Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala vs The State Of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1956

Decision Date: 27 January 1961

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.L. Kapur, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala versus The State of Bombay, decided on the twenty‑seventh day of January, 1961, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment through a bench comprising Justice Raghubar Dayal, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice J. L. Kapur, Justice K. C. Das Gupta, and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The appellant, Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala, had been convicted under section ninety‑two of the Factories Act, 1948 for operating a salt works without the licence required by the statute. The salt works, identified as the Wadia Mahal Salt Works situated at Wadala in Bombay, occupied roughly two hundred and fifty acres of land; the only permanent structures on the premises consisted of temporary shelters for laborers, a small office building, and, at selected locations, solid platforms erected to support water‑pumping equipment used to draw sea water. The appellant contended three separate points: first, that the salt works did not qualify as a “factory” within the meaning of clause (m) of section two of the Act; second, that the term “premises” contained in the definition of a factory should be interpreted to exclude open land; and third, that the conversion of sea water into salt did not amount to a “manufacturing process” as defined in clause (k) of the same section. The Court examined each of these submissions and concluded that the salt works indeed fell within the statutory definition of a factory because the expression “premises” is a generic term encompassing both land with buildings and open land, and the salt works constituted such premises. Moreover, the Court held that the extraction of salt from sea water was not a result of mere natural forces but required human intervention aided by natural forces, thereby satisfying the requirement of a manufacturing process. By treating sea water—a non‑commercial raw material—as the input and producing salt—a commercial product—through a process of treatment and adaptation, the appellant was engaged in manufacturing as contemplated by clause (k). The Court therefore affirmed that the appellant’s conviction for operating the salt works without a licence was proper and lawful. In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished earlier authorities such as Kent v. Astley, Redgrave v. Lee, and Nash v. Hollinshead, and rejected the application of decisions like Sedgwick v. Watney and Grove v. Lloyds British Testing Co. Ltd., which had addressed different factual contexts. The judgment thus clarified that, under the Factories Act, a salt works situated on open land with temporary structures qualifies as a factory, the land constitutes “premises,” and the process of converting sea water into salt satisfies the statutory definition of a manufacturing process.

The judgment referred to several authorities, including the decision of the Manager of Sangu Soap Works reported in the All India Reporter 1957 Madras 755, as well as the cases Paterson v. Hunt (1909) 101 L.T.R. 571, Law v. Graham [1901] 2 K.B. 327, Hoare v. Truman, Hanbury, Buxton & Co. (1902) 86 L.T.R. 417, and McNicol v. Pinch [1906] 2 K.B. 352. The matter was presented before the Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1956. The appeal challenged the judgment and order dated 7 October and 10 October 1955 issued by the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 817 of 1955. Counsel for the appellant comprised Porus A. Mehta, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnan, while counsel for the respondent consisted of N. S. Bindra, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen. The judgment was rendered on 27 January 1961 and delivered by Justice Raghubar Dayal.

This appeal was filed by special leave on behalf of Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala, who sought to set aside the order of the Bombay High Court that had permitted the State to appeal against the acquittal of the appellant. The acquittal related to an alleged violation of section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 (Act LXIII of 1948), hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” The alleged offense involved the appellant’s operation of the Wadia Mahal Salt Works located at Wadala in Bombay without obtaining a licence required under section 6 of the Act read with rule 4 of the rules framed under the Act. The principal issue presented for determination was whether the salt works fell within the definition of “factory” under clause (m) of section 2 of the Act.

The Court explained that answering this issue required first construing the term “premises” as used in the definition of “factory,” and secondly deciding whether the activities carried out at the salt works—specifically the conversion of sea water into crystalline salt—constituted a “manufacturing process” as described in clause (k) of section 2 of the Act. The salt works covered an area of approximately two hundred and fifty acres; the Court noted that other salt works in the jurisdiction sometimes occupied even larger tracts of land. On the site, the only structures were temporary shelters built for the resident labourers and an office building. In addition, a few permanent platforms (pucca platforms) were present for fixing a water pump when it was necessary to draw water from the sea; when not in use, the pump was stored in the office. Apart from these mentioned constructions, the remainder of the salt‑work premises was open land. On the side facing the sea, bunds had been erected to prevent seawater from flooding the salt pans.

The Court then quoted clause (m) of section 2 of the Act, which defined “factory” as any premises, including the precincts thereof, where either (i) ten or more workers were employed, or had been employed on any day during the preceding twelve months, and where any part of the premises was used for a manufacturing process carried on with the aid of power or ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) twenty or more workers were employed, or had been employed on any day during the preceding twelve months, and where any part of the premises was used for a manufacturing process carried on without the aid of power or ordinarily so carried on. The judgment excerpt concluded with the wording of clause (m) as it appeared in the Act, ending with the phrase “and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried.”

Section 2 of the Act defines “factory” to include “premises” where manufacturing processes are carried on without the aid of power, but expressly excludes a mine governed by the Mines Act, 1952, and a railway running shed. Clause (k) of the same section provides the definition of “manufacturing process” as follows: “manufacturing process” means any process for (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal; or (ii) pumping oil, water or sewage; or ………

The appellant contended that the term “premises” appearing in the definition of “factory” should be interpreted to mean only buildings, and that open land without any structures is not covered by that term. The appellant further argued that because the Salt Works possessed only temporary sheds and no permanent buildings, the Salt Works could not be characterised as a “factory.” The Court did not agree with this submission. The Court observed that the word “premises” has, over time, come to denote either land, buildings, or both, depending upon the context in which it is used.

To illustrate this contemporary meaning, the Court referred to several legal dictionaries. Wharton’s Law Lexicon observes that “premises” is often used to mean “land or houses.” Cochran’s Law Lexicon, Fourth Edition, states that “premises” means “houses or lands.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, explains that “premises” in the context of estates includes (i) lands and tenements; an estate; land and buildings thereon; the subject‑matter of a conveyance; and (ii) a distinct and definite locality, which may be a room, a building, or another definite area. Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law notes that the term has gradually acquired the popular sense of “land or buildings,” and although historically used by laymen, it now frequently appears in statutes such as the Public Health Act, 1875, section 4, where “premises” includes messuages, buildings, lands, easements, tenements and hereditaments of any tenure. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, Second Edition, as quoted in Webster’s New International Dictionary, defines “premises” as the property conveyed in a deed, generally a piece of land or real estate, and sometimes, particularly in fire‑insurance documents, a building or buildings on land.

From these authorities, the Court concluded that “premises” is a generic term encompassing open land, land with buildings, or buildings alone. The argument that the phrase “premises including precincts” in the definition of “factory” limits “premises” to only buildings because only buildings can have precincts was rejected. The Court explained that the addition of the word “including” expands, rather than restricts, the scope of “premises,” and does not require the existence of precincts for a parcel of land to qualify as premises.

The Court explained that the expression “premises” does not require the presence of precincts. Even a building may exist without any precincts attached to it. The term “including” therefore does not limit the meaning of “premises”; rather, it expands it. Consequently, the argument that “premises” should be confined solely to buildings and should exclude open land is unsound. Section 7(1)(bb) of the Act obliges a factory occupier, in the written notice that must be sent to the Chief Inspector before occupying or using any premises as a factory, to state the name and address of the owner of the premises or building, including any precincts referred to in section 93. This requirement shows that “premises” is not limited to buildings alone. The “building” mentioned in this clause is the same building referred to in section 93. Section 93(1) provides that where separate buildings within any premises are leased to different occupiers for use as distinct factories, the owner of the premises is responsible for providing and maintaining common facilities such as approach roads, drainage, water supply, lighting and sanitation. That provision makes clear that “premises” denotes an entire area that may contain several separate buildings, not merely the buildings themselves.

The Court further noted that section 85 empowers the State Government to declare that any or all provisions of the Act apply to any “place” where a manufacturing process is carried on, whether or not it is aided by power. The word “place” is a generic term that covers both open land and buildings, and its use in this section indicates that the Act can be applied to manufacturing activities conducted on open land. Thus, internal evidence within the Act itself demonstrates that “premises” should not be confined to buildings alone. The High Court had correctly observed that the purpose of the Act is to protect workers’ health, safety, welfare, working hours, employment of young persons and leave, and that the legislature could not have intended to discriminate between workers engaged in manufacturing inside a building and those performing the same process on open land. The appellant contended that the Act’s various provisions could not apply to salt works where sea‑water is converted into salt in the open, but the Court rejected that contention.

The Court observed that while certain provisions of the Act may indeed apply to the situation, the legislation does not impose a blanket obligation on every factory occupier to obey every requirement contained in the Act. Rather, an occupier is required to comply only with those provisions that are relevant to the particular type of factory in which he is engaged. The Court noted that it is an admitted fact that the workers in the salt works sometimes have to labor during night hours, that women are employed among the workforce, that the employees are entitled to rest periods, that they receive a midday meal, that drinking water must be made available, and that first‑aid materials are kept in an office room. Even if the occupier has already made satisfactory arrangements for these necessities, this does not imply that the statutory provisions concerning such amenities cease to be applicable to salt works. Moreover, the Act contains sufficient authority for the State to grant exemptions to occupiers from compliance with particular provisions in special cases. Section 6 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules requiring that prior written permission from either the State Government or the Chief Inspector be obtained before a site can be used for the establishment of a factory, and before any construction or extension of any factory or class of factories is undertaken. This requirement, together with the rules made under it, does not mean that every factory must be a building, nor that a licence for construction or extension is automatically required for every factory. Of course, each factory must have a defined site, and it may be necessary to obtain prior permission from the State Government or the Chief Inspector before that site is utilized for factory purposes. The Court further held that the definition of “manufacturing process” in the Act does not stipulate that such a process must be carried out inside a building; the definition addresses the nature of the work performed rather than its physical location, and the work may be undertaken either within a building or in the open. Finally, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon certain precedents, beginning with the case of Kent v. Astley (1) (1869) L.R. 5 Q.B. 19, where it was held that a slate quarry covering an area of four hundred acres, the operations of which were conducted in the open air with only sheds as buildings, was not a “factory” within the meaning of Section 3, sub‑section 7 of the Factory Acts Extension Act, 1867. Cockburn, C.J., observed on page 23 that had the work been performed inside a building, it would likely have fallen within the scope of the statute, and he expressed doubt that the legislature intended to include sheds erected merely as protection against the weather within the meaning of “premises.”

The Court explained that the quarry and the equipment used in the quarrying process were only accessories to the quarrying activity and that the legislature had not yet declared that work carried out in the open air would fall within the scope of the Factory Acts. It observed that, except in cases that had been specially provided for, the Acts had not been extended to open‑air works because such works were considered less exposed to the evils attendant upon manufacturing carried on inside buildings. Mellor, J., said at page 24: “The legislature has from time to time extended the Factory Acts to different trades and businesses. Numerous slate quarries exist, and a large number of persons are employed in them: if the legislature intended to apply the Factory Acts to them, it would have been done by special enactment.” Hannen, J., added: “I agree with my Brother Mellor, that if the legislature had intended to apply the Factory Acts to quarries, they would have been expressly mentioned, and this omission leads strongly to the conclusion that it was not intended to interfere with persons employed in quarries.” The Court noted that the observations above did not by themselves explain why slate quarries where work was carried on in the open air and not in a building were not held to be “a factory.” This was apparent when one considered the purpose and the wording of the Factory Act of 1833, which had been enacted to regulate the labour of children and young persons in the mills and factories of the United Kingdom and applied only to cotton, woollen, worsted, hemp, flax, tow, linen or silk mills or factories wherein steam, water or any other mechanical power was used to propel or work the machinery in such mill or factory. The later Acts merely extended the scope of the 1833 Act. The Act of 1844 amended the law relating to labour in factories and, by section LXXIII, provided that “the Factory Act as amended by this Act and this Act” would be construed together as one Act. The definition of “factory” in that Act read: “The word ‘factory’ notwithstanding any provision or exemption in the Factory Act shall be taken to mean all buildings and premises situated within any part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland wherein or within the close or curtilage of which steam, water, or any other mechanical power shall be used to move or work any machinery employed in preparing, manufacturing, or finishing, or in any process incident to the manufacture of cotton, wool, hair, silk, flax, hemp, jute, or tow, either separately or mixed together, or mixed with any other material or any fabric made thereof.” This definition indicated that premises need not consist of buildings and that the term “premises” meant something different from “buildings.” The Act of 1850, which regulated the employment of children in factories, provided that it would be construed together with the previous Acts as one Act, and it contained no additional reference that would bring open‑air quarry work within the definition of a factory.

The Act of 1860 addressed the employment of women, young persons and children in bleaching works and dyeing works and placed those activities under the regulations of the Factories Act. Section VII of that statute supplies a definition of the terms “Bleaching Works” and “Dyeing Works.” In its relevant portion the provision states that, for the purposes of the Act, the expressions “Bleaching Works” and “Dyeing Works” shall be understood to mean any building, building, or premises in which females, young persons and children, or any of them, are employed, and in which one or more of those buildings or premises any process preceding packing is carried out. Section IX of the same Act enumerates the exemptions and provides, in its material portion, that nothing contained in the Act shall extend or apply to any premises, whether open, enclosed, or covered, which are used or intended to be used bona‑fide exclusively for the purposes of carrying on the specified operations. This wording makes clear that the term “premises” may include open areas as well as structures. The Factory Acts Extension Act of 1867, commonly referred to as the 1867 Act, contains in Section 3 a definition of “factory” that includes “any premises, whether adjoining or separate, in the same occupation, situated in the same city, town, parish or place, and constituting one trade establishment, in, on or within the precincts of which fifty or more persons are employed in any manufacturing process.” The legislative sequence up to the decision in Kent’s case demonstrates that Parliament deliberately specified the locations to be controlled by each Factory Act, and it is evident that had the legislature intended the Factory Act to apply to slate quarries, it would have expressly extended the legislation to cover them. Because the factories and mills originally covered by the Factory Act of 1833 were facilities that could operate only in buildings, a prevailing interpretation emerged that nothing could be described as a “factory” unless it involved a building and unless the Act expressly provided for its application.

The next authority cited by the appellant is Redgrave v. Lee (1874) 9 Q.B. 363, which was applied in a similar manner. The appellant also relies on Nash v. Hollin‑Shead [1901] 1 K.B. 700. In that case the court considered a farm where a workman operated a movable steam engine to drive a mill for grinding meal intended solely for feeding livestock on the farm and not for sale. The court held that the farm was not a factory because the meal produced was not intended for commercial sale but merely for the farm’s own stock. This distinction was emphasized to avoid the absurd result that would follow if a farm were treated as a factory, a view echoed in later decisions concerning the application of the Factories Act to salt works.

In the earlier discussion it was observed that treating a farm as a factory would produce a result that could only be described as ludicrous. Relying on that observation, the trial Court in the present matter concluded that applying the provisions of the Factories Act to the Salt Works would likewise lead to “ludicrous results.” The present Court, however, has already indicated that such an outcome does not follow from the application of the relevant provisions of the Factories Act to the Salt Works. The authorities cited by the trial Court, namely Weston v. London County Council (1) and Wood v. London County Council (2), offer no assistance to the arguments in this case. It is appropriate to note that the Factories Act, 1937 (I Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 67) expressly provides in subsection (7) of section 151 that “premises shall not be excluded from the definition of a factory by reason only that they are open‑air premises.” Subsection (1) of section 151 further defines “factory” as “any premises in which a certain type of work is carried on by way of trade or for purposes of gain.” These statutory clauses support the way this Court interprets the term “premises” in clause (m) of section 2 of the Act. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Salt Works fall within the meaning of “premises” in the definition of “factory,” and that the Salt Works constitute a factory if the work carried out there falls within the definition of “manufacturing process.” The appellant’s second contention is that the conversion of sea water into salt does not qualify as a “manufacturing process” because, according to the appellant, no process of making, altering, packing, cleaning, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance for the purpose of its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal is undertaken. The appellant further argues that none of the processes listed in clause (k) of section 2 are performed at the Salt Works; instead, the necessary work is allegedly done solely by the force of gravity and by solar energy, as referred to in the authorities (1) [1941] 1 K.B. 608 and (2) [1941] 2 K.B. 232, and that no human agency is employed in the conversion. This argument was accepted by the trial Court. The High Court, however, rejected that position and observed: “In our opinion it is a travesty of language to say that although forty‑seven workmen are working on these works, salt is made without the assistance of human agency….” The High Court further noted that there is no doubt that the workmen employed at the Salt Works handle the sea water in a specific manner, and that without such handling the salt produced at these works would not be obtained. The present Court agrees with the High Court that the conversion of sea water into salt is not a process occurring solely by natural forces, but involves human effort assisted by natural forces.

The Court observed that the transformation of sea water into salt was not produced merely by natural forces; rather, it required human effort that was aided by natural forces. The natural force of gravity was employed to move sea water from the sea to the reservoirs, then onward to the tapavanis and finally into the crystallising pans, which were specially prepared by compacting mud and creating a hard, watertight tiled surface. Solar energy was used to evaporate the water contained in the brine. In addition to these natural inputs, human agency was applied to other processes carried out in the salt works.

The Court relied on a letter dated 12 July 1949, which was exhibited as Exhibit 1 and originated from the President of the Salt Merchants and Shilotires Association, Bombay, addressed to the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Supply, Government of India, New Delhi. The letter described the operation of a salt work as follows: “A salt work mainly consists of an open marshy area, surrounded by a mud embankment whose height is above the highest tide water mark in that locality to prevent inundation. Within this embankment, sluice gates are provided with suitable openings for taking in sea water and for discharging waste water respectively. The inner enclosed area is divided into compartments for the storage of sea brine of different densities. When the salt is formed, it is stored on the platform by the labourers engaged in the manufacture. It is then weighed, bagged and carried to the railway station or to a port of shipment. For the production the sea water is taken into the reservoirs at high‑water tide twice during a month. The high tides occur on about nine or ten days in a month, five days during daylight and four times at night. Some labourers are detained for this work but they are not required to be present the whole time when evaporation is proceeding. Once the brine is let into the crystallising beds, its surface is not to be disturbed for four or five days. After this, the labourer must carefully ensure that the density does not exceed a certain limit and that other kinds of salt contained in the brine are not deposited, which would contaminate the sodium chloride (common salt) already formed. This knowledge is gained by experience. Sifting and storing then begins. The labourer also has to refill the crystallising beds with fresh brine. Thus the labourer’s work is intermittent and not continuous for any fixed hours.”

From this description the Court concluded that labourers were employed for several specific tasks: (i) admitting sea water to the reservoirs by operating sluice gates, sometimes at night, or by using a pump; (ii) filling the crystallising beds with brine; (iii) monitoring the density of the brine in those beds; (iv) ensuring that the density did not exceed prescribed limits and that salts other than sodium chloride were not formed; (v) scraping and collecting the salt crystals; and (vi) grading the salt crystals by sieving. These activities demonstrated that human agency, assisted by gravity and solar energy, was essential to the extraction of salt from sea water.

In addition to the earlier enumerated steps, the labourers also placed the harvested salt into gunny bags. From this it follows that the extraction of salt from sea water results from human agency working together with natural forces. The activities that take place in the Salt Works and have been described above therefore fall within the meaning of a “manufacturing process,” because salt is effectively manufactured from sea water by treating and adapting the sea water so that it becomes salt. In this transformation the sea water, which is a non‑commercial raw material, is converted into salt, a commercial product. The observations made in Sedgwick v. Watney Combe, Reid & Company, Limited at page 463 support this view, as that judgment regarded the process carried out at the Salt Works as a treatment of sea water for the purpose of converting it into salt. For comparison, the case that was the subject of controversy involved a hereditament used in connection with the manufacture of “bottled beer” by the respondent. In that situation, beer that was not yet drinkable and therefore not saleable as draught beer was brought to the premises in tank wagons, pumped into large tanks, carbonated, filtered and finally placed into bottles that were corked, labelled, packed and dispatched for delivery. The issue for determination was whether the hereditament was occupied and used for a distributive wholesale business. The court observed that the crucial question was whether the treatment of the beer on those premises was merely a prelude to distribution. It was held that it was not, because the finished article intended for distribution was bottled beer, and the treatment altered the beer’s quality, changing it from an unpotable, unsellable state into a potable, marketable one. In the present matter, the finished article produced in the Salt Works is salt. The material does not arrive at the Salt Works as salt; it arrives as brine. Through the processes carried out, the brine’s quality is altered and it becomes salt, a marketable article. The decision in Grove v. Lloyds British Testing Co. Ltd. at page 467 reinforces this reasoning, stating that “adapting for sale” clearly denotes that something has been done to the article that makes it, in some respect, different from what it was before. Likewise, the rulings in Kaye v. Burrows & Others and Hines v. Eastern Counties Farmers’ Co‑operative Association Ltd. at page 484 articulated the same test as in the bottled‑beer case: one must examine what the finished article to be turned out is. If the finished article is only placed into its final condition by the processes to which it has been subjected within the hereditament, then those processes constitute an “altering or adaptation for sale.” In the present case, the salt that emerges from the Salt Works is indeed a different article from the brine that entered, and thus the processes performed amount to an adaptation for sale.

It was observed that when a process changes the nature of the material that enters a premises, that process falls within the statutory phrase “altering or adaptation for sale.” The Court pointed out that in the cases concerning rags and seeds, the finished product differed from the bulk material that entered the premises, and therefore, in the Court’s view, that transformation constituted an adaptation for sale.

In the case of The State of Kerala v. V. M. Patel, the Court held that the treatment of pepper and ginger amounted to a “manufacturing process.” The work carried out on the firm’s premises was described as consisting of winnowing, cleaning, washing and drying pepper on a concrete floor. A similar method was applied to ginger, which was dipped in lime and then spread out to dry in a warehouse on the same premises.

The Court noted that the decision reported as In re: Chinniah, Manager, Sangu Soap Works provided no assistance to the appellant because it did not definitively state whether the process in question was a manufacturing process. That decision dealt only with the general meaning of the word “manufacture” and did not address the concept of a “manufacturing process.” Likewise, the case reported as Paterson v. Hunt was of little relevance. That decision merely held that the simple act of sorting rags did not amount to an adaptation for sale.

The Court further referred to the judgment in Law v. Graham, which held that washing bottles before filling them with beer did not adapt the beer, the bottles, or the bottled beer for sale. In contrast, the decision in Hoare v. Truman, Hanbury, Buxton & Co. found that forcing carbonic acid into beer at high pressure, thereby aerating the beer, did constitute an adaptation for sale. The Court distinguished these authorities by explaining that sorting rags involved no material change; the rags were merely separated from other mixed items, and therefore were not transformed into a different article. That situation differed from the conversion of sea water into salt, where a clear transformation occurs.

Finally, the Court stated that the rulings in McNicol v. Pinch, State v. Chrestien Mica Industries Ltd., and G. R. Kulkarni v. The State were of no assistance in resolving the present issue. In those cases, the word “manufacture” was interpreted according to its dictionary meaning and the specific context of the statutes involved. The present matter, however, required an interpretation of the expression “manufacturing process” within the relevant provision, and the Court emphasized that neither the dictionary definition of “manufacture” nor interpretations of “manufacture” for other statutes could guide the determination.

Even if the word “manufacture” is given its ordinary meaning, the conversion of brine into salt qualifies as manufacture of salt, because “the essence of making or of manufacturing is that what is made shall be a different thing from that out of which it is made,” as stated in McNicol v. Pinch (4) page 361. Accordingly, the Court held that the process of converting sea‑water into salt carried out at the appellant’s Salt Works falls within the definition of “manufacturing process” prescribed in clause (k) of section 2 of the Act. The Court referred to a letter written by the Chief Inspector of Factories to the Deputy Salt Commissioner, Bombay, in which the Inspector expressed the opinion that salt works, in themselves, did not fall within the meaning of the word “factory.” The letter explained that, initially, salt pans were regarded as being subject to the Factories Act and that occupiers of such pans were instructed to obtain registration and licences. Because doubts subsequently arose, the question was reconsidered and it was concluded that salt pans would not be deemed factories unless they were equipped with a building used (1) [1906] 2 K.B. 352, (2) [1956] Pat. 660, (3) I.L.R. [1937] M. P. 13 in connection with the manufacture of salt. The Deputy Commissioner for Salt disagreed with this view and, in a reply dated 13 September 1952, after referring to clause (m) of section 2 of the Act, observed that “by premises is meant building and its adjuncts.” No further correspondence between these authorities was placed on record, and the Court did not know the ultimate conclusion reached by them. Moreover, the Court found that any view expressed by an authority on this point did not assist in resolving the matters before it.

The Court also noted that a representation made on 12 July 1949 by the President of the Salt Merchants and Shilotires Association to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Industries and Supply, did not contend that salt works were outside the definition of “factory.” Rather, the representation merely requested that the provisions of the Act not be applied to salt works for the reasons mentioned in that submission. Similarly, a reply dated 9 April 1952 from the appellant’s firm to the Inspector of Factories did not assert that the salt works were outside the definition of “factory”; instead, the reply stated that the provisions of the Indian Factories Act were considered redundant because the Bombay Salt Association had already made an appropriate representation to the Government of India. It was only in the written statement filed by the appellant before the trial Court that, for the first time, an argument was advanced that the Salt Works did not fall within the definition of “factory.”

The Court observed that the failure of the accused or Association of salt merchants to raise the argument that the salt works were outside the definition of the word “factory” in the Act was irrelevant. The Court noted that it mentioned this point only because the appellants referred to an opinion expressed by the Chief Inspector of Factories in a letter to the Deputy Salt Commissioner dated September 13, 1952. Having considered that opinion and the material placed before it, the Court formed the view that the appellant’s salt works unquestionably fall within the statutory meaning of the word “factory” under the Act. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the conviction of the appellant for operating a factory without obtaining the required licence was legally justified. The Court therefore ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the conviction and sentence previously imposed remain in force. No further relief was granted to the appellant, and the matters raised in the appeal were left without alteration. Thus, the judgment rendered by the lower court was affirmed in its entirety, confirming the conviction and the penalty imposed. The decision underscores that the definition of “factory” under the Indian Factories Act includes salt processing establishments such as those operated by the appellant.