32 Dhagamwar Narsingh vs S. S. Grewal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1958

Decision Date: 9 October 1961

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

In the matter titled Dhagamwar Narsingh versus S. S. Grewal, decided on 9 October 1961, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment through Justice A.K. Sarkar, with Justices P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo and K.C. Das Gupta forming the bench. The case was reported in 1962 AIR 422 and also appeared in the Supreme Court Supplement (1) 1962. The appeal involved a dispute under the Mines Act concerning the appointment and powers of a Chief Labour Officer and a Welfare Officer as governed by the Mines Rules of 1955, specifically Rules 72, 73 and 74. The appellant, Dhagamwar Narsingh, had been appointed by the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (referred to as “the Company”) as the Chief Labour Officer for the Company’s collieries on 25 September 1947. He continued in that capacity until the Company issued a notice of termination on 5 December 1955. Claiming that he was, in fact, a Welfare Officer for one of the mines, the appellant filed an appeal before the Chief Inspector of Mines, invoking Rule 74(2) of the 1955 Mines Rules, which allows a Welfare Officer to challenge the validity of a dismissal. The Chief Inspector examined the claim and concluded that the appellant did not qualify as a Welfare Officer within the meaning of Rule 74(2); consequently, the Chief Inspector refused to entertain the appeal. Dissatisfied, the appellant approached the Patna High Court seeking a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution directing the Chief Inspector to consider the appeal. The High Court dismissed the petition, largely adopting the reasoning of the Chief Inspector. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, challenging the High Court’s decision. The Court examined the statutory framework and noted that Rule 72(1) requires the appointment of at least one Welfare Officer in any mine where five hundred or more persons are ordinarily employed, and that such appointment is intended for a specific mine. The Court observed that the appellant, as Chief Labour Officer, served several mines owned by the Company rather than a single mine, and therefore could not be considered the Welfare Officer contemplated in Rule 74(2). Accordingly, the Court held that the appellant was not a Welfare Officer within the meaning of the relevant rule and therefore lacked the statutory right to file the appeal under Rule 74(2). The judgment affirmed the earlier findings of the Chief Inspector and the Patna High Court, and dismissed the appellant’s appeal.

The Mines Rules of 1955 were framed under the Mines Act of 1952 and became effective on 2 July 1956. The Court’s primary focus lay on the proviso to rule 74(2), which, however, must be read together with rule 72. The relevant portions of those Rules were set out as follows. Rule 72(1) required that every mine employing five hundred or more persons ordinarily must appoint at least one Welfare Officer, and if the number of persons ordinarily employed exceeded two thousand, additional Welfare Officers were to be appointed on a scale of one for every two thousand persons or fraction thereof. Rule 72(2) stipulated that no person could serve as a Welfare Officer of a mine unless he possessed certain qualifications, which were enumerated in the Rule. The provision further allowed that, where a person was already in service as a Welfare Officer in a mine, the qualifications could be relaxed with the approval of the Chief Inspector. Rule 72(4) mandated that a written notice of every such appointment, together with the date of the appointment, be sent by the owner, agent or manager to the Chief Inspector within seven days of the appointment. Rule 73 prescribed the duties of Welfare Officers, enumerating the specific responsibilities that such officers were required to perform. Rule 74(1) dealt with general matters, while rule 74(2) provided that the condition of service of a Welfare Officer shall be the same as that of other staff members of corresponding status in the mine; it further provided that, in the case of discharge or dismissal, a Welfare Officer shall have a right of appeal to the Chief Inspector, whose decision shall be final and binding upon the owner, agent or manager of the mine as the case may be. The Chief Inspector mentioned in these Rules is the Chief Inspector of Mines in India. The Court observed that if the appellant was not a Welfare Officer within the meaning of the proviso to rule 74(2), as the company asserted, then no appeal by him could be maintained under that provision and he would not be entitled to the writ that he sought. Consequently, the central question for determination was whether the appellant qualified as a Welfare Officer under the Rules and thus fell within the construction of those provisions. The Court then noted certain undisputed facts. Firstly, both the Act and the Rules had come into force long after the appellant had been appointed by the Company. Secondly, after the Rules became effective, no application for relaxation of qualifications had been made to, nor granted by, the Chief Inspector with respect to the appellant under the proviso to sub‑rule (2) of rule 72. Thirdly, no notice required by rule 72(4) had been issued concerning the appellant’s appointment. It appeared that the Chief Inspector had found that the appellant “was performing duties akin to those of Welfare Officers contemplated by rule 73 and he was qualified to work as a Welfare Officer.” The Court indicated that it would consider the appeal on the basis of these findings. It proceeded to address the contention raised by the Chief Inspector and the High Court that a Welfare Officer under rule 74(2) must be appointed after the Rules came into force.

In this case, counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sen, argued that a person who possessed the required qualifications and had been performing the duties of a Welfare officer before the Rules became effective should be regarded as a Welfare officer within the Rules. He emphasized that the proviso to sub‑rule (2) of rule 72 contemplated continuation of service of such a person as a Welfare officer, permitting relaxation of qualifications where necessary and granting it. He submitted that sub‑rule (4) of rule 72 did not apply to the appellant because his appointment pre‑dated the Rules and the proviso to rule 72(2) showed its provisions were not intended for such appointments. The Court indicated that it was unnecessary to pronounce on that specific question in the present appeal. Nevertheless, the Court held that the appeal had to fail even if counsel’s submission were accepted, for reasons unrelated to that contention. The Court observed that the Rules did not contain a definition of the expression ‘Welfare officer’. The Court noted, however, that there was no dispute that the Welfare officer referred to in the proviso to rule 74(2) was the same category of officer that appeared in sub‑rule (1) of rule 72. In the Court’s view, it was perfectly clear that the Welfare officer envisaged by rule 72(1) was an officer assigned to a single mine. Rule 72(1) required at least one Welfare officer for every mine employing between five hundred and two thousand persons, which precluded any broader interpretation. Counsel for the appellant also accepted that the Welfare officer contemplated by the rule was to be appointed with respect to a single mine. However, the record showed that the appellant served as the Welfare officer for several mines owned by the Company, not for any one mine alone. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant could not be characterised as a Welfare officer within the meaning of rule 72(1) and therefore did not fall within the proviso to rule 74(2). Counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant might be deemed to have been separately appointed as the Welfare officer of each of the Company’s collieries. The Court found that view untenable because a single appointment could not be treated as multiple appointments, and it was undisputed that the appellant held only one appointment covering all the Company’s collieries. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, ordered costs against the appellant, and entered the order of dismissal.