For clarity the relevant portion of the contested section is reproduced: “Section 16. (3) In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included—(a) so much of the income of a wife, or a minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly—(i) from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner; (ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner.” Section 16 therefore provides the rule for computing a person’s total income and specifies which sums must be included or excluded. Under sub‑clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (a) of sub‑section (3), the shares in the partnership profits received by the wife and the minor children are to be included in the individual’s total income, rendering the individual liable to tax on the income of his wife and minor children, albeit only in the circumstances enumerated in the provision.

The Court noted that the statutory provision imposes liability on a husband or father for the income of his wife and minor children only in the situations expressly mentioned in the provision. Counsel for the petitioner argued that Entry 54 of the Federal Legislative List contained in the Government of India Act, 1935, does not grant the legislature authority to tax person A on the income of person B, and consequently the challenged sub‑section exceeded the legislature’s competence. Entry 54 of the Federal Legislative List reads: “Taxes on income, other than agricultural income.” The petitioner pointed out that this entry is identical to item 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. On that basis, the petitioner submitted that income tax is a tax levied on an individual in respect of his own income, and therefore only the individual’s own income may be taxed, not the income of his spouse or minor children.

Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the wording of Entry 54 does not limit the legislative power to tax solely the income of the person assessed. The counsel argued that the entry authorises taxation of “income” in a broader sense, and nothing in the entry prevents the legislature from imposing the tax incidence on a person other than the one whose income is being assessed. Alternatively, the respondents distinguished between the taxability of the income and the mechanism for its collection, contending that although only the wife’s and minor sons’ income is taxable, it is not unlawful to place the immediate tax burden on the husband because of the close nexus between the husband, his wife and minor children who are partners in a business. The respondents cited earlier decisions that addressed the same issue. In B. M. Amina Umma v. Income‑Tax Officer, Kozhikode, the Court ruled in favour of the Income‑Tax Department. The same question was raised before this Court in Sardar Baldev Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Ajmer, where the matter was left unresolved. While a definitive ruling on this important question would be desirable, the Court, with some reluctance, chose to keep the question open because the petition could be disposed of on a narrower ground. The Court reiterated the settled principle that entries in the legislative lists are not powers themselves but delineate fields of legislation, and that the language used in the entries must be given its widest import. Referring to the earlier judgment, the Court quoted Sarkar, J.: “Entry 54 should be read not only as authorising the imposition of a tax but also as authorising all enactment which prevents the tax imposed being evaded. If it were not so read, the admitted power to tax a person on his own income might often be made infructuous by ingenious contrivances.” This observation confirms that Entry 54 can support legislation aimed at preventing tax evasion.

In this case the Court identified the central issue as whether section 16(3)(a)(1) and (ii) of the Income‑Tax Act was enacted by the Legislature with the purpose of preventing tax evasion. The provision in question dealt with the treatment of partnership income. Under the relevant clause, when a firm was registered, the share of profit attributable to each partner was to be added to that partner’s other earnings and treated as part of his total income. This rule had remained unchanged after 1956 except for one aspect that the Court noted was not presently before it. The statutory scheme was originally intended to benefit partners by making each of them liable only for tax on his own share of the partnership profit. However, the same mechanism also created an opportunity for evasion. A husband or a father could nominally admit his wife or his minor children as partners, thereby dividing the business income among several persons. By doing so, the aggregate income of each individual could fall below the taxable threshold or be attracted to a lower tax slab, lightening the overall tax burden. This arrangement enabled the assessee to retain the full economic benefit of the business while escaping the tax that would have been payable on the undivided income. The Income‑Tax Enquiry Commission of 1936 had examined such practices and recommended measures to curb the evasion. The Legislature accepted those recommendations and enacted the sub‑section in order to close the identified loopholes. Consequently, the Court held that sub‑section 16(3)(a)(1) and (ii) was legislated expressly to prevent tax evasion and fell well within the legislative competence of the Federal Parliament.

The constitutional validity of the provision was then challenged on the ground that it infringed the principle of equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution, which states that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” The Court observed that previous decisions permit classification in legislation provided there is a reasonable basis for the distinction. It clarified that Article 14 forbids class legislation, not reasonable classification serving a legitimate legislative purpose. To satisfy the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be met: first, the classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes the persons or objects included in the group from those excluded; second, the differentia must bear a rational relation to the objective sought to be achieved by the statute. Applying this test to the impugned sub‑section, the Court noted that the law subjects an individual to tax on the income of his wife or minor children when he carries on business in partnership with his wife or admits his minor sons to the partnership. In contrast, an individual who partners with a third party—whether male or female—or with his adult children, or who conducts the business separately from his spouse or children, is liable only for tax on his share of the partnership income. Thus, the law creates a distinction between two categories of partners, and the Court proceeded to examine whether this distinction bears a rational connection to the statute’s anti‑evasion purpose.

In the present case, the Court observed that the provision placed a person who earned income from a partnership with his wife or his minor children in a different tax category from a person who earned income from a partnership with a third party, whether that third party was male or female, or from a partnership with his adult children, or who conducted his business separately from his spouse or children. The Court noted that a distinction indeed existed between the two groups, but the contention was that the distinction did not bear any rational connection to the purpose of the statute. The Court then examined how, for the purpose of tax imposition, the difference between an individual and his wife carrying on a partnership, the difference between an individual and his wife carrying on business separately, the difference between an individual and his wife in partnership versus an individual in partnership with a third party, and the difference between an individual who admitted his minor children to a partnership and an individual who partnered with his adult children or outsiders, could be justified on a reasonable basis. The Court rejected this argument as it ignored the legislative object, which had been previously identified as the prevention of tax evasion. The Court explained that a similar device would rarely be employed by individuals who entered into partnerships with persons other than those specified in the subsection, because doing so would expose the third‑party partner to the risk of asserting his own rights. Consequently, the Legislature deliberately selected for classification only that group of persons who were in practice used as a cloak to perpetrate fraud on the tax system.

The Court further addressed the submission that genuine partnerships might exist between a husband and his wife, and therefore the classification lacked a reasonable relation to the statutory objective, at least in those genuine cases. The Court held that the statute did not distinguish between genuine and non‑genuine partnerships; rather, it classified all partnerships involving a husband, his wife, and/or his minor children, irrespective of their authenticity, against partnerships involving other persons. While the net of the classification was cast a little wider, the Court emphasized that this broader approach was necessary because any further subclassification into genuine and non‑genuine partnerships could defeat the purpose of the legislation. The Court then turned to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Albert A. Hoeper v. Tax Commissioner of Wisconsin. In that case, the appellant had married a widow; both spouses earned separate incomes and filed separate returns. Under the applicable tax statute, the wife’s income was added to the husband’s income for tax purposes, which increased the husband’s tax rate and imposed a tax that would otherwise have been payable by the wife. The appellant contended that the statute violated due‑process and equal‑protection principles. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Roberts, accepted the contention and struck down the statute, observing that the law effectively taxed income that did not belong to the taxpayer by labeling it as such.

The Court observed that the fundamental principles underlying the constitutional system forbid any state from determining a tax on one person’s property or income by reference to the property or income of another, as such measurement would violate the due‑process protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It further stated that income which is not, in fact, the taxpayer’s cannot be transformed into taxable income merely by labeling it as such. In the earlier American case, the Court of Appeal had offered two reasons for upholding the contested provisions: first, that the provisions were necessary to prevent fraud and tax evasion by married persons, and second, that they constituted a regulation of marriage. The United States Supreme Court rejected both arguments. It declined the first reason on the ground that the asserted necessity could not justify an otherwise unconstitutional levy, and it dismissed the second reason because a mere difference in social relations could not be said to alter the taxable status of a person receiving income enough to warrant a separate tax measure. In dissent, Justice Holmes defended the statute, arguing that it reflected a thousand‑year historical view that husband and wife were considered one unit and that it helped prevent tax evasion. While the majority opinion initially appears to support the petitioner’s counsel, a closer examination reveals significant differences from the present matter. In the American case there was no partnership between the spouses; the wife’s income was simply added to the husband’s, causing him to pay a higher rate on his own earnings as well as a share of the tax that otherwise would have been the wife’s liability. By contrast, the provisions under challenge in the present case do not create such a general liability; they apply only when a husband treats his wife as a partner. This creates a greater risk of fraudulent evasion through the creation of fictitious partnerships involving the wife and minor children than when spouses earn separate incomes from different sources. Moreover, the social and economic status of women in India, even compared with their American counterparts in 1931, is considerably lower, rendering the American decision inapplicable to Indian circumstances. A wife in India, especially if illiterate—a condition that applies to a large majority—typically lacks economic independence and is often used as a tool by her husband; many transactions are conducted in her name without her knowledge. When the Indian legislature, presumed to understand the conditions and needs of its people, enacted a law recognizing this widespread fraudulent device to prevent tax evasion, it becomes difficult for this Court to deny the law’s validity in the absence of any countervailing circumstances.

In the present case the Court observed that there were no circumstances which could offset the reasoning that, by analogy with decisions from the United States, the necessity for the statute in question did not exist. On the contrary, the Court pointed to a clear authority of the Madras High Court in B. M. Amina Umma v. Income Tax Officer, Kozhikode (1), where the provision was upheld on the basis of a reasonable classification. Justice Rajagopalan, speaking for a division bench, after analysing the relevant case law, stated that “the reasonableness or otherwise of a classification has to be decided with reference to all the circumstances of the case including the social and economic structure prevalent in the area where the taxing statute is in operation.... An attempt to prevent by legislation an evasion of just tax liability and the necessary classification to give effect to that object cannot, in our view, be termed unreasonable.” The Court expressed full concurrence with these observations and therefore dismissed the contention that the statute was unnecessary or unreasonable.

The next challenge to the validity of the provisions was raised on the ground that they violated Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which respectively guarantee every citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and the right to practise any profession, occupation, trade or business. The argument advanced was that, because the husband is statutorily required to pay a specified amount of tax on the income of his wife, the State action deprives him of his property and thus infringes his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f). Moreover, it was contended that the impugned statutory provision imposes an unreasonable restriction on the said right by compelling the husband to pay tax on income that, under law, belongs to his wife and children as distinct legal persons. The learned Additional Solicitor‑General responded that a tax imposed under the authority of law cannot be challenged on the basis that it infringes Article 19. The Court found no support for this submission in the constitutional text. It referred to Article 265, which provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law, and to Article 13(1), which declares that any law in force before the commencement of the Constitution that is inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. The Court noted that, unless the context requires otherwise, the term “law” in Article 13 includes any ordinance, order, bye‑law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of India, and that “law in force” also embraces laws passed or made by a legislature or other competent authority before the Constitution came into effect, even if such law is not currently operative in all areas. This interpretation confirms that a law providing for the levy and collection of taxes must satisfy the constitutional test and cannot be deemed invalid solely on the basis of alleged infringement of the rights guaranteed under Article 19.

In this case the Court held that a straightforward, combined reading of the constitutional provisions shows that any statute which conflicts with any part of Part III of the Constitution is void. It was further noted that a statute authorising the levy and collection of taxes falls within the definition of a law under Part III and therefore must satisfy the test prescribed by Article 13 of the Constitution. The Court explained that the term “law” in Article 265 must refer to a valid law, meaning that a law must not only be enacted by a legislature exercising a power conferred on it, but also must not infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. To illustrate this principle, the Court cited the decision in Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, Jalalabad (1), where it was held that imposing a licence fee under a municipal bye‑law that exceeded the powers granted by the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act violated the citizen’s right under Article 19(1)(g). The Court also referred to Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2), observing that when a State attempted to levy a sales‑tax in a manner beyond the competence of its legislature, the threat to collect tax without lawful authority infringed the same fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). The Court emphasized that the same reasoning applies whenever a tax‑imposing statute is void because it offends constitutional fundamental rights. In Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni & Moopil Nair v. State of Madras (1), after reviewing earlier judgments, the Court articulated two essential tests for a law’s validity: first, the legislature must possess the competence to enact the law; second, the law must not abridge any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III. Accordingly, the Court stated that Section 16(3)(a) of the Act must satisfy both tests, and if it contravenes any provision of Article 19, it will be void to the extent of that inconsistency. This view was affirmed by the Court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala (2), where the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Travancore‑Cochin Land Tax Act, XV of 1955, as amended by the Travancore‑Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act, X of 1957, and the learned Chief Justice held that the Act was void for violating both Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

After examining the relevant provisions of the Act and observing the unreasonable character of the restrictions, the Court concluded that the provisions of the Act were unconstitutional when assessed in light of the provisions of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court could not accept the broad contention advanced by the learned Additional Solicitor‑General that a tax law is incapable of being challenged on the ground that it infringes Article 19 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the learned Additional Solicitor‑General maintained that the provisions of s. 16(3)(a)(1) and (ii) of the Act, as cited in (1) (1960) 3 S.C.R. 887, 91 1 and (2) (1961) 3 S.C.R. 77, constituted only reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(f) and (g), pursued in the interest of the general public. Counsel for the petitioner countered that the restrictions were unreasonable for several reasons: first, the husband was required to pay tax on income that his wife earned from her business, meaning that a tax was imposed on one person for the income of another; second, this imposition not only prevented a husband from taking his wife as a partner in his business but also barred a wife who possessed her own business from taking her husband as a partner; third, the husband was liable to pay tax at a higher rate than he would have paid if his wife’s income were not added to his own; and fourth, an identical situation arose between a parent and his minor children in relation to their joint business. Accordingly, the petitioner’s counsel argued that the provisions obstructed the honest pooling of resources among family members who were closely connected, thereby harming family prosperity and amounting to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights in question. While there is some plausibility to this argument, the Court observed that a broader view of the situation reveals the reasonableness of the restrictions. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row, Chief Justice Pattanjali Sastri articulated the test of reasonableness, stating: “The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.” Applying this test, the Court asked whether the restrictions imposed under the impugned provisions, as reported in (1) (1952) S.C.R. 597, could be said to be unreasonable. The object sought to be achieved by the provisions was to prevent a widespread abuse, namely, the evasion of tax by an individual who conducted business through a partnership nominally formed with his wife or minor children. The scope of the provisions was limited to a small number of intimate family members who ordinarily remain under the protection of the assessee and are his dependants.

The Court observed that the individuals targeted by the statutory provisions – specifically the wife and minor children – could not reasonably be expected to run a business on their own using independent capital while the husband or father is alive and continues to protect them. It was acknowledged that some of these partnerships might be genuine, with the wife or children actually contributing capital; however, the provisions do not interfere with the legal rights of those partners, nor do they alter the internal liability relationship between the husband and his wife or between the father and his minor children concerning the tax that has been paid. The Court noted that, for assessment purposes, the income earned by a person in the capacity of a partner must be aggregated with that person’s personal income, yet the provision does not prevent the husband or father from allocating, within the partnership accounts, the portion of tax that corresponds to the share of income attributable to his wife or children. It was recognised that the addition of a spouse’s or children’s earnings could raise the total income of the husband or father into a higher tax bracket, potentially resulting in a higher rate of tax than would otherwise apply. Nevertheless, the Court explained that this outcome is not inevitable; if the husband’s or father’s own income is modest, the increase may be negligible, and even when the added income is significant, the taxpayer may debit a portion of the excess tax against the amounts attributable to his wife and children. In essence, the Court described that a registered firm is treated as a separate unit for tax assessment, but unlike a typical registered firm, the entire income of the unit is added to the personal income of the husband or father. This method of taxation may impose a slightly heavier burden on a husband or father who is in a genuine partnership with his wife or minor children, yet the Court held that the burden is largely counterbalanced by the public benefit of preventing income‑tax evasion and by the practical reality that any additional tax paid on the spouse’s or children’s income will ultimately be settled between them in the final accounting. Consequently, the Court concluded that the provisions of section 16(3) of the Act do not constitute an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. On that basis, the petition was dismissed with costs, and the Court entered an order that the petition be dismissed.