The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others vs Babu Ram Upadhya

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 119 of 1959

Decision Date: 25 November, 1960

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.R. Mudholkar, Subba Rao

In this case the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal brought by the State of Uttar Pradesh and others against the respondent Babu Ram Upadhya. The judgment was delivered on 25 November 1960. The Bench that decided the matter consisted of Justice P B Gajendragadkar, Justice A K Sarkar, Justice K N Wanchoo and Justice J R Mudholkar. The case was recorded as the State of Uttar Pradesh and others versus Babu Ram Upadhya. The decision appears in the law reports as 1961 AIR 751 and 1961 SCR (2) 679. Citator references to the judgment include: F 1961 SC 773 (5,7); RF 1964 SC 600 (57,63,18); F 1965 SC 868 (4); R 1967 SC 356 (7); RF 1968 SC 224 (3); RF 1969 SC 903 (30); RF 1969 SC 1108 (8); D 1970 SC 122 (12); D 1970 SC 1244 (29); RF 1971 SC 1403 (7); F 1971 SC 2111 (7); E 1973 SC 883 (19); RF 1974 SC 794 (13); O 1974 SC 2192 (50,51,53); R 1975 SC 446 (10); RF 1976 SC 2433 (6); R 1977 SC 747 (6); R 1979 SC 52 (13); R 1979 SC 1149 (19); RF 1980 SC 2181 (104); RF 1981 SC 711 (11); F 1982 SC 1407 (24); R 1983 SC 494 (8); RF 1983 SC 558 (20); O 1985 SC 1416 (43,56,58); RF 1986 SC 555 (6); RF 1988 SC 805 (10); D 1989 SC 811 (3,10); RF 1989 SC 1160 (30); RF 1990 SC 820 (31); RF 1992 SC 1033 (54). The matters raised concerned the dismissal of a public servant who was a police officer, whether the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations were mandatory, whether disregard of those regulations invalidated disciplinary action, the authority to exercise the Governor’s powers under the Police Act 1861, section 7, the applicability of paragraph 486 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, and the relevance of Articles 154, 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India.

The respondent, a sub‑inspector of police, was alleged to have stopped a complainant who was carrying a bundle of currency notes totalling Rs 650. During the search the respondent opened the bundle and handed the notes one by one to a person identified as Lalji, who was present with him. Lalji subsequently returned the notes to the complainant, but when the complainant reached home he discovered that Rs 250 was missing from the bundle. On the basis of this allegation the authorities instituted proceedings under section 7 of the Police Act, charging the respondent with misappropriation of Rs 250. The Deputy Inspector General of Police then passed an order dismissing the respondent from the police service. The respondent challenged that dismissal by filing a writ petition before the High Court, asserting that the authorities had acted in contravention of Rule I of paragraph 486 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations. Rule I required that any information received by the police concerning the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer must first be dealt with under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court examined the case and held that the provisions of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations had not been observed. Consequently, the Court found that the proceedings initiated under section 7 of the Police Act were invalid and illegal, and it set aside the order of dismissal issued against the respondent.

The Court noted that the provision of section 7 of the Police Act, which had been invoked, was held to be invalid and illegal, and consequently the order of dismissal that had been issued under that provision was set aside. The appellant put forward several submissions. First, it argued that the complaint did not disclose any cognizable offence by the respondent and therefore rule I of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations should not apply. Second, it contended that rule III of paragraph 486 authorised the department to commence disciplinary proceedings even if rule I was not complied with. Third, it submitted that the Police Regulations, which were framed under the authority granted to the Government by the Police Act and which delegated the Governor’s power to dismiss at pleasure to a subordinate officer, were merely administrative directions meant to guide the exercise of discretion in a reasonable way, and that any breach of those directions did not create any enforceable right or cause of action for the public servant. Fourth, the appellant maintained that the regulations were only directory in nature and that a failure to obey them could not invalidate the dismissal order.

The Court, speaking through Justices Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, held that the dismissal order was illegal because it was based on an enquiry that contravened rule I of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations. The Court found that the facts alleged in the complaint established a cognizable offence under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent, and therefore rule I of paragraph 486 was indeed applicable. It was observed that a police officer who conducted a search was “entrusted” with any money handed over by the person being searched. The Court further observed that rule III of paragraph 486 dealt only with offences under section 7 of the Police Act and with non‑cognizable offences; it did not provide an alternative procedure for cognizable offences and could not override the procedure prescribed in rule I. Turning to the constitutional dimension of the tenure of public servants and the power to impose disciplinary action, the Court set out the following propositions: (i) every individual who is a member of a public service mentioned in Article 310 of the Constitution holds office at the pleasure of the President or the Governor; (ii) the power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure is outside the ambit of Article 154 and therefore cannot be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer, and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution; (iii) such tenure is subject to the limitations and qualifications enumerated in Article 311; (iv) neither Parliament nor a State Legislature may enact a law that abrogates or modifies this tenure in a way that infringes the overriding power conferred upon the President or the Governor by Article 310, as qualified by Article 311; (v) however, Parliament or the State Legislatures may enact statutes that regulate the conditions of service of such members, including provisions for disciplinary proceedings, without affecting the constitutional powers of dismissal; and (vi) the legislatures may also enact statutes laying down and regulating the scope and content of the doctrine of “reasonable opportunity” embodied in Article 311, though such statutes remain subject to judicial review.

The Court observed that the doctrine of “reasonable opportunity” articulated in Article 311 possessed a defined scope and content, and that any law addressing that doctrine remained subject to judicial review. It further held that when a legislature enacted a statute within the permissible limits prescribed by the Constitution, the rules framed by an authority exercising the power conferred by that statute would be effective so long as they remained within those same constitutional boundaries. In support of this principle the Court referred to a series of authorities, namely N.W.F. Province v. Suraj Narain (AIR 1949 PC 112), Shenton v. Smith (1895 AC 229), Gould v. Stuart (1896 AC 575), Reilly v. The King (1934 AC 176), Terrell v. Secretary of State (1953 2 All ER 490), State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid ([1954] SCR 786), Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India ([1958] 681 SCR 828), R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India (1936 LR 64 IA 40) and High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I.M. Lall (1948 LR 75 IA 225). The Court then turned to the Police Act, contending that the Act together with the rules made thereunder formed a self‑contained code that provided for the appointment of police officers and prescribed the procedure for their removal. Accordingly, any authority taking action under the Police Act or its rules was required to conform strictly to those provisions, and a public servant whose rights were infringed by a violation of mandatory rules could legitimately challenge the authority’s order.

The Court noted that Paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations was expressed in mandatory language, using the term “shall” rather than “may,” and therefore could not be interpreted as merely permissive. It cited Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque ([1958] SCR 104), State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava ([1958] SCR 533) and Montreal Street Railway Company v. Noymandin (1917 AC 170) in support of this interpretation. Subject to the overriding power of the President or the Governor under Article 310, as qualified by Article 311, the Court held that rules governing disciplinary proceedings could not be treated as ordinary administrative directions; instead, they possessed the same force as the statutory provisions from which they were derived, provided they did not conflict with those provisions. The Court further explained that the Governor’s pleasure was not exercised through the officers specified in Section 7 of the Police Act, and consequently the Governor’s pleasure could not be equated with the statutory powers vested in those officers. Accordingly, any inquiry undertaken under the Act had to be conducted in accordance with both the Act itself and the rules made thereunder. The Court reinforced this position by referring to R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India (LR 64 IA 40), High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I.M. Lall (1948 LR 75 IA 225), R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India (1936 LR 64 IA 55), S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India ([1954] SCR 1150) and Khem Chand v. The Union of India ([1958] SCR 1080). Finally, per the observations of Justices Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, the provisions of Paragraph 486 were described as merely directory and

It was held that failing to follow a particular rule did not render the disciplinary action taken against the respondent void. All public servants, except those expressly excluded by the Constitution, occupy their positions at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, and no statute or rule made under Article 300 or Article 154(2)(b) could diminish the substance of the pleasure tenure provided in Article 310, subject to Article 311. The Police Act could not prevail over a law enacted under Article 309 or Article 154(2)(b), nor could it curtail the content of the pleasure tenure in Article 310. Consequently, police officers served at the Governor’s pleasure and their sole protection comprised the two guarantees contained in Article 311. The rules made under Section 7 of the Police Act were classified into two categories. The first category defined the jurisdiction of the four grades of officers listed in Section 7 to impose specific punishments on subordinate police personnel; such rules were mandatory provided they did not conflict with Article 311. The second category consisted of procedural rules, which were further divided. Those procedural rules that prescribed the manner of giving effect to the guarantee in Article 311(2) were mandatory, whereas other procedural rules were merely directory. The Governor’s power to dismiss was an executive function of the State and could be exercised under Article 154(1) either directly by the Governor or indirectly through subordinate officers. The officers named in Section 7 of the Police Act exercised the Governor’s dismissal power and were bound by the same limitations that applied to the Governor. Whether the dismissal power was delegated by the Governor himself, by law under Article 154(2)(b), or by an existing law treated as analogous to a law under Article 154(2)(b), the officer acting on that power was only indirectly exercising the Governor’s authority, and his order remained subject to the two fetters in Article 311, without additional constraints from procedural rules apart from those aimed at implementing Article 311(2).

The Court observed that Paragraph 486 was not intended to further the purpose of Article 311(2) and therefore could not be treated as mandatory nor could it impose an additional restriction on the Governor’s dismissal power beyond the limitations already set out in Article 311. This paragraph was designed merely to collect material for the authority’s consideration, whether to take action or not, and was thus merely directory. Consequently, a failure to comply strictly or otherwise with Paragraph 486 did not invalidate the disciplinary action. The Court also referred to the decision in R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India in Council, [1936] 64 I.A. 55, to support this view. In sum, the procedural rule embodied in Paragraph 486 was not a substantive requirement, and its non‑observance could not vitiate the disciplinary measures imposed on the respondent.

No. 119 of 1959 was filed as an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 9 January 1958 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 115 of 1955. Counsel C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal represented the appellants, while the respondent was represented by counsel G. S. Pathak, Achru Ram, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, J. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra. The judgment was pronounced on 25 November 1960, with the opinions of Justices Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar delivered by Justice Subba Rao, and the opinions of Justices Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo delivered by Justice Wanchoo.

This appeal by special leave challenged the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, which had allowed a petition filed by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondent had been appointed as a Sub‑Inspector of Police in December 1948 and was transferred to Sitapur in June 1953. On 6 September 1953 the respondent proceeded to the village of Madhwapur to investigate a theft case. While returning that evening he was accompanied by an individual named Lalji, a former patwari of Mohiuddinpur. During their return they observed a man named Tika Ram emerging from beside a canal and hastening toward a field while carrying an object concealed in the folds of his dhoti. Suspecting suspicious conduct, the respondent stopped and searched Tika Ram, discovering a bundle that contained currency notes. The respondent counted the notes and handed the bundle to Lalji with instructions to return it to Tika Ram, who subsequently retrieved the bundle and departed.

Later, when Tika Ram examined the notes at his residence, he claimed that the total value of the notes was short by Rs 250. He alleged that the bundle he had received from the respondent contained notes worth Rs 650, but that only Rs 400 remained after his counting. Consequently, on 9 September 1953 Tika Ram lodged a complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, accusing the respondent and Lalji of misappropriating a sum of Rs 250. The precise wording of the complaint was later contested.

Upon receipt of the complaint, the Superintendent of Police conducted inquiries and issued a notice to the respondent directing him to show cause why his integrity certificate should not be withheld. The respondent submitted his explanation on 3 October 1953. The Superintendent then transmitted the case file to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Range, Uttar Pradesh, who instructed him to initiate departmental proceedings against the respondent under Section 7 of the Police Act. Accordingly, on 2 November 1953 a charge‑sheet was served on the respondent, stating that there were strong reasons to suspect that he had misappropriated Rs 250 from Tika Ram’s purse. The respondent thereafter filed his explanation in response to the charge.

The Superintendent of Police conducted an enquiry after receiving the respondent’s explanation and concluded, based on the evidence, that the respondent was guilty of the charge laid against him. Consequently, on 2 January 1954 the Superintendent issued another notice requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be demoted to the lowest grade of Sub‑Inspector for a period of three years. The respondent submitted his own show‑cause statement, and after considering it the Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, issued an order on 16 January 1954 reducing the respondent to the lowest Sub‑Inspector grade for three years. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, upon reviewing the entire record, determined that the respondent should be dismissed from service and, on 19 October 1954, made an order to that effect. The Inspector General of Police confirmed the dismissal order on 28 February 1955, and the respondent’s revisionary petition against that order was dismissed by the State Government in August 1955. Thereafter the respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, seeking to set aside the orders. A division bench comprising Justices Randhir Singh and Bhargava heard the petition. The learned judges held that the provisions of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations had not been observed; accordingly, they found the proceedings instituted under section 7 of the Police Act to be invalid and illegal, and they quashed the impugned orders, thereby setting aside the dismissal of the respondent. The State Government, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, and the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, appealed the High Court’s order.

The Court then turned to the various contentions raised by counsel in the order they were presented. Counsel for the appellants, Mr C B Agarwala, argued that there was no breach of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations. He asserted that if this contention were accepted, no further question would arise in the case, and therefore the Court would deal only with that issue. The essential part of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations reads: “When the offence alleged against a police officer amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code. In such cases, and in other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is ordered, inquiry will be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the following rules: Every information received by the police relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer shall be dealt with in the first place under Chapter XIV.” The appellant’s counsel contended that the information received in the present case did not relate to any offence committed by the respondent, let alone a cognizable offence, and that this point had not been raised in the High Court. The Court noted that the High Court had not considered the proposition that the information failed to disclose an offence; on the contrary, the High Court had assumed that the information disclosed an offence by the respondent, a premise that the appellants now sought to challenge for the first time.

According to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, a case that falls under the relevant section must be registered at the police station that has jurisdiction over the matter. This rule expressly provides that every piece of information received by the police concerning the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer must initially be dealt with under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provision, however, does not apply where the information received does not relate to the commission of a cognizable offence. Counsel for the appellants argued that the information received in the present case does not relate to any offence committed by the respondent, let alone a cognizable offence. This contention was raised before the Court for the first time and does not appear anywhere in the statement of case filed by the appellants. In the proceedings before the High Court, it was not asserted that the information failed to disclose any offence by the respondent. Rather, it was a common allegation that the information disclosed an offence committed by the respondent. The appellants had maintained that the alleged misappropriation of a portion of the money amounted to an offence under section 403 of the Indian Penal Code, which is not a cognizable offence, while the respondent contended that the conduct amounted to an offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned judges of the High Court accepted the respondent’s contention. Nonetheless, the appellants argued that, irrespective of the parties’ positions, the information supplied by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of Police clearly showed that no offence had been alleged against the respondent, and that the Court could, even at this advanced stage, accept the appellants’ view. The Court found that the contents of the information did not support such an assertion. Paragraph 3 of the application presented by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of Police at Sitapur reads as follows: “That on Sunday last dated 6th September 1953 the applicant had with him the currency notes of Rs. 650. The opposite party as well as Shri Babu Ram met the applicant on the west of Rampur near the Canal. The opposite‑party said to the Sub‑Inspector ‘This man appears to be clad in rags but is possessed of considerable money.’ After saying this the person of the applicant was searched. The Sub‑Inspector, having opened the bundle of notes, handed over the (notes) one by one to the opposite party.” This statement clearly indicates that either the Sub‑Inspector alone or both the Sub‑Inspector and Lalji searched the person of Tika Ram, that the Sub‑Inspector took the bundle of notes and handed them, one by one, to Lalji for return to the applicant, and that from the total of Rs. 650, a sum of Rs. 250 was not returned. The facts alleged in the application therefore constitute an offence against both the Sub‑Inspector and Lalji. The mere fact that the respondent is not named as one of the opposite parties in the application does not change the substance of the allegation, which attributes the commission of an offence to both the respondent and Lalji.

The fact that the respondent’s name does not appear as one of the opposite parties in the original application does not alter the essential issue, because the information contained in that application attributes the commission of an offence to both the respondent and Lalji. The notice issued by the Superintendent of Police on 2 November 1953 to the respondent likewise charges him with the offence of misappropriation. Although the notice merely states that the Superintendent had reasonable grounds to suspect that the respondent had misappropriated the sum of money and does not expressly affirm that the offence had been committed, the crucial point is that the Superintendent, based on the information before him and the enquiry he conducted, concluded that the respondent had indeed committed the misappropriation. The petitioner's reliance on paragraph 3 of the writ petition—where the respondent asserts that Tika Ram filed a complaint against Lalji and not against the respondent—is factually correct only insofar as the respondent’s name is absent from the list of opposite parties in that filing. Nevertheless, the body of the application contains explicit allegations against the respondent. In the counter‑affidavit submitted by the Superintendent of Police on behalf of the State, it is clearly asserted that on 9 September 1953 Tika Ram appeared before the Superintendent and lodged a petition stating that both Lalji and the respondent had misappropriated a sum of Rs 250. Any possible ambiguity in the information is removed by this allegation, and at this stage the appellants cannot persuade the Court that the petition failed to disclose an offence against the respondent. Consequently, the Court must hold that the information received by the police relates to the commission of an offence by the respondent. The appellants further contend that the alleged offence is not cognizable because no entrustment was made by Tika Ram to the respondent, arguing that the conduct therefore falls under section 403 of the Indian Penal Code, which is not cognizable, rather than under section 409, which is cognizable and deals with criminal breach of trust by a public servant. Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code defines “criminal breach of trust” and, together with section 409, prescribes the punishment for such breach when committed by a public servant. According to section 405, “whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any person so to do, commits ‘criminal breach of trust’.” To constitute an offence under this provision, the prosecution must establish the essential elements of entrustment and dishonest misappropriation.

To constitute an offence under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that there be an entrustment of property and a dishonest misappropriation of that property. The individual who is entrusted with the property may either misappropriate it himself or may knowingly permit another person to do so. In the present case, the respondent was a police officer who, by law, had the authority to search a person who was found under suspicious circumstances. When Tika Ram handed a bundle of currency notes to the police officer, he did so with the expectation that the notes would be returned to him once the suspicion was cleared. Accordingly, there can be no difficulty in holding that the notes were handed over by Tika Ram to the respondent for a specific, lawful purpose, but were thereafter dishonestly misappropriated by the respondent, or, at the very least, the respondent willfully allowed Lalji to misappropriate them. Consequently, the Court holds that if the respondent took the currency notes in the discharge of his duty for inspection and eventual return, he was certainly entrusted with the notes within the meaning of section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. In such a situation, the information disclosed a cognizable offence, and the first contention raised by the appellants is rejected. The second objection raised by counsel for the appellants concerns sub‑paragraph (3) of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations, which they contend permits the appropriate police authority to commence departmental proceedings without observing the provisions of sub‑paragraph (1) of the same paragraph. The relevant portion of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations provides: “When the offence amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code. In such cases, and in other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is ordered, inquiry will be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the following rules: ….” Rule I relates to a cognizable offence, Rule II to a non‑cognizable offence, including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act, and Rule III to an offence under section 7 of the Police Act or a non‑cognizable offence, including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act. Rule III states: “When a Superintendent of Police sees reason to take action on information given to him, or on his own knowledge or suspicion, that a police officer subordinate to him has committed an offence under section 7 of the Police Act or a non‑cognizable offence (including an offence under section 29 of the Police Act) of which he considers it unnecessary at that stage to forward a report in writing to the District Magistrate under Rule II above, he will make or cause to be made by an officer senior in rank to the officer charged, a departmental inquiry sufficient to test the truth of the charge. On the conclusion of this inquiry he will decide whether further action is necessary, and if so, whether the officer charged should be departmentally tried, or whether the District Magistrate should be moved to take cognizance of the case under the Criminal Procedure Code.”

The Court noted that the argument advanced was that the phrase “an offence under section 7 of the Police Act” necessarily refers to a cognizable offence and therefore the rule in question offers a procedural alternative to that prescribed under rule I. The Court found this contention to be untenable. It explained that section 7 of the Police Act authorises certain officers to dismiss, suspend or reduce any subordinate police officer whom they deem remiss, negligent or unfit in discharging duty, and that the grounds for such disciplinary action are broad, encompassing offences under the Indian Penal Code or other penal statutes. Consequently, action under section 7 may be taken in three distinct situations: (i) where the misconduct consists solely of remissness or negligence falling within section 7, without involving any cognizable or non‑cognizable offence; (ii) where a cognizable offence is involved; and (iii) where a non‑cognizable offence is involved. The Court referred to paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations, which clarifies that when the alleged misconduct amounts only to an offence under section 7, no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code is permissible. This provision applies to the first category mentioned above. The Court then interpreted rule I as relating to cognizable offences, rule II to non‑cognizable offences, and rule III as covering offences under section 7 of the Police Act as well as non‑cognizable offences. Although rule III does not explicitly contain the word “only,” the Court held that, in the context, “offence under section 7” can be understood to mean an offence solely under that section, i.e., the first category. Accordingly, the three rules can be reconciled. Since the offence complained of in the present case is a cognizable offence, the Court concluded that it falls under rule I and not under rule III, and therefore rejected the earlier contention. The Court then turned to the third contention raised by counsel for the appellants, which raised a constitutional question of considerable significance. The argument summarized that, in England, service under the Crown is held at the Crown’s pleasure unless the employment is for good behaviour or for a cause, and that a statute prescribing the terms of service and dismissal would control the Crown’s pleasure. The argument further suggested that, in India, the Constitution and the earlier Constitution Acts of 1915, as amended in 1919 and 1935, incorporated the doctrine of “tenure at pleasure” of His Majesty, the President or the Governor, but did not empower the legislatures under those Acts and the Constitution to enact a law that would abrogate or modify that tenure. The Court therefore identified the constitutional point raised as one of substantial importance for consideration.

Parliament and the legislatures created by the Constitution have authority to enact a statute that repeals or alters the tenure‑at‑pleasure provision; consequently, any legislation that gives a subordinate officer the power to dismiss a government servant must be interpreted as not diminishing the authority of His Majesty, the President or the Governor, as appropriate, but merely indicating that those authorities will express their pleasure through the designated officers. The rules issued under a statutory power delegated to a subordinate officer constitute administrative directions that facilitate the exercise of pleasure by the competent authority in a reasonable way, and a breach of those rules cannot give the aggrieved servant a cause of action or a right to approach a court to enforce his rights. Counsel for the respondent argues that the constitutional Acts in India incorporated the same elements of tenure‑at‑pleasure that existed under the Crown, and that, just as Parliament could modify such tenure in England, the Indian legislatures may likewise abrogate, limit or modify the tenure‑at‑pleasure created by the constitutional provisions. He further submits that even if the Police Act does not expressly curtail the tenure‑at‑pleasure, the legislature validly passed the Act and the government validly framed statutory rules under the powers conferred by that Act; therefore, the appropriate authorities may dismiss the respondent only in strict compliance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. To understand the issue, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions. The statute in question is the Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861), whose constitutional validity at the time of its enactment was not contested. Section 7 of the original Police Act provided that the appointment of all police officers, except those listed in clause B. 4, shall be made by the Inspector‑General, Deputy Inspector‑Generals, Assistant Inspector‑Generals and District Superintendents of Police, who, under rules sanctioned by the local Government, may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer. This provision was replaced by the present section in 1937 and subsequently amended to align with the Constitution. The amended provision states that, subject to rules made by the State Government from time to time under the Act, the Inspector‑General, Deputy Inspector‑Generals, Assistant Inspector‑Generals and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any subordinate‑rank police officer whom they consider remiss, negligent or unfit in the discharge of his duties.

In exercising the authority granted by section 46 of the Police Act, the Government issued the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations which laid down the procedures for conducting investigations and inquiries. The Court indicated that it would consider the content of those Regulations at a later point in the judgment. The historical background began with the Government of India Act of 1915, which as amended by the 1919 Act introduced, for the first time, the doctrine of ‘tenure at pleasure’ through section 96‑B. Pursuant to the power conferred by subsection (2) of that provision, the local Government framed certain classification rules. The 1915‑1919 legislation was subsequently repealed by the Government of India Act of 1935, and the equivalent provision to section 96‑B became section 240(1) in the 1935 Act. Section 241(2) of the 1935 Act authorised, subject to any express limitation in the Act, the Governor‑General and the Governor to prescribe the conditions of service of the persons they were empowered to appoint. A principal distinction between the 1919 Act and the 1935 Act lay in the limitations placed on the Crown’s pleasure. Under the earlier Act there was a single restriction: no individual in service could be dismissed by an authority that was subordinate to the authority by which he had been appointed. By contrast, the 1935 Act added a second safeguard, requiring that a person could not be dismissed or demoted unless he had been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action, as provided in section 240, subsections (2) and (3). Another difference concerned the treatment of the various public services. While the 1919 Act placed all services in a uniform category, the 1935 Act made a special provision for the police forces, stipulating that the conditions of service of subordinate police ranks should be determined by the respective Acts governing those forces, as set out in section 243. With the adoption of the Constitution, the 1935 Act was repealed, and clauses (1) and (2) of article 310 of the Constitution substituted for subsections (1) and (4) of section 240, while article 309 replaced section 241(2). Article 313 of the Constitution provided that, until new legislation was enacted, all laws that were in force immediately before the Constitution commenced and that applied to any public service or post continuing after the Constitution’s commencement would remain in effect, provided they did not conflict with constitutional provisions. Consequently, the Police Act and the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, which had been made under the powers granted by that Act and had been preserved under section 243 of the 1935 Act, continued to be operative after the Constitution came into force, so long as they were consistent with constitutional requirements. The learned counsel for both sides, as evident from their arguments, accepted that the Act and the Regulations formed the foundation of the present discussion.

The Court observed that the regulations made under the Police Act were valid when they were first promulgated and that they remain consistent with the Constitution. The dispute between the parties centred on whether the constitutional principle of “office held at the pleasure of the President or Governor” could be altered by ordinary legislation. One side argued that the doctrine of “His Majesty’s pleasure” is immutable and cannot be changed by statute, while the other contended that the tenure is nevertheless subject to statutory regulation. The Court then set out the relevant constitutional provisions. Article 309 provides that, subject to the Constitution, a legislature may make laws regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts of the Union or a State, but it also authorises the President (for Union services) or the Governor (for State services) to make rules on recruitment and service conditions until such matters are provided for by an act of the legislature; any such rules operate subject to the provisions of the governing act. Article 310 states that, except as expressly provided by the Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service, a civil service, or holds any post connected with defence or a civil post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a State civil service or holds any State civil post holds office during the pleasure of the Governor. The Court explained that Article 309 empowers the legislature to regulate recruitment and conditions of service, while Article 310 declares that every public servant described therein holds office at the pleasure of the President or Governor, as applicable. The expression “conditions of service” in Article 309, interpreted broadly, includes the tenure of a civil servant, as recognised in N.W.F. Province v. Suraj Narain. Consequently, the “tenure at pleasure” is itself a condition of service. However, Article 309 begins with the qualifier “subject to the provisions of this Constitution.” Because Article 310 contains no comparable limiting clause, the Court concluded that the legislative power to determine conditions of service must be read subject to the tenure‑at‑pleasure rule in Article 310. Therefore, any legislative enactment cannot override the superior authority of the President or the Governor to end a civil servant’s tenure at pleasure.

The Court examined whether the introductory words of the clause in Article 310 – “Except as expressly provided by this Constitution” – affect the interpretation of the provision concerning tenure at pleasure. It observed that the wording of the clause in Article 310 differs from that in Article 309. The Court explained that if a specific constitutional provision grants a government servant a tenure that differs from the general rule in Article 310, that servant is excluded from the operation of Article 310. The introductory words therefore refer, among others, to Articles 124, 148, 218 and 324, which stipulate that Supreme Court judges, the Auditor General, High Court judges and the Chief Election Commissioner may be removed only in the manner prescribed in those articles. The Court held that when the Constitution contains provisions that expressly prescribe a different tenure, those provisions are excluded from Article 310, thereby fulfilling the purpose of the introductory clause and leaving Article 310 free from any further restrictive operation. Consequently, Articles 309 and 310 must be read together, omitting the opening words of Article 310, namely “Except as expressly provided by this Constitution”. The learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to limit the operation of the introductory words in Article 309 to those constitutional provisions that empower other authorities to make rules regarding the conditions of service of certain classes of public servants, specifically Articles 146(2), 148(5) and 229(2). While the Court acknowledged that such a limitation might be possible, it found no reason to exclude Article 310 from that scheme. Accordingly, the Court concluded that although Article 310 provides for tenure at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, Article 309 enables the Legislature or the executive, as the case may be, to enact laws or rules concerning conditions of service without encroaching on the overriding power recognized in Article 310. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that this construction conflicted with the prevailing English law and that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended a radical departure from English legal principles. The Court noted that English law on the doctrine of “tenure at pleasure” has become well settled. Under English doctrine, all Crown servants hold office during the Crown’s pleasure; the power to dismiss at pleasure is an implied term in every Crown employment contract, derived not from any Crown prerogative but from public policy. However, where the terms of appointment expressly prescribe tenure for good behaviour or provide a specific power to remove for cause, the implied power of dismissal at pleasure is excluded. Moreover, an Act of Parliament may abrogate or amend the public‑policy doctrine in the same way it may modify any other part of the law.

In discussing the doctrine of tenure at pleasure, the Court noted that this principle originated in common law and was illustrated by several English decisions, namely Shenton v. Smith (1), Gould v. Stuart (2), Reilly v. The King (3) and Terrell v. Secretary of State (4). The Court observed that the English doctrine was not adopted in its entirety by Indian statutes, citing the decisions in State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (5) and Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (6). The Court explained that Section 96‑B of the Government of India Act, 1915, after being amended in 1919, for the first time gave statutory recognition to the doctrine, but it was qualified by a condition that no person serving in that service could be dismissed by any authority subordinate to the authority that had appointed him. Subsequently, Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, imposed an additional limitation by requiring that a reasonable opportunity to show cause be given to the person against whom a proposed action was to be taken. The Court emphasized that neither of these two Acts conferred on the appropriate legislature the power to repeal or amend the doctrine of tenure at pleasure. It further observed that the Constitution of India essentially incorporated the provisions of Sections 240 and 241 of the 1935 Act into Articles 309 and 310, yet the Constitution did not subject “tenure at pleasure” to any law that could be made by the appropriate legislature.

The Court then turned to the argument advanced by counsel for the respondent that a power to vary the doctrine might be found in the entries of the Seventh Schedule. The Court rejected this line of reasoning, noting that the respondent had referred, among others, to Entry 70 of List I and Entry 41 of List II. While it is undisputed that Parliament has the authority to legislate for the organization of the police and for the prevention and detection of crime, the Court held that under Article 245 any such legislative power is subordinate to the Constitution and therefore to the limitations imposed by Article 310. Moreover, the Court found that no implication of such power could be drawn from Article 154(2)(b). Article 154 declares that the executive power of the State is vested in the Governor and may be exercised by him directly or through subordinate officers in accordance with the Constitution, and clause (b) adds that nothing in that article prevents Parliament or a State Legislature from conferring by law functions on any authority subordinate to the Governor. The respondent’s contention was that the power to terminate service at pleasure under Article 310 formed part of the executive power of the State, that this power could be exercised by the Governor under Article 154, and that consequently Parliament or a State Legislature could confer the same power on a subordinate authority. The Court rejected both the premise and the conclusion of this argument, holding that the power to dismiss a government servant at pleasure under Article 310 is not within the legislative competence of either Parliament or a State Legislature.

The Court observed that the Constitution allows the legislature to confer on any authority subordinate to the Governor the power to act on the Governor’s pleasure, or at least to enact a law directing that the Governor exercise his pleasure through a specified officer. The Court rejected both the premise advanced and the conclusion drawn from that premise. The initial issue, the Court said, was whether the power granted to the Governor by Article 310 to terminate a government servant’s service at pleasure forms part of the executive power of the State as defined in Article 154. The Court explained that Article 154 merely declares that the executive power of the State vests in the Governor; it does not encompass those constitutional powers of the Governor that lie outside the State’s executive power. Article 162 further provides that, subject to the Constitution, the State’s executive power extends only to matters over which the State Legislature is competent to legislate. Consequently, if the State Legislature lacks authority to legislate on the Governor’s pleasure‑tenure, that power must lie outside the ambit of the State’s executive power. The Court noted that, as it would later demonstrate, the State Legislature indeed possesses no such authority, and therefore the power cannot be treated as part of the State’s executive power. Moreover, even assuming that the power were generally classified as executive power, Article 162 imposes an additional limitation, namely that such executive power must conform to the Constitution and, in particular, to Article 310. In either analysis, the Court concluded, the power under Article 310 does not fall within the scope of Article 154.

The Court further remarked that the power under Article 310 may be similar to the powers conferred on the Governor by Articles 174, 175 and 176, but similarity does not transform it into a component of the State’s executive power nor permit the Governor to delegate it. Even if one were to assume that the power under Article 310 qualified as executive power within the meaning of Article 154, the Court stated that such an assumption would not alter the legal position in the present case. Article 310 provides, except where the Constitution expressly provides otherwise, that every civil servant holds office at the Governor’s pleasure, subject to the safeguards in Article 311. The Court asked whether Article 154(2)(b) expressly creates a different tenure or grants Parliament or the Legislature a power exceeding that given by Article 245. It answered in the negative, observing that Article 154(2)(b) merely preserves the Legislature’s existing constitutional authority to enact statutes assigning functions to authorities subordinate to the Governor. That authority under Article 245 is not unlimited; it remains constrained by the constitutional provisions, including Article 310.

The Court observed that the power to appoint civil servants is governed by the constitutional provisions and therefore must be exercised within the limits of Article 310. It was argued that rejecting the appellants’ contention would create a jurisdictional clash, because under Article 310 the Governor may dismiss a public servant at pleasure, whereas a statute might empower a subordinate officer to dismiss a servant only under specified conditions; alternatively, a subordinate officer acting under a statute might be unable to dismiss a servant while the Governor could do so in the same situation, or the subordinate officer might dismiss a servant and the Governor could order that the servant remain in office. The Court held that this line of argument stemmed from a misunderstanding of the scope of Article 309. According to the Court, a law enacted by the appropriate Legislature or rules issued by the President or the Governor, within the framework of Article 309, may vest a particular authority with the power to remove a public servant, but such vesting does not constitute a delegation of the Governor’s pleasure. Any action taken by that authority derives from an express statutory or regulatory grant of power, not from a transfer of the Governor’s discretionary authority. Consequently, the Court found that no conflict could arise between the Governor’s pleasure under Article 310 and a statutory power, because the statutory power would always remain subordinate to the Governor’s overriding pleasure.

The Court further rejected the contention that this principle would subject Indian public servants to the whims of the executive, unlike their counterparts in England who are protected by legislation against arbitrary state action. The Court explained that, contrary to that apprehension, a member of the Indian public service enjoys constitutional protection in at least two respects: first, a servant cannot be dismissed by an authority lower than the one that originally appointed him; second, a servant cannot be dismissed, removed, or demoted without being afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The Court noted that a condition analogous to the first protection appears in Section 96‑B of the Government of India Act, 1919, and was affirmed by the Judicial Committee in R. T. Bangachari v. Secretary of State for India as having statutory force. The second protection mirrors a provision in sub‑section (2) of Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which the High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall held to be a mandatory qualification of the employer’s right recognized in sub‑section (1). Both of these statutory safeguards have been incorporated into Article 311 of the Constitution, which imposes two qualifications on the exercise of the President’s or Governor’s pleasure.

The Court observed that the provisions of Article 311 place clear limits on the rule of tenure at pleasure described in Article 310(1), as affirmed by Chief Justice Das in Dhingra’s case. The most significant of the two limitations is the requirement that a civil servant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause before any action is taken against him. Because this requirement restricts the concept of “tenure at pleasure,” Parliament is free to enact legislation that defines what constitutes a reasonable opportunity and to prescribe the procedural steps for providing it. Such legislation may be examined by the appropriate High Court or by the Supreme Court to determine whether the statutory scheme indeed furnishes the opportunity mandated by the Constitution. If the law passes this test of validity, the courts may also verify, in individual cases, whether the prescribed reasonable opportunity has actually been granted to the officer concerned. The Constitution‑framers, having inserted the tenure‑at‑pleasure rule without allowing legislative interference, intended that these safeguards would protect civil servants from arbitrary dismissal. The Court therefore concluded that the following principles govern the matter: every individual appointed to a public service listed in Article 310 holds office at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, subject to the explicit qualifications in Article 311; the power to dismiss a public servant under this pleasure doctrine is not covered by Article 154 and consequently cannot be delegated to a subordinate officer, but must be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution; the tenure is further qualified by the limitations found in Article 311; neither Parliament nor any State Legislature may enact a law that abolishes or alters this tenure in a way that diminishes the supreme authority of the President or the Governor under Article 310, as qualified by Article 311; however, Parliament and the State Legislatures may legislate on matters relating to the conditions of service, including disciplinary proceedings, provided such legislation does not affect the constitutional powers of the President or Governor under Article 310 read with Article 311; likewise, Parliament and the Legislatures may enact statutes that define and regulate the scope of the “reasonable opportunity” doctrine embodied in Article 311, though any such statute would remain subject to judicial review; and finally, if a statute is validly enacted within these permissible bounds, any rules made by an authority exercising the power conferred by that statute would be effective, so long as they operate within the same limits.

The Court then turned to the practical effect of these doctrinal propositions when applied to the provisions of the Police Act and the rules made thereunder. It noted that the Police Act of 1861 continues to be valid law under the Constitution, and that the Police Regulations, particularly paragraph 477 of Chapter XXXII, were framed pursuant to section 7 of the Police Act. The corresponding rules were presumably made by the Government under the authority granted by section 46(2) of the Police Act. Paragraph 479(a) expressly preserves the Governor’s power to punish all officers, thereby saving the Governor’s constitutional power under Article 310. The Court reiterated the principle that rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction and enforcement as if they were part of the statute itself, and that they are to be judicially noticed in the same manner. Such statutory rules cannot be described merely as administrative directions. Consequently, the Police Act and the rules made under it constitute a self‑contained code, and any analysis of the effect of the constitutional limitations on tenure at pleasure must be carried out in the context of that code.

The Court observed that the Police Act of 1861 remains valid law under the Constitution. It noted that Paragraph 477 of the Police Regulations indicates that the rules contained in Chapter XXXII were framed pursuant to section 7 of the Police Act. The Court further inferred that those rules were likely made by the Government exercising the authority granted by section 46(2) of the same Act. Under Paragraph 479(a) the power of the Governor to punish any police officer is expressly preserved, and the Court explained that this provision saves the Governor’s power under Article 310 of the Constitution. The Court quoted the authority that rules made under a statute must, for all purposes of construction or obligation, be treated as if they were part of the statute itself, having the same effect and being judicially noticed in the same manner. It cited Maxwell’s “On the Interpretation of Statutes”, tenth edition, pages 505‑511, to support that proposition. The Court stressed that statutory rules cannot be described or equated with mere administrative directions.

The Court then explained that, if the statutory rules were treated as administrative directions, the Police Act together with the rules made under it would fail to form a self‑contained code governing the appointment of police officers and the procedure for their removal. Consequently, when the appropriate authority initiates disciplinary action under the Police Act or its subordinate rules, it must act in accordance with the specific provisions that confer such power. The Court held that any breach of those provisions, subject to the pending determination of whether the rules are directory or mandatory, gives the public servant a right to challenge the authority’s decision. Counsel for the appellants relied on several decisions of the Privy Council and this Court to argue that the rules are administrative directions. The cases cited were R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India (1), R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India (2), High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall (3), S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India (4), and Khem Chand v. The Union of India (5). The Court described the first case, in which a Government Press reader was dismissed and sued the Secretary of State for India, alleging that the dismissal violated the statute because it was not preceded by the inquiry required by Rule XIV of the Civil Services Classification Rules made under section 96B(2) of the Government of India Act. The Court noted that section 96B provides that every civil‑service officer holds office at the pleasure of His Majesty, and that subsection (2) empowers the Secretary of State for India to make rules concerning conditions of service and other matters.

The provision identified as subsection (5) stated that no rule made under the Act could be interpreted as limiting or diminishing the authority of the Secretary of State in Council to handle the affairs of any individual serving in the Crown’s civil service in India in any manner that the Secretary deemed just and equitable. Upon interpreting these provisions, the Judicial Committee concluded that the doctrine of His Majesty’s pleasure was supreme and could not be legally restricted or modified by any rules. The Committee based this conclusion on two principal grounds. First, section 96B expressly declared that an office was held at the pleasure of the Crown, leaving no scope for implying a contractual term that would require the rules to be observed. Second, subsection (2) of section 96B along with the rules provided detailed mechanisms for the redress of grievances through administrative processes, and subsection (5) reaffirmed the overriding authority of the Secretary of State in Council over the civil service. It is evident that the rules framed under the power granted by the Act were intended merely to regulate the exercise of His Majesty’s pleasure. The observations of the Committee were evidently influenced by the English doctrine of “tenure at pleasure,” which holds that such tenure may be altered only by statute, and by the principle that rules created under a statute must be consistent with the statute’s express provisions. In the Court’s view these observations cannot be removed from their original context and applied to the Constitution of India or to statutes enacted by Indian legislatures in a way that would contravene established principles of statutory construction, as noted in the case reported in the 1936 Law Reports (1) L.R. 64 I.A. 55. In Bangachari’s case, a police officer was dismissed by an authority lower than the one that had originally appointed him; this appeal was heard together with the appeal in Venkata Rao’s case, and both judgments were delivered on the same day. The Judicial Committee distinguished Venkata Rao’s case by observing that the clause or condition concerning dismissal possessed statutory force and stood on a different footing from any rule, which could be varied at will. The present remarks do not extend beyond that distinction, and the Court’s earlier comments on Venkata Rao’s case equally apply here. In I.M. Lall’s case, the issue concerned subsection (3) of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Once again the Judicial Committee drew a line between the rules and the statutory provisions, holding that subsections (2) and (3) of section 240 represented qualifications or exceptions to the preceding provision in subsection (1). This decision merely adopted the reasoning set out in the earlier decision, and the observations made earlier in connection with Venkata Rao’s case remain applicable.

The observations made in Venkata Rao’s case (2) were held to be equally applicable to the present decision. In S. A. Venkataraman’s case (4) the Court, while referring to the observations of the Judicial Committee in Venkata Rao’s case (2), observed that rules which had not been incorporated into a statute did not impose any legal restriction on the Crown’s right to dismiss its servants at pleasure. The Court clarified that it was not laying down any general proposition; rather, it was merely restating the essence of the reasoning found in Venkata Rao’s case (2).

Chief Justice Das, if the reference may be so described, correctly articulated the scope of the rule in Venkata Rao’s case (2) in the judgment of Khem Chand’s case (5). At page 1091 he stated, “The position of the Government servant was, therefore, rather insecure, for his office being held during the pleasure of the Crown under the Government of India Act, 1915, the rules could not override … or derogate from the statute and the protection of the rules could not be enforced by action so as to nullify the statute itself.” The quotation was followed by citations to the authorities (1) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 40, (3) (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 225, (2) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 55, (4) [1954] S.C.R. 1150 and (5) [1958] S.C.R. 1080.

To express the same idea in different words, the Government of India Act, 1915, as amended in 1919, and the Government of India Act, 1935, both expressly provided that the tenure of a government servant was at the pleasure of the Crown. Consequently, any rules framed under those Acts had to be consistent with the Acts themselves and could not be in derogation of them. The decisions and the observations contained therein could not be read as signalling a radical departure from the fundamental principle of statutory construction that rules made under a statute must be treated as if they were part of the statute and must have the same effect as provisions contained in the statute.

Another principle, equally fundamental to the rules of construction, holds that the rules shall be consistent with the provisions of the authorising Act. The decisions of the Judicial Committee concerning the earlier Constitution Acts can be sustained on the ground that rules made in the exercise of powers conferred by those Acts cannot override or modify the tenure‑at‑pleasure provision found in section 96B or section 240 of the respective Acts, as the circumstance may require.

Therefore, when a statute concedes or declares the paramountcy of the doctrine of tenure at pleasure, there may be justification for sustaining the rules made under that statute in derogation of the statutory provision on the basis that such rules are merely administrative directions. If that justification were not available, the rules would have to be struck down as inconsistent with the Act.

In such a situation, if the statute is valid—meaning it does not derogate from the provisions of Article 310 read with Article 311—then the rules made under that statute would possess the same efficacy as the statute itself. This holds so long as neither the statute nor the rules made thereunder affect the power of the Governor‑in‑Chief.

In the present case the Court observed that the pleasure of the Governor is expressly preserved by law and therefore must be legally enforceable. The Court noted that a number of decisions of various High Courts in India have been cited for this issue, but it was unnecessary to examine each decision in detail. It was sufficient to recognise the general trend of those decisions, which fall into two opposing views. One strand, relying on the observations of the Privy Council in Venkata Rao’s case, characterises all statutory rules that relate to disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant as merely administrative directions. The other strand applies the well‑settled rules of statutory construction and holds that the authority conducting an inquiry under a particular statute is bound to obey the mandatory provisions contained in the rules. The Court further observed that a close examination of several of the decisions reveals an implied, though not expressly stated, distinction between statutory rules that define the scope of a reasonable opportunity and those that regulate other procedural steps in a disciplinary process. In the Court’s view, subject to the overriding power of the President or the Governor under Article 310 as qualified by Article 311, the rules governing disciplinary proceedings cannot be treated as mere administrative directions; rather, they must have the same effect as the provisions of the statute under which they are made, provided they are not inconsistent with that statute. The Court also rejected the argument advanced by counsel that the Governor’s pleasure is exercised through the officers specified in section 7 of the Police Act, and therefore cannot be equated with the statutory power of those officers. Accordingly, the inquiry under the Act must be conducted in accordance with the Act’s provisions and the rules made thereunder. Counsel further contended that even if the rules possess statutory force, they are only directory and that non‑compliance would not invalidate a dismissal order issued by the competent authority. Before addressing whether the rules are mandatory or merely directory, the Court considered the broad scope and purpose of the inquiry envisaged by the rules. Section 2 of the Police Act defines the police establishment; section 7 empowers specified officers to punish subordinate officers who are remiss, negligent, or unfit in the discharge of their duties; and section 46 authorises the Government to make rules to regulate the procedure to be followed by magistrates and police officers in performing any duty imposed by the Act. Under sections 7 and 46, the Police Regulations incorporated in Chapter XXXII were framed. Paragraph 477 of those Regulations states that the rules in that chapter have been made under section 7 of the Police Act and apply solely to officers appointed under section 2 of the Police Act.

The Court explained that paragraph 478 of the Police Regulations specified the type of punishment that could be imposed on officers who were found delinquent. Paragraph 479 authorised certain senior officers to punish designated subordinate officers. Paragraph 483 set out the procedural steps to be followed when an inquiry was instituted against a police officer. It provided that, subject to the special provision in paragraph 500 and any special orders that the Governor might issue in particular cases, a proceeding against a police officer would consist of a magisterial or police inquiry, and, if that inquiry revealed the need for further action, it could be followed by a judicial trial, a departmental trial, or both, in sequence. Paragraph 484 stated that the character of the inquiry would depend on the nature of the offence involved. For cognizable or non‑cognizable offences, the inquiry would be conducted in accordance with Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code. When the District Magistrate received information, he could, exercising powers conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, either order a magisterial inquiry or direct an investigation by the police. Paragraph 485 further provided that, when a magisterial inquiry was ordered, it would be carried out pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Superintendent of Police would have no direct involvement until the judicial proceedings concluded or the case was referred to him for further disposition. Nevertheless, the Superintendent was required to give any legal assistance that the inquiring magistrate might request and to suspend the accused if necessary under paragraph 496.

Paragraph 486 clarified that no magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code could be initiated when the alleged offence against a police officer was solely an offence under section 7 of the Police Act. In such situations, and in other cases where a magisterial inquiry had not been ordered, the inquiry would be conducted under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the rules applicable thereto. Rule I of paragraph 486 required that any information received by the police concerning the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer be dealt with first under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that a case under the appropriate section be registered at the police station concerned. Six provisos accompanied that rule. Rule II dealt with inquiries into non‑cognizable offences, while Rule III prescribed the procedure for offences solely under section 7 of the Police Act or for non‑cognizable offences where the Superintendent of Police deemed it unnecessary to forward a written report to the District Magistrate at that stage. Paragraph 488 addressed the procedure for a judicial trial, and paragraph 489 dealt with a departmental trial. Paragraph 489 specifically noted that a police officer could be tried departmentally under section 7 of the Police Act after he had been tried judicially, after a magisterial inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code, or after a police investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code or a departmental enquiry under paragraph 486, III above.

In this case the Court explained that a police officer may be tried by way of a departmental proceeding under section 7 of the Police Act only after one of three prior steps has been completed: first, the officer must have been tried in a judicial court; second, a magisterial inquiry conducted under the Criminal Procedure Code must have taken place; or third, a police investigation carried out under the Criminal Procedure Code or a departmental enquiry as contemplated in paragraph 486, sub‑paragraph III must have been completed. The Court noted that there are additional provisions that regulate the manner in which such inquiries are to be conducted and that these rules also address related procedural matters. According to the rules, when an inquiry indicates that further action is required, it must be followed by a judicial trial, a departmental trial, or both, in succession. For cognizable offences the Superintendent of Police is instructed to investigate under chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code; for non‑cognizable offences the investigation must be carried out in the manner prescribed in rule II of paragraph 486; and for offences that fall solely under section 7 of the Police Act or for a non‑cognizable offence, the investigation must proceed as provided in rule III of paragraph 486. After the appropriate investigative procedure has been completed, the Superintendent of Police is empowered to conduct a departmental trial of the police officer.

The Court then turned to the question of whether rule I of paragraph 486 is mandatory (directory) or merely advisable. Rule I states that the police officer shall be tried first under chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. While the word “shall” ordinarily carries an obligatory meaning, the Court observed that numerous decisions have interpreted “shall” as permissive, that is, as “may”. The Court referred to the decision in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, wherein it was observed at page 1125 that “It is well established that an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory and that the use of the word ‘shall’ does not conclude the matter.” The judgment further explained that the rules are well‑known and that they serve only as aids to discover the true intention of the legislature, an intention that must be ascertained from the context of the provision. Supporting this approach, the Court quoted Crawford’s On the Construction of Statutes (p. 516): “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other ….” This passage had been previously approved by this Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava. The Court also cited Craies on Statute Law (5th edition, p. 242), which observes that no universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments are to be treated as merely directory or absolutely obligatory, and that it is the duty of the courts to determine the legislature’s true intention by carefully examining the whole scope of the statute.

The Court observed that it is the duty of courts of justice to discover the true intention of the legislature by giving careful attention to the entire scope of the statute that is being interpreted. A helpful guide for determining legislative intent is provided in Maxwell’s work “The Interpretation of Statutes”, tenth edition, page 381. Maxwell states that when the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and when ignoring those provisions would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over the officials entrusted with the duty, and when such ignoring would not advance the essential aims of the legislature, those provisions are generally regarded as merely instructional for the guidance and governance of those on whom the duty is imposed. In other words, they are considered directory rather than mandatory. Maxwell further notes that neglect of such provisions may be punishable, but such neglect does not invalidate the act performed in disregard of them. The Court pointed out that this passage was accepted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin (2) and was also endorsed by this Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (1). From these authorities the Court distilled a brief rule of interpretation: when a statute employs the word “shall”, it is prima facie mandatory, yet the Court may still ascertain the legislature’s real intention by examining the whole statute. In doing so, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, the consequences that would follow from either construction, the effect of other provisions that may obviate the need for compliance, whether the statute provides for a contingency in case of non‑compliance, whether non‑compliance attracts any penalty, the seriousness or triviality of the resulting consequences, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation would be defeated or furthered. Applying this approach, the Court examined the purpose of rule I of paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations. In the Court’s opinion, that rule was intended not only to enable the Superintendent of Police to collect relevant information but also to safeguard the interests of subordinate officers against whom a departmental trial might be initiated. After completing the investigation required under chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Superintendent may conclude that the officer is innocent and consequently dismiss the proceedings altogether. Alternatively, the Superintendent may determine that the case warrants criminal prosecution, a route that an honest officer falsely accused might sometimes prefer to a departmental trial.

The Court observed that the preliminary inquiry served a genuine purpose for both the police department and the officer against whom a departmental inquiry was to be initiated. It held that setting aside the order of dismissal would not affect the public at large; the only result of such setting aside would be that the officer would have to be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by the Police Regulations. The Court noted that paragraphs 487 and 489 of the Regulations made it abundantly clear that a police investigation conducted under the Criminal Procedure Code was a condition precedent to any departmental trial. Paragraph 477 was emphasised as providing that no officer appointed under section 2 of the Police Act could be punished by an executive order except in the manner laid down in chapter XXXII of the Police Regulations. The Court described this provision as an imperative injunction that prohibited any inquiry not complying with the Rules. Paragraph 489 was explained to empower the holding of a departmental trial only after a police investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code had been completed. Consequently, the Court concluded that when a rule stipulated that a departmental trial could be held only after such an investigation, it was impermissible to conduct the trial without the investigation. For these reasons, the Court held paragraph 486 to be mandatory and found that, because an investigation under chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code had not been undertaken, the subsequent departmental inquiry and the order of dismissal were illegal. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the respondent had been dismissed without complying with paragraph 486(1), rendering the dismissal order illegal and confirming that the High Court was correct in setting aside that order. The appeal therefore failed and was dismissed with costs. Justice WANCHOO expressed regret that he was unable to agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

Babu Ram Upadhya, the respondent, had been appointed as a sub‑inspector of police in December 1948 and was posted at Sitapur in 1953. On 6 September 1953, while returning from the village of Madhwapur, he observed a man later identified as Tika Ram emerging from the side of a canal and hurrying into a field, a movement that raised his suspicion. Accompanying the sub‑inspector was Lalji, an ex‑patwari. The sub‑inspector called and searched Tika Ram, discovering a bundle containing currency notes. The sub‑inspector counted the notes, handed the bundle to Lalji, who in turn returned it to Tika Ram. Tika Ram, an elderly man who was almost blind, departed the scene. Upon reaching his house, he discovered a shortfall of Rs 250 and lodged a complaint with the Superintendent of Police on 9 September 1953, detailing the incident. The Superintendent conducted an inquiry, and departmental proceedings under section 7 of the Police Act were subsequently initiated against the sub‑inspector.

The departmental proceedings against the respondent resulted in his dismissal, after which he filed a petition before the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondent contended that Rule 486 of the Police Regulations, which had been made under Section 7 of the Police Act, had not been observed and that, because of this failure, the departmental action taken against him was illegal. The appellant responded on two grounds. First, it argued that Rule 486 was inapplicable because there was no report of a cognizable offence against the sub‑inspector who had carried out the search. Second, it maintained that the rules contained in the Police Regulations were merely administrative guidelines and that any non‑compliance with them could not affect the validity of the departmental proceedings, so long as the guarantees prescribed in Article 311 of the Constitution were not breached. The High Court, after examining the material, held that a report of a cognizable offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code had indeed been made against the respondent and therefore the procedure prescribed by Rule 486 should have been observed. It further observed that Rule 486, being framed under Section 7 of the Police Act, possessed the force of law as a statutory provision. Relying on its earlier decisions in two similar cases, the High Court concluded that a dismissal resulting from departmental proceedings conducted without compliance with Rule 486 would be illegal, and consequently it allowed the writ petition. The appellant then sought a certificate to permit an appeal to this Court, but the certificate was denied. The appellant thereafter applied for special leave to appeal before this Court, and that leave was granted, bringing the matter before us.

Counsel for the appellant reiterated the same two points before us. Regarding the first point, we find no merit in the argument. Although the complaint made by Tika Ram did not place the respondent’s name in the heading, the facts narrated in the body of the complaint clearly show that the sub‑inspector searched Tika Ram and recovered a bundle of currency notes. The sub‑inspector acted within the authority vested in him as a police officer. After completing the search, when he was satisfied that no further action was required against Tika Ram, he was obligated to return the entire amount that had been seized back to Tika Ram. The High Court was correct in observing that when property is taken away with the intention that it will remain the property of the person from whom it was taken, the taking officer holds the property in trust. If the officer later appropriates the property for his own use or causes another person to do so, the conduct amounts to criminal breach of trust rather than mere misappropriation. This reasoning supports the view that an offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code was prima facie committed in the present case.

The Court observed that if a person either directly uses property entrusted to him or causes another person to use it, such conduct constitutes a criminal breach of trust rather than a mere misappropriation. Accordingly, on the basis of the material before the Court, an offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code appeared to have been established prima facie. Because section 409 creates a cognizable offence, rule 486 of the Police Regulations was applicable to the present dispute. The Court then turned to the principal issue raised in the appeal, namely the scope of the power of dismissal that is contained in section 7 of the Police Act and the manner in which rule 486 must be observed. Section 7, as framed by the State Government, provides that, subject to such rules that the State Government may from time to time make under the Act, the Inspector‑General, Deputy Inspectors‑General, Assistant Inspectors‑General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they consider remiss, negligent or unfit in the discharge of his duty. The section further authorises these four grades of officers to impose any of the following punishments on a subordinate officer who performs his duty carelessly, negligently or renders himself unfit by his own acts: (a) a fine not exceeding one month’s pay; (b) confinement to quarters for a period not exceeding fifteen days, with or without additional duties such as drill, extra guard, fatigue or other duty; (c) deprivation of good‑conduct pay; and (d) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument. This provision therefore grants the specified senior officers the authority to dismiss, suspend, reduce or otherwise punish subordinate officers, but only in accordance with rules that the State Government may prescribe.

In the instant case, the matter before the Court concerned only the power of dismissal, and the discussion that follows is confined to that aspect of section 7. The provision makes clear that the dismissal power conferred on the four senior grades of police officers must be exercised subject to any rules that the State Government may periodically formulate under the Police Act. The respondent argued that because the power of dismissal is subject to such rules, the authority exercising it was bound to follow the procedure laid down in rule 486, which was framed under section 7 for cases involving a cognizable offence. The respondent contended that rule 486 is a mandatory requirement and that any failure to comply with its procedural requirements would render the departmental proceedings invalid. The Court noted that there was no dispute that rule 486 sets out a particular procedure to be followed when a cognizable offence is alleged against a subordinate police officer.

In the present matter the Court observed that Rule 486 was not complied with. Rule 486 requires that when a report of a cognizable offence is made against a police officer who is of a subordinate rank, the report must be entered in the register prescribed in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the matter must then be investigated in accordance with the provisions of that Chapter. After the investigation the competent authority must decide whether to refer the case for trial before a criminal court or to initiate departmental proceedings. The facts show that no such report was entered under Chapter XIV, and no investigation as mandated by that Chapter was undertaken. Instead, the Superintendent of Police to whom the complainant Tika Ram addressed his grievance merely examined the complaint and subsequently resolved to conduct a departmental inquiry under section 7 of the Police Act against the respondent. The appellant contended that the rules made under section 7 of the Police Act are merely administrative and, even if they are directory, their non‑observance cannot invalidate the later proceedings unless there is a violation of the protection guaranteed by Article 311 of the Constitution. The appellant relied on the decision in R Venkata Rao v Secretary of State for India in Council. The Court then examined the principle governing the tenure of public servants. Under English law, all public servants hold office at the pleasure of His Majesty, meaning that their service can be terminated at any time without cause, as noted in Shenton v Smith. Parliament, however, may legislate a different tenure, and the Crown accepts such a change by granting royal assent, as explained in Gould v Stuart. The same principle was applicable in India before the Government of India Act, 1915, and was modified by the insertion of section 96‑B in that Act. Section 96‑B for the first time provided by statute that every person employed in the civil service of the Crown holds office during His Majesty’s pleasure, subject to the Government of India Act and the rules made thereunder, and that the only safeguard against the exercise of pleasure is that a public servant cannot be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him. The Privy Council considered this provision in Venkata Rao’s case and held that, notwithstanding the phrase “subject to the rules made under the Government of India Act,” the employment was not of a limited and special kind confined to strict adherence to those rules; consequently, the service remained at pleasure and could be terminated even if the prescribed procedural rules were not followed.

In this case, the Court explained that section 96‑B created a limited and special kind of tenure that was held to be “during His Majesty’s pleasure” and that the Rules prescribed a contractual term requiring strict observance of their procedure. The Court noted that, because the section expressly used the phrase “during His Majesty’s pleasure,” the right of action claimed by Venkata Rao did not exist. The Privy Council further pronounced that although section 96‑B contained a statutory assurance that a public servant’s tenure, though at pleasure, would not be subject to capricious or arbitrary action, the tenure was nevertheless to be regulated by a large number of detailed rules that could be amended. However, the Council held that no enforceable right existed for a public servant to remain in office by virtue of those rules, and consequently a servant could be dismissed even when the prescribed procedure was not followed.

The Court also recounted the main argument presented in Venkata Rao’s case, namely that rule XIV of the Civil Services Classification Rules forbade dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a public servant unless a properly recorded departmental inquiry had taken place. In that case the prescribed departmental inquiry was found not to have been held. Nevertheless, the Privy Council ruled that the language of section 96‑B could not be interpreted as limiting the pleasure of His Majesty by the rules, although it acknowledged that the section contained a solemn statutory assurance that tenure would not be arbitrary and would be governed by the rules. The Council emphasized that the greatest care must be taken to give effect to that assurance both in letter and in spirit. It further observed that, in the matter before it, there had been a serious and complete failure to comply with important and fundamental rules, that serious mistakes and wrongs had been committed, and that those wrongs ordinarily called for redress. Despite this, the Council concluded that, as a matter of law, such redress could not be obtained through a court action. This position reflected the law as it stood under the Government of India Act 1915.

Subsequently, the Court turned to the material change introduced by the Government of India Act 1935. Under the earlier Act, the sole protection afforded to a public servant was that he could not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him, as recorded in the 1936 citation (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 55. The 1935 Act, however, introduced section 240(1), which stipulated that, except as expressly provided by the Act, every person who was a member of a civil service of the Crown in India “holds office during His Majesty’s pleasure.” The Court pointed out that the wording of section 240(1) differed from that of section 96‑B, and that the tenure of all public servants not specifically excluded by the Act was to be at the pleasure of His Majesty. While the Act retained the protection against dismissal by a subordinate authority, it also incorporated two additional safeguards in sub‑sections (2) and (3) of section 240, thereby modifying the earlier legal position.

The first safeguard remained identical to the earlier rule, stipulating that a public servant could not be dismissed by an officer who was subordinate to the one who had appointed him. In addition, a new exception to the tenure at pleasure was introduced, providing that no public servant could be dismissed until he had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. This additional protection was examined by the Privy Council in the case of High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. M. L. Lall, where it was held to be a mandatory provision that qualified the tenure at pleasure and constituted a condition precedent to the exercise of the power granted to His Majesty under sub‑section (1) of section 240. Consequently, the Government of India Act 1935 incorporated two statutory guarantees for public servants against the unrestricted exercise of the Crown’s pleasure. Nonetheless, section 240 made clear that the pleasure of His Majesty to dismiss a servant was not otherwise subject to rules framed under the later provisions of the Act contained in Chapter 11 of Part X, which dealt with public services. This legal position persisted until the enactment of the Constitution. Article 310(1) of the Constitution reproduced the substance of section 240(1), providing that, except as expressly provided by the Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service, a civil service of the Union, an all‑India service, or who holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President, and similarly, every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of that State. Accordingly, all public servants, unless expressly exempted by the Constitution, occupy their positions at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as applicable. Article 311 then mirrored sections 240(2) and (3) by furnishing two guarantees: (i) no person shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him, and (ii) no such person shall be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank without first being given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, the Court held that Article 311 functions as a proviso to Article 310, delivering two constitutional guarantees that restrict the pleasure of the President or Governor and that it is a mandatory provision.

In this case, counsel for the respondent argued that the language of Article 310 permitted statutes or statutory rules to limit the pleasure‑tenure that the article otherwise provides. He likened the situation to England, where an Act of Parliament can curtail the Crown’s pleasure in matters of dismissal, and therefore contended that the phrase “as expressly provided by this Constitution” allowed the legislature to diminish the pleasure‑tenure either by law or by rule. To support this position, he relied on Article 309 and Article 154 of the Constitution. Article 309, he noted, begins with the words “subject to the provisions of this Constitution” and authorises Acts of the appropriate Legislature to regulate recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts connected with the affairs of the Union or any State. The proviso to Article 309 further provides that, until a provision is made by such an Act, it shall be competent for the President or the Governor, as the case may be, to make rules relating to recruitment and conditions of service. From this, he concluded that Article 309 is itself subordinate to the Constitution and consequently to Article 310; therefore, any law or rule made under Article 309 must remain subject to Article 310 and cannot modify the pleasure‑tenure prescribed therein. The expression “except as expressly provided by this Constitution” in Article 310, he argued, indicates that only those exceptions expressly enumerated in the Constitution may limit the pleasure‑tenure, and he cited Articles 124, 148, 280, 324 and Article 310(2) as examples of such exceptions. Accordingly, unless there is an express constitutional provision curtailing the pleasure‑tenure, every public servant holds office at the pleasure of the President or the Governor. He urged that a law enacted under Article 309, even if it prescribed conditions of service, should be treated as an express constitutional provision that narrows the pleasure‑tenure of Article 310. The Court, however, observed that the Privy Council in Venkata Rao’s case had held that rules framed under Article 309 or laws enacted thereunder constitute a statutory guarantee that, although the tenure remains at pleasure, it will not be subject to arbitrary action but will be governed by prescribed rules. The Court further clarified that if such rules or laws define the content of the guarantee contained in Article 311(2), they may be mandatory only to the extent that they give effect to that guarantee. Excepting this, the Court could not accept the respondent’s contention that legislation under Article 309 could override the constitutional limitation on pleasure‑tenure.

In this case the Court observed that any law or rule made under Article 309 cannot diminish the pleasure tenure established by Article 310. The same principle, the Court held, applies to a law enacted under Article 154(2)(b), which empowers Parliament or a State legislature to assign functions to an authority subordinate to the Governor. If a statute confers on any authority the power to dismiss, remove or reduce the rank of a public servant, that statute does not curtail the pleasure tenure set out in Article 310; such a statute is enacted under Article 245 and, like all statutes, it commences with the words “subject to the provisions of this Constitution.” Consequently, a law made under Article 154(2)(b) is, in the same manner as a law under Article 309, subject to the pleasure tenure of Article 310 and cannot lessen that tenure or impose additional restrictions except those that are expressly provided in Article 311. From an examination of the relevant constitutional provisions, the Court concluded that all public servants, except those specifically excepted by the Constitution, hold office at the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, and that no law or rule framed under Article 309 or Article 154(2)(b) may reduce the scope of that pleasure tenure, save for the safeguards contained in Article 311. Having set out this fundamental constitutional position, the Court turned to the Police Act, which is the statute under consideration. Section 7 of the Police Act provides that four grades of officers may dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks, but only in accordance with rules that the State Government may from time to time make under the Act. Although the Police Act is a pre‑constitutional enact that continues to operate under Article 372, the Court held that it cannot outrank a law made under Article 309 or Article 154(2)(b) nor can it override the pleasure tenure enshrined in Article 310. The subordinate police officers are not expressly excluded from the operation of the pleasure tenure by any constitutional provision; therefore they serve at the Governor’s pleasure and their only protection consists of the two guarantees found in Article 311. The Court acknowledged that Section 7 states that the four grades of officers empowered to dismiss will act according to rules framed by the State Government, but it clarified that this does not mean such rules may introduce any additional fetters on the pleasure tenure of the subordinate police officers. The need for rules was explained as arising because the section envisages the conferral of various punitive powers on the four grades of officers, and the rules are intended to detail how those powers are to be exercised, not to add further constraints beyond those permitted by the Constitution.

In this case, the Court observed that the statutory provision required the State to make rules dealing with the various cadres of police officers who occupied subordinate positions. The purpose of those rules was to specify which of the four grades of officers authorized by the statute could dismiss a police officer of a particular subordinate rank or could impose a particular type of punishment on such an officer. The Court held that these substantive rules would necessarily be mandatory because they formed the core of the jurisdiction granted to each of the four grades of officers under section 7 of the relevant enactment.

The Court further explained that, in addition to the substantive jurisdiction‑defining rules, the State could also enact additional rules under section 7 to guide the officers in the manner in which they should proceed when carrying out a dismissal or any other form of punishment against a subordinate police officer. However, the Court warned that not every procedural rule could be made mandatory. If all procedural rules were compulsory, they would create additional constraints beyond those permitted by article 311 of the Constitution on the Governor’s pleasure to dismiss a public servant. The Court clarified that any rule framed under section 7 that effectively implements the purpose of article 311 (2) would be mandatory, and a breach of such a rule would amount to a breach of article 311 itself. Conversely, the Court stressed that it would be impermissible to craft rules that would place further fetters on the Governor’s power to dismiss, as such fetters would be inconsistent with the constitutional scheme.

The Court then categorized the rules that could be made under section 7 into two distinct groups. The first group comprised rules that define the exact jurisdiction of each of the four grades of officers to impose a specific punishment on a particular subordinate police officer; these rules would be mandatory because they relate directly to the core authority of the officer exercising the power, although even these rules could not contravene the guarantee of article 311 (1) which prohibits dismissal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. The second group consisted of procedural rules, which the Court further divided into two sub‑categories. Some procedural rules would prescribe the manner in which the guarantee of article 311 (2) must be carried out; such rules would also be mandatory. The remaining procedural rules would be merely directory, intended to guide the process without imposing additional legal fetters on the Governor’s discretionary power under article 310. The Court concluded that this analytical framework must be applied when considering rule 486, and that, before addressing rule 486 directly, the Court would first dispose of another argument that had been raised.

The Court observed that the contention that the four categories of officers who may dismiss under section 7 are merely exercising a statutory power independent of the Governor’s pleasure is incorrect. Article 310 defines the tenure of public servants as being at the pleasure of the Governor, subject to the exceptions and guarantees contained in Article 311. By implication, Article 310 confers upon the Governor the authority to dismiss any public servant, and that authority is an executive function of the State.

The Court explained that the executive power to dismiss may be exercised by the Governor directly under Article 154(1) or indirectly through officers who are subordinate to him. The Governor is therefore free to delegate his dismissal power to subordinate officers; however, when those officers act, they are executing the Governor’s pleasure in a delegated capacity. Even after delegation, the Governor retains the inherent power to dismiss at his discretion in any particular case, because the delegating authority never loses the power it has vested in others.

Consequently, whenever a subordinate officer exercises the power of dismissal, that officer is, in effect, carrying out the Governor’s power of dismissal at pleasure. Accordingly, the same constitutional limitations that apply to the Governor’s direct exercise of dismissal also constrain the officer’s delegated action.

The Court rejected the argument that the present power had not been delegated by the Governor under Article 154(1) but was instead conferred by legislation on the police officers. It held that such legislative conferral does not alter the character of the power. Article 154(2)(b) authorises Parliament or a State legislature, by law, to assign functions to authorities subordinate to the Governor. When the function of dismissal is assigned by law to a subordinate authority, it amounts to a statutory delegation of the Governor’s executive power to dismiss at pleasure. This statutory delegation is no better, in legal effect, than a direct delegation made by the Governor under Article 154(1).

Whether the delegation originates from the Governor himself under Article 154(1) or from legislation under Article 154(2)(b), the officer who exercises the dismissal power is indirectly exercising the Governor’s power of dismissal at pleasure. Therefore, the officer’s action is subject only to the constitutional fetters provided in Article 311 and cannot be subjected to additional procedural constraints beyond those necessary to give effect to Article 311(2).

In this case, the Court observed that when an officer of the four grades dismissed a subordinate police officer under section 7 of the Police Act, the officer was not exercising his own independent power but was only indirectly exercising the Governor’s power to dismiss at pleasure. The Court explained that the order of dismissal issued by such an officer had the same legal effect as an order that the Governor himself might issue. Consequently, the only limitations that could be placed on that order were the two safeguards contained in article 311 of the Constitution, and no additional procedural restrictions could be imposed except those necessary to give effect to article 311(2). The Court therefore held that the dismissal power exercised by the four grades of officers was merely a delegated form of the Governor’s power, and the only constitutional fetters applicable were those in article 311. The Court referred again to the earlier decision in Venkata Rao, where a dismissal by an officer subordinate to the Governor of Madras was held to be an indirect exercise of His Majesty’s pleasure to dismiss. That decision supported the view that non‑compliance with rule XIV of the Classification Rules did not give a public servant a cause of action against an order made in the Governor’s pleasure. The Court reiterated that whether the power to dismiss is delegated directly by the Governor, delegated under a law made pursuant to article 154(2)(b), or delegated under an existing law that is treated as analogous to a law under article 154(2)(b), the effect is the same: the officer is exercising the Governor’s power indirectly and is bound only by the guarantees in article 311. The Court further noted that the fact the dismissal in the present matter was effected under section 7 of the Police Act did not alter this analysis; the officer remained a delegate of the Governor’s power to dismiss at pleasure. The Court added that even when the power to dismiss is delegated by statute, the Governor’s own power to dismiss directly, which stems from article 310, cannot be taken away by that statute. Thus, the present case had to be decided on the same footing as a dismissal made directly by the Governor and was subject only to the two limitations in article 311. The Court then turned to rule 486, which it had already described as requiring that any complaint of a cognizable offence by a police officer be registered at the appropriate police station under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and investigated according to that chapter. After the investigation was completed, the Court explained that the authority concerned—whether the Superintendent of Police or the District Magistrate—was free to decide whether to commence criminal proceedings in a court of law, to hold a departmental inquiry, or to do both, with the proviso that a departmental inquiry should follow only after the criminal trial had concluded.

The Court observed that Rule 486 of the Police Regulations, which allows a complaint of a cognizable offence by a police officer to be registered and investigated under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, may be followed by an authority such as the Superintendent of Police or the District Magistrate who can decide either to refer the matter to a criminal court, to conduct a departmental inquiry, or to do both. In cases where both actions are taken, the departmental inquiry must be postponed until after the criminal trial has concluded. The Court then considered whether Rule 486 is intended to implement the purpose of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, which requires that a public servant be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause before dismissal. The Court concluded that the language of Rule 486 does not indicate that it serves that constitutional purpose; rather, it merely prescribes a police investigation under Chapter XIV. Such an investigation does not compel the investigating officer to examine the accused individual, nor does it require the accused to make a statement. Consequently, the investigative process prescribed by Chapter XIV does not satisfy the requirement of Article 311(2), which is to provide the servant an opportunity to be heard before a dismissal is considered.

The Court therefore held that because Rule 486 is not designed to fulfil the object of Article 311(2), it cannot be regarded as mandatory nor can it impose an additional restriction on the Governor’s power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure beyond the constitutional safeguards. The purpose of Rule 486, in the Court’s view, is to enable the concerned authority to make an initial inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient basis to either prosecute the officer in a criminal court or to initiate departmental proceedings. After such an inquiry, the authority may decide that no case exists for either criminal prosecution or departmental action, which is a normal outcome in any complaint against a government servant. The Court noted that it is a standard and logical procedure for any authority confronting a complaint against a public servant to first conduct a preliminary inquiry to assess the merit of the complaint before taking any definitive action. This preliminary step serves the authority’s need for information and does not relate to the protective guarantee of a hearing under Article 311(2). Accordingly, Rule 486 is intended solely for the purpose of gathering material for the authority’s satisfaction and is not meant to implement the constitutional requirement of providing a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The opportunity required by Article 311(2) will therefore arise only after the authority has completed its preliminary inquiry and decided that further action is warranted.

The Court observed that Rule 486 was intended merely to collect material so that the authority concerned could decide whether any action was warranted, and that the rule could not be treated as mandatory because imposing such a requirement would add a restriction beyond the limitations set out in Article 311 on the Governor’s power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure. Accordingly, the Court held that Rule 486 was only directory and that failure to follow it strictly would not invalidate any later proceedings. The Court then referred to two additional aspects of the matter. First, it noted that if one argues that the Governor must himself exercise the pleasure so that only the two limitations in Article 311 apply, the fact that the Governor dismissed the revisional application filed by the respondent shows that the Governor had indeed exercised his pleasure in this case; there was no reason to hold that the Governor’s exercise of pleasure was limited to the original dismissal order alone. Second, the Court explained that the presence of the word “shall” in Rule 486 does not make the rule mandatory, citing the principle that such language is not decisive of compulsory effect. In view of the surrounding context, the Court concluded that Rule 486 could only be regarded as directory, and that non‑observance of the rule in a strict manner would not render subsequent departmental proceedings invalid. The Court then addressed the question of whether there was substantial compliance with Rule 486. It pointed out that there was no strict compliance because no case was formally registered on the complaint of Tika Ram and no investigation was conducted under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, the Court found no doubt that before the Superintendent of Police issued the charge‑sheet to the respondent in November 1953—thereby commencing the departmental proceedings—he had conducted a preliminary inquiry into Tika Ram’s complaint and had become satisfied that there was a case for departmental action against the respondent. In those circumstances, the Court held that the spirit of Rule 486 had been substantially complied with, and that action was taken only after the Superintendent’s preliminary inquiry confirmed the necessity of departmental measures. Even if the rule had been complied with strictly, the same outcome would have occurred. Consequently, the Court concluded that Rule 486, being directory, had been complied with in spirit, and that the subsequent departmental proceedings could not be declared illegal merely because strict compliance was lacking. The Court therefore found that the High Court was wrong in holding the departmental inquiry illegal and in setting aside the dismissal order on that ground.

The Court observed that the particular proposition, when taken by itself, could not be sustained under the applicable legal standards. After examining the submissions, the Court concluded that the argument presented in isolation lacked sufficient support to justify a favorable ruling. Consequently, the Court decided to permit the appellant’s relief on the basis of the other grounds that had been raised in the proceedings. In making this determination, the Court noted that while one aspect of the appellant’s case could not succeed alone, the overall merits of the appeal warranted a grant of relief. Nevertheless, the final resolution of the matter was shaped by the view expressed by the majority of the judges hearing the case. In accordance with that majority opinion, the ultimate order entered by the Court was to dismiss the appeal. In addition, the Court directed that the costs of the proceedings be awarded, thereby requiring the appellant to bear the expenses incurred by the other party. Thus, the appeal was allowed in part, but the prevailing judgment of the majority required its dismissal, and the costs issue was resolved in favor of the respondent.